Jens Vesterlund Mathiesen, RDDC
International politics often walks the tightrope between normative ideals and strategic realities. In the present situation, the international engagement with Afghanistan serves as a perfect example of this dichotomy. So far, no state in the world has officially recognized the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA). However, the IEA has slowly and gradually expanded its relations internationally since it gained power in August 2021. To many observers it has been puzzling to observe how Western countries have been hesitant, if not outrightly refusing, to engage with the IEA. This Insight attempts to describe the current trends in international engagement with Afghanistan and discuss the reluctance of Western states.
Like today, the former Islamic Emirate ruling from 1996 to 2001, was also looking for international cooperation and recognition. The first Islamic Emirate led by Mullah Omar immediately received international recognition from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE (these were later rescinded after the September 11, 2001 attacks). However, while it has been argued that the first Emirate largely pursued a policy of non-interference or even isolationism, the second Emirate understands that the world has changed.
Globalisation and the worldwide spread of information through internet, smartphones and social media have connected and integrated the world. The IEA has partly adapted to this development and has seemingly concluded that establishing relations with the international community is unavoidable, as all states need foreign investments and international trade to have a functioning economy. As argued by the Interim Foreign Minister of the IEA, Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi; the IEA understands the “globalised nature of modern relations”. To succeed in such a quest, the IEA needs diverse diplomatic relations, to have a sustainable functioning and legitimate government.
As of August 2023, the IEA has officially participated in diplomatic engagements with more than 72 countries across the world. However, looking closely at these numbers, the Western approach, particularly of European nations is in stark contrast with that of regional states. We can observe this in terms of official diplomatic representation (embassies and consulates), but also in terms of diplomatic meetings and other engagements. As of September 2023, 15 different nations and one multinational organisation (the EU), have functioning embassies in Kabul. Examining this list, no Western state is directly represented in Afghanistan. Instead, the US is utilizing Qatar as a third-party facilitator, and European countries are being indirectly represented by the EU External Action Service (EEAS). On the other hand, the neighbouring states of Afghanistan are all represented in Kabul. Notably, five regional countries; China, Russia, Iran, Pakistan and India, kept their embassies open during the power transition in Afghanistan in August 2021. Furthermore, close neighbours, such as Pakistan, Iran and Turkmenistan also have consulates in other major cities of Afghanistan. The same pattern emerges when looking at the number of diplomatic meetings held by the IEA from August 2021 to August 2023. Aaron Y. Zelin at the Washington Institute has done the impressive work of mapping all diplomatic engagements with the IEA during this period. The data shows how regional countries; Turkey (150), China (141), Iran (99), Qatar (92) and Pakistan (82) top the list with the highest number of meetings. At the same time, the most actively engaged of the Western actors; the EU (36), United Kingdom (23), Norway (22) and the US (18), are significantly down the list. In the first two years of the IEA rule, they held 378 meetings the first year, and 566 meetings the second year. Not only does this signify that the IEA is not isolated from the world as some analysts argue; but it also indicates that the international relations of the IEA are consistently expanding in scope and frequency.
While we observe the IEA's active pursuit of international relations, it becomes necessary to explore the underlying factors contributing to Western reluctance in engaging with the IEA, providing a clearer picture of the geopolitical dynamics at play.
Some would argue that after more than 20 years of military, diplomatic, development and humanitarian engagement in Afghanistan, many Western countries would remain committed to some form of engagement with Afghanistan despite the incumbency of the Taliban whom the Western countries fought for nearly two decades. However, as the data presented suggest, Western states have been reluctant in their engagement with Afghanistan. The reason for the Western reluctance is the defeat of US-led invasion of 2001 in Afghanistan by August 2021. The protracted conflict in Afghanistan, spanning over two decades, has left an indelible mark on the Western mindset. The West, after investing heavily - in terms of both personnel and resources - now witnesses the ‘enemy’ they fought in power in Afghanistan (a scenario reminiscent of pre-2001). For Western populations and decision-makers, this is not merely a strategic setback, but an affront to the very core of Western identity that has historically prided itself on idealism in the form of promoting human rights, fostering democracy and ensuring global stability.
When this is affecting the foreign and security policy of many Western states today, it often comes down to domestic politics and dominates public opinion. Large parts of the Western population cannot accept politicians stating that they are willing to cooperate with the former enemy, and thus further engagement with Afghanistan is very difficult to defend politically. This is both in terms of arranging diplomatic meetings, but also in supporting the IEA with aid or investments.
This is but one analysis of the Western stance, but with this, let us turn our focus to the future, analysing the evolving trends in Western pragmatism and the challenges and opportunities that may arise in the changing landscape of international relations with Afghanistan.
Western states can learn from regional states and adopt more pragmatic approach when engaging with the IEA. Emerging signs of Western pragmatism are already visible and have been gradually increasing since August 2021. The US, for instance, initiated constructive dialogue with the IEA in July 2023, and even appointed two special representatives to facilitate diverse aspects of these engagements. These discussions are not limited to issues such as women’s rights, which have so far been Western key points; they also encompass other areas, such as drug trafficking and anti-corruption measures.
For the West, expanding pragmatic engagements could potentially pave the way for diplomatic recognition. While this remains unlikely in the near future, it is more likely that it could establish a "new normal" in international relations with Afghanistan and IEA. A “normal” situation where diplomatic meetings take place, trade agreements are negotiated and agreed upon, and common security threats are handled through joint efforts, while any official diplomatic recognition remains off the table. This would of course not be a complete solution to Afghanistan’s problems, but it would provide a framework for Western and regional countries to start managing them in a constructive, and potentially sustainable way.
In conclusion, from a Western perspective, the integration of Afghanistan and the IEA into the world community will be slow and gradual and require outspoken pragmatism from all sides. Whether this will lead to official diplomatic recognition remains uncertain. However, this is not just a matter of the conduct of the IEA, but also a matter of domestic politics in Western states, as well as accepting a “new normal” of international relations towards Afghanistan.