Since their independence, Pakistan and India's diplomatic relations have remained strained due to numerous territorial disputes. It has heavily influenced their foreign and security policies towards each other. Kashmir has remained the main point of contention, capturing widespread international attention and scrutiny. Other disputed territories like Siachen Glacier and Sir Creek have also maintained a consistent presence in bilateral dialogue between Pakistan and India over the past three decades. Most recently, these disputes were explicitly included in the Comprehensive Bilateral Dialogue agenda agreed upon between the two nations in 2015. However, the dispute over Junagadh has largely faded from public discourse despite Pakistan's robust legal position under international law.
In a noteworthy development, Pakistan issued a new political map in 2020 that designates Junagadh and Manavadar (a part of the wider Junagadh area) as Pakistani territory, signalling an intent to bring this dispute back into focus. This Insight explores the origin of the Junagadh dispute and examines its implications under international law.
Origin of the Dispute
Junagadh was classified as a 'princely state' during British colonial rule in the 19th century. It was placed under British suzerainty in 1807, with Nawab of Junagadh retaining control over most of the territory's affairs. At the time of independence, Junagadh had the option of either remaining independent or acceding either to the territory of Pakistan or India under the Indian Independence Act of 1947. On September 14, 1947, Nawab Mahabat Khan of Junagadh signed an Instrument of Accession (IoA) declaring that Junagadh would be part of the Dominion of Pakistan. It was formally accepted a day later by Muhammad Ali Jinnah.
After Nawab's request for accession was granted, the two states of Mangrol and Babariawad declared their independence from the suzerainty of Junagadh. In response, Nawab's forces militarily occupied the two states, escalating the tense situation. A group of Junagadhis, led by Samaldas Gandhi, formed a government-in-exile, the Aarzi Hukumat (temporary government). Soon after, the Indian government dispersed troops in and around Junagadh on September 17, 1947, without the consent of the Junagadh administration. Owing to surmounting pressure from Indian forces, the Dewan (Prime Minister) of Junagadh, Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, relinquished control over Junagadh to India on November 7 and invited India to intervene "in order to avoid bloodshed, hardship, loss of life and property and to preserve the dynasty." When informed of India's decision to take control over Junagadh's administration, Liaquat Ali Khan responded, "Your action in taking over state administration and sending Indian troops to state without any authority from Pakistan Government and indeed without our knowledge, is a clear violation of Pakistan territory and breach of International law." The use of Indian military force to pressure the Junagadh administration to relinquish administrative control over the territory thus constituted a violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.
Just over three months later, India conducted a plebiscite on February 20, 1948, leading to the annexation of Junagadh. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru informed Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan of an intention to hold a referendum to finalize Junagadh's status. However, Khan disagreed, arguing that it violates international law. Pakistan's consent to the plebiscite was not sought. Sir Walter Monckton, the legal adviser of Mangrol, had informed Mountbatten months before the plebiscite that Pakistan's recognition of a plebiscite was a necessary precondition. It can be likened to similarly illegal plebiscites in Russian-occupied Crimea, where over 90% 'voted' for annexation to Russia. Conducting a plebiscite without the consent of the state that owns territorial sovereignty provides a basis for its illegality. Pakistan has not accepted the plebiscite results, claiming the territory as unlawfully occupied by India.
Demographics and Geography of Junagadh
Before evaluating the legal validity of IoA, it is important to consider Junagadh's demographics and geography. A Muslim ruler governed Junagadh, which had a predominantly Hindu population and had no physical contiguity with Pakistan but could be accessed by sea and air. Its accession with Pakistan was considered a folly by some due to its situation as a small state completely encircled by India's dominion and its Hindu majority, and Mountbatten, the last viceroy of India, also "recommended the princely states consider their accession either to India or Pakistan by the communal allegiance of the people and geographical contiguity."
However, these considerations were recommendations based on political and administrative pragmatism, not legally binding requirements. Mountbatten, along with India's former Defence Minister Gopalaswami Ayyangar, also held the same view that "Junagadh's geographical contiguity could not have 'any standing in law', that is, it was 'strictly and legally correct' for it to have joined Pakistan." Thus, the propositions concerning geographical contiguity and demographic composition were merely advisory in nature and did not represent mandatory legal prerequisites.
While the circumstances cannot be deemed ideal, it would be incorrect to label Junagadh's accession to Pakistan as wholly impractical. The Veraval Port, located in Junagadh, provided the princely state with the potential to establish a simple maritime connection with Pakistan, as "the ships from Karachi covered the distance of 300 knots in six hours." Ian Copland supports this perspective of Junagadh's accession to Pakistan as not completely devoid of practicality in the following words: "Even tiny Junagadh, which, unlike Hyderabad, probably lacked the financial and economic resources to lead an independent existence, could, with a seacoast facing the Arabian sea, conceivably have survived as a part of Pakistan; after all, nearby Diu and Goa lasted as outposts of a much more distant state - Portugal - until 1961."
Legal Status of the Instrument of Accession
From an international law perspective, Nawab Mahabat Khan had the legal capacity to enter into IoA on behalf of Junagadh. As a princely state, Junagadh operated with a considerable degree of autonomy only limited by the British Crown. The Independence of India Act of 1947 differentiates between 'dominions' and 'Indian States', with the former referring to India and Pakistan. Under section 7(I)(b) of the Act, British suzerainty over princely states ended with the independence of India and Pakistan, making them independent autonomous states. Consequently, it allowed these states to either operate independently or to accede to either Pakistan or India under section 2(3) of the Act, subject to the consent of the dominion being acceded to.
In Junagadh's case, Nawab had acted under the legal capacity and authority granted to him by the Independence of India Act of 1947 and had validly executed the IoA. Thus, as reflected by the Ministry of Law at the time, it was clear that "Junagadh's accession to Pakistan had not been nullified by referendum, and the state had not acceded to India yet. However, New Delhi went ahead because "it was almost likely that the referendum will be in [New Delhi's] favour." Nevertheless, this amounted to a unilateral decision that violated the sovereignty of Pakistan based on the IoA.
Internationally, the Kashmir dispute overshadowed the issue of Junagadh. UN Security Council Resolution 47/1948 called for a plebiscite in Kashmir to decide its accession to India or Pakistan. Ayyanger had advised M.K. Vellodi, India's representative to the UNSC at the time, on "the need' as far as possible to avoid being drawn into legalistic arguments as regards the validity of Junagadh's accession to Pakistan for its impact on Kashmir." It shows that Indian leaders were fully cognizant of their illegal actions and did not want to bring up the issue of Junagadh's accession to the UNSC.
Analysis
Overshadowed by the more high-profile Kashmir conflict, the Junagadh dispute has been relegated to the margins of Pakistan's foreign policy agenda, receiving scant attention and resources. It has led to its political neglect, diminishing its prominence in diplomatic dialogues and international legal debates.
The issuance of a new political map by Pakistan in 2020, which significantly features Junagadh and Manavadar, is a positive development since maps under international law are recognized to be the most formal evidence of a State's intent and nature of claim over territory. Pakistan's state practice should reflect its territorial claim by continuing to confer the status of 'Sovereign in Exile' upon the Nawab of Junagadh.
Besides the addition of Junagadh to the new political map, September 15 should be notified as "Junagadh Day" by the government, and steps should be taken to include Junagadh's history and legal status in the academic curriculum to create awareness regarding the issue.
With the death of Muhammad Jahangir Khanji in July 2023, it is imperative for Pakistan to promptly issue an official declaration acknowledging his successor as the legitimate heir to Junagadh State. The new Nawab should be extended invitations for all significant State ceremonies, particularly those organized outside of Pakistan, to enhance global awareness of Nawab's status as Sovereign in Exile and India's continued territorial violation.
In conclusion, Junagadh's legal status is that it is part of Pakistan. The IoA remains as the authoritative legal source to determine the status of Junagadh's sovereignty. Subsequent Indian actions constitute violations of various principles of international law, including the central UN Charter principle of respecting territorial integrity and political independence of states. Using coercion to unlawfully annex territory without due process reflects the unfortunate reality of realpolitik and weak enforcement mechanisms. Together, these factors obstruct the enforcement of this vital international law principle aimed at safeguarding states against unlawful territorial aggression and facilitating peaceful resolution of conflicts.
In light of evolving geopolitical dynamics, it becomes imperative for Pakistan to adopt a consistent legal approach to documenting its territorial claims, whether they pertain to mainland disputes, glaciers, or maritime boundaries. The political map in 2020 was a positive step, but a more comprehensive legislative instrument could provide a stronger basis for Pakistan's claim under international law. India's unilateral measures in Jammu and Kashmir, enacted through the Reorganization Act of 2019, underscore the critical importance of solidifying territorial claims through both legislative and executive actions. Moreover, China's recent move to rename locations in Arunachal Pradesh in April 2023 is a timely reminder that India's actions have had repercussions, prompting other states to reassert their territorial claims. These developments collectively highlight the need for Pakistan to take the documentation of its territorial claims thoughtfully, particularly as state practices evolve in a complex and interconnected international landscape.