

## DE-RADICALIZATION AND DISENGAGEMENT FROM EXTREMISM: AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS FOR PAKISTAN

Muhammad Nawaz Verdag\*

### Abstract

*This research paper attempts to propose a creative and non-conventional strategy based on 'De-radicalization, Disengagement, and Rehabilitation (DDR)' initiatives to deal with extremism victimizing Pakistan by radical germination. Criticality of extremism-affected communities has given birth to ingenious modes in tackling radicalization, since solely resorting to repressive hardcore military and muscular means may actually cause more problems. The trends of extremism in the world commonly identify rigid intellectual propellants behind them, drawing a lesson that the spread of rotten intellectualism can solely be defeated by strategic doses of vital intellect alone and not by explosives. The DDR programming can significantly shrink the supply and demand of the militants. Tracing conceptual understanding of de-radicalization and disengagement by upholding the significance of soft power strategy through DDR engineering, this research paper analyses contemporary approaches to de-radicalization; identifies phenomenal routes and roots to de-radicalization and disengagement; presents extremism and its intricacies in Pakistan; and finally makes policy recommendations for de-radicalizing and demobilizing the extremist groups.*

**T**he counter-terrorism phenomena as observed in the contemporary world today, is getting complicated. There is neither a broadly accepted understanding of the challenge nor a comprehensive long-term strategy to counter the indiscriminate violence.<sup>1</sup> Propelled by international response in the immediate aftermath

---

\* Muhammad Nawaz Khan Verdag is Assistant Research Officer at Islamabad Policy Research institute.

of 9/11 attacks, the transient hard strategy of pre-emptive strike against the rogue states became a buzzword in the international media. The underlying axiom was that there were a finite number of extremists, whose elimination would blot-out the threat of further attacks. On examining cyclical structures, trends and patterns of extremism in the world, one explores intellectual theories operative behind them, Hence, any kind of putrid intellectual idea can solely be defeated by strategic doses of vital intellect and not by bullets. Moreover, the idea of combating violence with violence is preposterousness. Thus, miscalculation of the exorbitant reliance on muscular strategy to eradicate terrorists and avoid recidivism has further deteriorated the situation rather than reversing it.<sup>2</sup>

Deprogramming of a bomb or a missile is possible but how can an extremist is deprogrammed?<sup>3</sup> As a matter of fact, counter-terrorism policies have not been chalked out to a direction involving psychologically-devised synchronic measures to reinforce the natural tendencies for terrorists to quit the violent motion. Thus, De-radicalization, Disengagement, and Rehabilitation (DDR) policies and research on extremism are being immensely recognized as core components of softer strategy in orienting peace and stability to the terrorism-torn societies. For the popularity of DDR Engineering, there is a need to develop widespread international support and discussion of its objectives for their continued development. With this realization, a turning point is spearheading toward an innovative thinking in counter-terrorism policies in countries that have directly experienced terrorism.<sup>4</sup>

Today, Pakistan stands at the most critical juncture of history and waves of violent acts - suicidal attacks, bomb blasts, sabotage,<sup>5</sup> attacks on security personnel and state installations - are threatening the country. Military measures could cut off the main supply of terrorists by hitting the

---

<sup>1</sup> Paul B. Strate & Mona Yacoubian, Unconventional Approaches to an Unconventional Threat: A Counter-Epidemic Strategy, in *Mapping the Jihadist Threat: The War on Terror Since 9/11*, ed., Kurt M. Campbell & Willow Darsie, (MaryLand: The Aspen Institute, 2006), 85-86. [http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/aspen%20strategy%20group/ASGMAPPING\\_JIHADIST\\_THREAT.PDF](http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/aspen%20strategy%20group/ASGMAPPING_JIHADIST_THREAT.PDF) (accessed March 18, 2009).

<sup>2</sup> Christopher C. Harmon, *Terrorism Today*, Second Edition (London: Routledge, 2009), 127-129.

<sup>3</sup> Susan Mohammad, To Deprogram a Jihadist, *Macleans. CA*, February 2, 2009. <http://www2.macleans.ca/2009/02/02/to-deprogram-a-jihadist/> (accessed January 21, 2011).

<sup>4</sup> Tore Bjorgo & John Horgan, ed. *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement* (London: Routledge, 2009), 1-2.

<sup>5</sup> Kazi, "We must Fight Terrorism to Save Islam, Pakistan," *Press Release no. 311*, Press Information Department Government of Pakistan (Islamabad), July 28, 2009.

core sanctuaries of insurgents, but in the long-run this approach cannot win over hearts and minds of the affected communities, fraught with radical ideologues, which calls for softer power measures to pacify souls and bodies of the individuals and challenge the ideological narrative of extremism.

This research paper attempts to conceptualize a dynamic, soft power counter-terrorism strategy based on DDR Initiatives. This is possible only through ideological cathartic reorientation, socio-economic amelioration and political overhauling.<sup>6</sup> Pakistan may bring forth the example of many extremism-affected contemporary countries and commission her own DDR Programmes, by pointing out programmes that suit her environment. The paper seeks modes to change and align hardcore ideological or religious beliefs that the terrorist convey to that of the civilized societal and Islamic norms. This approach focuses on the rehabilitation and re-education of extremists in Pakistan through a number of channels by reinforcing the true interpretation of ideological tenets of Islam.

## Conceptual Understanding of De-Radicalization and Disengagement

Conceptual divergence between de-radicalization and disengagement is imperative in pointing out that not only one gets rid of terrorism movement, but also one becomes de-radicalized.<sup>7</sup> De-radicalization implies a fundamental transition in understanding. It gives a re-orientation in outlook, often due to some personal traumatic experience of the violent ideologies,<sup>8</sup> engendering post-traumatic growth in the form of rehabilitation. It leads to the opening up of cognitive avenues, making the individual receptive to logical ideas. Disengagement envisages a transformed role for an affected individual by undergoing behavioral and social changes such as leaving a band or changing one's role within the band by discarding the commonly shared norms, values and attitudes of the terrorist network.<sup>9</sup> It also implies some persistent recognition of these

---

<sup>6</sup> The policy option of DDR may be viable only if implemented parallel to well-equipped security-level technical infrastructure, to check any recurrence of terrorists' incidents in Pakistan.

<sup>7</sup> John Horgan, De-radicalisation or Disengagement, *Perspectives on Terrorism*, vol. 11, issue 4 (February 2008): 6, <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/articles/issues/PTv2i4.pdf> (accessed June 9, 2010).

<sup>8</sup> Naureen Chowdhury Fink & Ellie B. Hearne, "Beyond Terrorism: Deradicalisation and Disengagement from Violent Extremism," *International Peace Institute*, October 11, 2008, 3, <http://www.ipacademy.org/media/pdf/publications/beter.pdf> (accessed April 21, 2009).

<sup>9</sup> John Horgan, *The Psychology of Terrorism* (London: Routledge, 2005): 124.

values and attitudes; concurrently engaging in some other socially germane support behavior, but no longer indulged in terrorist maneuvers.<sup>10</sup>

Islamist de-radicalization took place in several other Muslim-majority states in the late 1990s and 2000s, resulting in remarkable ideological transformations toward non-violence by removing tens of thousands of former militants from the ranks of Al-Qaida's supporters.<sup>11</sup> Some of the most successful DDR Programmes are commissioned in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, addressing above mentioned dimensions of behavior and social ties in very creative ways.

DDR Engineering explores systematic ways to desert terrorism. It refers to a package of socio-political, legal, educational and economic programmes focused to deter disaffected individuals from joining the terrorists' ranks.<sup>12</sup> It is about managing the risk of individuals' reentry into the terrorist movement and reducing new recruitments, besides exploring methods aimed at re-socializing the affected individuals into the mainstream society.

## **Analysis of Contemporary Practical Approaches and Practices**

In the counter-terrorism strategies, multiform of DDR Initiatives are world-wide receiving enormous concern today.<sup>13</sup> Extremism will continue to be a socio-political problem<sup>14</sup> and initiatives derived from socio-political and psychological principles<sup>15</sup> are not entirely constant in all the de-radicalization programmes, but undergo multiplicity due to diverse challenges, local threat environment and political paradigms.

---

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Omar Ashore, *Islamist De-radicalization in Algeria: Successes and Failures*, The Middle East Institute, *Policy Brief no. 21* (November 2008), 1, <http://www.mei.edu/Portals/0/Publications/Ashour-Algeria.pdf> (accessed May 27, 2009).

<sup>12</sup> United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, "First Report of the Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism that Lead to Terrorism: Inventory of State Programmes," *UN Action to Counter Terrorism*, 5, <http://www.un.org/terrorism/pdfs/radicalization.pdf> (accessed March 24, 2010).

<sup>13</sup> Froukje Demant & Marieke Sloopman et. al. "De-radicalization of the Right-wing Radicals and Islamic Radicals," *Anne Frank* (2008), [http://www.annefrank.org/ond\\_upload/Downloads/Mon8-UK-Ch11.pdf](http://www.annefrank.org/ond_upload/Downloads/Mon8-UK-Ch11.pdf), (accessed April 3, 2009).

<sup>14</sup> "Terrorism is A Social Problem, Not a Mental or Criminal Problem," *Medical News Today* (London) July 4 2008, <http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/113876.php>, (Accessed, July15, 2009).

<sup>15</sup> John Horgan, *De-radicalisation or Disengagement*, 6.

Driven by their indigenous furor to develop practical programmes countering the appeal of militancy, DDR underpinnings are aimed at curbing the violent practices and changing minds by getting the repentant terrorists absorbed into society.<sup>16</sup>

This kind of terrorism-renunciation is better termed as desertion, de-mobilisation, defection, de-escalation, rehabilitation, reforming, deprogramming etc., carrying different connotations but quite varied assumptions about the way in which DDR Initiatives are developed and implemented in different settings.<sup>17</sup> The DDR Processes are context-specific, oscillating in line with political sensitivities of the countries.<sup>18</sup> Saudi Arabian government uses terminologies conveying sense of Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare (PRAT). Under extremist art therapy and counseling of radical prisoners in Saudi Arabia, 1500 people out of 3200 people, successfully completed the reforming process and were released from prison.<sup>19</sup> The Saudi programme claims a success rate of 80%-90% for successful reintegration into the society.<sup>20</sup>

Yemen, Northern Ireland, Colombia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Algeria, Jordon, Egypt, Great Britain, the Netherlands and Singapore<sup>21</sup> – are the countries who have developed their own respective DDR approaches. Evolved in multiple ways, these strategies carry certain common features as illustrated below:-

- Re-education and Rehabilitation Programme is premised on the redressing of misguidance, through re-education and close examination of the beguiling narrative that the individual has embraced.
- Offering outlets to vent frustrations.
- Alternative lifestyle programmes.
- Engaging with civil society.
- Promoting intercultural alliances.
- Redressing socio-economic inequalities.

---

<sup>16</sup> Tore Bjorgo & John Horgan, *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement*, 170.

<sup>17</sup> John Horgan, *Deradicalisation or Disengagement*, 6.

<sup>18</sup> Naureen Chowdhury Fink, *Beyond Terrorism: Deradicalisation and Disengagement from Violent Extremism*, 4.

<sup>19</sup> Drake Bennett, "How to defuse a human bomb," *The Boston Globe* (Boston), April 13, 2008, [http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2008/04/13/how\\_to\\_defuse\\_a\\_human\\_bomb/](http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2008/04/13/how_to_defuse_a_human_bomb/). (accessed June 12, 2009).

<sup>20</sup> Christopher Boucek, *After Guantanamo: How Effective are the Rehabilitation Programmes in the Muslim World?* Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (February 10, 2009), <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/?fa=view&id=22731> (accessed April 30, 2011).

<sup>21</sup> Drake Bennett, How to Defuse a Human Bomb.

- Countering online radicalization.
- Involving qualified agencies in implementing counter-radicalization policies.
- Amnesty programme, under which the repentant terrorists act as lead mentors.<sup>22</sup>
- Role of a psychologist, mentor etc. who can influence the terrorist - often from family or peer group.
- Ideological tools, such as counter-verdicts, dialogue with renowned clerics.
- Subsequent monitoring to avoid recidivism.

Different Muslim countries have experienced different types of DDR Initiatives, founded on their indigenous customs, political peculiarities and threat environments as outlined below:-

- Raised in August 2002, "The Yemen Committee for Dialogue"<sup>23</sup> appeared as a dual-phased programme that gathered senior clerics, who challenged the ideological themes of militants and imprisoned jihadists, and unveiled their self-assumed religious perceptions.<sup>24</sup> In the ultimate phase, rehabilitation of the individuals was worked out by engaging in social constructs like marriage etc.
- Heavily focused on educational and ideological aspects, since 2003, the Saudi government has launched its successful programme of countering the Al-Qaeda ideology through mass media, university curricula and repentant terrorists, who discourage potential recruits by unfolding the violent internet propaganda of terrorists.<sup>25</sup>

---

<sup>22</sup> Tore Bjorgo & John Horgan, *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement*, 175-176.

<sup>23</sup> Michael Tarnby, "Yemen's Committee for Dialogue: Can Jihadists Return to Society?" *Terrorism Monitor* (Washington), July 15, 2005, [http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx\\_ttnews%5Btt\\_news%5D=527&tx\\_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=180&no\\_cache=1](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=527&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=180&no_cache=1) (accessed October 18, 2011).

<sup>24</sup> Ane Skove Birk, "Incredible Dialogues: Religious Dialogue as a Means of Counter-Terrorism in Yemen," *The International Center for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence*, (April 2009), 3-4, <http://www.icsr.info/publications/papers/1245345445AneSkovBirkReport.pdf> (Accessed: July 30, 2009).

<sup>25</sup> Christopher Boucek, "Saudi Arabia's "softer" Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare," Carnegie Paper no.97, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, (September 2008), 6. [http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/cp97\\_boucek\\_saudi\\_final.pdf](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/cp97_boucek_saudi_final.pdf) (accessed April 3, 2011).

- Under the Parliament's backed de-radicalization policies, core seminaries got united in Indonesia, backed by senior police officials, in February 2007, to prevent radicalization devised in the name of religious justification for terrorism. By focusing on poverty alleviation projects, efforts were channelized to deny opportunities to the radical bands, in targeting fresh recruits by marketing their venomous publicity material.<sup>26</sup>
- An extended version of such DDR Initiative, under the title of Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG), is also observed in Singapore, where by counseling within prisons initially the Jemah Islamiyah (JI) detainees, their immediate families and the whole community was engaged.<sup>27</sup> Reunion with the family proved to be a persuasive matter promoting de-radicalization. Thus, Singapore is accredited with the most successful jihadist rehabilitation programmes.
- In Algeria, between 1997-2000, DDR took place with the unilateral ceasefire of armed wing of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), known as the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), included subgroups from the notorious Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC).<sup>28</sup>
- During the 1990s, Egypt fought a bitter campaign against militant Islamists. Since the end of the insurgency in 1997, Egypt's two fiercest Islamic terrorist groups, the Islamic Group (Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyah) and Islamic Jihad, not only ceased their violent activities, but also published texts revising their religious beliefs on the use of violence.<sup>29</sup> Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyah successfully

<sup>26</sup> Kristen E. Schulze, Indonesia's Approach to Jihadist De-radicalization, *CTC Sentinel*, vol.1, issue. 8, (July 2008): 8-12. <http://www.artkeller.com/uploads/CTCSentinel-Vol1Iss8.pdf>. (Accessed: April 21, 2011).

<sup>27</sup> Darcy M.E. Noricks, Disengagement and De-radicalisation: Processes and Programs, in *Social Sciences for Counterterrorism Putting the Pieces Together*, ed. Paul K. Davis & Kim Cragin, et.al, (Santa Monica: Rand National Defense Research Institute, 2009), 309, [http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND\\_MG849.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG849.pdf). (accessed July 8, 2010).

<sup>28</sup> Omar Ashore, Ending Jihadism? The Transformation of Armed Islamist Movements, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* (September 9, 2009), <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/arb/?fa=show&article=23805>, (accessed October 15, 2011), see also Omar Ashore, "Islamist De-radicalization in Algeria: Successes and Failures." *The Middle East Institute*, Policy Brief no. 21 (November 2008), <http://www.mei.edu/Portals/0/Publications/Ashour-Algeria.pdf> (accessed May 27, 2009).

<sup>29</sup> Lisa Blaydes & Lawrence Rubin, Ideological Reorientation and Counterterrorism: Confronting Militant Islam in Egypt, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol.20, issue. 4, (October 2008): 461,

dismantled its armed wings and abandoned its *fiqh al-'unf* (Islamic jurisprudence justifying violence) literature, between 1997 and 2002. In 2007, Al-Jihad Organization initiated a similar de-radicalization process.<sup>30</sup>

In Europe, the Norwegian project, functioned by the local youth workers, NGOs, indigenous municipal agencies, child welfare officers, police officials etc,<sup>31</sup> successfully trained around 700 people to assist the programme.<sup>32</sup> By extremist art therapy, Exit Sweden Programme ferreted to work directly with those who voluntarily contacted them; indeed, the self-proposed character of the interaction endowed great reliability on the programme.<sup>33</sup> In Germany, manifold initiatives are made functional by civil society tiers and the government. Conspicuous among the latter is the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution.<sup>34</sup>

Increasing imprisonments have raised concerns about long-term rehabilitation of imprisoned terrorists; therefore, based on strong personal ties, reintegration has surfaced, as prisons themselves become major center of radicalization and recruitment.<sup>35</sup> One Indonesian initiative focused on prisoners involved in extremism, persuaded about two dozen members of Jemaah Islamia (JI) and a few members of other jihadi organizations to cooperate with the police.<sup>36</sup> The two most obvious cases are the successful cooperation of two high-ranking detainees, Nasir Abbas and Ali Imran, known to have played a major role in the 2002 Bali

---

<http://www.stanford.edu/~blaydes/Violence.pdf> (accessed September 6, 2011).

<sup>30</sup> Omar Ashore, *Islamist De-radicalization in Algeria: Success and Failures*, 1.

<sup>31</sup> Tore Bjørge & Yngve Carlsson, *Early Intervention with Violent and Racist Youth*, *Working Paper*, no.677, (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2005), 67, <http://english.nupi.no/Publications/Working-Papers/2005/Early-Intervention-with-Violent-and-Racist-Youth-Groups> (accessed November 18, 2010).

<sup>32</sup> Report by United Nation's Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, *First Report of the Working Group on Radicalization and Extremism that Lead to Terrorism: Inventory of State Programmes*, *UN Action to Counter Terrorism*, 20, <http://www.un.org/terrorism/pdfs/radicalization.pdf> (accessed January 9, 2011).

<sup>33</sup> Tore Bjørge & Yngve Carlsson, *Early Intervention with Violent and Racist Youth*, 71.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.* 73-74.

<sup>35</sup> Greg Hannah, Lindsay Clutterbuck, Jennifer et al., *Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the Challenge of Extremist and Radicalized Prisoners*, *Technical Report* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2008), ix-xi, [http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical\\_reports/2008/RAND\\_TR571.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2008/RAND_TR571.pdf) (accessed June 30, 2009).

<sup>36</sup> International Crisis Group, *De-radicalization and Indonesian Prisons*, *Asia Report*, no.142 (Islamabad), November 19, 2007, i.

bombing.<sup>37</sup> About 150 men and one woman, out of 170 people involved in jihadi crimes, have been released after serving sentences for terrorism and underwent de-radicalization in 2006-2007.<sup>38</sup>

Some programmes devise approaches to cut down the number of active terrorist participants (e.g. the Columbian Reincorporation Programme)<sup>39</sup> and may require only a behavioral shift, repudiating violent extremism as the precondition for an individual to be released from prison.

With stark heterogeneity of these initiatives, most programmes objectify to facilitate the societal reincorporation of individual terrorists.<sup>40</sup> This was the case with Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), wherein the members chose to disengage individually. There are also programmes that seek a more collective approach<sup>41</sup> as experienced in the case of Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), wherein the entire movement surrenders to conclude collective disengagement.

Governments could accrue great practical benefits by exploring the drop-out phenomena. Instead of having a one-size-fits-all approach that produces marginal results, there needs to be a tailor-made, comprehensive, multifaceted and flexible programme. By comparatively analyzing case studies in different countries, we can customize de-radicalization programme matching our cultural and political horizon.

## **Significance of Softer Power Strategy: DDR Engineering**

During the last two decades, the phenomena of soft power have gained currency due to the relative failure of the hard strategy;<sup>42</sup> intensifying fault lines illustrated by the ever escalating of vicious circle of extremism. Following table depicts the dynamics of hard and soft powers,

---

<sup>37</sup> Paul E. Pendleton, *Countering Terrorist Ideologies: A Rational Actor and Game Theoretic and Analysis of De-radicalization Programs for Al-Jemaah Al-Islamiyah Prisoners in Singapore and Indonesia* (Postgraduate diss., Naval Postgraduate School, December 2008), 74, [http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2008/Dec/08Dec\\_Pendleton.pdf](http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2008/Dec/08Dec_Pendleton.pdf) (accessed December 27, 2010).

<sup>38</sup> *International Crises Group*, De-radicalization and Indonesian Prisons, i.

<sup>39</sup> Tore Bjorgo & John Horgan, *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement*, 152-169.

<sup>40</sup> Froukje Demant & Marieke Sloodman, *De-radicalization of Right-wing Radicals and Islamic Radical*, 1-2.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Kashmir and Palestine exemplify the failure of the strategic options like coercion, brinkmanship, sanctions, threats and military means to establish influence.

wherein the latter set of policy options can be employed in dealing with centrifugal forces in a befitting manner.

**Table-1**

<b>HARD POWER</b>	<b>SOFT POWER</b>
Use of force	Diplomacy
Sanctions	Engagement
Threats	Persuasions
Coercion	Incentive
Brinkmanship	Dialogue
Aggression	Coexistence
Containment	Co-option in the power structure
Regime change	Tolerance

The DDR Engineering is associated with intellectual interventions, rectifying ideological rigidities of the extremists, as part of synchronized efforts at psychological operations to counter-terrorism,<sup>43</sup> which would benefit greatly from a sharp observation of 'how' and 'why' of individual disengagement. Terrorism is a war for hearts and minds that cannot be won by smart bombs and missiles.<sup>44</sup> Psychological warfare cannot be combated by high-tech weapons; but exclusively by psychological warfare. Commentaries of the clerics, who have rejected Al-Qaida, are surely positive indicators. Unless all aspects of the radicalization cycle are better understood, including those who have left the terrorists' fold, it will be difficult to develop an effective strategy to defeat the Al-Qaida and Taliban Movement.<sup>45</sup>

There is a crucial need to establish an evidential base for framing policies, data compilation, enhancing law enforcement and intelligence agencies' knowledge on individual de-radicalization from extremism. An insight into the drop-outs may enable the counter-terrorism authorities to determine which terrorists are reconcilable and how the government should proceed. For this purpose, bad experiences of former terrorists, autobiographies, interviews of terrorists or their immediate family members, communiqués by the movements etc. can render as essential

<sup>43</sup> Jerrold M. Post, The Key Role of Psychological Operations in Countering Terrorism, in *Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in 21st Century International Perspectives*, vol. 1, ed., James J. F. Forest (Westport: Prager Security International, 2007), 380-394.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> Alex Kingsburg, Why Some Terrorists Make the Choice to Leave al Qaeda, *US News* (Washington), July 16, 2008, <http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2008/07/16/why-some-terrorists-make-the-choice-to-leave-al-qaeda> (accessed February 12, 2011).

source for DDR.<sup>46</sup> In Indonesia, Mohammad Nasir Bin Abbas, a former member of the movement, responsible for the Bali bombing of October 2002, regularly meets the world's press to narrate story of his disengagement from Jemah Islamiyah.<sup>47</sup>

## Phenomenal Roots and Routes to De-radicalization and Disengagement

While observing trend cycles of individual terrorist, ranging from the stages of recruitment to escalation, and de-escalation, one comes across the psychological disillusionment and physical transformations. In the chain of actions, physical change might subsequently bring psychological change, while the later acts as stimuli for the former. The expressions of both psychological and physical de-radicalization and disengagement might be either voluntary or involuntary (threats of arrest or imprisonment).<sup>48</sup>

More elaborative phrasing of physical and psychological de-radicalization and disengagement is done within the framework of Push and Pull factors. Push relates to negative social forces which make it unattractive to remain in a particular social environment.<sup>49</sup> It is indicative of changing personal priorities and longing for a socio-psychological state that is missing in the militant network.<sup>50</sup> Push factors consist of situation like disillusionment with group headship and repulsion from violent acts. These involve negative social sanctions: loss of faith in the ideology of the violent movement; loss of confidence, status and position within the group; becoming burned-out of illicit clandestine life style; competing loyalties between group and family obligations weaken the individuals' commitments to fanaticism; financial disputes etc.<sup>51</sup>

---

<sup>46</sup> Josh Kurlantzick, A Radical Solution, *Los Angeles Times* (Los Angeles), January 6, 2008, <http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jan/06/opinion/op-kurlantzick6> (accessed April 18, 2009).

<sup>47</sup> Nick O'Brien, Interview with a Former Terrorist: Nasir Abbas Deradicalisation Work in Indonesia, *CTC SENTINEL* vol. 1 issue.12 (November 2008): 19-21, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/CTCSentinel-Vol1Iss12.pdf> (accessed July 15, 2009).

<sup>48</sup> John Horgan, Psychological Factor Related to Disengaging From Terrorism: Some Preliminary Assumptions and Assertions, in *A Future for the Young Options for Helping Middle East Youth Escape the Trap of Radicalization, Working Paper* no. WR-354, ed. Cheryl Benared, (Santa Monica: RAND National Security Research Division, September 2005), 72, [http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/working\\_papers/2006/RAN\\_D\\_WR354.pdf](http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/working_papers/2006/RAN_D_WR354.pdf), (accessed June 3, 2011).

<sup>49</sup> Tore Bjørgo & Yngve Carlsson, *Early Intervention with Violent and Racist Youth*, 25.

<sup>50</sup> Hrogan, *The Psychology of Terrorism*, 129.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

The development of inceptive feelings of disillusionment or desire for some substitute ideology is a common finding of many DDR Programmes.<sup>52</sup> It is important to identify these feelings offering an obvious basis to build on DDR, ultimately triggering individuals' final decisions to leave the violent role and creating a new identity as an "ex". Disillusionment may emanate from:-

- Inconsistency between initial ideas, goals and fantasies, that shaped a person's initial involvement and his subsequent experiences with the reality that reflects mismatch between the fantasy and reality,<sup>53</sup> thereby leading to gradual dismantling.
- Disagreement on tactical matters,<sup>54</sup> wherein tactical and operational differences with the leadership lead loyalty erosion in the group.
- Strategic, political or ideological differences.<sup>55</sup>

The strategy of Pull refers to factors that attract a person to more rewarding alternatives,<sup>56</sup> longing for a peaceful life outside the covey (marriage, finding a career or beginning a family), desire for freedom without stress of illegal activism, amnesty or reduced sentencing; deteriorating energy, economic support and establishing a family with new social networks. These phenomena can be triggered under increasing age, pressure from spouses or families, and desire to engage in alternative occupations having socio-economic prospects.<sup>57</sup>

### **Extremism Intricacies in Pakistan: Available Policy Dimensions for De-radicalizing and Demobilizing the Spoilers' Groups**

There is a strong convergence of views among the security critics that the challenge of terrorism is complex and deeply rooted in the evolution of political and socio-economic forces.<sup>58</sup> The same holds true in the case of Pakistan. A common perspective in seeking the more distal origins of terrorism is that the trajectory to extremism is a dimension that begins in grievance and ends in violence. Suicide bombings during the last three

---

<sup>52</sup> Darcy M.E. Noricks, *Disengagement and De-radicalization: Processes and Programs*, 305-306.

<sup>53</sup> Hrogan, *The Psychology of Terrorism*, 126.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid. 129.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid. 126-129.

<sup>56</sup> Tore Bjørgo &Yngve Carlsson, *Early Intervention with Violent and Racist Youth*, 26.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> Luis de la Corte, *Explaining Terrorism: A Psychosocial Approach, Perspectives on Terrorism*, vol. 1, issue. 2 (2007), \ <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/8/html> (accessed December 27, 2010).

years in Pakistan confirm that the planners are concentrating on the most precious human asset of the nation; youth ranging from 14 to 30 years of age, as the primary source of recruitment for training and indoctrination for terrorist acts.

Since 1 January, 2001 to 17 January, 2011, a total of 34814 persons were affected by the extremists' acts and suicide attacks, injuring 7214 security personnel and 17126 civilians, while killing 2704 security personnel and 7770 civilians.<sup>59</sup> Waves of violent acts in the form of bomb blasts, target killings, sabotage activities, and attacks on security personnel and state institutions, attacking soft targets like worship places of opponent sects to ignite ethno-sectarian strife; is the terrorists' agenda to subjugate the entire country by imposing their harsh ideology, which has nothing to do with Islam. Terrorism is not an issue of law and order; it is a socio-political problem that requires a matching approach to solve it.<sup>60</sup>

Bad governance, erosion of order, decimation of institutions, polarization of society, bewildering administrative vacuum, absolute poverty, glaring levels of illiteracy, feelings of oppression, sense of marginalization, lack of sports and recreational facilities and the resultant alienation of the youth from society, are a few factors which drive the youth towards eccentric radicalization. In a society like Pakistan's, territorial disputes - with India and now Afghanistan - ethnic contests, competing visions about the very basis of Pakistani state and absence of consensus on the nature and direction of political system, raise the probability of violence and mismanagement. Parallel to this, is the unchecked mushroom growth of *Madaris* in Pakistan during the 1<sup>st</sup> Afghan war of the Soviet era, whereby the US engineered *jihād* brought into Pakistan approximately 35,000 *Mujahedeen*, to be trained, armed and pumped back into Afghanistan to fight the US-branded *jihād* against the Soviets. This involved a large section of Pakistani youth – especially those belonging to the front line FATA and adjacent western highlands of Pakistan. In the years of post-Soviet withdrawal, these *Mujahedeen* were termed as *Taliban*.

Soft power humane approaches are needed to stem the tide of radicalization, particularly in the youth, who are falling prey to extremism. Political and ideological motivations are the centre-pieces in the complex terrorism phenomena, which is not a conventional crime. The dogma of terror is such that triumph in using hard power; through raids, incarceration, detention, captivity and capital punishment, are not the ideal measures. Central objective of DDR Programming is to thwart further

---

<sup>59</sup> Crises Management Cell, Ministry of Interior Government of Pakistan, Yearly-Wise Summary of Human Losses in Terrorist Acts in Pakistan 1 January 2001 to 17 January 2011" *IPRI Factfile*, vol. XII, no. 12 (December, 2010): 1.

<sup>60</sup> Dr Rashid Ahmad Khan, Re-strategizing the Anti-terror War, *Daily Times* (Lahore), August 31, 2010.

acts of terror, whether directly by the person concerned or through his sway.

Furthermore, successfully rehabilitated individuals can provide valuable insights into the workings of terrorist organizations, and can thus be seen as contributors to the overall counter-terrorism strategy. Innovative and collaborative approaches can be successfully employed by involving strategic communities, social workers, academics, therapists, municipal employees, NGOs, and intelligence as well as law enforcement agencies pursuing counter-terrorism goals. It is largely through their commitment, together with support from families of the target demography,<sup>61</sup> that the DDR Programmes can be commissioned. Pakistani policy-makers face a grave challenge to design a holistic approach toward the issue of extremism and terrorism.

### **Policy Recommendation**

Presently there is no known official DDR Programmes in Pakistan. To fill in the vacuum, following recommendations are made to curb this ever-growing evil:-

#### **Role of NGOs in Bridging the Rifts and Vocal Support from Civil Society**

To knock out the threat of recidivism, community-based homogeneous approach; deriving funding from indigenous sources (like charitable organizations, entrepreneurs, welfare organizations, local chamber of commerce etc., and integration of indigenous police, municipal agencies<sup>62</sup> and political agents in tribal areas) is necessary for capacity-building and DDR Projects. Under private-public ventures, they can establish schools, welfare projects, training programmes etc. for repentant prisoners, by tapping community resources through national-level mass-awareness.

Citizen, Peace and Security Committees comprising notables from all walks of life, should be effectively created and operated at all levels. Community nobles and police administration can help enforcing security arrangements, keeping mosques and madrassas under check to prevent the spread of radical germination.

---

<sup>61</sup> Renee Garfinkel, *Personal Transformations Moving from Violence to Peace, United States Institute of Peace* (Washington), *Special Report 186*, (April 2007), <http://www.usip.org/files/resources/sr186.pdf> (accessed September 27, 2010).

<sup>62</sup> Naureen Chowdhury Fink & Ellie B. Hearne, *Beyond Terrorism: De-radicalization and Disengagement from Violent Extremism*, 5.

## Psychological Counseling Programmes

Counseling Programmes, entailing sessions with psychologists and social scientists, may be designed for participants and their families, evaluating prisoners' social standing, diagnosing psychosomatic problems and assessing the conformity rate. This provides vital insights into how an individual participant is progressing and<sup>63</sup> determines whether or not the rehabilitation is genuine.

## Familial Engagement

Familial engagement is a critical factor in the success of the Exit programmes and DDR Processes to overcome the feelings of isolation and guilt. Competing social relationships or pressure by family, friends, parents and spouses may thus use social relationships to convince a militant to return to normal life. During the aftercare, concentration is focused on the personal stature through state protection, providing skills, training and assistance; stable relationships reinforced parenting and building of new social networks, so that former extremists may establish their new lives.<sup>64</sup> Similarly, involvement of parents-driven initiative also proves to be highly effective in extracting children from the clutches of extremism.<sup>65</sup>

## Attractive Alternatives and Support

Extremist-terrorist assemblage meets certain needs of its associates, in terms of providing identity, community, shield, and exhilaration. Potential defectors from extremist religious' identities are unlikely to take the plunge, if they see no pragmatic and reasonably secure escape channels substitute the type of life they are presently living. Those who withdraw from the terrorist band, usually do so because continued membership appears unattractive and is no longer fulfilling their socio-psychological needs (push-factors), whereas life outside the group appears more eye-catching (pull-factors).

## Countering Online Radicalization

Internet's role in shaping and sustaining global terrorism is emerging as the critical new dimension of 21<sup>st</sup> century terrorism; with websites and

---

<sup>63</sup> Ari W. Kruglanski, Michele Gelfand & Rohan Gunaratan, Detainee De-radicalization: A Challenge for Psychological Science, *Association for Psychological Science*, vol. 23 no. 1 (January 2010), 1-3, <http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/ICPVTRinNews/DetaineeDeradicalization-AChallengeForPsychologicalScience.pdf>, (accessed December 3, 2011).

<sup>64</sup> Tore Bjørgo & Yngve Carlsson, *Early Intervention with Violent and Racist Youth*, 30-32.

<sup>65</sup> Naureen Chowdhury Fink & Ellie B. Hearne, *Beyond Terrorism: De-radicalization and Disengagement from Violent Extremism*, 10.

electronic bulletin boards spreading radicalized ideological messages, perpetuating terrorist networks, recruiting disciples and providing links between operatives on cyber-space. A pervasive, public information campaign should be put in place to counter this cataclysm. To identify the most innovative and effective counter strategies, following is recommended: deterring the producers of extremist materials; empowering users to self-regulate their online communities; reducing the appeal of extremist messages through education; and awareness.<sup>66</sup>

Countering online radicalization is the first systematic effort, bringing together IT industry and national experts to capitalize upon the potential contributions of the internet companies and internet users, e.g. Saudi Arabia launched the *Sakhina* (tranquility) scheme,<sup>67</sup> in which trained individuals challenged the wrong ideologues of susceptible terrorists by logging on to the internet in radical chat-rooms.

### **Re-education and Rehabilitation**

Emphasize moderate teachings and non-violent resolutions to religious conflict through massive religious education campaigns. Enrich the curricula of religious seminaries by providing courses in history, technology and science to broaden the scientific horizons of religious clerics and their students. Massive book distribution programme, introducing persuasive and balanced studies of Islam and comparative religions through school libraries, may be an effective tool. Regional and provincial disparities in educational sector need to be overcome by raising adequate and streamlined public-private schooling ventures<sup>68</sup> in backward regions, producing strategic doses of human capital oriented to sophisticated technical economic requirements.

### **Holistic Interpretation of Religion**

Crafted on the premise that extremism originates from a mistaken interpretation of Islam, rather than willful inclination to terrorism, the programmes need to be constructed to re-educate individuals and promote a more holistic interpretation of religion ensuring ideological

---

<sup>66</sup> Tim Stevens & Dr. Peter R. Neumann, *Countering Online Radicalisation: A Strategy for Action*, The International Centre for The Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, *Policy Report*, (London), January 28, 2009, <http://www.icsr.info/news/attachments/1236768445ICSROnlineRadicalisationReport.pdf> (accessed July 7, 2010).

<sup>67</sup> Hayat, Saba Noor and Shagufta, *De-radicalization: Approaches and Methods*, *Conflict and Peace Studies*, vol. 2, no.2, (Apr-Jun 2009): 50-51.

<sup>68</sup> Andrew Coulson, *Education and Indoctrination in the Muslim World: Is There a Problem? What Can We Do About It?* *Policy Analysis*, no. 511 (March 11, 2004), <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa511.pdf>, (accessed December 18, 2011).

immunization<sup>69</sup> to rotten narrative. Well-respected clerics, Islamic scholars and university professors should involve in multiple modes of education, public speaking and writings using verses from the Holy Quran and Hadith that speak of peace and good conduct thus neutralizing the dangerous radical ideology.

### **Alternative Channels to Vent Frustration**

As lack of healthy activities to express grievances or dissatisfaction may result in violent behavioral tendencies, *Taliban* are exploiting the class inequalities and regional disparities of the tribal areas. The tribal zone is adversely affected by high unemployment (50%) while the 15-30 year age group accounts for 75% of the population, yet there is absence of enough resources to engage this group in productive activities.<sup>70</sup> Creating space where disaffected groups may meet, express and organize themselves through non-violent means is an underlying feature of the programme to reincorporate vulnerable individuals into society in the post disengagement period by providing them with alternative employment opportunities or subsidized vocational training skills.

### **Amnesty Programmes**

It involves offering certain sort of forgiveness by society or certain segments of society, ensuring a new start and helping people merge into their community. Peripheral criminals, and not the diehard elements, may be granted amnesty which will alienate them from irreconcilable militants. The issues of amnesty and reconciliation in these cases exclusively depend on the magnitude of violence, cultural context and legal traditions of the concerned society. These programmes do not consider people guilty of major crimes, like mass murder, rape etc, and may not exempt people who are serving a prison sentence. A security committee, under Ministry of Interior, can evaluate prisoners for security risks and then make release recommendations, based on the input provided by the Religious, Psychological and Security Committees. Central objective of the Security Committee is to monitor detainees upon their release.

Legal Assistance Programme (LAP) is one component facilitating reduction of sentences in exchange for repentance and collaboration with authorities, as was a case with the Italian Repentance Programmes under which members of the Red Brigades and Mafia were offered amnesty, who had testified against their former colleagues of the terrorist group.<sup>71</sup> In

---

<sup>69</sup> Paul B. Strate, *Unconventional Approaches to an Unconventional Threat: A Counter-Epidemic Strategy*, 91-93.

<sup>70</sup> Tore Bjorgo, *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement*, 232.

<sup>71</sup> Erica Chenoweth, "Italy and the Red Brigades: The Success of Repentance Policy in Counterterrorism" in *Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in 21st*

Colombia, legal and judicial matters conceived de-mobilization and disengagement not just of existing prisoners, but also of the active members of AUC, FARC and Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN). To facilitate exit process, the Colombian judiciary suspended the militants' trial to encourage and sustain de-mobilization.<sup>72</sup>

### Role of Madaris

As a result of the Afghan war, more than three million Afghans refugees brought conservatism, extremism and radicalism to Pakistan. The seminaries or *Madrasah* mushroomed and provided religious education to a large number of students, most of which received purely religious education to become '*Masjid imams*' (prayer leaders) or preachers of religion.

However, seen against the backdrop of low literacy rate and low availability of quality-based public education, the role played by *Madrasah* in imparting education is crucial to Pakistan.<sup>73</sup> *Madrasah* in Pakistan have a long history of providing religious education and free boarding-lodging to poor children, who would otherwise receive no education at all. With less than 2% of GDP spent on education;<sup>74</sup> religious seminaries essentially fill the vacuum created by a deficient schooling system in the public sectors, and a small percentage of the *Madrasah* have been known to teach militant- interpretations of Islam.

*Wafaq-ul-Madaris*, being the federation of religious schools that regulates curricula of the majority of Islamic institutions and holds examinations throughout Pakistan, has failed to monitor what type of religious education is being taught in the *Madrasah*. Any DDR Programme must recognize that in Pakistan, violent extremist individuals are recruited mainly from uneducated and impoverished communities, wherein the role of *Madrasah* in brewing militancy is relatively limited in extent.

Though, it is also a fact that there is no credible monitoring of the qualifications of *Madrasah* teachers and their backgrounds, and many *Madrasah* continue to employ teachers with sympathies to militant interpretations of Islam, therefore DDR Initiatives must recognize that teenagers are easily influenced by recruiters. Critically, *Madrasah* graduates can only become religious teachers as they are not imparted strategic skilled educations to join mainstream skilled employment and

---

*Century*, vol. 3, ed. James J. F. Forest (Westport: Prager Security International, 2007), 359.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid. 310-330.

<sup>73</sup> Robert Loonney, Reforming Pakistan's Education System: the Challenge of the Madrasahs, *Journal of Social, Political Science, and Economic Studies*, vol. 28, no.3, (Fall 2003), 261, <http://www.uvm.edu/~envprog/madrassah/reform-edu.pdf>, (accessed April 27, 2011).

<sup>74</sup> International Crises Group, Pakistan: Reforming the Education Center, *Asia Report*, no. 84, (Islamabad), October 7, 2004.

some are therefore, not surprisingly, opting to join a violent *jihad*. There is a need for comprehensive strategy to employ human capital of *Madrasah* in the development of the Pakistan along the modernized scientific lines of private and public education. Role of *Wafaq-ul-Madaris* needs to be expanded in modernizing the *Madrasahs'* curricula, within the imperatives of worldly and religious education, besides adding importance to the innovative trainings of clerics.<sup>75</sup> Moreover, enforcement of *Madrasahs'* registration and the monitoring of religious instruction should not be overlooked.

### **Role of Media**

While the events since the 9/11 terror attacks and the ensuing questionable war against terrorism continue to stir debates and emotions all over, it also reverberates in the media in various dimensions. One dimension is the radicalization of youth in the Muslim societies in particular. Most of the media in countries, such as Pakistan, still seems wrapped in emotional responses to the foreign policy objectives of the U.S. and its allies. This also impacts the youth in particular and there also is little conscious effort to prevent them from falling victims to the emotional debate on the causes of the existing notional gaps between the Muslim and non-Muslim societies. The media, therefore, needs to proactively intervene-logically rather than emotionally-and help the youth.

### **Rehabilitation of Detainees**

Rehabilitation programmes, during police detention and imprisonment, would be aimed at converting former terrorists into wise members of their families<sup>76</sup> and communities by carefully identifying those who would be cooperative and are susceptible to work with security officials. Detainees are likely to respond more positively to those who have knowledge of and respect for tribal culture.

### **True Interpretation of Jihad**

The concept of *jihad*, so central to Pakistani politics over several decades, has been seen as a capture of the mind. The literal meaning of

---

<sup>75</sup> Dr Manzoor H Khatana, Pak must Regulate Mosque & Madaris, *Pakistan Observer* (Islamabad), September 25, 2010.

<sup>76</sup> Ansyaad Mbai, Fighting Extremism through Cooperation an Indonesian Perspective, a paper presented in Security in Government Conference, *Australian Government Attorney-General's Department*, (December 5-7, 2007), 7.

[http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/\(CFD7369FCAE9B8F32F341DBE097801FF\)~E000Fighting+Extremism+Through+Cooperation--LT+Final.pdf/\\$file/E000Fighting+Extremism+Through+Cooperation-LT+Final.pdf](http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(CFD7369FCAE9B8F32F341DBE097801FF)~E000Fighting+Extremism+Through+Cooperation--LT+Final.pdf/$file/E000Fighting+Extremism+Through+Cooperation-LT+Final.pdf) (accessed June 18, 2009).

*jihad* is struggle.<sup>77</sup> Islam recognizes four major categories of *Jihad* that are: *Jihad* against one's self (*Jihad al-Nafs*), *Jihad* by tongue (*Jihad al-lisan*), *Jihad* by hand (*Jihad al-yad*), and *Jihad* by sword (*Jihad as-sayf*)<sup>78</sup> or *Jihad Al-Asghar* is the minor *jihad*, as it pre-supposes certain conditions and imposes specific limits. *Jihad Al-Akber* is the major *Jihad* and is known as *Jihad al-Nafs*, implying self-restraint or personal struggle.<sup>79</sup> The misinterpretation of *Jihad* has been a vital tool for radicalization in Pakistan. The credible re-evaluation of *jihadi* ideology must take centre stage to strike at the heart of the process of recruitment into violent extremism, world-wide. The contextual true understanding of *Jihad*, however, can also be an essential tool for the engagement and rehabilitation of *jihadis*. Sayyid Imam al-Sharif, also known Dr Fadl, the founder of Egyptian *Jihad*, now argues that true *Jihad* can only be conducted by conforming to certain preconditions.<sup>80</sup> Respected Islamic intellectuals are central to this mobilization.

### **Nation-wide Intellectual Debates**

Open up dialogues between the liberal segments of society and Taliban sympathizers. Dialogues and peace deals could isolate hardliners from the moderate elements in the society. The current environment in Pakistan is advantageous to a nation-wide debate through public mass-awareness campaigns, displaying banners across Pakistan with verses from the Holy Quran prohibiting extremism and gratuitous acts of violence. This calls for tolerance, pluralism, and peace in academic discourses popularized through media and cultural mediums.<sup>81</sup>

### **Reforms in the Tribal Belt**

The battle for political reforms is ventured with the issue of de-radicalization and disengagement in the tribal belt. Elected political representation in FATA will modify the economic arena of the belt, fallen deep into poverty and neglect. It will also change the socio-political arena by taking away some of the influence of the militants. The issues of

<sup>77</sup> Sanusi Taofiq Temitope, *Jihad and Terrorism: An Appraisal of Islamic International Law*, *Ediaro.com*, no. 06/40IL062, May 2010, [http://www.ediaro.com/eLibrary/Law/Project\\_Download/JIHAD\\_AND\\_TERRORISM\\_AN\\_APPRAISAL\\_OF\\_ISLAMIC\\_INTERNATIONAL\\_LAW.pdf](http://www.ediaro.com/eLibrary/Law/Project_Download/JIHAD_AND_TERRORISM_AN_APPRAISAL_OF_ISLAMIC_INTERNATIONAL_LAW.pdf) (accessed May 3, 2011).

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>80</sup> Michael Jacobson, *Why Terrorists Quit: Gaining from Al-Qaida's Losses*, *CTC SENTINEL* vol. no. 1 issue no. 8, (July 2008): 1-4, [http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/CTC\\_whyterroristsquit.pdf](http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/CTC_whyterroristsquit.pdf) (accessed April 27, 2010).

<sup>81</sup> Ansyaad Mbai, *Fighting Extremism through Cooperation an Indonesian Perspective*, 7-8.

political and socio-economic grievances remain concerns on the national scale, calling for developmental projects of Social Action Programme (SAP) and subsequent opportunities. On political front, it calls for the strengthening of political agents and effective restoration of the tribal systems. Tribal social structure imposes a hierarchy that forms a strong bulwark against rebellions by forcing conformity upon the clans, ultimately limiting the social space available for rebels to operate in.<sup>82</sup> Tribes can collaborate with the security forces in taking action against belligerents, and they can also take responsibility for the good conduct of remorseful militants.

## Conclusion

Facing the most acute problem of militancy and extremism, and no official DDR Programme, Pakistan is a country regarded by many as the epicenter in the fight against global terrorism. The ballooning of extremism against the backdrop of a tribal society demonstrates why a comprehensive and sustainable DDR Engineering is indispensable. A long-term strategy; backed by people from all walks of life, associated with high-level of vigilance at all official, semi-official and private ends, is need of the hour. By bringing the militants into the fold of DDR Programming, the government may kill two birds with one stone - winning trust of the tribal people who would no longer be motivated to support the left-over terrorists, and beginning the slow painful process of gradually disengaging itself from the US-led War on Terror. Undoubtedly, it appears to be an uphill task but not beyond resources to keep intact Pakistan's sovereignty and fundamental rights of her citizenry.

Pakistan requires transformation from belief-based to knowledge-based society to meet the challenges of radicalization of youth in the county. Most people who have alienated from extremism and passed through DDR Engineering are vulnerable. To fight extremism, publicizing the peaceful rationality of Islam that teaches universal harmony and brotherhood and has no link with "-isms" derivational of terrorism, extremism, fanaticism, fundamentalism etc., is urgently required. Emphasis is to be laid on the exigency for preventing the minds of our youth from descending into mental slums, where toxic germination of radicalism is growing.

There is need to seek a pragmatic strategy that makes a bridge between hard and soft power strategies, to be employed at the state level for long-term rehabilitation and reintegration of the extremists; as extremism is related with minds and cannot be resolved by mere ammunition.

---

<sup>82</sup> Kamran Bokhari, Limits to the Saudis' jihadi Crackdown, *Asia Times*, Middle East (Hong Kong), May 16, 2009, [http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle\\_East/KE16Ak01.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KE16Ak01.html). (accessed September 27, 2011).



