

# Sovereign Development: Outline of a Grand Strategy for Pakistan

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**A**bstract: During 2005-2013, missiles fired from US drones led to verified deaths of some 80,000 Pakistanis (49,000 civilians); and associated domestic subversion and terrorism, to the estimated death of another 50,000. More have been dying since 2013. There is a need to defend the nation, better. To do so requires a grand strategy. While, there are objective limits to the scope for sovereign action, hostile information operations have sapped the will to resist of those, who take decisions and make public opinion, in Pakistan, leading to greater helplessness than is warranted. Identifying four emergent global trends, the article outlines a grand strategy—of sovereign development—which would provide an overall integrated approach to strategic communication, diplomacy, development, and defence. It concludes by identifying some constraints to implementation and suggesting ways to overcome them.

**Keywords:** War on Terror, National Security, Grand Strategy, Strategic Communication, Diplomacy.

## Introduction

National power is based on four basic elements: military, economic, diplomatic, and informational. While, strategies are formulated for each, a grand strategy provides a unified vision for the coordinated deployment of these individual strategies toward the achievement of national objectives.<sup>1</sup> This article is based on the premise that Pakistan's security is compromised not only by heightened external threats, but also by the absence of an internal grand strategy.

The formulation of a grand strategy is a complex, iterative, long, collective affair, to which a short article cannot begin to do justice. This article merely seeks to initiate a discussion. It does so by approaching the task from an economic angle, to outline a grand strategy for sovereign development.<sup>2</sup> The concept of sovereign development re-imagines development as economic growth with national security. In our present predicament, this call for a change in our ways of thinking and action is not academic, our survival as a nation and as a country may depend on it.

## The Ongoing War on Pakistan

Over the last decade or more, foreign military forces have been conducting clandestine, covert, special, information, and psychological operations in Pakistan. It

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is high time that we stop being passive recipients of this aggression and assume a more proactive, more sovereign posture in putting a stop to them and defending the nation. Unfortunately, exactly as intended, effective hostile propaganda has sapped our will to resist, and wisdom is seen to lie in blaming the victims rather than the aggressors, while making a virtue of necessity by seeking to profit from this war.<sup>3</sup> In considering the article's proposals, the reader should not get bogged down in this blame game; instead the focus should be on feasible future conduct, guided by as objective, an assessment of present conditions, as possible, and only to the extent necessary by their proximate antecedents.

In this spirit, let us recall the key events in the short history of the twenty-first century. On the day following the death of some 3,000 Americans on September 11, 2001, the United States (US) threatened Chief Executive of Pakistan, General Musharraf to either assist the US in invading and occupying Afghanistan or prepare "to be bombed back to the Stone Age".<sup>4</sup> On September 19, 2001, Musharraf announced to the nation that to save Pakistan and Islam, he had made the difficult choice to surrender to US demands and join the US War on Terror: "I am, at the moment, only worried about Pakistan. I am the Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan, and my main worry is the safety of Pakistan. The welfare of Pakistan is my main concern. We want to take a decision that is advantageous to the country. ... If, God forbid, any damage is done to the castle of Pakistan, then it would be a damage to Islam. My countrymen, have trust in me, the way you had trusted me, when I was going to Agra. Trust me now. I did not disappoint the nation on that occasion. I did not compromise the dignity of Pakistan. God willing, on this occasion also, I will not disappoint you."<sup>5</sup>

While, opinion will remain divided on whether the road not taken would have been better or worse,<sup>6</sup> and whether the safety of Pakistan can be secured while ignoring the safety of our neighbours, few would deny that the 'dignity of Pakistan' (and much else) was 'compromised' in the years that followed. In particular, during 2005-2013, over 80,000 Pakistanis (including 49,000 civilians) were killed by US drones in Pakistan.<sup>7</sup> By far the largest proportion of targets were 'religious buildings' (mosques and madrasas).<sup>8</sup> In addition, the government estimates that 50,000 people were killed by domestic terrorism—a fallout of external subversion and domestic strife.<sup>9</sup>

This loss of lives is a failure primarily (though not exclusively) of defence strategy. What we have failed to appreciate is that there has been a tectonic change not just in the technology, but in the nature of war itself. Among other differences, the new war seeks to establish control over the mind of the enemy's decision-makers

to convince them to cooperate rather than resist, thus, “defeating the enemy without fighting.”<sup>10</sup>

As a result of highly effective information and psychological operations,<sup>11</sup> the US has been able to establish near-complete control over the civil and military leadership’s strategic thought, and effective dominance over key narratives in the communications media that shape public opinion, in Pakistan. This was revealed most graphically, when on the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of 9/11, the government—seeking to profit from the deaths of disenfranchised citizens—took out a tasteless full-page advertisement in the Wall Street Journal, which asked Americans: “which country can do more for your peace? and informed them that: since 2001 a nation of 180 million has been fighting for the future of the world’s 7 billion, making sacrifices statistics cannot reflect.” And, then went on to cite the statistics; and answered its own question: “only Pakistan.”<sup>12</sup>

Naturally, no American was persuaded. But, we did end up supporting rather than contesting the narrative by which Pakistan has been damned globally that this war had nothing to do with securing Israel, and oil supplies in the Gulf; that those fighting against the invasion and occupation of sovereign nations—including on the knowingly false pretext of possession of weapons of mass destruction, as in Iraq, which threatened Israel not the US—were ‘terrorists’ (until then, the Israeli term for Palestinians); and that these terrorists threatened the lives of not just those, who kill them and take their lands and resources, but of 7 billion people around the globe.

The central point of this article is to contest this assessment of our capabilities and potential courses of action. It argues that our helplessness is in our minds. In reality, even though the scope for sovereign action is not unlimited, we can do a better job of defending the nation—in part by formulating and projecting a narrative that supports and not undermines our national security.

### **Anticipated Challenges: Four Emerging Global Trends**

In assessing future outlook, four emerging global trends are notable: (1) the rise of racism in the West; (2) the new central battlefield of narrative; (3) the emergence of Sino-Russian Eurasia; and (4) of militant extremism in India.

#### *The Re-Birth of Racism, Fascism, and Nationalism in the West*

Although, Western analysts are reluctant to use the word fascism, the rise in racism—called nationalism—reflected in the UK (Brexit), the US (Trump), and Europe is widely recognised; as is the fact that liberalism, the dominant post-War ideology of the West, is fighting for survival. As a result, the West is now divided—internally, and across governments—into beleaguered liberals, with a global

inclusive outlook, and ascendant nationalists, whose views are eerily close to those of Hitler and Mussolini. Also as a result, globalism—the vision of sovereign equal nations with free flows of goods, services, and perhaps even labour—is dead.

Consequently, the United Nations (UN) and international law may continue to be weakened; and it is not clear whether the nationalists will (or will not) be less active militarily in the world. Closer to home: Pakistan may be of lesser military priority, reducing violence, but also aid flows; India will be the US surrogate in South Asia (like Israel in the Middle East); Strong anti-Muslim bias may lead to continued instability in Iraq; while joint US-Russia action may well bring greater stability in Syria and Yemen.

### *The Primary Battlefield - Narrative*

Second, a revolution in military technology and practice has been underway, in which control of the narrative—the new name for an expanded conception of propaganda—is no longer merely in aid of battle, but is the high ground to seize and hold by perpetual operations across all theatres.

Once again, it is instructive to recall the facts that the terrorism narrative has successfully masked. Under the Nixon doctrine, the US provided Saudi Arabia and Iran with billions of dollars of weapons.<sup>13</sup> In return, they ensured the flow of Gulf oil to the US and the West. On January 16, 1979, however, the Shah of Iran was deposed, and Ayatollah Khomeini took over, creating panic in the West. Seven days later, on January 23, 1979, US President Carter announced that the US itself will police the Gulf—enunciating the so-called Carter doctrine (drafted by his National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski): “Let our position be absolutely clear; an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”

It is important not to forget—as public narrative in Pakistan does—that this was (11 months) before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (December 24, 1979). Second, as revealed some two decades later, it was at the secret US initiative that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were co-opted to aid the Afghan mujahedeen, not vice versa, and that this began as early as July 1979, again before the Soviet invasion.<sup>14</sup> In sum, it was US reaction to the Islamic revolution in Iran, raising American fears for the safety of Israel and of access to Gulf oil, and not the Taliban (whom the US was supporting in Afghanistan, well before the Soviet invasion), that brought this war to Afghanistan and Pakistan, the two countries eventually morphing into one (“AfPak”) theatre of American military operations.<sup>15</sup>

The main aim of the US war in Pakistan today is to control the state apparatus, and through control of media and psychological and information operations, the public narrative. Like Israel, the US now seeks ‘total security’ (a state in which all potential enemies are disarmed), and has been engaged in ‘total war’ (war across all—civil and military—fronts, by all available means). “Since the end of the Cold War and especially since 9/11, ... US national-security policy increasingly conforms to patterns of behaviour pioneered by the Jewish state. This ‘Israelification’ of US policy may prove beneficial for Israel. Based on the available evidence, it is not likely to be good for the United States.”<sup>16</sup> In short, the Israel-Palestine model has been globalised, against an enemy—Islam and Muslims—constructed in the image of America’s twentieth-century enemies.<sup>17</sup>

The narrative crafted, by which this war has been sold to a Vietnam-weary US public has evolved over time. For its latest form let us quote retired US Lt. Gen. Michael T. Flynn, the designated US National Security Adviser (NSA) in the new administration: “Islam is a political ideology based on a religion. So, this is a political system that we are facing, and we must defeat this political system. ... We are in a war. It is a war declared by our enemy [!] ... Radical Islamists, and radical Islamism. You know, -isms that we faced over the last 75 years, you know, Nazism, fascism, communism—you know, now it’s radical Islamism. It is a cancerous, barbaric, vicious form of element with inside [sic.] of the Islamic system. Islam is a political ideology based on a religion. So, this is a political system that we are facing and we must defeat this political system, the cancerous form of this political system, which is this radical Islam.”<sup>18</sup>

Unless Pakistan—and the Muslim world—contest this narrative, effectively, we will be isolated diplomatically, economically, and militarily. Within the frame of this narrative, no case based on facts or logic alone will have any chance of prevailing. While not official, a private study published in 2016 by the Strategic Studies Institute and US Army War College forecasts that: “The CIA will have extensive evidence of Pakistani Army support to the Taliban inside Afghanistan, and one of the first challenges for the next US President taking office in January 2017 will be deciding how to deal with this provocation.”<sup>19</sup>

The study also holds that: “Bangladesh, East Timor, Eritrea, and South Sudan all exist today because a unified Pakistan, Indonesia, Ethiopia, and Sudan were never going to be nations within their existing colonial maps. It is heresy to the State Department, which has always fought against it, but sometimes the best way to solve a problem is to draw a new map.” Accordingly, it calls for a bifurcated (North, South) Afghanistan, following US withdrawal: “Pakistan may consider half of Afghanistan sufficient strategic depth, although some scholars believe Pakistan’s fear of the old

dream of a Pashtunistan will drive Pakistani resistance to partition, as it could be a precursor to a Pashtun national independence movement.”<sup>20</sup>

None of this bodes well for Pakistan’s relations with the new US administration. In addition to NSA Flynn, Trump has designated a like-minded Deputy NSA (from Fox News, who will head the huge US government inter-agency propaganda complex), and an educated Secretary of Defence, albeit with similar biases. As of this writing, the number of ex-military cabinet appointments by Trump is raising concerns in the US. Irrespective, an important determinant of future US conduct would be the outcome of the expected contest between the entrenched members of the defence and foreign policy establishment and the new political appointees.

### *The Emergence of Sino-Soviet Eurasia*

The third trend is the emergence of Sino-Russian Eurasia, a joint effort by China and Russia to build a unified North Eurasian economic zone.<sup>21</sup> As part of a grand “China Dream”, China has conceived the “One Belt One Road” project, that seeks to link Asia-Pacific with Europe: overland by rail and road (called “the Belt”), and across water by the Maritime Road (called “the Road”). The Belt is envisaged to have 4 spurs going South (to the ports of Singapore, Kolkata, Gwadar, and Istanbul), as well as two spurs to the Northwest, across Mongolia and Kazakhstan.

The Chinese initiative is coordinated with Russia, which has been engaged in its own efforts to promote greater cooperation between members of the former Soviet Union; in particular, the effort to create a Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).

### *The Rise of Militant Extremism in India*

Finally, the rise of Militant Extremism in India is a noteworthy trend with global implications. Since, these are well known, the article confines itself to a few brief remarks on the rise of the Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP) in India, and the emergence of what is being called a Modi Doctrine:

- Moving from non-alignment to multiple-alignments; to establish India’s position as a global great power.<sup>22</sup>
- Moving, as befits a regional hegemon, from a vision of regional cooperation (the so-called Gujral doctrine), to a more militarised approach; in pursuit of the eventual achievement of ‘Undivided India’ (Akhand Bharat).<sup>23</sup>
- Making the “Five T’s” (trade, tourism, talent, technology, and tradition) the basis of India’s relations with all countries other than Pakistan.

In the last 8 elections to the Lok Sabha, the BJP has returned a stable core with a rising trend, while, the Congress party’s share has declined progressively. What this

holds for the future is anybody's guess—but the global trend toward authoritarian nationalism should favour BJP. This is reflected in a shift in Indian strategic thought from a neoliberal vision of peace based on trade and commerce—some in India call it the Saudāgar strategy—toward a more coercive offensive realism—or the Subēdār strategy. This is reflected in military developments also, and is consistent with India's late 2016 belligerence.

### **Proposed Response: Sovereign Development**

In terms of response, the article proposes a programme of four key initiatives: An urgent rebuttal of the debilitating propaganda against Pakistan, that requires an intellectual response; and the formulation and implementation of an integrated strategy of diplomacy, development, and defence.

#### *A Joint Civil-Military Counter-Propaganda Initiative*

It is critically important that first priority should be given to putting together a joint civil-military counter-propaganda initiative, so that the efficacy of our diplomatic efforts can be restored and strengthened. After due deliberation, the government should establish a permanent high-level, inter-ministry, inter-agency body for strategic communication and public diplomacy. Only a permanent arrangement would be able to meet the 24/7 hostile propaganda that Pakistan and the Muslim world face and can expect to face, and to advance our viewpoint.

Instead of perpetually contesting, unsuccessfully, the terrorism narrative, by saying that we are doing more, and more, we must expand the agenda of global discussions (from a one-point focus on terrorism, to include Israel, oil, racism, and imperialism), and change its frame by developing and promoting a suitable narrative to counter this anti-Pakistan anti-Muslim propaganda. This narrative should: (1) Present an innovative national ideology of tolerance, justice, and charity, with safeguards for all vulnerable groups; (2) Expose the racism (Zionism) and imperialism, in which terrorists, who fight the Soviet Union were called freedom fighters, but when they fought imperial powers, they became insurgents and terrorists; (3) Outline the lies behind the unlawful invasions and occupations of the US-led wars; and (4) Narrate Pakistan's vision of peace and prosperity for all mankind, based on a pluralist philosophy of co-existence. As this requires brains, not brawn or money, civil society institutions of higher education should be enlisted in this task.

#### *Initiatives in Sovereign Diplomacy*

In the face of a severely adverse balance of power, prospects of a weaker UN and less effective global peace-keeping institutions, and rising anti-Muslim belligerence of newly emergent nationalist governments in the Atlantic alliance, diplomacy has to be

our first line of defence. Unfortunately, since the early 1950s, the almost overriding purpose of statecraft in Pakistan has been to maximise military and economic assistance. In this, the military and economic establishments have worked directly with their counterparts, bypassing the foreign ministry. As a result, Pakistan's diplomacy has been transactional and reactive and has seldom been integrated with any higher purpose. This should change.

While a platitude, diplomacy should aim to consolidate friends, build alliances, keep neutrals neutral, and isolate enemies. Within these overall aims, there may be a need to give greater attention to some countries that may not have received the degree of attention they deserve. In these, Iran, Russia, and Germany (the new leader, for at least 4 years, of liberal democracy in the West) merit special attention. Obviously, China should be accorded the pride of place in Pakistan's foreign relations; but there may be a need to keep expectations reasonable, and avoid falling into the deeply ingrained habit of seeking client-patron relationships.

#### *Initiatives in Building a Sovereign Economy*

Like diplomacy, the economy should also be seen and developed as an element of national power. A study of forty countries, over 1870-1950, found a 'quantitatively strong positive' relationship between sovereignty ("the power of the state to advance, in the long run, the interests of indigenous factors in opposition to the interests of foreign factors") and economic growth.<sup>24</sup> Sovereign development should be imagined not just as the pursuit of growth, but as the security-oriented competition for protection of domestic, and capture of foreign markets. This is not to advocate autarky. Instead, it is a call to protect our weaknesses and press our advantages, on a case-by-case basis, in an increasingly nationalist, neo-mercantilist, world.

In terms of openness, we should integrate with the world economy selectively, in line with domestic comparative advantage; and review, accordingly, our external trade and payments regime, especially on capital transactions. Internally, we should attach top priority to employment (where the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, CPEC, project may afford major opportunities); pursue an eclectic sector strategy; and reconsider all ideological commitments—especially in the balance between privatization and public-sector enterprise management. Finally, financial sector reforms seem to have enriched banks and promoted inefficiency, both at public expense, and merit reconsideration.

#### *Initiatives in Sovereign Defence*

While, defence is a specialised and sensitive area, two things seem obvious: first, with the new US-India military alliance, Pakistan must reassess contingent threats to

its national security; and second, that achievement of greater unity between civil and military loci of power, can only strengthen national security.

**Table 1. Balance of Power, ca. 2015**

Country	Potential Power		Actual Power		
	GDP	Population	Armed Forces	No. of Nuclear Warheads	
	(US\$ 2015)	b, (mln, 2015)	('000, 2014)	Deployed	Total
<b>US</b>	17,947	321	1,381	1,930	7,000
<b>UK</b>	2,849	65	155	120	215
<b>France</b>	2,422	67	312	280	300
<b>Germany</b>	3,356	81	179	Non-Nuclear Country	
<b>Russia</b>	1,326	144	1,287	1,790	7,290
<b>Korea, D.P.R.</b>	..	25	1,379	–	(10)
<b>China</b>	10,866	1,371	2,993	–	260
<b>India</b>	2,074	1,311	2,750	–	100-120
<b>Pakistan</b>	270	189	926	–	110-130
<b>Iran</b>	..	79	563	Non-Nuclear Country	
<b>Israel</b>	296	8	185	–	80

**Note:** All nuclear countries and Germany and Iran are included. Because of the high shares of agriculture in GDP for China, India, and Pakistan, their latent power in relation to other countries is overstated. Also, GDP is at current prices; the balance of power would be different at purchasing power parity (PPP) prices.

**Sources:** World Bank, World Development Indicators (<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/>, accessed November 20, 2016, series: NY.GDP.MKTP.CD, SP.POP.TOTL, and MS.MIL.TOTL.P1); Number of nuclear warheads (estimates, as of Jan. 2016): *IPRI Yearbook*, 2016 (Summary, p. 23).

A review of the latest statistics on balance of power among all declared and selected undeclared nuclear powers in the world (Table 1) shows that the Americans have much to be anxious about. In military terms, a Sino-Russian alliance is nearly at par with the US in nuclear weapons, and considerably ahead in conventional forces. In economic terms, China remains behind, but is fast catching up. Significantly, China also holds over US\$1,100 billion of US debt (that the US borrowed to finance the war). This explains the urgent intensity of the US desire for a comprehensive alliance with India. Pakistan should not see US actions in terms of loyalty or betrayal, as some are wont to do, but as a rational action in present circumstances.

Similarly, rational state behaviour on our part demands that we now treat the US (and occupied Afghanistan) at par with India, among potential sources of military threats, in our defence planning. Naturally, Pakistan should always be willing to establish close friendly relations with all countries, who wish to do so—including India and the US—on the basis of mutual respect, and sovereign equality, as and when they are ready.

Secondly, as the US seeks full-spectrum dominance, we must also put together a full-spectrum defence. Unfortunately, this is impeded by the state of civil-military relations in Pakistan, which undermine national security.<sup>25</sup> The report of the Abbottabad Commission (leaked to Al-Jazeera) provides a disturbing picture of our defence capabilities, especially against unconventional warfare. To remedy the situation, the Ministry of Defence might consider taking the lead in:

- Finding a *modus vivendi*, by isolating contentious areas from those that are mutually agreed to be of vital national security, on which cooperation—including in formulating integrated civil-military strategies—could be organised and pursued, under the aegis of the Ministry.
- Working with the Joint Staff Headquarters (JSHQ) to revise, reflecting the new realities, the Defence Plans (2004), the Joint Strategic Directive (2007), Standard Operating Procedures, the Blue Book, etc.
- Reviewing and rationalising as necessary the remit of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC), who is the principal advisor to the government on all defence matters, but does not have oversight of the three services, and the service chiefs report directly to government.
- Gearing up counter-intelligence as part of a major reorganisation of intelligence agencies, to meet the subversion operations being carried out in Pakistan.

## **Conclusion**

The problem, of course, is of leadership: A grand strategy requires a grand strategist. The bureaucracy is not, and should not be, the source of leadership. What is needed is a body that enjoys the full confidence of both the civil and the military establishment. One (and not the only) solution can be to upgrade the Planning Commission, and charge it with responsibility for the national grand strategy, with a small secretariat; this would mean divesting it of its responsibilities for project portfolio management and macroeconomic planning (and hence, of the Planning Division, which should be allocated to the Ministry Finance). Finally, reform of budget and financial management may also be warranted.

The scope for sovereign action by government is limited. Even so, there is space for some recovery of lost sovereignty. The people expect their leaders to claim this space and lead them to a life of freedom and dignity, not of new servitude.

## Endnotes

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<sup>1</sup> While other formulations are possible, this follows US military thought: “The United States relies for its security on the complementary application of the basic instruments of national power: diplomatic, economic, informational, and military. Guided by national security policy and strategy, the Armed Forces of the United States shape and employ the military instrument to advance and defend national security interests and objectives.” And: “The fundamental of unity of effort demands that all undertakings be directed toward achievement of common aims. Unity of effort is first achieved at the national level when the President develops national security strategy (otherwise known as ‘national’ or ‘grand strategy’).” U.S. Department of Defense. 2000. *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*. Joint Publication 1 (JP-1, 14 November), Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Press.

<sup>2</sup> For a comprehensive study, from a diplomatic angle, see Husain, Javid. 2016. *Pakistan and a World in Disorder: A Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

<sup>3</sup> Quoting testimony by the Director-General, Inter-Services Intelligence, the Abbottabad Commission reports: “the reality for Pakistan was not defined by the might of the US. It was defined by the fact that ‘we are a very weak state and also a very scared state. We will take anything and not respond. It all boils down to corrupt and low-grade governance.’ ... There was ‘apathy at every level; in every sector of national life.’ Pakistani society was ‘deeply penetrated.’ The media was ‘practically bought up’ and nearly ‘every one of our elite was purchasable.’” Al Jazeera Investigative Unit. 2013. “Document: Pakistan’s Bin Laden Dossier.” *Al Jazeera*. 8 July. Accessed December 10, 2016. <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/binladenfiles/2013/07/201378143927822246.html>.

<sup>4</sup> Musharraf, Pervez. 2006. *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir*. London: Simon & Schuster.

<sup>5</sup> The original Urdu speech does not seem to be available on the Internet. The English translation cited (slightly edited to improve syntax) is from C-SPAN (2001).

<sup>6</sup> For some current appraisals, see Brig. (Retd.) T. Yamin and H. Khan’s report “Strategic Decision Making: Pakistan’s Support to the US War on Terror” that was published in January 2016, in Islamabad. (January 2016), (2013). Also check Khan Hidayat report “Strategic Decision Making: Pakistan’s Support to the US War on Terror” that was published in *IPRI Journal*; 2013 page no 37-56.

<sup>7</sup> According to Professor Neta Crawford, Boston University; adding journalists (45), militants (26,862), and security forces (5,498), “It can be suggested that at least 80,000 Pakistanis (insurgents, security forces, civilians) have been killed, with twice as many civilians killed than insurgent fighters.” IPPNW. 2015. *Casualty Figures after 10 Years of the “War on Terror” (Iraq Afghanistan Pakistan)*. Translated by Ali Fathollah-Nejad. Washington DC, Berlin, Ottawa: International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War.

<sup>8</sup> The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ), an independent not-for-profit organisation in the UK <https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/drones-graphs/>, accessed on November 18, 2016. As of that date, the most recent strike reported was on May 21, 2016. Since May 2011, when Pakistan-U.S. relations soured (in the wake of the Abbottabad incursion), U.S. drones were expelled from Pakistan to Afghanistan. For a recent review, see Woods, Chris. 2015. *Sudden Justice: America’s Secret Drone Wars*. London: Hurst Publishers.

<sup>9</sup> Woods, Chris. 2015. *Sudden Justice: America's Secret Drone Wars*. London: Hurst Publishers.

<sup>10</sup> Rejecting Clausewitz, a U.S. Army Field Manual quotes Sun Tzu as being “more relevant today; although battles should be won, ‘winning 100 victories in 100 battles is not the acme of skill; defeating the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.’ There is more than one way to compel an enemy.” U.S. Department of Defense. 2008. *Army Special Operations Forces: Unconventional Warfare*. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.130, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

<sup>11</sup> In years to come, the successful Islamabad-is-about-to-fall-to-the-Taliban operation (late April/May 2009), leading to Operation Rāh-e-Rāst, may well go down in military history as an all-time classic among PSYOPS ever executed. Although referenced by Khan, Khurshid. 2014. “Understanding information warfare and its relevance to Pakistan.” *Strategic Studies* 138-159, citing Shah, Farzana. 2011. “Propaganda & Warfare in Cyber World.” *PakTribune: Pakistan News Service*. 2 August. Accessed December 10, 2016. <http://paktribune.com/articles/Propaganda-%5E-Warfare-in-Cyber-World-242277.html>, a full analysis of the operation is yet to be conducted.

<sup>12</sup> The advertisement is reproduced in: IPPNW. 2015. *Casualty Figures after 10 Years of the “War on Terror” (Iraq Afghanistan Pakistan)*. Translated by Ali Fathollah-Nejad. Washington DC, Berlin, Ottawa: International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War.

<sup>13</sup> Under the U.S. commitment to maintain Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME), Israel was supplied with the next generation of whatever weapon systems were provided to Saudi Arabia and Iran.

<sup>14</sup> Gates, Robert Michael. 1996. *From the Shadow: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War*. New York: Simon & Schuster; corroborated by Zbigniew Brzezinski, in an interview, *Le Nouvel Observateur* (France). 1998. “Brzezinski Oui, la CIA est entrée en Afghanistan avant les Russes ... ».” *VoltaireNet*. 15 January. Accessed December 10, 2016. <http://www.voltairenet.org/article165889.html>. “According to the official version of history, CIA aid to the Mujahideen [sic.] began during 1980, that is to say, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan, 24 Dec 1979. But the reality, secretly guarded until now, is completely otherwise: Indeed, it was July 3, 1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul.” English translation by St. Clair, Jeffrey, and Alexander Cockburn. 1998. “How Jimmy Carter and I Started the Mujahideen.” *Counterpunch*. 15 January. Accessed December 10, 2016. <http://www.counterpunch.org/1998/01/15/how-jimmy-carter-and-i-started-the-mujahideen/>.

<sup>15</sup> Bacevich, Andrew J. 2016. *America's War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History*. New York: Random House. *Le Nouvel Observateur* (France). 1998. “Brzezinski: « Oui, la CIA est entrée en Afghanistan avant les Russes ... ».” *VoltaireNet*. 15 January. Accessed December 10, 2016. <http://www.voltairenet.org/article165889.html>.

<sup>16</sup> Bacevich, Andrew J. 2016. *America's War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History*. New York: Random House.

<sup>17</sup> Qureshi, Emran, and Michael A. Sells. 2003. “Introduction: Constructing the Muslim Enemy.” In *The New Crusades: Constructing the Muslim Enemy*, edited by Emran Qureshi and Michael A. Sells, 1-50. New York: Columbia University Press.

<sup>18</sup> Interview to *Business Insider*, July 11, 2016. [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O9Ab\\_46Nx6o](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O9Ab_46Nx6o), accessed December 10, 2016.

<sup>19</sup> Mason, M. Chris. 2015. *The Strategic Lessons Unlearned from Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan: Why the Afghan National Security Forces Will Not Hold, and the Implications for the U.S. Army in Afghanistan*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press. In his book, NSA-designate Flynn, Michel T., and Michael Ledeen. 2016. *The Field of Fight: How we can win the global war against radical Islam and its allies*. New York: St. Martin's Press. had also warned that: "Countries like Pakistan need to be told that we will not tolerate the existence of training camps and safe havens for Taliban, Haqqani, and al Qaeda forces on their territory, nor will we permit their banks and other financial institutions to move illicit funds for the terror network. They are going to have to choose, and if they continue to help the jihadis, we are going to treat them harshly, cutting them off from American assistance, and operating against enemy safe havens."

<sup>20</sup> Mason, M. Chris. 2015. *The Strategic Lessons Unlearned from Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan: Why the Afghan National Security Forces Will Not Hold, and the Implications for the U.S. Army in Afghanistan*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press. Mason follows in the footsteps of Peters, Ralph. June 2006. "Blood borders: How a better Middle East would look." *Armed Forces Journal*. Accessed December 10, 2016. <http://armedforcesjournal.com/blood-borders/> (Map: <http://armedforcesjournal.com/peters-blood-borders-map/>), who had redrawn the map of the Middle East in which: "Pakistan's Northwest Frontier tribes would be reunited with their Afghan brethren... Pakistan, another unnatural state, would also lose its Baluch territory to Free Baluchistan. The remaining 'natural' Pakistan would lie entirely east of the Indus, except for a westward spur near Karachi."

<sup>21</sup> The main document is People's Republic of China. 2015. "Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road." *National Development and Reform Commission*. 28 March. Accessed December 10, 2016. [http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330\\_669367.html](http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html); for Russian President Putin's vision of EAEU (on the pattern of the EU), see his article in *Izvestia*; Putin, Vladimir. 2011. "Новый интеграционный проект для Евразии — будущее, которое рождается сегодня (A new integration project for Eurasia - the future is born today)." *Izvestia*. 3 October. <http://izvestia.ru/news/502761> (tr. Google).

<sup>22</sup> Narayanan, M. K. 2016. "Non-alignment to multi-alignment." *The Hindu*. 5 January. <http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/indian-diplomacy-nonalignment-to-multialignment/article8065319.ece>.

<sup>23</sup> Gujral, Inder Kumar. 2003. *Continuity and Change in India's Foreign Policy*. New Delhi: Macmillan.; *The Hindu*. 2015. "India, Pakistan, Bangladesh will reunite to form Akhand Bharat: Ram Madhav." *The Hindu*. 26 December. <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/akhand-bharat-india-pakistan-bangladesh-will-reunite-one-day-says-ram-madhav/article8031920.ece>; and Yadav, Shyamlal. 2016. "RSS and the idea of Akhand Bharat." *The Indian Express*. 4 January. <http://indianexpress.com/article/explained/rss-akhand-bharat/>.

<sup>24</sup> Alam, M. Shahid. 1999. "Does sovereignty matter for economic growth? An analysis of growth rates between 1870 and 1950." In *Economic Growth and Change: National and Regional Patterns of Convergence and Divergence*, edited by John Adams and Francesco Pigliaru. Aldershot, UK: Elgar. Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=952428>., italics in original.

<sup>25</sup> For a review, see Haq, Noor ul. 2012. "Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan." *IPRI Journal* XII (2): 110-116; and Aziz, Mazhar. 2008. *Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State*. New York: Routledge.