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THE ANATOMY OF CRIME TERROR NEXUS IN PAKISTAN

Muhammad Fiaz Hussain

Abstract

A phenomenon of “Criminal-Terrorism” is replacing “Religious Terrorism” in Pakistan. A plethora of criminal gangs and mafias have been found to be collaborating with the banned militant bandits in the country. It seems that they are cohabiting in a symbiotic relationship. The terrorists are financed by the crime and in return; due to instability created by the terrorists, the crime thrives very rapidly. Terrorism has become a profit making industry whose raw material comes from Crime: organized as well as disorganized. The industry is booming because the raw material is bulging. Abduction for ransom, bank robberies, illicit car lifting, small arms smuggling and proliferation, drug trafficking, money laundering, and Hawala System are rampant and terrorism thriving on this fertile soil. The counter insurgency strategies have not brought forth expected results so far, because the focus has been misplaced: much on terrorism and less on crime. It is asserted, therefore, that the war on terror cannot be won without the war on crime and a two pronged anti Crime-Terror strategy is needed. It is argued that if the arteries of crime are not cut, the blood will flow to the terrorist muscles. And a change of approach from religion to crime is needed to fight Terrorism.

Introduction

A remarkable convergence of interest between the Criminal and Terrorist groups has taken place in the post 9/11 era. Before this incident, the states used to covertly fund the Terrorist groups. But after the Global War on Terror, that economic assistance stopped because of the US pressure on those states. Resultantly, the Terrorist groups have fallen on the alternate sources of income. Crime has the potential to feed them. So, an unholy nexus has developed between the Crime and Terror whose dynamics have yet to be studied adequately.

In Pakistan, Terrorism has become a profit making industry whose raw material comes from Crime: organized as well as disorganized. The industry is booming because the raw material is bulging. Abduction for ransom, bank robberies, illicit car lifting, small arms smuggling and proliferation, drug trafficking, money laundering and Hawala System are rampant and terrorism thriving on this fertile soil.

The Crime-Terror Nexus has two operational methods: one, structural; two, functional. Structurally, the Terrorists physically interact with the Criminal gangs and mafias. They trade of their organizational expertise and small weapons with the black money of Criminals. Functionally, the Terrorists behave like chameleons: they act as criminals daytime, and as terrorist at night. This phenomenon of “Criminal-Terrorism” has adopted new dynamics in Pakistan, different from “Religious-Terrorism”.

Therefore, it is asserted that the war on terror cannot be won without the war on crime. So a sustainable, two pronged anti Crime-Terror strategy is needed. It is argued that if the arteries of crime are not cut, the blood will flow to the terrorist muscles. A change of approach from religion to crime is needed to fight Terrorism. Moreover, a lethal transnational nexus between Crime and Terror warrants an equally forceful transnational cooperation among the states.

This study conceptualizes the Crime-Terror Nexus in Rosenau's "Post international Paradigm", Makerenko's "Continuum Theory" and Dishman's concept of "Leaderless Nexus". It concludes that the symbiotic relationship of Crime and Terror is impeding the state to protect the life and property of its citizens. In the end, a two pronged strategy is recommended to fight Crime and Terrorism Simultaneously.

Conceptual Framework

In the post Cold War era, the criminal gangs and the terrorist groups have born as evil twins. They have formed a multifaceted relation best described as the "Nexus". This Crime-Terror nexus has been rarely studied. But, as both the terrorist and the organized groups are posing a serious challenge to the security and sovereignty of the state, numerous discussions are going on that hyphenate Crime with Terror in their premises. Anyhow, the Scholars are engaged in the rudimentary and preliminary discussion of the subject yet, that means the scope and the nature of this emerging Nexus is yet to be defined. The structural linkages and the functional

dynamics of this Nexus could be best framed in Rosenau's Post internationalism paradigm, in the murky rather turbulent global affairs.¹

It is the age of post internationalism. The relative relevance of Nation-States is diminishing rapidly. Non State actors, both groups and individuals, have emerged as a significant variable in every security equation. Their peculiar character is that they behave like independent variable. Therefore, non-state actors like Criminal gangs and Terrorist groups need to be studied in a post national approach, rather than classic state centric approach of the realists. It will provide an analytical framework commensurate with the new dynamics of post cold war era.

Post international paradigm defines the relationship with its premise, "individuals fulfilling multiple goals". Individual level of analysis has been given more importance than the state level analysis of the realist paradigm. In contemporary world, individuals have different roles and they construct different organizations simultaneously. The nature of the organization is defined by the individual roles of the constituent units and not the vice versa. If the analysis of Crime and Terror groups is taken as organizations, not just the agents of change, their dynamics can best be understood. Instead of discussing organizational capabilities and power basis, the relational concept vis-à-vis Crime and Terror groups provides better insight into the relations. In this regard the relational concept is "Control". Control of an actor is defined

as, “to modify, preserve, or otherwise affect the orientations or actions of another”.²

Two kinds of continua are formed when post international paradigm defines control. One, deals with the methods of control; second deals with the reaction to that control. Methods of control originate from the controllers and make a continuum from least violent to the most violent. Whereas, the reaction comes from the controlled; ranging from acceptance to rejection of the control. The focus on the repetition of these relational concepts is very significant to the study of Crime-Terror Nexus. Picarelli is of the view that “authority” comes from the controllers, whereas “legitimacy” comes from the controlled.³ Legitimacy is vital to this relational fabric because it gives the clear indications that it is the controlled that make this relationship very dynamic by accepting or rejecting the authority. The projected goals and behavior of the Criminal and Terrorist groups can better be gauged by these relational factors of control, authority and legitimacy. Figuratively, the idea follows as:




Figure 1

In this post-international paradigm, the non-state actors like criminal and terrorist groups reject the authority of the state and have many reasons to be in league with each other against the state. Before we move toward the main theme of rationale, methods and scope of any non-state nexus pitted against the state, we discuss the nature of these actors in brief first.

Picarelli categorizes the Criminal and Terrorist groups into Sovereign bound and sovereign free groups, by using the above mentioned post internationalist relational concepts.⁴ The Sovereign bound Criminal and Terrorist groups share commonality in controlling a region of the state, while supplanting the sovereignty of the state with the legitimacy of that locality. The second remarkable commonality is that both possess an organizational hierarchy in their structures. Perhaps they want to establish a parallel government with that of the state. Their third character is that their members eschew an ideology which is embedded locally. So, they tend to look inward habitually rather than transcending state borders. Shelley has pointed out their habitual behavior in changing circumstances because of their attachment to the local area and the illicit profits attached to it.⁵

The factor of ideology may bring schism to the Crime-Terror Nexus too. The argument, “Methods not Motives” brings clarity that the traditional Criminal and Terrorist groups may have similar methods but differ in their motives. As, the traditional Crime groups are strongly tied with host

states whose very sovereignty, the Terrorist groups challenge. So, the Sovereign bound Crime group and the Sovereign bound Terrorist group are difficult to live cheek by jowl. Their relation is precarious, and the Nexus will be unviable. On the contrary, the Sovereign free Criminal group and the Sovereign bound Terrorist group pose a challenge to the “Methods not Motives” argument. As according to Shelley, the undermining of sovereignty by the Terrorist group will not blur the relationship with the Sovereign free Criminal group.⁶

The religious Terrorist groups, not necessarily sectarian; do not regard the sovereignty of the state sacred. They belong to the Sovereign free category. As in the words of Hoffman, “For the religious terrorist, violence is first and foremost a sacramental act or divine duty executed in direct response to some theological demand or imperative. Terrorism thus assumes a transcendental dimension, and its perpetrators are consequently unconstrained by the political, moral or practical constraints that may affect other terrorists.”⁷ Moreover, the Sovereign free Criminal Groups and the Terrorist groups have benefited a lot from the revolution in the technology. They can better adapt to the changes while working through their networks. They have decentralized their decision making power to the networks and have become ruthlessly resilient. Stern has discussed this adaptability in the case of Al Qaeda as, “Over its life span, al Qaeda has constantly evolved and shown a surprising willingness to adapt its mission. This capacity for change has consistently made the group more

appealing to recruits, attracted surprising new allies, and—most worrisome from a Western perspective—made it harder to detect and destroy.”⁸ The other similarity between the two is their global world view. Both of them transcend the national boundaries. The sovereign bound and sovereign free groups are typified in the tabulation form as:

Type	Sovereign Bound	Sovereign Free
Sovereignty	Bound	Free
Adaptability	Habitual	Adaptive
Organization	Hierarchy	Network
World View	Local	Global
Examples	TTP, Lashkar e Jhangvi, Sipah e Sahaba, Sipah e Muhammad	Al Qaeda, TNSM, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jundullah

Table 1

It is important to note that the sovereign free terrorist groups have relative ease to collaborate with criminal groups. It is because due to the global crack down on the hierarchy of these groups, new dynamics in the organization of these illicit groups have emerged. It has led to the diminishing of hierarchy, and flattening of the organization into self sustaining networks. The emergence of networks in both the terrorist and the criminal groups has led to greater independence of lower but relatively large stratum of the organization. Now, they do not have to answer a chain of

command. Earlier, such cooperation was difficult to achieve as the leaders forbade because that could go against the mandate of the group. The result is that a phenomenon of “leaderless nexus” has emerged.⁹




Figure 2

The figure shows that the decentralization has blurred the crime terror boundaries. The self sustaining cells have emerged, and act like nodes connected with each other. These nodes collaborate in methods, and exchange expertise. This convergence leads to hybrid organization best termed as “Leaderless Nexus”.

Makerenko sees the Crime-Terror Nexus in the form of a continuum.¹⁰ The crime and terror groups tend to converge towards each other. But, it is important to note that it is the marriage of convenience, not of affection. Before September

11, 2001, the states covertly used to fund different terrorist groups throughout the Globe. But due to the War on Terror, the economic aid flowing through state exchequers has decreased significantly. So, the terrorist groups started to engage in criminal activities for the generation of their revenues. A kind of complicated relationship has developed between the terrorist and criminal groups. The relation is both structural and functional. The criminals and the terrorist collaborate, provide technical assistance, expertise, weapons, and money to each other; and sometimes are directly involved in each other's activities.




Figure 3

The figure above can better figurate their relation with each other. If we start from the left, the first point is where a criminal group makes an alliance with the terrorist group. The relationship is interest based. There are no ideological roots common to both the groups. This alliance is very precarious

because of few factors. The crime group wants status quo, while the terrorist group challenges it. The terrorist groups strive to come under limelight, but the criminal groups would not want to bring attention of the law enforcement agencies. The motives of a terrorist group are mainly political, but that of a crime group are solely economic. Therefore, the leader of a criminal gang will be cautious to put it in the same bed with the terrorist group.

So, the alliance is very difficult to achieve. But there are some opportunities for both of them to make some functional relationship whose goals have been discussed earlier. If the crime group adopts the techniques of the terrorist group, a second point on the continuum is achieved. At this point, the crime group uses terror for the operational purpose. The third point is reached, when the collaboration is made for the commitment of political crime. Conversely, from the right side of the continuum is the converse relationship of point one from the left. The second point shows the involvement of the terrorist group in criminal activity. The third point of relationship shows the terrorist group carrying out commercial terrorism. So, in this relationship, varying degrees of cooperation and collaboration is worked out till both the groups reach the Black Hole Syndrome. It is the grey area where the boundaries are blurred. The trans-boundary exchange of personnel is frequent. And the scope of activities at this point of relationship is such that it is difficult to

decipher that who is who and which is which. A strong nexus, rather a virtual merger of the groups takes place.

This theoretical debate concludes on the point that post internationalism defines the relational factors of Crime-Terror Nexus. The methods not motives argument which denies any link between the two does not hold water due to the dynamics of ever changing nature of the relationship. Second, due to the modern compulsions these groups have been decentralized into sustainable networks, which provide better opportunities for the crime and terror groups to converge structurally and collaborate functionally: hence a “leaderless nexus”. Third, the nexus is too fluid to be identified in discrete form due to the organizational compulsions, and monetary problems of these groups. Hence, we have reached a conclusion that there is an absolute chance of an evil Nexus between the terrorist and the criminal groups.

Terrorist Groups in Pakistan

Terrorism in Pakistan is pandemic. The losses to life and property are dangerously high.¹¹ Many terrorist groups are entrenched in the society who are at war with both the state and the society. Some of these groups are sovereign bound and some are sovereign free. A brief account of banned terrorist group is given below.

- **Al-Qaeda:** Formed in 1988, Al-Qaeda is a global terrorist organization banned by the United Nations Security Council.¹² Its upper hierarchy was apprehended to be in Pakistan after US Attack on

Afghanistan in 2001. It worked in the form of decentralized networks. Many of its leaders have been caught or dead, the last one to be Osama bin Laden, its founding father. Formed against the US imperialism, its goal has been global jihad of political Islam against the west. But, Al-Qaeda is thought to be extinct in Pakistan.¹³

- **Haqqani Network:** Haqqani Network, first nurtured by the US against the Soviets, has declared war against the US since 1994.¹⁴ Its prominent leaders are Jalaluddin Haqqani and Sirajuddin Haqqani. The network fights against the NATO and ISSAF in Afghanistan and alleged to be involved many bomb attacks in Afghanistan. So, it is also a sovereign free terrorist group. The Network was banned by the US executive order in November 2001.¹⁵ It has been alleged by US Ambassador Ryon Cocker to be involved in the bomb attacks on US Embassy in Afghanistan.¹⁶
- **Jaish-e-Muhammad:** Literally meaning the Army of Muhammad, it was founded by Maulana Masood Azhar in 2000. Its basic aim was to expel Indian forces from Jammu and Kashmir. It is largely a sovereign bound group, but it shares some contacts with Al Qaeda and Sipah Sahaba. In 2002, Pakistan banned the group. And it split into two wings with new names, the Jamaatul Furqan and the Khudame Islam. Maulana Azhar founded Al Rahmat Trust which gave financial

assistance to the group. The Attacks on Indian Parliament in 2001, and the hijacking of Indian airline 155 in 1999 and different attacks on the Christian minorities in Pakistan are alleged to be wrought out by this banned outfit.

- **Jundullah:** Jundullah is Operating against the Iranian Regime since 2003. It is led by Muhammad Dahir Baluch. It has conducted many attacks on Iran for the equal rights of Salafis in Iran. The most violent attacks were the attack on Iranian President in 2005, Zahedan Bombing in 2007, and Chah Bahar in 2010. It is officially labeled as terrorist by the US as well.¹⁷
- **Lashkar-e-Jhangvi:** It was formed by Riaz Basra, Akram Lahori, and Malik Ishaq in 1996, when they broke away from their parent Sipah Sahaba.¹⁸ Pakistan and the US have banned the group.¹⁹ It is mainly a sectarian group involved in the massacres of Shia Muslims in Pakistan.
- **Lashkar-e-Taiba:** Formed in 1990, it is the largest and well organized terrorist group of South Asia. Its leader is Hafiz Muhammad Saeed. And its motives are expelling the Indian forces from Kashmir and Pan Islamism in South Asia.²⁰ The attacks on Indian Parliament in 2001 and the Mumbai Attacks 2008 are the major terrorist attacks of the group. Its political wing Jamaat ud dawa has also been banned by the UN after the Mumbai attacks.

- **Sipah-e-Muhammad:** It is a Shia militant group which was formed in early 1990's in a reaction to the militant activity of Sipah Sahaba.²¹ It was banned in 2001 by Pakistan. Its founder was Mureed Abbas Yazdani.
- **Sipah-e-Sahabah:** It was formed in 1980's to deter Shia influence in Pakistan in wake of Iranian Revolution in 1979. Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, Azam Tariq, Ziaurehman Farooqi and Eesarulhaq Qasmi founded Anjuman Sipah Sahaba in 1985.²² It was banned by Musharraf in 2002. It is widely accused of sectarian violence in Pakistan against Shia Muslims.
- **Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhamadi:** It is a militant rebel organization formed in 1992 by Sufi Muhammad for the purpose of establishing Sharia law in Pakistan. The group was banned by Pakistan in 2002.²³ It took control of Swat in 2007 and attacked Buddhist sculptures. Pakistan Army conducted an operation to clean Swat from it successfully in 2009.
- **Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan:** Fighting mainly against Pakistani forces in FATA area, Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan was formed by Baitullah Mehsud in 2007 with the coalition of seven militant groups. Although it is separate from the Taliban groups in Afghanistan, it also targets the US in wake of drone strikes in Fata. Moreover, it has links with Al Qaeda and other militant groups.²⁴ Among many, Terrorist

Activities the group is accused of assassinating Benazir Bhutto on December 27, 2007.²⁵

Organized Crime in Pakistan

As the state is busy in fighting terrorism, Crime in Pakistan has not been given commensurate attention with respect to the gravity of the issue. Crime is sapping the economy. It has become an illicit source of revenue. There is a huge potential of Crime to feed terrorism in Pakistan as well. The actual and potential sources of crime which could run the industry of terrorism are discussed below:

- **Abduction for Ransom:** Kidnapping is rampant in Pakistan. It is a quick source which pays fast and in abundance. Every region, every class, and every age group is largely affected by this crime. Professional and business classes are equally affected. Mostly, the ransom is paid. And rarely, law enforcement agencies are allowed to intervene. It has become a profitable occupation. In year 2010, 16,977 cases of abduction were registered.²⁶
- **Bank Robberies:** Bank Robberies have increased in recent years. The commercial hubs of Pakistan like Karachi are attacked through bank robberies. The money has the potential to feed the terrorist groups working throughout the country. The biggest bank robbery in Pakistan happened in December, 2009 in Allied Bank Karachi. It was worth Rs. 500 million.²⁷

- **Hawala System:** Unofficial transfer of money is the other potential source of income for the terrorists. After the states applied a strong check on the flows of money through banks, the terrorists are financed through this informal system of money transfer. Almost Rs. 500 billion are transacted in Pakistan through Hawala System.²⁸
- **Illicit Drug Trafficking:** Drug trafficking is the main source of terrorists. It is the traditional link between the terrorists and the criminals. Ninety percent of world opium is supplied by Afghanistan, whose 30% is trafficked through Pakistan.²⁹ It has led to the phenomenon of Narco-Terrorism. The UNODC reports Pakistan's Gawadar port being used in narcotics trafficking from Afghanistan.³⁰
- **Illicit Firearms Trafficking:** Small weapons are smuggled because they are a rich source of income and easily transferred from one place to the other. Secondly, they are also used in the street crimes as well as by the terrorist groups. According to a report, 40% of arms made in Darra Adam Khel are used by the terrorists.³¹
- **Illicit Trafficking in Stolen Motor Vehicles:** In the urban areas, the law and order situation is deteriorating. Motor vehicles are the hot cakes for the criminal groups who are left scot free. The vehicles stolen in the urban areas are trafficked to the FATA

illicitly. A rampant illicit trade of these vehicles takes place, under the hand of terrorist groups. About 1100 vehicles whose price is worth Rs. 200 billion are stolen every year in Pakistan.³²

- **Money Laundering:** It is the crime of hiding the source of illegal money. According to a report, Pakistan is not involved in money laundering. But it is feared that drug smugglers use money laundering in their trade extensively.³³ The Government of Pakistan has passed a strict anti money laundering law in 2010. Many money laundering cases have been caught as well, especially Khanani and Kalia case in 2008.
- **Transnational Economic Crimes:** Miscellaneous economic crimes like fraud, white color crime, counterfeit of documents can also source the terrorist group.

Crime-Terror Nexus in Pakistan

Crime thrives and Terror prevails in a society where state apparatus is weak. This is the hard fact of post international era that equally applies to Pakistan. A plethora of criminal gangs and numerous militant bandits is operating in Pakistan. There is a likelihood of collaboration in their activities. Due to various reasons, their interests converge. And it seems that they are cohabiting in a symbiotic relationship. Crime feeds terrorism. Conversely, terrorism nourishes crime. In Pakistan, this situation has developed due to two main reasons. First, the terrorists generate money from crime necessary for their

activity. Earlier, Saudi Arabia, the US, UAE, and Iran funded them. But when the Frankenstein monsters turned upon their masters, the economic assistance stopped. Heavy sanctions followed. Therefore, the terrorists turned to a wide range of illicit and illegal sources of income. Second, in some instances the crime groups trade off money with weapons and expertise of the terrorists. So, a dynamic nexus between crime and terror has emerged.

The phenomenon of Crime-Terror Nexus has emerged. And the relation is much like a rider-host relation. Terrorism being the rider uses much of the benefits from Crime. So, the focus of this study has been on this aspect of the relation. It is noteworthy, that the Nexus can be dissected into two aspects: one, structural relationship; two, functional relation. The instances of structural relationship are many. For example, a doctor who was abducted for ransom was interviewed.³⁴ He told his story that first a criminal group abducted him and then sold him ultimately to Talibans through a series of purchasers and buyers. His family had to pay Rs. 4.3 million for ransom. Second example is the funding of D-Company to Lashkar e Taiba in Pakistan. In addition to real estate business, D- Company earns black money through pirating electronic films,³⁵ abduction, smuggling of arms, and Contract killing.³⁶ The third example is the financing of Al- Rahmat Trust to militant groups like Al-Qaeda and Lashkar e Taiba.³⁷

The functional relationship includes terrorists involved in criminal activity. Here, Rosenau's theory applies aptly which

focuses on “individuals fulfilling multiple roles”. The Terrorists act like chameleons: they are terrorist by day and criminal by night. Since there is no terrorist bank in the world, the terrorists get themselves into criminal activities. These crimes include Abduction for Ransom, Bank Robberies, Hawala System, Illicit drug trafficking, Illicit firearms trafficking, Illicit trafficking in stolen motor vehicles, Money laundering, and Transnational economic crimes to name a few. In the following paragraphs the criminal activities of the terrorist groups are highlighted.

Being the Commercial hub of the country, Karachi provides many opportunities to the terrorists to generate their revenue. A story covered by the *New York Times* heads as: “Organized Crime in Pakistan Feeds Taliban.” It says that militants are actively involved in kidnapping of business class people, and robbing the banks. A police man was interviewed and he revealed that the terrorists earn 10% of their income through kidnapping.³⁸ A multimedia video shows an interview of a militant who had fled from Swat operation and settled in the sub-urban area of Karachi. He reveals that Karachi has become the main hideaway of the militants. A large number of them have got settled and they generate revenues through crime in Karachi. That money is used back in home areas where militancy is rampant.³⁹

In an interview, a police officer said, “We started seeing a different kind of crime — more professional, more aggressive. We realized these criminals were linked to jihadis”.⁴⁰

US private crime investigator Bill Warner wrote an interesting article where he revealed that how “the stolen cars of Al Qaeda financed Osama bin Laden”.⁴¹ Stolen motor vehicles are the other source of income the terrorists generate. Due to the deteriorating law and order situation, cars are stolen from the urban areas and kept in the unruly areas of FATA. There, they are sold to finance terrorism. Mostly, the stolen vehicles are used in the terrorist activity. A policeman has reported that by stopping car theft we have seen a remarkable decrease in terrorist activity in Islamabad.⁴²

A dangerous nexus has been developed between the drug mafias and the terrorists in Pakistan. The UN report apprehends that the opium output of Afghanistan is about US \$3 trillion. Even a fraction of the export can finance the Terrorists. It further says that drug trafficking has provided funds for the insurgency, including the transit roots.⁴³ In this case Pakistan. The International Narcotics Control Board reports that the annual income of Taliban from narcotics in 2007 can be estimated between \$259 million to \$ 518 million.⁴⁴ Even, Pakistan’s Gawadar port has been reported to be used in Narco-Terrorism.⁴⁵

Small Arms proliferation in Pakistan, especially in Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa and FATA has militarized the society and created large scale instability.⁴⁶ The AK 47 Culture in Pakistan has fueled the militancy in Pakistan. Small weapons have been smuggled through Afghanistan from Russia for the last three decades. The insurgency in Kashmir developed a nexus

between the small arms suppliers and the fighters in Kashmir. According to a report, about 100 factories are producing weapons in Darra. This weaponry and the explosives are purchased by the Talibans. According to a political analyst, “the militants are the permanent customers of the weapons factories”.⁴⁷

Through money laundering and counterfeit, transnational organized crime, and Hawala system, money flows through illegal veins to help the terrorists. Hawala is the most fluid source for the terrorists to use. A case in India was identified where Lashkar e Taiba received Indian Rs. 4.1 million.⁴⁸

In short, the terrorists are financed by the crime and in return; due to instability created by the terrorists, the crime thrives in Pakistan. The focus of law enforcement agencies is much on terrorism and less on crime. They are in a symbiotic relationship. As the new dynamics of the nexus emerge, more opportunities of the collaboration will emerge and a more forceful and sustainable threat of Crime and Terror will impede Pakistan in protecting life and property of its citizens.

Policy and Operational Recommendations

- A comprehensive, two pronged strategy to clamp down upon Crime-Terror Nexus simultaneously is needed. Because, the war against terrorism cannot be separated from the fight against organized crime.
- A regional approach of inter-state cooperation in sharing intelligence, technology and expertise is

needed, because this nexus is engulfing South Asia indiscriminately.

- Improvement of intelligence using scientific techniques, and enforcement of the law enforcing agencies.
- An enhanced inter-agency cooperation, even intermediary networks between anti terrorist squads and other law enforcement agencies must be developed.
- Instead of banning the groups, efforts must be done to stop their financing.
- Legislation to check financing through banks. e.g. Anti Money Laundering Act 2010
- Enforcement activity on the border area of Pakistan and India to stop small arms proliferation and drug smuggling.
- A sustained anti terrorist campaign which also includes clamping down on crime, specifically where the Nexus is emerging rapidly.

Conclusion

The Crime and Terror in Pakistan are in a symbiotic relationship. The illicit sources of crime are enriching the Terrorist industry, because the licit sources are dried up. So a phenomenon of “Criminal-Terrorism” is replacing “Religious Terrorism”. Therefore, “a combined anti Crime-Terror” strategy must be adopted to eliminate the scourge of this Nexus. A paradigm shift from religion to crime is essential to

deal with terrorism in Pakistan. Therefore, the bottom line is: The war against terrorism cannot be separated from the fight against organized crime.

End Notes

¹ J. Rosenau, (1990) *Turbulence in World Politics*, Princeton University Press. While Rosenau has published two books that build on the post international paradigm, the core essence of the paradigm and its best expression are found in turbulence. Therefore all citations to Rosenau refer to this volume unless otherwise noted.

² J. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics: A theory of change and continuity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 183.

³ John T. Picarelli, "The Turbulent Nexus of Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism: A theory of malevolent International Relations," *Global Crime*, 7:1 (2006), 12.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 12

⁵ L. Shelley, "The unholy trinity: transnational crime, corruption and terrorism," *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, 11:2 (Spring 2005), 101-11.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ B. Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 92.

⁸ J. Stern, "The Protean Enemy," *Foreign Affairs*, 82:4 (July August 2003), 28.

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PAKISTAN'S IMAGE DILEMMA: QUEST FOR REMEDIAL ACTION

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Abstract

Pakistan has been a frontline participant in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). In performing this role, it has sacrificed immensely in terms of men and material. However, despite its concerted efforts, it has been depicted quite negatively in the global media. As a result, it is perceived as a dangerous country, tarnishing its standing in the comity of nations. There is a popular view in Pakistan that the 'West' is deliberately creating this poor image which in turn is affecting the country's developmental process. Hence, this paper endeavours to analyze the tangible and intangible factors involved in this pursuit. Specifically it highlights factors like: the nation's inability in reaching a consensus regarding its own internal identity, its ideological mooring, the socio-political environment and the war on terrorism.

Introduction

"The two most precious things this side of the grave are our reputation and our life. But it is to be lamented that the most contemptible whisper may deprive us of the one, and the weakest weapon of the other."

Charles Caleb Colton.

For one reason or the other, Pakistan like other countries like Iran, Afghanistan and Somalia etc has a serious image dilemma which needs to be improved. The term “image” became popular in the 1950s which can be defined as, “The opinion or concept of something which is held by the public; or a mental representation of something; a mental picture or impression, an idea, concept.”¹

Thus, image is all about creating perceptions, but what does that mean? The word perception can be defined as the act of comprehending through the sense of the mind, cognition or awareness”; its origin is Latin verb “*percipere*” which means “gathering in”. Therefore, perception can be explained as a process through which humans collect information and a source for how humans understand things.²

However, image is not a phenomenon that can be easily manipulated to hide the facts. It is well understood within the business community that synthetic or false images invariably cause damage sooner or later, which is why Barry Day argues for honesty in his book on marketing.³

Various commentators, businessmen and marketing experts argue that image must reflect the actual characteristics of a nation or the real behaviour of its people.⁴ The image of a nation is usually the result of biases or prejudices held by others. It would neither appear suddenly, nor disappear quickly as it often grows over long period of time.⁵

In this context, it is obvious that Pakistan suffers from a chronic negative image problem and it is getting worse day by

day. The global media, foreign think tanks, international academia, even government representatives are almost unanimous in portraying Pakistan as a 'problematic' nation. In essence we can say that Pakistan has become the target of a global media war,⁶ which it seems to be losing. In global and national media nearly all significant news coverage and analytical comments about Pakistan are negative or hostile.

However, in response to this ruthless assault, Pakistan is not using a single world-scale media weapon to counter the attack.⁷ According to former Information Minister Javed Jabbar, "While not being physically destructive, the media war, in one sense, is worse. It erodes and diminishes the contours of our true identity in the minds of billions of people exposed to overseas media."⁸

Nevertheless, this negativity is a serious obstacle in Pakistan's relations with other countries, specifically with the U.S. While public opinion and international relations are subject to change overnight, the influence that the media demonstrates over policy-makers, academia, and common men alike, remain consistent. Thus, the key to repairing and building Pakistan's international image is media management and utilization of soft power.

Improving Pakistan's Bad Image Using Soft Power

Every Pakistani deems it obligatory to improve the flawed image of its country. But can it be totally improved? Professor William Benoit's "Image Repair Theory" implies that an image might be improved but may not be entirely restored.⁹

Countries also try to repair their image as Saudi Arabia did after the incident of 9/11.¹⁰ Clearly, a favourable Image for Pakistan is the need of the hour, and whatever could be, tarnished images need to be repaired. In this process use of soft power could be most helpful.

“Soft power” is a concept developed by Joseph Nye in his 1990 book to describe “the ability to attract and co-opt rather than coerce and using force or money as a means of persuasion to get the outcomes you want.”¹¹ There are three broad categories of soft power: culture, political values and policies. It is also called the second face of power that indirectly allows you to obtain the outcomes you want.¹²

According to Nye by using soft power, "a country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries – admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness – want to follow it. In this sense, it is also important to set the agenda and attract others in world politics.¹³

Nye asserts that, "“Seduction is always effectual than coercion, and many values like democracy, human rights, and individual opportunities are deeply seductive.”¹⁴ Soft power is hampered when policies, culture, or values repel others instead of attracting them. In addition, soft power extends beyond the operations of government altogether, to the activities of the private sector and to society and culture at large.¹⁵

It's high time for Pakistan to start investing in soft power and start using media as an instrument of promoting its soft image all over the world. Some recommendations to improve Pakistan's image are given separately in this paper. But before proceeding further, it is necessary to understand the global and national entities that create negative perceptions of the country. The following sections will have an insight in to them.

Pakistan's Image Abroad: Drawing the Picturesque

Globally, print and electronic mediums are the one which make or break people's perceptions about states and personalities. All conceivable mediums - from books and official/semi official publications to newspapers and magazines to even movies - seem to predominantly reflect a negative image of Pakistan. This section will briefly discuss selected resources with various perceptions they are promoting. Thousands of examples of published material against Pakistan could be found however, because of space constraint, only a few examples are quoted here.

Journals and Books

The well-known expert on Afghanistan Barnett R. Rubin's, writes in the journal of '*Foreign Affairs*' that, "the main centre of terrorism to global reach, is in Pakistan".¹⁶ He also claimed that, "during western military offensives in mid-2006, intelligence reports confirmed that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was continuing to actively support Taliban leadership, which is now working out of Quetta".¹⁷ He further

argued that 9/11 did change Pakistan's behaviour but not its interests.¹⁸

Emma Duncan's book, *'Breaking the Curfew: A Political Journey Through Pakistan'* covers the "murkier" side of Pakistani state and society particularly focussing on the shadow of military over national politics, drug trafficking and arms smuggling, violation of civil and human rights and corruption in the state institutions. The book projects Pakistan as a volatile and unruly country where uncertainty reigns.¹⁹

Another book, *'Waiting for Allah: Pakistan's Struggle for Democracy'*, is authored by *Financial Times'* correspondent Christina Lamb. It is written in the backdrop of transition from military rule to the civilian government under Benazir Bhutto. *Waiting for Allah* is replete with the usual stereotyping of Pakistan that invariably predicts a bleak future of the country. The author covered the position of women, economic disparity, political patronage, tribal system, the influence of drug barons, and Pakistan's troubled relations with India and Afghanistan. Lamb has hardly anything positive to say about Pakistan.²⁰

Stephen Philip Cohen is a well known American writer on South Asia. His 2004 book, *'Idea of Pakistan'* is an instant "bible" for Pakistan-bashers. Cohen is not new to lambasting Pakistan. His 2001 book titled, *India: Emerging Power* also contained negative references to Pakistan. *The idea of Pakistan* has several unfair comments about Pakistan. It

particularly predicts a bleak future for Pakistan in Chapter 8 titled 'Pakistan's Futures.'²¹ Some of its content is outrageous, as illustrated below:

“...Pakistan has adapted to changing strategic circumstances by “renting” itself out to powerful states, notably the United States, but also Saudi Arabia and China. Occupying a piece of strategic territory, an inexhaustible resource, strengthens the central government and inhibits the prospect of genuine reform. Thus there is no urgent need to develop domestic capabilities, build human capital, or even look ahead to the day when the resource might be exhausted. The Establishment is prone to much wishful thinking that something or someone will always come to Pakistan’s rescue because of its location; this also tends to dampen public debate over alternative strategies and link Pakistan’s identity to seemingly immutable geography.”²²

Official/Semi-Official Publications

A British officer from the MI6 for the Defence Academy, [a British Ministry of Defence think-tank] wrote a paper alleging that ISI was indirectly supporting extremism in Afghanistan, Iraq and the UK. Following is the verbatim reproduction from the paper: “Indirectly Pakistan (through the ISI) has been supporting terrorism and extremism - whether in London on 7/7 or in Afghanistan or Iraq. [The West has] turned a blind eye towards existing instability and the indirect protection of Al Qaeda and promotion of terrorism (by ISI).”²³

A year-end report of the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) stated Pakistan was the focus of three major US foreign policy concerns: Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation, terrorism and democracy. The report under review opined that the US sought to balance an “acute interest in Islamabad’s continued counter-terrorism cooperation, especially regarding Afghan stabilisation and the capture of Al Qaeda leadership, with tandem concerns about the weapons proliferation and the perceived need to encourage development of a more democratic and moderate Pakistani state.”²⁴ The US legislators depend largely on CRS in the process of opinion making. Thus, it has an immense impact on amongst the officials.

Feature Films and Documentaries

Syrina: This 2005 feature film on terrorism is centred on a young Pakistani oil worker in UAE, which promotes the stereotype that even common Pakistanis are easily susceptible to become suicide bombers.²⁵

Reinventing the Taliban: This 2003 documentary by Sharmeen Obaid-Chinoy, and Ed Robbins focuses on the rise of fundamentalists in Pakistan. The government functionaries and supporters in Khyber Pakhtun Khawa (KPK) are shown banning musical performances, painting over cinema murals; public burning of video cassettes and CDs and calling for an end to co-education. The documentary shows injustice and inequity, especially towards women and tries to explain why the Taliban’s ideology is being given new life in Pakistan. The

documentary also shows secular Pakistanis but they do not seem to be participating in improving the future of Pakistan.²⁶

Reports of Civil Society Organizations

In Amnesty International's (AI) Annual Reports for last 16 years, Pakistan features in all of them as a country with poor human rights record. In its December 2006 publication, AI reported a number of cases of the disappearance of people who were suspected of having links with Al Qaida, it alleged the involvement of security agencies, and the misstatement by officials in the highest court of the land.²⁷ In support of its arguments, the report quoted from the President Musharaf's autobiography *In the Line of Fire* that Pakistan had handed over, rather hurriedly, a large number of suspects to the US who was subsequently mistreated in Guantanamo and other prisons.²⁸

The Brussels-based *International Crisis Group (ICG)* frequently issues reports on Pakistan. The mere titles of these reports reflect the kind of perception they create about the country. For example, the December 2006 report titled, "Pakistan's Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants". Another 2011 report on Islamic parties in Pakistan states that, "The Islamic parties might work within the current political order, but eventually their aim is to replace it with one which is based on narrow, discriminatory interpretations of Islam. They have also taken oblique positions on militant jihad: on the one hand, they persist on their distinction from militant outfits by virtue of working peacefully and within the

democratic system; while at the same time, they admit to sharing the ideological goal of enforcing Sharia (Islamic law), while maintaining sizeable maddrasa and mosque networks that are breeding grounds for many extremist groups.”²⁹

Despite Pakistan's sacrifices and aid in GWOT, Stimson Centre's exclusively published report on 2008 Mumbai attacks concludes that, the Mumbai crisis remains unfinished. The Indian grievances still remain unresolved, ignited by terror attacks in late-November 2008 that were demonstrably launched from Pakistan. While on the other hand, Pakistani policies remain dangerously subject to miscalculation. Furthermore, attacks in India by extremists trained, equipped, and based in Pakistan can be expected, making the chance of another crisis most likely.³⁰

The material cited above gives a fairly good idea of the intensity of negative vibes created by foreign media regarding Pakistan. However, now the extent to which the local authors and intellectuals are creating this image will be analyzed.

National Character and Self Image

Talking about local authors, intellectuals – academia, researchers and journalists – are one of the worst critics of the government policies and socio-economic and political conditions of the country. They have more credibility than the government spokespersons and their hand outs. Some of the most often quoted writers/commentators are discussed below.

Ayaz Amir, a famous writer of Pakistan, wrote about Pakistanis “We lack spirit, conditioned more by history than

climate to bow meekly before authority. The people of Thailand have more spirit than us, the people of South Korea a greater sense of right and wrong, even the Nepalese people more mettle than we dare think of.”³¹

Ahmad Rashid in his latest book, "Pakistan on the Brink: the Future of America, Pakistan and Afghanistan" asserts that the Haqqani network enjoys ISI support. Moreover, he is of the views that, Afghan Taliban have safe havens in Pakistan. Attacks led from these sanctuaries are in fact instigated by the Pakistani Intelligence agency- ISI. In addition, ISI provides them money, ammunition and training.³²

The Washington, D.C./Boston-based Husain Haqqani's book, "*Pakistan: between Mosque and Military*", essentially endorsed the widely held view in the West that the alliance of Islamists and the military officers have shaped Pakistan the way it is today. And the country's future and thus the outcome of the global war on terror will depend on this "unholy" alliance.³³ The book became instantly popular with scholars interested in South Asia and is repeatedly quoted in context with the role of religion and armed forces in Pakistani politics.

The Boston-based Hassan Abbas's book, "*Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror*", discusses the jihadist organizations, army's alleged support to them and the resulting tensions with Pakistan's neighbours. The book obliquely suggests international interference in Pakistan by detailing a role for the international community that is led by the US.³⁴

Retired senior officials, both civilian and military, are also not too far behind in this race of self-criticism. If they make any contribution to the media, they are likely to be critical of the government. This group of critics cover a broad spectrum, from people such as Lt. General (Retired) Hamid Gul to former Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmed Khan. They enjoy additional credibility with the foreign critics, with regards of being well informed from the inner working of the system.

The Diaspora's Views

Pakistani Diaspora is rather large, some 5-6 million all over the world. About two million of them are in the West. The Diaspora could be a major source of strength for Pakistan but they are generally disillusioned with the conditions of governance in Pakistan.³⁵ Therefore, for the most part, they have become a liability as far as the image issue is concerned. Adil Najam's report on philanthropy in Pakistani-American community concluded that about half of the Pakistani-Americans believed that their charitable contributions may not be put to good use in Pakistan.³⁶

The review of prevailing perceptions in the international media, academia, and think-tank community creates the image of Pakistan as a "backward" nation, a violator of human and civil rights, a major "source of extremism" in the world, "a violent, unstable and unpredictable" country, a "serial proliferators of WMD technologies" and a "suspect partner" in the War on Terror. However, all these perceptions may not be

true. The perceptions and realities are categorized and discussed in the proceeding section.

Drawing Cleavage between Misperceptions and Bitter Realities

Pakistan's international image suffers from a number of perceptions: Most of them are based in historic events or prejudices. They could be broadly classified in the below described categories:

- **Backward Society and Bad Governance:** Pakistan is an under-developed and backward society which suffers from failing economy, widespread poverty, low social indicators, and abysmally low rates of literacy, lack of law and order, and pervasive corruption.

This hub of issues is common to the developing world. However, few countries have broken the vicious cycle associated with the issues in this category. Pakistan may not seem very promising when viewed abstractly. However it can be argued that, considerable progress keeping in view where we were half a century ago and the geo-strategic environment we are condemned to live in. These aspects are conveniently ignored by international observers. One can always quote India as an example, which is afflicted with similar ills. But India receives a more sympathetic press on accounts of it being a democracy and secular state.

- **Extremist Ideologies:** Pakistani population espouses extremist ideologies and state organs if not actively

supporting such ideologies, do nothing to control them. Pakistan is thus a suspect partner in the global war on terrorism and a very unsafe country to visit.

Extremism is not a phenomenon that originated in Pakistan. It was exported to this country during the Afghan jihad against the Soviet occupation. Pakistan is not a culprit, it is a victim. We may not have done well to handle the situation but some of the constraints for not doing well were generated extraneously. The world walking away from Afghanistan and economic sanctions against Pakistan were to a large extent responsible for a situation which became untenable over a period of time. As a result, the news of violence from Pakistan keeps the world media well occupied.

- **Nuclear Proliferation:** Pakistan has proliferated nuclear technology to rouge states jeopardising international security. It can not be trusted with WMDs.

Pakistan's nuclear programme is an exercise in survival. However, globally the proliferation network already existed since 1950s and joining of A.Q. Khan to this network was natural to achieve national interests. No doubt that outward proliferation activity was unfortunate and embarrassing for Pakistan but once the activity was exposed, Islamabad took all necessary measures to plug any regulatory and administrative loopholes that could cause the repeat of any such

activity. Nuclear programmes of most countries were developed through carefully orchestrated proliferation. This not only includes Indian and Israeli programmes but also British and French programmes at an early stage. Pakistan, by no means, is without a company either in inward or outward proliferation.

- **Bad Neighbour:** There is a perception that Pakistan is in perpetual conflict with its neighbours. It supports militancy in Indian Held Kashmir (IHK) and Taliban resistance in Afghanistan as policy instruments. It is obviously an unfair perception. It is India which has declined to implement the UN resolutions. It is India which bifurcated Pakistan. India is a much bigger country and had been unfriendly towards Pakistan from the beginning, including refusing to part with Pakistan's share in post-British distribution of assets and imposing trade restrictions against Pakistan. Similarly, Afghanistan had been unfriendly towards Pakistan from the beginning including opposing Pakistan's membership of the United Nations and claim on Pakistani territory. Even in current phase of badmouthing Pakistan, the critic tend to forget that not only the Pakistan's role in keeping Afghan economy viable but also practically sheltering a fourth of Afghan population on its territory, thus substantially reducing Kabul's burden. Pakistan may be guilty of mishandling

its neighbours but the positive aspects by far outweigh this “guilt”.

- **Army Rule:** “The state in Pakistan is subservient to the military which either rules directly or controls the civilian dispensation indirectly.”

Army's rule is an unpleasant reality but the alternatives had not been better. Also, each of the military governments in Pakistan sooner or latter found a niche that made the democratic west as their staunch supporter. It is only an evolutionary process through which the army could return to its own professional domain.

- **Human Rights:** “Human rights mean very little to Pakistani state and society. The weaker sections of the society, particularly women, are treated horribly.”

The human rights situation in Pakistan is a result of a complex historic process. The situation today, however, is much improved than at any time in our history. Pakistan receives a lot of flake on this account but several positive things are ignored by the critics as they would not fit into their stereotyping of Muslim societies. The violation of rights of even one person is one too many but recognising and appreciating positives would facilitate more positives.

Although in recent years, particularly since the incident of 9/11, Pakistan has attracted a disproportionate attention of the international media and think-tanks,³⁷

seasoned readers know that the negativity about Pakistan had initiated a long time ago. When it comes to the image of Pakistan, most of these perceptions have *some* reality behind them but perceptions are invariably stronger than reality. Also, there are some contradictions between reality and perception. The realistic view of Pakistan is that it is a tremendously valuable ally in global war on terrorism, a progressive state, a liberalized economy, a forward looking nation and a bridge between the Islamic world and the west. The perception that prevails is that Pakistan is a suspect partner in the GWOT, a backward nation, the heart of extremism, and essentially violent, unstable, and unpredictable. This view is shaped by the hostile media and inevitably limits and influences policy-makers internationally in dealing with Pakistan. If the media mirrors reality, then Pakistan is stuck in a hall of mirrors.

Reasons of Pakistan's Bad Image

There may be many other reasons for Pakistan's bad image however, following factors inspire or fuel the media world war on Pakistan:

- The ugly and unpleasant reality of certain aspects of our own condition for which we alone are responsible. Thus, overseas media serve as mirrors of what actually exists.

- The sheer ignorance and bias of many personnel in overseas media outlines the superficiality and skin-thin approach with which they portray our complexities.
- There are inherent prejudices overseas against a country like Pakistan that calls itself an "Islamic republic" and yet fails to pursue "ijtihad" and reforms, when other states are becoming increasingly secular.
- Barring a few exceptions, most overseas media, especially western media despite being "independent" serve as instruments to further the objectives, interests and values of the states, the societies and the corporate sectors in which the media are based. Sometimes, these determinants are entirely opposite to the interests and values espoused by Pakistan.
- Historically, and continuously to this date, we have failed to invest the diverse, the professional and the financial resources required to project a credible, positive portrait of ourselves in overseas countries and in world media in particular.

In his article, published in 1999, Professor Adil Najam very appropriately summarised the Pakistan's image problem. He said, "The international media seems anti-Pakistani not simply because it is controlled by some phantom "Zionist Lobby" or because it is pro-India, but because we have never given it much reason to be pro-Pakistani.

Over the last so many years--but particularly in the last four or five--Pakistan has consistently scarred its own

international image through acts that can only be defined as self-mutilation. Today, in the eyes of the international media--even those we count as our friends--we appear untrustworthy and disfigured. What we have done to our international image through our own actions is worse than what all the Indian propaganda could ever have done in a hundred years. As far as our international image is concerned, we have indeed been our own worst enemy.”³⁸

Does Image Matter?

Having ascertained that Pakistan has a less than favourable image in the West, it needs to be determined whether it matters or not? The reasons why a positive image is deemed so desirable are in many ways self-evident; however, for the sake of completeness they should be re-examined.

One element of national power is political influence, the strength of which is based on a combination of tangible and intangible factors. Within the intangible category sits the perception, or image, of a state as seen by other states. Pakistan aspires to be one of the lead members of the Organisation of Islamic Conference, to join economic cooperative groupings such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association of Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) and has recently been allowed to rejoin the Commonwealth. Acceptance into, and effectiveness within, such organisations depends on a mix of hard facts and perceptions.

Trade likewise would benefit from a significantly enhanced national image.³⁹ Speaking about ways to improve Pakistan's exports to his country, the Japanese Ambassador explained that Pakistan suffered from a surfeit of negative images including nuclear tests, military coups, sectarian violence and terrorism. He suggested that Pakistan would benefit from introducing a more balanced image to the Japanese people.⁴⁰

Similarly, attracting much needed Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is an extremely competitive business in the globalised market place. Although hard economic realities prevail, negative perceptions and poor image put off prospective investors even before the formal analysis stage. In the US/UK survey only eleven per cent of business executives were aware Pakistan is encouraging economic growth and the majority were also unaware of the democracy building.

Few business leaders are prepared to invest in Pakistan due to an image of corruption.⁴¹ Shortly, in a globalised world where politics, economics and trade all lead to multiple choices and constant competition, there can be little doubt image matters. Furthermore, image for better or worse, can have a significant impact on national morale and confidence.

Looking at the globe: How other states are dealing with the image dilemma? It might be of value to see what importance other countries place on image and to examine a few snapshots of how they tackle the challenge of projecting a positive image abroad. The US faced with severe negative

opinions abroad, appointed Karen Hughes as the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy.

She was tasked with improving the US image and providing a better dialogues with other nations, in particular the Muslim world.⁴² This started with a high profile tour of Muslim states in mid-2005. This approach is based on an analysis which suggests the tarnish of its international image is ascribed to “ineffective foreign publicity” and “inadequate communication”; albeit the US has spared no effort to include its image in almost all of its diplomatic activities. The problem, as seen by the People’s Daily in China, does not lie with ineffective US public diplomacy but rather with an irrational foreign policy.⁴³

UK has at its disposal the instrument of the British Council, founded in 1934, to make the life and thought of the British people more widely known abroad and to strengthen common cultural traditions in the Commonwealth.⁴⁴ It now promotes the UK’s image in 110 countries worldwide.⁴⁵ About India, an ex-Minister of Information for Pakistan commented that India’s external communication frontiers dominate due a number of factors including; the sheer size of the country, the popularity of Bollywood, a mix of history and image, having a larger Diaspora and due to higher investment in media.⁴⁶

Japan, in the aftermath of the atrocities committed by its military in World War Two, had an acute image problem both regionally and globally. Through a long term strategy of introducing democracy, a market economy and constitutional

limitations on the use of military power, Japan is now the world's second economic power and has developed a different and more positive image. There is perhaps still some distance to travel in terms of transforming in its image with its closer neighbours but arguably it has played its cards well in the West.⁴⁷

Thus, even from this brief look at a few countries, it is apparent that nations have historically and continually placed great importance on public diplomacy and image. They seek to improve international understanding of their culture, language, art and sport. Inevitably such public relations activities widen and deepen understandings about a particular nation; the aspiration is that knowledge will create a better image which can be sustained over the long term.

The Way Forward

The main recommendations are based on the assessment the solution to Pakistan's image problem can only be found in a long term, sustained approach based on a clearly defined outcome. In order to dismantle the old negative image and foster a new positive image of Pakistan following steps are recommended:

- Conduct a strategic analysis of the problem, involving all the key stakeholders, senior editors and external consultants.
- Focus on the weak areas in administration and policies and try to improve those weaknesses; in other words, bring your own house in order.

- Pakistan needs to respond to the almost universally negative media coverage by branding⁴⁸ its image with the following four objectives in mind:
 - Balance the negative media image.
 - Create a new and positive image.
 - Consistently generate ‘good’ news at home to overcome the effects of any ‘bad’ news.
 - Promote the achievements of Pakistanis
- Develop key messages for media campaigns and promote them while applying the basic lesson of advertising.⁴⁹
- Build capacity for public diplomacy within all relevant Ministries which includes media training for all senior government officials, military and civilian.
- The government may seek professional help from a few reputable public relations firms abroad that could keep a close watch on the important electronic and print media sources and respond to any negative comment in real time. The response should be delivered promptly, consistently, widely, and at least as forcefully as the attack.
- Use “indirect approach” of cultural visits and displays, sporting events and sports stars, influential people in worldwide Diaspora and educational visits. In other words work on the many positives of Pakistan.

- While projecting position on political issues such as democracy, human rights, nuclear weapon and Kashmir is a challenging task, promoting Pakistan's culture is a much easier and least controversial job. It is, however, equally necessary.
- The cultural presence could be increased through: promoting Pakistani music; organizing exhibitions of Pakistani paintings sculpture and handicraft; and translation of Pakistani literature in foreign languages.
- Continue to increase freedom of press and TV and to improve access for foreign journalists. The aim is to build trust.
- Consistent improvement in socio-economic indicators through economic policies that would create a balance between development and welfare.
- Restore/improve law and order situation through adhering to the principles of rule of law.
- Educate the people through mass media in tolerance to other ideologies, religions and cultures. Its practical manifestation would be extended over a broad spectrum from denouncing all kind of violence against 'the others'.
- Project Pakistan as a moderate state and victim of extremist and terrorist ideologies as a consequence of Russia Afghanistan war and GWOT. Also promote the Pakistan's sincerity in participation in GWOT and the

sacrifices it made in terms of casualties suffered by its troops.

- Engage and mobilise Pakistani Diaspora.
- Develop long term global public diplomacy network, build trust and avoid short term expediencies.
- Develop an institutionalised system to pre-brief all young Pakistanis before they embark on overseas educational courses of one year or longer.⁵⁰

In a nutshell, although there is no “silver bullet” available to fix ‘Pakistan’s image dilemma’ there is a clearly identified way forward. The essence of success is to set and maintain a consistent long term course towards the new image of Pakistan; building on the many positives with which the nation has been blessed.

Conclusion

To conclude the issue, it must be based on real events and harness the power of the key stakeholders within the nation. The most significant conclusion is that there is no quick fix or silver bullet for Pakistan’s image problems. Not only do perceptions take a long time to be altered but the evidence indicates these perceptions are based, for the most part, on ground realities in Pakistan. Changing the root causes will take time, patience and bold government policies.

There is also a dire need to harness all the resources to formulate a media policy which would not only project Pakistan’s perspective internationally but could also bring about national integration and counter hostile propaganda.

The government will have to make the media responsible and accountable, while allowing freedom. There is, however, a need to strike a balance between freedom of media and public interest within the purview of our national ideology and strategy.

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DEMAND FOR NEW PROVINCES IN PAKISTAN

Muhammad Usman Asghar

Abstract

There is an increasing demand for the creation of new provinces among the masses, due to uneven socio-economic growth in the less developed regions of Pakistan which seems to be reasonable enough considering their basic right to prosper. This sense of trust deficit in provincial setup has made voice louder in the concerned public, for new and small administrative units in the form of new provinces. It is also a fact that the people of Pakistan are credulous which threatens the rationality and causality of this demand. This may affect the desired outcome of social and economic uplift of common man in the backward regions. A just principle in the form of a policy decision is the need of hour, taking on board all the parties, ensuring the division to satisfy the grievances of all stakeholders. This paper surfaces critical questions and proposes a model for the new provinces, resting on the premise that welfare of the population should be the prime concern in this process.

Introduction

Pakistan emerged as an independent state in 1947, on the partition of British India into two sovereign states in South Asia. The dominion which consisted of modern-day Pakistan and Bangladesh was created for the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent, theoretically with majority areas of the Muslim population. The territory of Pakistan was a federation of five

provinces, namely East Bengal, West Punjab, Balochistan, Sind and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) along with princely states within the geographical boundaries of the provinces and others willing to accede to Pakistan. Bangladesh separated from Pakistan in 1971 and at present, Pakistan consists of four provinces, Gilgit-Baltistan, Islamabad Capital Territory and Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

Four Provinces Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan¹ constitute present day Pakistan. These provinces are administered by their respective provincial assemblies and governors, and comprising of multiple ethnicities, speaking variety of languages, possessing cultural and social norms and traditions, having diverse religious affiliations and lifestyles in the provinces. The socio-economic situation and level of development also varies in the provinces, even within a province, level of prosperity and growth is uneven. This is a natural phenomenon that some regions possess more potential to develop as compared to other ones. State is responsible for equitable distribution of resources to develop all regions of the country. . State is also supposed to take care of its units regardless of any discrimination. Government plays a vital role in this regard, as the economic development at national and provincial level has become one of the major public policy concerns in Pakistan during the past decades.

This partial failure at the government's end has led to frustration and disappointment among the public due to their deprivation in terms of regional development and access to

political power. Pakistanis, being credulous, are more attuned to the political motives of the ruling class being clueless about their share in the Development pie.

In this background, the demand for the creation of new provinces is on full swing at present in the political spheres of Pakistan. Despite the 18th amendment in the 1973 constitution regarding more provincial autonomy, there are masses who demand the division of existing provinces for their economic rights at national level. The demand for creation of new provinces is stirred due to local socio-economic disparities in the country. A perception is prevalent among the concerned masses that the economic and social development of Pakistan has been uneven in the last few decades. Despite the fact, that the entire country has suffered from the energy crisis, security situation, low foreign investment and strained foreign relations, it is perceived that the provincial capitals and their peripheries have benefited more than other areas of the province.

This paper explores the historical trends and the rationale for the division of provinces in sub-continent in the past, which was meant to achieve the desired level of development and good governance under the different rules. It covers the post-partition era regarding the administrative units till 1971 and then 1971 onwards till present day. This paper also seeks to define the problem as a matter of public policy and discusses the policy criteria to address the demand for the creation of new provinces in Pakistan. The speculative

demands and the lack of any criteria for changing the administrative status of provinces in Pakistan have triggered the expectations in many ethnicities and stakeholders. The paper is purely an academic endeavour to define the problem and seek the policy framework rather favouring or discarding the proposal of demand for new provinces.

Historical Outlook

The administrative system has evolved in India, from the rule of Mughals to East India Company. Modern approach to administration was introduced by the British to cater for the vast apparatus of the government as a colony. Bureaucracy was introduced to govern and administer the large territory of British India.

The British also followed the Mughal precedent of provinces which was headed by the governors. They further divided the provinces into small administrative territorial units called districts. An officer was assigned the duty of administration of each district known as district officer who was assigned the designations of an executive, chief magistrate and a collector of revenue. The British stretched their network of administration to the grass root level for increased control and governance. The motive behind the division of provinces into divisions, districts, tehsils and villages was to manage the state affairs and its administration efficiently.

In the historical perspective of provinces and their division, Partition of Bengal in 1905 is quite important to understand the political, religious and social dynamics of that period. It is described that the first partition of Bengal in 1905 was an administrative initiative to boost good governance in the province. It shows that the administration is a core criterion for the division of provinces in the greater interest of the nation and the state. A brief description of the provinces and their administration in 1907 is given in the table as under:²

Province of British India	Chief Administrative Officer
Burma	Lieutenant Governor
Bengal	Lieutenant Governor
Madras	Governor In-Council
Bombay	Lieutenant Governor
United Provinces	Lieutenant Governor
Central Provinces	Chief Commissioner
Punjab	Lieutenant Governor
Assam	Chief Commissioner

There were also some small provinces like British Balochistan and NWFP. Partition of Bengal and then its annulment is also an important development in the history of sub-continent for the recognition of the public demand and its repercussions in the region.

In 1935, British Raj introduced the Government of India Act 1935, to administer and govern the India in the light of emerging trends of political scenarios. One of the most significant aspects of the Act was the grant of large scale autonomy to the provinces in British India. Pakistan maintains the same pattern of provinces and their structure at present. The administrative and political autonomy vested by the British Raj was in prime interest of the federation, for example, Sindh was separated from Bombay. This was also generally recognized, that the clauses of act relating to the provincial autonomy conferred a great deal of power and responsibility on local politicians to play their role in the local development. Our neighbour, India started with 14 states i.e. provinces and at present it has 28 provinces.³

Criteria for the New Provinces

There are some indicators or variables that must be well evaluated and analyzed in the national interest of Pakistan before undertaking any endeavour to the creation of new provinces. In the absence of a comprehensive and just policy, it will be tough to manage the growing demands of new provinces. A red line has to be defined in a democratic process to further the demands; otherwise it may lead towards a situation of anarchy and further exploitation by the interest groups and influential stakeholders. Meanwhile, acceptance of unending demands for the creation of more provinces can leads towards situation like pre-independence era of more than 560 princely states. Pakistan is not in a position to

undertake a distorted wave of unrest in its internal framework. Any loophole in the policy towards the creation of new provinces, may lead to further deterioration of inter-provincial relations. Furthermore, Federation of Pakistan needs internal strength and unity among its public to cope with the hostile international relations in the backdrop of war against terrorism. Pakistan presently, is striving for providing a reasonable solution to the demand of new provinces. It is observed that in a very recent development, the Punjab Assembly has unanimously approved resolutions in favour of reinstating Bahawalpur province and the formation of a separate province in southern Punjab; both resolutions were tabled by Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz (PML-N) leader and Punjab Law and Parliamentary Affairs Minister Rana Sanaullah, in a session of the provincial assembly and a commission is proposed to be established for this very purpose.⁴

There are some questions which come to mind being a public policy analyst in the wake of demand for the creation of new provinces in Pakistan such as following:

- Is it sure that the justified social and economic growth is impossible with the existing system/ provinces?
- Does the division of large provinces empirically project the road map to quicker growth and development in Pakistan?
- Does the salvation of the demanding stakeholders lie only in the division of provinces?

- Is there enough homework being done to constitute the genuineness of demand based on the evidences by the government under some competent authority or commission?
- What are policy options and alternatives available with the government to furnish the demand of new provinces in the light of uneven economic and social development?
- What will be the acceptable criteria in the democratic government for the division i.e. Equity, Equality, Justice, Population, Resources, Income Share, Urbanization, Literacy and others?
- What will be the minimal economic and geographical size of a new province?
- Is the calculus for the economic and financial constraints being done or assessed in due course of emergence of new provinces?
- It is also observed that any break-up is always emotionally and politically wrenching for the people involved, hence what may be the remedial or reconstructing measure for the stakeholders?
- How long can the political parties both at provincial and national level afford to ignore the demand of new provinces by the masses in the less developed regions of the country?
- Pakistan has witnessed the partition of Bengal in 1971. Will the creation of more provinces strengthen our

federation or will it lead to further inter-province conflicts?

Keeping in view, a comprehensive and meticulous response is desired by the government and political parties. There are some basic measures that must be considered while devising any criteria or framework for the further division of already existing administrative units.

- Constitutional Amendment
- Political Will
- Ethnic Affiliations
- Linguistic Cohesion
- Social Contract

Constitutionally, a two-third majority is required in the parent provincial assembly for its division into new provinces as per article 239, subsection 4 of the constitution of Pakistan. This is mentioned as:

“A bill to amend the Constitution which would have the effect of altering the limits of a province shall not be presented to the President for assent unless it has been passed by the Provincial Assembly of that Province by the votes of not less than two-thirds of its total membership.”⁵

This interprets that in case of Punjab, a two-third majority is mandatory out of its total 370 members for the further division into small provinces. A resolution has also been passed on May 09, 2012 unanimously in the Punjab Assembly for the creation of two new provinces out of it.

Political will for the creation of new provinces is enthusiastic at present, especially the ruling party and some of its coalition partners in the government. This is a good sign that political high ups are concerned about the demand of public. But this enthusiasm should not override the national interests in greater benefit for the state and its sovereignty. Moreover, demand for new provinces should not be merely based on the political scoring in the country. The motive should be the improvement of social and economic uplift of the general public. This situation also surfaces the questions, whether the demand for new provinces is nationalistic or people oriented by the political parties. The political mobilization and articulation along caste/ethnic/language-based social cleavages need to be evaluated unbiased. There is a difference of opinion in the national parties and regional parties regarding the demand for new provinces.

There are also different ethnicities living in the existing provinces. The creation of new provinces may lead to ethnic demands for more recognition and self-centred isolation in the national landscape. Demand for new province, on the basis of regional identity, culture and geographical differences, is more evident in Saraiki and Hazara regions. Moreover, precedence of language based division in the Sub-Continent is also prevalent; however, this criterion of division may neither be suitable nor fruitful. There is also a change in populace criterion on division of province, now new provinces are being demanded on the basis of good governance, efficient

administrative management and economic development. Now, new provinces are being demanded on the basis of good governance and economic development rather than on the language principle.

Social contract of the people living in one province is important in the current demand for new provinces. There have been such events in the past, which stirred the social sentiments of the concerned regions. Economic exploitation is the core concern in the social disparity among the masses. Punjab province is the largest, with almost 60% of total Pakistan's population. At times, it becomes difficult to address the problems of the entire public due to larger size of the province. This brings us to a question, is it the size of the province that becomes a hurdle in efficient service delivery or is it lack of efficiency in delivery system in the local administration and political end? As the state declares unprejudiced and priority based administrative setup exists all over the country. Moreover, political system with representation in the national and provincial assembly is also ensured by the state.


In broader context, it is also necessary to define the exact problem which can solve the grievances of the concerned population. As a matter of case study, if new provinces are carved as per demands then what is the surety that there will be social and economic uplift of the ordinary public? There is also fear that this division may lead to further exploitation by

same interest group who already have the positions in the high ranks of both civil and political domains.

Pakistan's Administrative Structure

Since colonial era, administrative divisions had formed an integral tier of the government structure in the sub-continent. At independence, Pakistan comprised of two wings – eastern and western, separated by a distance of thousand miles of Indian Territory.

From 1955 to 1970, The One Unit Policy meant that there would only be two provinces in Pakistan, namely East and West Pakistan. After the Fall of Dhaka in 1971, Eastern wing separated from the western as a new state, known as Bangladesh. The remaining portion of western wing comprises Pakistan at present. Pakistan consists of four provinces, Islamabad Capital Territory and Federally Administered Tribal Areas with a total area of 796,096 sq. km. at present and its administrative structure is shown in the chart below:



It also raises the question about level of efficiency of the existing system, because the very same system will work under the new provincial administration if new provinces are carved out. In this way, what will be the real change to acquire the desired results? This is a big question which needs to be answered by the competent authorities.

Legal Perspective


The Organization structure of the federal and Provincial Governments in Pakistan is governed by the provisions in the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan. In a federal setup, where both the Federation and the Federating Unit (Provinces) derive their authority from the same Constitution, both are independent of each other's control in the spheres assigned to each by the constitution.⁶

- As for the governance of provinces, each province will have a governor, appointed by the President of Pakistan.
- Each province will have Provincial Consolidated Fund comprising all revenues, loans etc.
- Each province will have a Public Accounts of the Province.
- Executive authority of the province shall extend to all matters in respect of which the Provincial Assembly may make laws.
- Provincial Government may make rules of business regulating the procedures.

Above mentioned are a few salient features of a province in Pakistan. It is perceived that through the demand for the creation of new provinces, all the stakeholders are also seeking such a setup for their respective regions and ethnicities. Moreover, this will bring the desired level of development and progress to their respective areas. Although there is no harm in having positive perceptions and aspirations but these should be realistic and well-evaluated.

Administrative Perspective

Pakistan already maintains comprehensive administrative setup at different levels. There are three tiers of administration at division level, also shown below:



This system of administration already exists at each district level.⁷ With the creation of new provinces, it is vital to ascertain the level of improvement which will be yielded resultantly. It is the believed that this system can be developed to the highest level of output and service delivery by enhancing the people's skills and training.

Administrative reforms in the existing and proposed provinces may be considered on a three point agenda i.e. a) measure for improvement in service provisions, b) an

instrument for political/ideological control and c) a condition for economic development in Pakistan.

Policy Options

Government should seek multiple policy options regarding the demand for new provinces to reach a democratic solution, catering all the stakeholders. The ultimate goal should be the national interests of Pakistan along with the fulfilment of public demand.

Model for New Provinces

A model was applied in “Papua New Guinea” for creation of new provinces, which is a four tier process model. The same model can be applied in context of Pakistan for creation of new provinces.

The resolution regarding creation of new provinces in Punjab Assembly also accompanied the demand for the establishment of a commission to process in a comprehensive way. This depicts the difficulties involved in the process, as it is very sensitive, and precautionary measures are indispensable. Government of Pakistan may put together proposals for administrative criteria and processes for consideration on the creation of new provinces:

- One option can be the establishment of new provinces either by amalgamation or separation between existing provinces or
- By the variation to existing Provincial Boundaries

In this background, a Four Tier Process Model may be proposed. Basically it involves:

- The Initiator which may be a legislative body or some other entity to provide a proposal that must demonstrate how it proposes to meet constitutional, legislative, national policy, financial feasibility, ethnic and geographical cohesion, popular support and other criteria.
- A Competent Commission to screen proposals assesses substantive proposals, advise the legislature on those proposals and assist in the smooth processing.
- Parliamentary Committee with consultation to its supporting institutes like Federal Ministry of Inter Provincial Coordination, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs and Establishment Division decide the final acceptability of the proposal and introduce legislation for boundary changes (including new provinces) if so decided or some other decision.
- Parliament to decide on legislation for change of boundaries.

There is a set of principles for the process in the Model which may be negotiated according to the domestic requirements. The principles for the process are:

- To establish a baseline set of requirements for establishing new provinces and boundary variations.
- To put the onus on Initiators of Proposals for new provinces/boundary variations to “make the case”.

- To force initiators of proposals to provide sufficient information for informed decision making, especially costing and funding information.
- To give a rational basis to the commission to make a decision on whether to approve introduction of legislation for a new province/boundary variations.

Development Strategies for Pakistan

Pakistan needs to review the development strategies to attain the desired level of equal growth among its existing and contingent proposed provinces to boost the local economic system and pro-business climate. China provides an absolute case study of such development in recent decades. Chinese leaders developed several incentive policies to encourage productivity in their economic system, resulting in the uplift of social and economic conditions of respective regions.⁸ In Pakistani context, the less developed or deprived regions should be accorded incentives for economic activities i.e. direct subsidies, quotas and investment.

Case Study of China and Turkey

China also suffered from bureaucratic problems as inefficiency, unresponsiveness, lack of innovation and corruption but as a response Chinese granted greater authority at various tiers of government including provincial, county, city and village, over issues relating to their jurisdiction along with local economic planning, resource management and even foreign trade.⁹ The 18th amendment appears to be a very progressive and the results will be even

fruitful for Pakistan. The purpose of new provinces should be very clear to the public on logical grounds rather than mere political pledges. Pakistan seeks growth and development, no matter if it undergoes the division of its provinces or status quo.

Turkey has an area of 783,562 km² being 37th largest state on globe whereas, Pakistan is at 36th position with 796,096km² but it is quite astonishing to mention that there are 81 provinces in Turkey and only 4 in Pakistan. Turkey is ranked 16th in terms of GDP (PPP) as per 2011 estimates with the total of \$1.073 trillion.¹⁰ Whereas, Pakistan is merely estimated a total \$488.580 billion GDP (PPP) in same period.¹¹ It shows that division of provinces as per respective requirements and national interest can be beneficial for the nation as in the case of Turkey.

Conclusion

Pakistan is the only Islamic nuclear power in the world and at the same time, it is the second most affected state after Afghanistan due to the war against terrorism in the world. Pakistan needs strong and united federation to cope with the international and internal security threats in the course of this war against terrorism at present. Energy crisis, low foreign investment, political maturity in democracy, low growth in Gross Domestic Product and internal security situation are the big problems for Pakistan which needs priority and long term response by the government. In the light of all these concerns, this is perhaps not the right time to involve the masses in the

quest for new provinces in absence of any justified criteria or formula. It is also suspected that the motivation behind this demand is merely political rather than in the national interest of Pakistan. This paper emphasizes the need to critically evaluate and analyse the political/ administrative decisions regarding the creation of new provinces and suggest a well-articulated policy which may answer all the concerns in the due course of division.

This does not suggest in any sense that there should not be demand for more provinces or division of existing large units. The crux of the study is that this demand should be rationale and logical in its nature and application and its core motives should be the adherence to the national interest of Pakistan, unity amongst provinces, increased collaboration, communication at each level, harmony in the nation, strong federation and most importantly the welfare and well-being of the ordinary citizen of Pakistan on equal basis. If the populace is to remain in the same suppression even after the creation of new provinces then the purpose of this whole effort is void.

It is also observed that the administrative and political setups already exist then what will be the new power or motivation factor to realize the demands of public in the wake of new provinces. The determination of the direction is vital as it may lead towards the opposite side of the path to success.

Despite the fact, Pakistan is abundant in resources, new administrative facilities, technical equipments and staff working in the new provinces will still require a large amount

of governmental financial sources. It will be in greater interest of Pakistan and its national integration if democratic concerns like economic growth, social development, welfare, decentralization and good governance are given priority rather than the religious, ethnic, linguistic, caste to be the valid bases for conceding the demands for the creation of new provinces.

End Notes

¹ See the Annexure 2 for map of Pakistan.

² Imperial Gazette of India vol. IV 1907, p. 46.

³ PILDAT Discussion paper on “Proposed Constitutional Amendments in the constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 for empowerment of Azad Jammu & Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan” authored by Justice (Retd.) Syed Manzoor Hussain Gillani, (Islamabad, 2011).

⁴ Dawn News, <http://dawn.com/2012/05/09/resolution-on-new-provinces-sails-through-punjab-assembly/>

⁵ Article 239, clause 4 of the 1973 Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

⁶ Jameelur Rehman Khan, ed. “Government and Administration in Pakistan”. Islamabad: Pakistan Public Administration Research Center, 1987

⁷ See Annexure 1 for the Administrative map of Pakistan.

⁸ Kuotsai, Tom Liou. “Local Economic Development in China and Unites States: Strategies and Issues”. Public Administration Review, S29-S37, 2009.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ "IMF World Economic Outlook Database, April 2012". International Monetary Fund. 2012. Retrieved 17 April 2012.

¹¹ "Pakistan". International Monetary Fund. Retrieved 20 April 2012.