Rafia Ashar, Intern
China-Myanmar bilateral relations gained momentum, particularly, when Beijing decided to develop China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) under the ambit of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The project, primarily aimed at building physical infrastructure to link East Asia and Europe, focusing to expand politico-economic influence, and economic growth at large.
CMEC begins from Kunming in Yunnan province of China to Mandalay in Central Myanmar and extends in the east to Yangon and in the west to Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ) that China helped Myanmar to establish. From Kyaukphyu port begin the strategic 1060 km gas and oil pipelines that China built across Myanmar to link Kunming at an investment of $7.5 billion and commissioned during 2013-15. These pipelines are likely to play an instrumental role in facilitating the transportation of oil and gas to China. Chinese markets are also broadly dependent on the strategic outreach and CMEC can accomplish such objectives.
CMEC aims to connect China’s landlocked south to Myanmar’s western Rakhine State which would serve as Beijing’s long-awaited gateway to the Indian Ocean. CMEC’s strategic depth encompasses infrastructure development, construction of new railway link, development of Special Economic Zones (SEZs), and other development projects located along the 1700 km long corridor to strengthen Myanmar’s economy and upsurge China’s strategic investment in the region. In October 2022, a 135 megawatt power project valued at $180 million was inaugurated by the Kyaukphyu SEZ.
However, to achieve such substantial objectives, it is imperative for China to address the challenges that emerge as pronounced hurdles, causing an uncertainty on the progress of CMEC. In 2017, Myanmar’s military conducted a campaign that resulted in the forced displacement of the Rohingya, an ethnic minority group in Rakhine state. As a consequence, Rohingya sought refuge into Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, Indonesia, Cambodia, Thailand and Laos. The crisis had a significant impact on the diplomatic relations between Myanmar and other neighbouring nations, as well as, generated a persistent state of insecurity in the Rakhine State.
Rohingya crisis has distracted the Myanmar’s government attention and resources away from the CMEC projects. Funds that could have been used for infrastructure projects are being diverted towards managing the humanitarian crisis. Additionally, the adverse image associated with Myanmar due to this crisis also dissuades the foreign investors from partaking in CMEC initiatives, as depicted in the figure.
On 27 October 2023, an alliance of ethnic armed groups launched a coordinated offensive against Myanmar military in the north of Myanmar’s Shan State, seizing several towns, several important overland trade routes to China and overrunning dozens of military outposts. Dubbed as “Operation 1027” after the date they began, these attacks involved several thousand experienced, and well-armed fighters attacking multiple locations simultaneously. They pose the biggest battlefield challenge to the military since February 2021 coup. Instability and security concerns create a challenging environment for potential investments besides leading to strained relations especially with some Western nations, that may result into diplomatic isolation and sanctions for Myanmar and ultimately slowdown the CMEC progress.
In the intricate web of global geopolitics, the burgeoning contention between China and USA has cast a shadow over strategic economic initiatives like China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and CMEC, testing the resilience of Chinese investments amidst heightened geopolitical tensions. Just like CMEC, CPEC is another project under BRI that faces almost similar challenges. CPEC traverses from Gilgit-Baltistan region in northern Pakistan to Gwadar in southern Balochistan. Both corridors are situated along the coastal belt near the Indian Ocean and both confront instability in the respective regions along the corridors. This is not merely a coincidence that entry and exit points of both corridors are facing multifaceted challenges rather it’s a reflection of geopolitical complexities. Despite economic advantages that these corridors bring, the persistent threat of terrorism, and politico-economic instability in these countries remain a significant concern for both the corridors.
It is no wonder that timing of rise of Rohingya crisis in Myanmar (2016-17) coincides with the potential operationalization of the CMEC. Owing to Rohingya crisis (exit point of CMEC) and recent unrest in the northern parts of the country (entry point of CMEC) there is a deep political and economic instability in Myanmar which has raised serious concerns about the future of CMEC.
Interestingly, the situation of Pakistan and CPEC is no different. The growing unrest in Balochistan especially its Southern part (exit point of CPEC) and some signs of recent unrest in Gilgit–Baltistan in the Northern Pakistan (entry point of CPEC), alongwith politico-economic instability of Pakistan do not augur well for the future of CPEC. Hence, the biggest beneficiary of this politico-economic instability in both Pakistan and Myanmar are US and its partners, especially India, in the region and not China.
In this backdrop, the future of CPEC and CMEC needs to be seen from the lens of US-China rivalry in the region. As a corollary of the same, the socio-political and economic instability of both Pakistan and Myanmar may also be seen in the same context. Although, it is important to bring about peace and stability in both countries by addressing the problems of the people of Balochistan, Gilgit-Baltistan, Rohingya and Shan province, it must also be understood that these problems are merely the symptoms of a bigger strategic conundrum which can be conveniently understood through the prism of US-China rivalry. Therefore, the solution to the problems lies in addressing the bigger questions first rather than getting bogged down in tactical complexities.