


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MESSAGE OF PATRON



The depth of knowledge, maturity of thought and improvement in analytical skills are the cardinals of National Security and War Course at Armed Forces War College (NDU). The year long intellectual and professional pursuit on national and international issues equip the future policy and strategy makers with conceptual clarity and analytical skills.

Intellectually honest, genuinely serious and thematically current, the package of ideas, words and images are the new edition of e-journal “Opinion”. The selected articles on current national and international issues are prepared by the members of NSWC 2016 and 2017. We expect the readers will feel more educated with regards to comprehensive national security.

I would like to acknowledge the commitment and hard work of the entire team of OPINION on publication of its 7th edition. I hope the ideas shared would contribute towards creating awareness on the security matters and highlighting need to promote peace and stability.

**Major General
Fayyaz Hussain Shah
Commandant
Armed Forces War College
National Defence University, Islamabad**

CHIEF EDITOR'S CORNER



We feel great pleasure in presenting the 7th edition of our AFWC “*Opinion*” e-journal, the first publication of this year’s annual issue. Deliberate efforts have been made by all concerned to maintain the high standard set forth by the University in bringing the well researched work by the panels of NSWC 2017 mainly comprising research work of individuals / panels on key issues.

For our new readers, OPINION e-journal is a publication of Pakistan’s premier institution National Defence University Islamabad. The magazine is a collection of selected researched work of the panels /individuals. The Journal is broadly divided into four sections i.e. Global / Regional issues, National Security, Military Strategy and Views of individual writers on contemporary issues. This year we helped readers unpick the many facets of global crises of intolerance, extremism and polarization taking into account DAESH in Middle East. Regional Section adds critical analysis of Malayan and Srilankan Insurgency. While National Issues selected to be share are Pakistan’s economy with special reference to Debt Trap, combating radicalism and mainstreaming FATA

I strongly believe that readers will feel a professional analytical approach and find new ideas in this edition as well. This edition will definitely be NDU's another leap for intellectual and professional development.

**Chief Editor
Midhat Shahzad**

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PART-I

GLOBAL / REGIONAL SECURITY

- **DAESH in Middle East, Threat Analysis and Implications for South Asia with Special Focus on Pakistan.**
- **Malyan and Sri Lankan Insurgencies.**

DAESH IN MIDDLE EAST, THREAT ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH ASIA WITH SPECIAL FOCUS ON PAKISTAN

**Lt Col Ameer, Lt Col Ali Akhter, Mr. Muzaffar,
Mr. Anwar, Cdre Younas & Gp Capt AO Adole**

Abstract

DAESH (Ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyahfī 'l-'Irāqwa-sh-Shām), a group that eclipsed Al Qaeda (AQ) and made Al-Zawahiri virtually irrelevant, offering different visions and strategies, based on brutality and fear. War in Iraq gave birth to DAESH, formed as a resistance group against persecution of Sunni Muslims by the Shia dominated government of the Iraqi Prime Minister Nur al Maliki. Being comprised of mostly the ex-Iraqi servicemen from the Iraqi Armed Forces, the organization soon grabbed significant territory and announced establishment of Islamic State with the Salafi Tradition. Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi, the self-proclaimed caliph declared to govern the state by Sharia laws and bringing all previously Muslim inhabited regions of the world under its political control, starting from Andalus (Spain) in the West till Khurasan in the East. DAESH carries out parallel campaigns across three geographic rings. The Interior ring, the Near Abroad ring and the Far Abroad ring encompassing the entire world, where DAESH attempts to foment a broader war. The organization / brand hold the potential to expand in other regions specially Afghanistan and South Asia, which provide ideal recruiting ground due to its ideology of Islamic Caliphate. There is a need to carryout detailed appraisal of DAESH including its perceived implicit and explicit objectives, underpinning its ideology, interests of international players and threat posed to Pakistan with a view to suggest response options.

Introduction

In post 9/11 era, Middle East has emerged as a most volatile region on the globe. The instability of Middle East is fundamentally attributed to host of domestic issues mainly authoritarian regimes, proxies of regional players and demographic divisions on sectarian and ethnic basis. While internal factors fundamentally define the instability matrix, the region has also been corrupted by various external dynamics of geopolitics. These include Israel - Palestine conflict, US attack on Afghanistan, Arab uprisings and consequent regime changes in Libya, Tunisia, Yemen and Egypt which have further complicated the security matrix of the region. DAESH since it's rising in 2014, has swiftly captured sizeable territory in Middle East and obstinately plans to expand swiftly in so called Khorasan Region comprising Afghanistan and some portions of Central Asia, Iran and Pakistan. The landscape is already in a perpetual state of volatility, fragility and instability which provides space for extreme ideologies to flourish. This warrants a deliberate study to understand this threat and formulate viable response strategy.

Genesis and Administrative Layout

Origin and Name of DAESH

The Origin

DAESH has emerged from the ashes of Al-Qaeda in Iraq. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian Afghan war veteran can be termed as founder of DAESH. Zarqawi, who after fighting against Soviets in Kabul came back to Jordan to attempt a failed coup against monarchy and was arrested in 1994. He founded Jamat al Tawhid Wa al Jihad in 1999 after been given general amnesty on regime change. In 2001, Zarqawi moved to Iraq to help Saddam's intelligence services to contain Kurdish separatist movement. After invasion of Iraq by US-led forces in 2003, the organization developed into a militant network to counter the occupation forces and their Iraqi allies. In October 2004, Zarqawi swore loyalty to Osama Bin Ladin and renamed his Organization as Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). This organization differed from Al Qaeda in use of brutal violence and aimed to create a Sunni caliphate in Baghdad. Zarqawi got killed in US air-strikes in Iraq in June 2006¹ and Abu Abdullah Al Rashid Al Baghdadi was appointed as new leader who formed Mujahideen Shura Council. In October 2006, Mujahideen Shura Council merged with several more insurgent factions and established Islamic State of Iraq (ISI).

In April 2010, Al Baghdadi was killed during US airstrike and was replaced by Abu Ayub al Misri who also got killed in US Iraq joint operations at Tikrit. Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, who was under US captivity at Bucca (Iraq) from February to December 2004, became the new leader of Islamic State in Iraq and reinvigorated the organization by expanding in both psychological and physical domain. Abu Bakr al Baghdadi sent operatives into Syria to establish a branch, which resulted in creation of Jabhat al Nusra in January 2012 which was supported by different Sunni states of Middle East and the US. In April 2013, the group adopted the name Islamic State of Iraq and Syria known as DAESH.² On 10 June 2014, ISIS with its 800 fighters captured second largest city of Iraq, Mosul by defeating more than 8000 Iraqi soldiers. On 29 June 2014, DAESH leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, while addressing the Muslim community announced the establishment of Islamic State (IS) and declared himself as self proclaimed Caliph.³

Name (DAESH / ISIS / ISIL / IS)⁴

DAESH is recognized with four different names i.e. Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), its Arabic acronym Ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah fī 'l-'Irāqwa-sh-Shām (DAESH), Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) or Islamic States (IS). All these names are appropriate and are used by different countries as: DAESH and ISIS in Arab World and Pakistan, ISIL by the US and IS by the organization itself. The word Levant used by the US has a French origin which means to rise from the East, referring to the old territory East of the Mediterranean Sea starting from Southern Turkey through Syria to Egypt including Lebanon, Israel, Palestine, Jordan and Iraq.

Flag and Emblem: The flag of DAESH is a Black Standard which bears seal of The Prophet (PBUH), within white circle and 1st part of Kalma written above the seal in Arabic i.e. LA ILLAHA ILL LALLAH.⁵ DAESH has developed an emblem

having clear symbolic meaning in the Muslim world. It displays an Arabic phrase which means One Banner, One Ummah.



Ideological Underpinnings of DAESH

DAESH derives its ideological moorings from the golden era of traditional Muslim rule in Islamic hinterland of Levant. While taking lead from writings of various Muslim scholars of the past, they usually interpret Quran as per their own inclinations and propagate their own myopic worldview.

Concept of Caliphate

Caliphate, which was established after the departure of Holy Prophet Muhammad (Peace be Upon Him), prevailed in Muslim world for over 1300 years. The last caliphate, ruled by the Ottoman Empire, was abolished by the secular Turkish leader Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in 1924. Although, most Arabs welcomed the end of Ottoman Empire because of its strong Turkish identity, single largest population of Muslim world in British India took exception to Caliphate's demise. DAESH wants to restore the Caliphate and considers Muslims as a single nation (Ummah) under one Caliph. They consider only two nations in the world; Muslims and non-Muslims.

Salafism Vs Wahabism/ Deobandi

The ideology of the DAESH is that of Salafist - Jihadism.⁶ As per the DAESH ideology, there is no distinction between religion and state. All decisions are based on a hard line interpretation of sharia (Islamic law), which is brutally enforced in the areas controlled by DAESH. The ideology is almost the same as that of other groups such as Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. It differs in its approach to the proper timing and the conditions necessary to establish a caliphate. Salafist thought is based on the idea of returning to the supposedly pure form of Islam practiced by the successors to the founder of Islam, Prophet Muhammed (PBUH) and the earliest Muslims.⁷ They reject any later additions as bid'ah (innovation) and un-Islamic leading to severe punishments.⁸

The Arab Uprising and DAESH

DAESH could not have surged without the Arab uprising and the sabotage of the aspirations of millions of citizens who called for a more just social contract and a bill of rights. The Arab uprising did not occur in a vacuum. Millions of Arabs reached a breaking point because of decades of autocratic rulers, repressive rule and developmental failure. The bitter regional rivals acted as counterrevolutionary

powers, trying to stem the tide of political change at home and in the neighborhood and to consolidate their influence.

Expansion of the Caliphate

Since the Islamic State demands allegiance from all Muslims, this puts other jihadist groups into a position where they must decide whether or not to submit to the Caliphate and recognize it. Soon after declaration of caliphate, the organization received pledges of allegiance from groups in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Saudi Arabia⁹ and Nigeria. The caliphate is, therefore, highly romanticized by jihadis, as it harkens back to an era where the Muslim empire was a rapidly expanding and powerful force.¹⁰ Many Muslim leaders around the world, including prominent Islamists and even leaders of other terrorist groups, have rejected the Islamic State's caliphate, claiming that it does not meet the religious preconditions required to be a valid caliphate.¹¹

Response by International Community: The lightning rise and expansion of DAESH that has seized large parts of Syria and Iraq sent shockwaves around the region and beyond. Organization's hardcore fighting force is within Iraq and Syria, but the group is also establishing affiliates in the region and encouraging terror attacks in the wider world. The response of global and regional powers against DAESH is:-

US: On 15 Oct 2014, US Military launched an operation against DAESH in Iraq and Syria, known as Inherent Resolve. US efforts to overthrow Bashar al Assad's regime received a setback with the emergence of DAESH. The weapons and logistic support provided by the US to radical element like Al-Nusra Front later landed in the hands of DAESH and were instrumental in its rise.¹² The US now leads a coalition of over 42 countries and carryout airstrikes against DAESH, while simultaneously providing support to Kurd fighters. The US wants to keep its interest (primarily Israel) in the region guarded and simultaneously deny growing Russian and Iranian influence in the region.

Russia: A longtime ally of the Syrian government, Russia does not support Assad's regime change. It believes that a new wave of terrorism would be unleashed by DAESH and other radical outfits after fall of Assad. Russian military intervention has produced significant gains for the Syrian Army, including the recapture of Palmyra. It has deployed fighter aircrafts and tanks to support Assad's regime in Latakia Air Base. Syria hosts a Russian Naval facility in Tartus and also target Chechen fighters in Syria.

KSA: The KSA is a major player in Gulf region and has been patronizing Wahhabi brand of Islam. It has established an alliance of 34 countries to counter DAESH. The KSA is supporting anti-Asad US-led rebel forces in Syria. There are also reports of some wealthy citizens donating money for spread of radical groups.¹³ Its main interest is to limit Iranian influence in the region.

Iran: Iran has sent revolutionary guards, Al-Quds force and Shia militias to fight alongside the Iraqi Army.¹⁴ In fact what limited success Iraqi Army achieved against DAESH was due to Iranian troops and Hezbollah on ground.

Iran also supports Syrian Regime through Hezbollah and own troops. Its main interest is to regain influence in the region.

Turkey: Turkey is eager to defeat DAESH, however, it earlier refrained from joining the coalition due to US support to Kurdish fighters. Turkey believes that any support to the Kurds will end up in the hands of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).¹⁵ However, after assurance from the US, Turkey joined coalition and resultantly, Turkish forces crossed into Syria and captured Jarabulus and expelled DAESH forces between Sajur River and Al Rai closer to Syrian Turkish border.¹⁶

France: France has been carrying out Operation Chammal within the framework of international coalition in Iraq and in Syria.

Israel: Israel is the only country in the region which seems indifferent with the rise of DAESH. It has refrained from joining US-led coalition due to possible apprehension from Arab countries, who do not want to see Israel as an ally. Moreover, Israel feels that joining fight against DAESH would incite sympathies for the terrorist organization, which is detrimental to the basic cause of the coalition.

Pakistan's Response: DAESH is considered to be a substantial security threat and Government is firm not to allow any space for DAESH and is following a Zero Tolerance Policy in this regard. The Government of Pakistan has repeatedly denied any existence of DAESH in Pakistan till date; however, it has claimed a few suicides bombing in the recent past.

World Organization Response

The former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon had continuously emphasized solidarity among the countries to counter DAESH threat. The director of Human Rights Watch also asked for global support and unity to counter DAESH threat. Amnesty International has strongly condemned DAESH for committing war crimes, including mass summary killings, beheadings, crucifixions and abductions'. OIC and Islamic Scholars have strongly condemned the brutality of DAESH. OIC has most strongly condemned DAESH's actions in Iraq and called them intolerant and against the teachings of Islam. Saudi Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdul Aziz al-Sheikh has condemned DAESH and stated: The ideas of extremism, radicalism and terrorism have nothing to do with Islam and they are the enemy number one of Islam. Egyptian Grand Mufti Shawqi Allam has also condemned the attacks by DAESH. 126 renowned Sunni Islamic scholars around the Muslim world signed an open letter to the DAESH's leader, explicitly rejecting and refuting the group's interpretations of Islamic scriptures, the Quran and Hadith, used by him to justify group's actions in late September 2014.

Beneficiaries of DAESH: The question of who benefits from DAESH phenomenon is quite complicated and no concrete evidence can be found to its support. Facts are marred by various conspiracy theories, traditional rivalries, sectarian divides and varying interests of influential states and actors. Few of the prominent conspiracy theories in formulation of DAESH are:-

Theory 1 (Israel as Main Beneficiary): As per the available circumstantial evidences, no physical, psychological or material damage has been caused to Israel directly or indirectly. Being the Islamic Caliphate, the focus of organization should have been to protect the interest of the Muslims suffering under Zionist regime rather than killing own Muslim brothers for sectarian and material gains. On 23 July 2015, Times of Israel quoted the Israeli Defence Minister saying about medical aid to the Syrian rebels, some of whom are fighting with Al-Nusra Front: We have assisted them under two conditions, that they do not get too close to the border and that they do not touch the Druze.¹⁷ The internal fighting within various neighboring states, their lack of ability to support Palestinians and focus of international media away from Israel gives Israel an opportunity to increase settlements on Palestinian territories in the West Bank taking it closer to the one – state solution.

Theory 2 (US as the Main Beneficiary): The main strategy of the US is to dominate Middle East in the context of control and regulation of oil prices and its flow, security of Israel, armed sales to major Gulf States and manage political dynamics in a manner that it supports US strategic objectives in the whole region. The US calibrated its support to DAESH to dismantle Assad's regime and neutralize Iranian and Russian influence in the region without accepting DAESH as a legitimate strategic actor. Media reports that growth and expansion of DAESH was a direct result of arms being sent by the US to anti-Assad Islamists, with the intention of toppling Assad's regime.¹⁸

Theory 3 (KSA as the Main Beneficiary): This theory is based on the struggle between the KSA and Iran for greater influence in Middle East. The KSA aims at containing DAESH's expansion beyond Iraq and Syrian borders to curb DAESH militant activities in the KSA and the GCC.

Theory 4 (Russia as Beneficiary): Syria is considered as Russia's ally in the Middle East. President Assad asked Moscow for help and Russia has stood by its ally in very difficult circumstances.¹⁹ Its posturing is meant to counter Western influence in the region working against Russian strategic and economic interest in Middle East. Russia by capitalizing on the evolving environment, wants to mitigate affects of sanctions in the aftermath of Crimean crisis by getting integrated into fight against DAESH. Simultaneously, its focus is to eliminate threats to Assad's regime by rebel forces.

Expansion of DAESH in South Asia

Khorasan: The Khorasan region holds a peculiar historic and religious significance for Muslims. It invokes various strategic objectives for DAESH. The importance of Khorasan region is emphasized in the various Ahadith of Holy Prophet (PBUH). One of the Hadidith narrates: Armies carrying black flags will spring from Khorasan, no power will be capable to stop them and they will finally reach Eela (the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem) where they will hoist their flags.

Footprints of DAESH

The footprints of DAESH have been noted across the globe in various countries including lone wolves attacks in America, Europe, Australia, and Asia. DAESH is also eyeing the Muslim Diaspora of South Asia as probable proxies, lone wolves allegiant Non-State Actors or direct recruits of Islamic State. Deeply marked footprints of DAESH are traced in South Asian countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh and India, in addition to Far Eastern countries like Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia. Since October 2014, DAESH footprints are reported in Afghanistan provinces of Nangarhar, Kunar, Khost and Nooristan. With increase in strength and affiliates, Nangarhar is declared as de facto 'Capital' of DAESH in Khorasan region.

Analysis and Conclusive Thoughts

Analysis - Global

DAESH is neither a myth nor a fleeting phenomenon, but a reality having lasting implications for global and regional mosaic. The US unjust invasion of Iraq in 2003, the biases of the Shia dominated regime subsequent led to a war and the vested interests of the regional players manifested through proxies, became the cause of formulation of this menace. The destruction of Iraqi institutions by the US, particularly dismantling of the Baath Party and Sunni dominated Iraqi Army, created a vacuum that unleashed a fierce power struggle and allowed al-Qaeda to infiltrate this fragile body politic. DAESH exploited pronounced Sunni-Shia fissures of Middle East and made grounds for using proxies by the regional and extra regional players to further their interests. DAESH could not have become such a well funded jihadist group; battle hardened without the support of Sunni countries in Middle East. DAESH and Al Qaeda Central differed from each other in their ideology wherein DAESH stresses on concentrating 'near enemy' i.e. anti-Shia maxim and secular regimes in the Muslim world. On the other hand al-Qaeda Central prioritized the fight against the 'far enemy—America and the West. This difference in ideology suits the interests of regional and extra regional players and there is a likelihood of convergence of the interests of the US and DAESH. DAESH believes in parallel campaigns across three geographic rings; Interior Ring - Levant region - (Hardcore fighting force), "Near Abroad" ring - Lands historically held by Muslims. It expands influence to offset losses in Interior ring. (Franchise) and Far Abroad ring - The wider world – (Lone wolves / Proxies).

Unlike its transnational, borderless parent organization, DAESH has found a haven in the heart of the Levant and has established itself in Sunni dominated oil rich region. This privilege of self governance, self financing in a sizeable territory with people qualified itself as a state which contributed in expansion of DAESH brand across the globe. Extremist Groups and other volunteer Muslims across the globe are motivated to affiliate DAESH to serve the sacred mission of resurrecting a romanticized caliphate. The same motivation attracted the masses in the battleground and in planning and execution of isolated lone wolf style actions or attributable to these. An intended hazy environment to pursue the implicit interests are very much evident in the policies of global and regional powers tackling DAESH. On one side these powers project to deal the phenomenon with iron hand while at the same time evidences also point towards giving sufficient space to DAESH to expand through black oil trade market, leverage in the form of military equipment and

weapon drops and money transactions through banks. Purposeful use of social media has been a force multiplier for the organization. An elaborate media campaign through professionally produced graphic content and projection of ideology through online magazines, video clips have resonated globally attracting lone wolves from USA to Australia. Non imposition of blockage to media campaign of DAESH facilitated the organization in propagating its ideology. Although no empirical evidences are available to exactly ascertain the beneficiary of DAESH however in view of circumstantial evidences, Israel seems to be one of the major beneficiaries of DAESH as withering power potential of regional powers will facilitate Israel in pursuance of her security in the region.

Keeping in view the prolonged turmoil in Middle East, the cleavage between KSA and Iran will deepen further and existing boundaries of Sykes Picot agreement may alter on the basis of ethnic / sectarian lines. With existing global consensus, DAESH as a territorial entity seems to be losing ground in short to midterm however its ideological underpinning will contribute in its existence in one form or the other with special interests in fragile and unstable countries like Yemen, Libya and Afghanistan. The success of DAESH is not merely its superior numerical strength but the leadership qualities of Baghdadi who after taking over in 2010 reinvigorated and restructured its military network by recruiting experienced officers from Saddam Hussein's disbanded army, particularly the Republican Guards, who turned DAESH into a professional fighting force. With the innovative improvisations in use of explosives and other man packed material the probability of terrorists using mass means of communications like commercials aircrafts, metro trains and ships etc for terrorists acts cannot be overruled and will keep posing a challenge to the Governments.

Analysis – Regional / Domestic

A Caliphate with a Caliph is more inspirational for Muslims and the ideology had been used by various militant organizations erstwhile. However, the ideology does not seem viable in existing political order. Since Iranian revolution, the Shia-Sunni strife between Iran and KSA has deepened the schism in our society. Various religious organizations in Pakistan and Afghanistan are funded for spread of respective sectarian ideologies. DAESH while spreading its myopic view, can give fire to the sectarian rift existent in the society. Due to lack of effective central authority, Afghanistan presents conducive grounds for DAESH. The recently developed footprints of DAESH close to Pakistan Afghanistan border inspite US forces presence in the region are source of concern and have already created spill over effects inside Pakistan. Full scale presence of DAESH in Pakistan is less likely in short to midterm however allegiance of few religious and proscribed organizations can badly affect peace. In spite giving temporary relief, Operation Zarb-e-Azb has not achieved TTP closure and TTP - DAESH nexus holds the capability of unleashing new wave of terrorism in Pakistan. Similarly, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi also has convergence of ideology with DAESH. India is making an all out effort to make CPEC a failure. Indo-Afghanistan-DAESH nexus is a readymade tool available to sabotage this project in coordination with their affiliates in Pakistan. Major global powers hold the capability of creating facts and building perception and executing their implicit policies. Nuclear Pakistan does not suit USA and India in rebalancing to Asia or pivot to Asia policy primarily meant to contain China. India cannot emerge as a regional power in presence of

Nuclear Pakistan. Due to adequate safety measures, possibility of DAESH getting access to such strategic assets is extremely remote.

Conclusive Thoughts: The phenomenon of DAESH can only emerge and flourish in societies confronting weak governance and wanting human security. Fissures in societal bindings, lack of political will, poor governance, lack of social justice, gap in civil military relations and inter departmental competitions give opportunity to organizations like DAESH to creep and impose their brand forcefully in the society. DAESH is not a conclusive phenomenon and will continue to loom as a challenge in one form or the other. Being an ongoing phenomenon, its not possible to give policy recommendations however; few important conclusive thoughts requiring further deliberations are:-

- No resolution of issues is possible without Political Will of the state. The plethora of problem confronting Pakistan needs firm resolve at national level manifested through policies and strategies.
- There is a need to formulate strategic framework for manifesting political will and building a national consensus against emerging threats including DAESH or any related threat. The state institutions should be harmonized to produce synergetic effects favouring attainment of the national aims.
- Pakistan is seemingly overwhelmed by host of issues and challenges and is resultantly forced to fire-fight through short term management. There is a need to develop long term policies after necessary forecasting challenges and taking appropriate remedial actions.
- Radical organizations like DAESH need space in society to establish itself. Space can only be denied through good governance and social justice.
- Armed forces are stretched to and cannot cope up with every emerging challenge. This warrants assigning additional responsibilities to other LEAs.
- As a concept, NAP is well crafted that suits the internal environment as a tool to establish writ if the state. However, to accrue optimum benefits, the concept needs to be strategized.
- Emerging challenges of fourth and fifth generation warfare cannot be tackled solely. There is a need to give special focus of civil military harmony especially on internal security matters.
- Operation against DAESH is being conducted by different countries like USA, Russian, KSA, Syria and Iran. There is a need to develop intelligence coordination and cooperation.

Conclusion

DAESH has enhanced the complexities of geo politics at global as well as regional level. The only viable solution of DAESH lies in political process which cannot be achieved without coordinated military operation followed by political reconciliation amongst various ethnic / religious communities. Pakistan must take Operation Zarb-e-Azb / Operation Rad-ul-Fassad to its logical end; implement NAP in letter and spirit and focus on broader governance and security sector reforms to ensure the threat of DAESH is kept under check.

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MALAYAN AND SRI LANKAN INSURGENCIES

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A victory [in a counterinsurgency] is not the destruction in a given area of the insurgent's forces and his political organization. A victory is the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon the population, but maintained by and with the population.

David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare¹



Abstract

The end of WWII transformed the way in which wars would be fought in the future. The trend of total or industrial wars went out of fashion and was replaced by low intensity and insurgencies. Evidence shows that the second half of 20th century and 21st century have witnessed predominantly number of insurgencies which exploited historical and cultural fault lines within ethnic communities. The Malayan insurgency is one such example. The British government's efforts for winning hearts and minds thus achieving unified and dynamic control though brought the violence under control but it was unable to eliminate the root causes of the insurgency, which continued till late 70s. Sri Lankan government on the other hand struggled for four decades and its efforts demonstrate that victories in insurgencies are possible. This victory is attributed to a political strategy rather than the purely military. It also demonstrates that a comprehensive whole of the government approach against insurgencies has the potential to result into victories for the government and bring in lasting peace in the country. An in-depth analysis of both these insurgencies provides valuable lessons for Pakistan and brings out some of the cardinals for assessing the current counter insurgency strategy.

Introduction

Geography: Malayan peninsula is situated in Southeast Asia and bordered only by Thailand in the north. Four-fifth of Malaya's terrain consisted of deep jungles, Rubber plantations and Tin mines with mountain ranges.

Demography: The population of Malaya in 1947 was almost entirely Asian which included 49% Malays, 38% Chinese, 10% Indians and 3% others.

Thomas Edward Lawrence also known as Lawrence of Arabia's statement that "Making war upon insurgents is messy and slow, like eating soup with a Knife is difficult to understand, as fighting insurgents is different from knowing how to defeat them and knowing how to defeat them is different from implementing the measures required to do it". Thus since World War-II rebel groups within a state, eager to enact political change based on deep rooted grievances or ideologies, often take up arms in an attempt to reallocate state power or overthrow the existing order. The

Malayan insurgency is one of the few such counterinsurgency campaigns that is projected to offer a satisfactory conclusion. The insurgency offers a variety of strategies to be studied which were tied together by civil and military programs into a counterinsurgency response. The Sri Lankans, on the other hand fought LTTE for over three decades trying various strategies and negotiated a number of peace initiatives to end the conflict, however, it was not until 2008-09, that peace was established. Though both insurgencies greatly differ in their geography and strategic environment but their analysis offers an established regime to analyse. Thus, it is important to carry out an objective analysis of past experiences to establish an understanding of the complicated dynamics and accrue valuable lessons.

Malaysian Insurgency (1948-1989)

In 1948, every region of the world was in its nascent state with onslaught of communism in Eastern Europe, whereas encroachment of Communism into Southeast Asia was plausible. Despite strong alliance, the US refusal to help, forced Britain to go alone in the counter insurgency.² The Malayan Insurgency spanned over 41 years guerrilla war fought by the British and Malaysian forces against Malayan Communist Party led by Chin Peng, who was driven by communist ideology and was confident that armed struggle was the only viable option for the Chinese in Malaya.³ Chinese immigrants joined tin mining industry of Malaya in 19th century. This new ethnic group distrusted the government and set them apart from British favored Malays. Resultantly, MCP was established in 1930's which sowed the seed of ethnic rivalry. After the 2nd WW, MCP-British relations deteriorated further owing to MCP's demand for priority role in Malayan administration since they had valiantly fought against the Japanese. With no redress of their grievances, the MCP renamed its armed wing as the Malayan Races Liberation Army.⁴

Overview of Insurgency (1948-89)

Phase I - 1st Insurgency (1948-1960)

Stage -1 (1948-1950) MCP on the Offensive: On 16 June 1948, three European Rubber planters were shot dead in Perak area in northern Malaya. The colonial government immediately declared a state of emergency in the whole Malaya. The authorities enacted a range of stringent measures, including ban on seditious publications, arrest, trial and death penalty. A prolonged Malayan Emergency had begun.

- MCP's objective was to replace the present government with a new Malayan People's Republic.
- MCP's Strategy invoked a protracted three-phase campaign strategy; a terror campaign was to be conducted by killing European planters, tin miners and government officials thus undermining the confidence of the population in their colonial rulers; seizure of villages and towns in order to turn them into liberated areas, leaving the federal capital of Kuala Lumpur for the final assault.⁵

- MCP relied heavily on the Chinese communities for support. The use of large force of Min Yuen (People's movement), was significant in terms of intelligence and logistics.⁶

Stage - 2 (1950-1955) Turning the Tide

After initial set back, the British response came to counter the growing insurgency.

- **Briggs Plan:** The main problem faced by the British was to deal with some 600,000 squatters being used as a refuge and food storage by guerillas. The government decided to resettle these squatters in New Villages where they could be isolated from the guerrilla. This was the famous Briggs Plan introduced by General Briggs who was appointed as Director of Operation Malaya in 1950.⁷ By the end of 1951, more than two-thirds of the squatters were shifted in 509 New Villages. The communists were thus cut off from their usual food supplies and were forced to move deep into the jungles. A reward system was set up which led to the surrender of many insurgents who offered useful information about their former comrades.⁸
- **Templer's Plan:** After the retirement of Gen Briggs, Sir Gerald Templer was appointed as the Director of Operations in Malaya in 1952. Underpinning the Brigg's plan, Templer introduced a new approach in security forces training, reorganization and implemented new intelligence systems. He appointed first Director of Intelligence and raised a Special Intelligence Branch. By early 1953, the improved Briggs Plan had a significant impact on the MCP activities. The control of logistics and individuals, succeeded in disrupting Communist insurgents.⁹
- **Concurrent Military Operations:** With initial heavy handedness came the stage of winning the hearts and minds of the people and government had to change its military strategy and tactics. Using tactics of search and destroy, the soldiers played the guerillas game by living out in the jungle for weeks in order to ambush them. This gave assurance to general population who felt secure and protected from MCP.
- **Psychological Operations:** C.C. Too played crucial role being the mastermind behind the British psychological operations that destroyed the Communist insurgent movement.¹⁰ The Psychological Warfare Section produced millions of leaflets for air drops. Recording of taped messages were also broadcasted from Dakota/Austere aircraft of the Voice Aircraft Flights.¹¹

Stage- 3 (1955-1960) Fading Away of MCP

- **The Independence:** Amid continued political process alongside COIN operations, Tunjku Abdul Rahman was elected as the first Chief

Minister of the Federation after first ever elections in 1955. Tunjku then declared an amnesty for all the MCP's guerillas which leading to the famous Baling talks in 1955 which failed as government refused to recognize MCP as a legal political party.¹²

- **Survival in Retreat:** By 1959, the MCP politburo had completed a broad revision of battlefield strategy. The MCP decided to direct future military activities from bases outside Peninsular Malaya. Chin Peng ordered withdrawal to Thailand border to establish a new base camp.¹³

Conflict Termination and Resolution: On 31 July 1960, the Malayan Government unilaterally declared the end of Emergency. The declaration only ended the usage of emergency laws, but the fight against the MCP continued.¹⁴ This formed the major premise of a protracted lull period from 1960-1968 and resurgence of the MCP that stretched till 1989.

Phase II - 2nd Insurgency (1961-1989)

Stage - 1 (1961-68) Apparent Calm: In July 1961, Chin Peng decided to conduct a second armed struggle and started streamlining, retraining, and re-indoctrination.¹⁵ Later, in 1967, a radio station named Suara Revolusi Malaya (Voice of Malayan Revolution) was established in Hannan, China to spread communist propaganda to undermine the Constitution providing special status to Malays.¹⁶

Stage - 2 (1968-74) Insurgent Strike Back

- **MCP's Offensive:** On 1 June 1968, the Central Command of the MCP issued a directive titled "Hold High the Great Red Banner of Armed Struggle and Valiantly March Forward."¹⁷ MCP launched an ambush in the area of Kroh-Bentong¹⁸ killing 17 members of Security Forces. Quietly, MCP sent out 'Shock Brigades, attempting not only to pick isolated police posts and jungle patrols, but also to rekindle support for the MCP.¹⁹ With the total British withdrawal, the MCP reorganized its armed struggle and instigated the Chinese to riots in 1969 after the general elections resulting in massive fighting.²⁰ The black day of May 13 marked the beginning of the 2nd Malayan Emergency from Malaysian Government's perspective.²¹
- **Malaysian Response through Security and Development (KESBAN):** Malaysian Government introduced a new strategy of fighting the MCP known as KESBAN that is Security and Development. The KESBAN programs succeeded in developing Malaysia into a more stable and secure society, with the setting up of coordinated bodies from village to federal level.²² By mid-1975, the government made huge efforts to implement the developmental programs without declaring a state of emergency.²³ Schemes called Rukun Tetangga (Neighborhood Watch)²⁴ and Rela (People's Volunteer Group) were introduced which brought Malays, Chinese and Indians closer and more tolerant of each other. Despite insurgency the economic prosperity climbed a continuous ladder under the Malaysian administrations.²⁵

Stage – 3 (1974-1989) MCP in Crisis

- **MCP Internal Conflicts:** Despite initial gains, the MCP experienced a major crisis within the party with emergence of internal disputes. By October 1974, the MCP leadership had split into two different factions, Maoist and the Marxist-Leninist and latter surrendered themselves to the Thai Government in early 1987²⁶ realizing their armed struggle was futile.
- **Road to Peace Accord:** Since 1972 Malaysia had established a bilateral relationship with China and urged the leadership to exert influence on MCP to which in early 1981, Chinese Prime Minister Deng Xiao Peng encouraged MCP to seek an avenue for a peace accord.²⁷

The Hat Yai Peace Accord: After a series of negotiations between Malaysian Government and MCP, with Thai Government as mediator, MCP finally agreed to sign a Peace Accord in Hat Yai, Thailand on the 2 December 1989. The peace accord did not require surrender but to cease their militant activities. Some members of MCP chose to return to Malaysia and the rest opted to stay in Peace Village in Southern Thailand including Chin Peng.²⁸

Analysis– Malayan Insurgency

Malayan Insurgency can be characterized as an indigenous and egalitarian overture with negligible outside support, though branded with communist ideology. MCP took a nationalistic approach but never succeeded in proving such credentials. Idealizing communism with deeper sense of an alienated class, MCP started off with anti-colonial cause 'Smash the federation and create a true Malaya'²⁹, but with British promise of Malayan independence, MCP lost its main cause. MCP then tried inciting people into 'establishing People's Republic' which was not even a plausible cause as targeted population felt contented with political and economic prosperity. Inherent fault lines, dictated, the very internal nature of problem inducing response accordingly. Whereas, Cold War concerns, shaped the British judgment, which were essentially overstated?

Elements of National Power (EoNP)

Geography: Alongside economic interests, it was geography which put British under compulsion to extend their rule in Malaya. For insurgents thick forests offered congenial environment for guerilla warfare, but at the same time, closed borders rendered isolation thus making outside support marginal, and at best moral than material.

Population: Population Control; Both British and Malaysian administrations kept the population largely under control through food, travel bans and resettlement of the squatters³⁰ which prevented the contact between insurgents and the people, stalling communist agenda and recruitment.

Persuasion or Winning Hearts and Minds: British adopted more of a transient approach from strategy of 'forcing the people' through extensive containment and intimidation³¹ to a strategy of 'winning hearts and minds' offering socio-economic benefits and political concessions. During 2nd insurgency, already

enjoyed public confidence enabled government to only focus on socio-economic developments. 'Winning hearts and minds' is thus a misleading dictum in counter insurgency; it is persuasion which always precedes winning.

Public Confidence: British gained the trust of Malays with promise of independence, protection of their rights, positions in government and sending their wards to England for tertiary education. Chinese were won over by granting land titles and citizenship, recruitment in police/Home Guards and setting up Chinese language schools.

Economy and Natural Resource: Malayan economy sustained prolonged insurgency. Natural resource based industries, mainly rubber/tin, maintained production despite added expense of plantation and estate defence, meeting chunk of insurgency's expenditures.

Political Primacy: Colonial administration exploited communism sprawl to convince British Government alongside shaping World opinion. Political will then became the driving force, enabling the administration to take decisive actions. During Second insurgency, Malaysians kept the legacy of British. Additionally, they successfully engaged China into rapprochement and involved Thai Government to deny the insurgents their bases.

Insurgency

Both Briggs and Templer treated the insurgency not as military but a civilian problem with an integrated civil-military approach. Until British applied the whole of the government approach, mere military actions proved counterproductive. Executive Committee System helped integration of various EoNP into a unified effort. Although, high-level policy direction became increasingly centralized, its execution, devolved to officials at state and district levels. Second insurgency saw an even greater application of non-military instruments i.e. social, economic and political dimensions of statecraft through the concept of Security and Development (KESBAN). During both periods of the insurgency, British and Malaysians approached with direct strategy of 'annihilation'³² through enormous force build up and large scale operations or big gun response. As soon they realized the real battle ground i.e. the population, they focused on indirect strategy of 'turning the loyalty of the people'.³³

There was a gradual move away from large scale army sweeps towards intelligence based small unit actions. Instead of carpet bombing, the primary use of air power was in psychological operations eroding the morale and will of CPM's fighters. Effective psychological operations resulted in large defections. Almost 70% of surrendered insurgents reported, their decision was influenced by the voice messages through air and Communist leaders had no way to counter this delivery method.³⁴ In informational domain, two aspects merit consideration, information management and intelligence. Information management remained critical and evolved as the conflict progressed, explaining government reasoning behind stern actions, conveying perspective on local issues, to demonizing MCP and Chin Peng. MCP could only rely on messages in person and secret letter boxes. Information management helps answer, how Chin Peng who was marched as hero of WW II at London's Victory Parade and conferred the Victoria Cross became enemy number 1.

Intelligence effort was directed, not only in typically operational context but it also catered for an insight into politico, socio, psycho and economic spheres enabling government to see a larger canvas and mount response accordingly. British did manipulate laws to their advantage, for instance, they introduced the word 'Emergency' instead of war or conflict to help secure insurance of western investments. Emergency Regulation was adopted to provide a legal umbrella to all their actions. The Malayan insurgency has always been mounted on a high pedestal, but the fact that British and Malaysians had an overwhelming superiority in every aspect; still it took 41 years, really question the notion of victory. Conversely, Chin Peng, with meagre resources sailed the insurgency for four decades and forced the counterinsurgents to address the very root causes. Therefore, victory remains a contested notion.



Sri Lankan Insurgency

The campaign is covered under the headings of geography, demography, genesis of conflict, Tamil Tigers external support and their military strategy. Broadly the campaign is covered in two distinct phases with post conflict strategy at the end. Sri Lanka is strategically located on Indian Ocean sea lanes. It is characterised by jungle terrain. Jaffna peninsula is Tamil dominated area with Elephant pass as an important land route between Northern and Eastern provinces. Sinhalese Buddhists forming 74% of the population speak Sinhala and are mostly settled in the Southern portion. Tamils the biggest minority consist 12.4% of the population, mainly Hindus, speak Tamil and are mostly settled in the Northern and Eastern portion. The Tamil insurgency can be traced back to ethnic tensions between majority Sinhalese and the minority Tamils from the colonial times when British created the Tamil Elite by offering privileged jobs and education. After the independence, tensions mounted when the Sri Lankan government declared Sinhala as sole official language. It initiated policies to take away rights to vote and hold office and introduction of quota for access to education. Gradually the cleavages of discontentment widened. The Tamil minority subsequently demanded a separate Tamil homeland. In 1972, Mr Prabhakaran established Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE) to fight for Tamil state in North-eastern Sri Lanka. He was Political as well as Military Leader of LTTE. It is regarded as the culminating point in the social movement curve and its transformation into insurgency.

Tamil insurgency nurtured on external support from India as well as Tamil Diaspora. Indian geo-political influence can be divided in two broad phases. In first phase from 1983 to 1987, RAW financed, trained and armed militants to destabilize Sri Lanka and establish the much desired foothold. In 1987, India carried out a direct political and military intervention when Sri Lankan army was about to uproot LTTE. This resulted in Indo-Lanka Accord-1987 and deployment of 100,000 strong Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). Thereafter, the LTTE turned against the IPKF as it tried to disarm it. In 1990 IPKF was forced out of Sri Lanka humiliated, the LTTE as revenge assassinated Prime Minister Mr Rajiv Gandhi in 1990. In the 2nd phase, Indian government largely avoided itself from Sri Lankan affairs however support continued from Tamil Nadu. LTTE established its wings in various other parts of the world and fed propaganda targeting Tamil Diaspora throughout US, Canada, France, Norway and Australia. Diaspora's efforts aimed at cultivating states' support putting

politico-economic pressure on government, weapon procurement and financial support up to \$200 Million annually through compelled and willing contributions.

LTTE's Strategy: The overall military strategy was to make the government ineffective through military action and to deny security forces access to LTTE controlled areas. In order to maintain the integrity of the northern land mass (counter-state), the LTTE applied a conventional defence posture as buffer to separate the area from government controlled area. From a well-developed militia LTTE transformed itself into a conventional force. Its Air wing and Sea Tigers had number of aircrafts, floating warehouses and suicide bomber vessels. LTTE was also famed for suicide bombings and engineering IEDs, recruitment of child soldiers, using humans as shield, political assassinations, and Jungle warfare. 3 x Eelam Wars were fought from 1983 to 2006. Sri Lankan army launched major operations which despite significant advances towards Jaffna could not capitalize on its gains owing to Indian intervention. Although these operations were success resulting in LTTE's tactical withdrawal, however international and political pressure resisting further military operations and pressurized government to resolve the issue through negotiations. LTTE astutely took advantage of various ceasefires to reorganize and rearm. End state was a stalemate, followed by ceasefire, split in LTTE and continued terrorism.

Response

The LTTE entered negotiations five times, including foreign assisted peace efforts but talks always collapsed. In 2006 the government finally decided to change its strategic objective, from negotiating with the LTTE to annihilating it. President Rajapaksa won national election in 2005 with the promise to put an end to this long insurgency. He spelled out his whole of government approach. During his time, SLAF underwent transformation process in terms of capacity building and fighting doctrine to strike the final. The armed forces increased in size with massive recruitment of 80,000 troops and 40,000 civil guards. Aircrafts and variety of arms and ammunition were imported from China and Pakistan. Chinese and Pakistani pilots trained Sri Lankan counterparts and actively participated in planning air operations. With increased strength including personnel assigned by SLN and SAF on ground role, it adopted a new strategy of attacking along different axes. The military approached from the North, West and South, cornered the LTTE at the Mullaitivu pocket. SLN vessels deployed along the Northeast coast prevented LTTE escape.

In the aftermath of 9/11 incident and assassination of Sri Lankan Foreign Minister, LTTE was declared a terrorist organization by the European Union. In mid-2006, LTTE deliberately ended the Norwegian-brokered ceasefire and initiated the Eelam War IV. In response, armed forces launched major offensive. It planned to eliminate LTTE in Eastern province first and then in Northern Province. Vakarai, the principle stronghold of the LTTE fell in 2007 cutting off supply routes of the Northern Tigers. LTTE was reduced to 140 square Kilometres pocket of jungle land in Thoppigala which was subsequently captured after 3 month's long Battle. The SLA captured LTTE strongholds of Vidattativu, Mallavi and Vellankulam. Complete Jaffna Peninsula finally fell to Sri Lankan Army in January 2009 limiting their influence to mere 200 Square Kilometres of "No Fire Zone" set up for civilians. In May 2009, Army captured the last section of coastline along with SLN deployed at the

Northeast coast at the Mullaittivu pocket. Death of rebel leader Prabhakaran marked the end of a long bloody war spread over nearly three decades.

Sri Lankan government faced two main issues, firstly, the immediate challenge of rehabilitation and reintegration of displaced population and secondly the political integration of Tamil community. The government claims to have dealt successfully the immediate challenge, some of the steps taken in this regard are formulation of National Plan of Action (NPA), accommodation/ welfare of nearly 300,000 Internally Displaced Persons, demining, rehabilitation/ reintegration of nearly 12,000 ex-LTTE cadres, demilitarization of the area, investigation of violations of human rights, accountability, comprehensive reforms and construction of infrastructure in conflict hit areas. The government has also done efforts for re-integration of Tamil Community; however, the process is marked by slow progress and political differences.

Analysis–Sri Lankan Insurgency

The analysis of Sri Lankan insurgency will be covered in sequence; a brief overview of insurgency, application of EoNP, Notions of Operational Strategy and Post Conflict Strategy. The Tamil insurgency is characterized as a Secessionist, ethno-nationalist conflict with a tinge of religion. It had roots in colonial era disparities and post-independence political expediencies. The external support to insurgency was mainly from diaspora. Sri Lankan COIN can be broadly categorized into two phases. In Phase 1 their efforts despite tactical brilliances failed to achieve their politico-military objective. Military approach lacked outreach to beleaguered Tamil population. Shaping of external environment was also a low key ingredient. These operations were punctuated with numerous failed peace initiatives close to culmination point of LTTE which afforded opportunities to LTTE to reorganize and re-arm. In Phase 2; President Rajapaksa came into power on the back of public expectations to uproot insurgency. He termed Tamil Tigers as non-reconcilable. He presented the winning formula, a cohesive politico-military COIN strategy. The insurgency was uprooted by whole of government approach.

Application of Elements of National Power

Political: President Rajapaksa's assumed the leadership role exhibiting unwavering leadership with strong political will. A unified politico-military effort mobilized resources necessary to fight. The government shaped the external and internal environment to strike the decisive blow. Internally, it marshalled public opinion to accept human losses and financial costs of war. On Diplomatic Front, the government manipulated the post 9/11 anti-terrorism drive and geopolitical tussle between the western powers and China to its advantage to continue its unimpeded military offensive. 32 countries were convinced to designate LTTE a terrorist organization. Thus, Tamil donors refused to provide additional funding. Pakistani and Chinese support was sought for capacity building of armed forces. Favourable Chinese diplomatic and financial support was won in return for supporting Strings of Pearls strategy for desired influence in Indian Ocean. Indian factor was effectively neutralized by the government by establishing extensive contacts with India. To win the most needed public support, the government's good governance and development activities continued which expressed notion of stability and resolve. It was the lead prong in post conflict reconciliation to examine human rights violations,

identify root causes of conflict, and revive democratic process, handover administrative tasks from military to civil administration, reconstruction and rehabilitation.

Information: Controlled reporting and unidirectional flow of conflict information from the front minimized the internal and external interference and effectively countered allegations of human right violations. Effective media campaign garnished public support by portraying the soldiers as national heroes and defenders of the motherland from terrorism. Respected in their own communities, the servicemen felt that country was behind them. Media also countered LTTE propaganda at home/ abroad.

Military: The Enemy Centric Strategy entailed complete Operational Freedom with military operations taking precedence over humanitarian considerations. The strategy to conduct operations on various fronts/axes exploited LTTE's decision making dilemma and inability to concentrate reserves and reinforcement. Naval vessels supported military offensive by preventing LTTE escape by sea and disrupted its supplies destroying its floating warehouses. The synchronized application of all services ensured entrapment and annihilation of LTTE in last Ealam war.

Transformation to Unconventional Methods: The military culture had a cultural shift from conventional military thinking to unconventional methods, to launch focused attacks and inflict maximum damage. The change in tactics had psychological impact also as LTTE commanders were immobilized and had to restrict their movements, depriving insurgents of frontline leadership. In post conflict period, SLAF are performing internal security duties, demining and intelligence tasks to check resurgence of insurgency.

Intelligence: The SLAF successfully exploited intelligence attained from cooperating countries, local populace, defected Tamil militants, captured LTTE cadres about LTTE operations, logistic and operational bases and supporters.

Law Enforcement and Legal: Government evolved 'Prevention of Terrorism Act' unchallengeable in any court, granting greater powers to law enforcement agencies. Legal umbrella was provided to avoid allegations of HR violations. Although, after the war, emergency regulations were repealed to facilitate reconciliation and reintegration.

Post Conflict Strategy: Two-fold strategy of rehabilitation and reintegration is characterized by limited progress. Although, post-conflict activities like de-mining, IDPs return and new housing programs have influenced Tamil - Sinhalese relations positively.

Post Conflict Issues: Major post conflict issues are the military's disproportionate search and detention powers, equitable distribution of educational opportunities, the heavy militarization of NE threatening to alter local demography, Return of Land occupied by the Military and unbiased investigations of human rights violations. Enduring peace could not be ensured until the political, economic and social grievances of the Tamils were addressed.

The Applicability of Sri Lankan COIN Model: Sri Lankan COIN paradigm was based on sound logics; to disregard international opinion distracting from the goal, no negotiations with the forces of terror, unidirectional flow of conflict information, absence of political intervention to pull away from complete defeat of the LTTE and complete operational freedom for the security forces. The principles of go to hell, no cease-fire, no negotiations and regulating the media may be unacceptable when seen through a moral and ethical prism. Nevertheless, it ultimately solves the problem faster and potentially with less cost and casualties. Success of SL COIN paradigm was also greatly affected by the environment and geography. Application of such paradigm requires whole of nation approach, unwavering political will and strong politico-military leadership supported by factors of environment and geography.

Lessons Learnt – Malayan and Sri Lankan Insurgency

Malayan and Sri Lankan insurgencies loom large in the popular consciousness as long, grinding conflicts that tested policy makers and militaries to the limits. They had different environmental consequences; however, each bore similarities in terms of principles of counter insurgency employed and approaches taken by respective governments. Though establishing a connection between these two insurgencies and Pakistan is difficult due to their varying characteristics and environment, however, they do offer valuable lessons in crafting counterinsurgency response. Some major lessons.

Nature and Character of the Insurgency

Establishing the nature and character of the insurgency is the over arching lesson which dictates the parameters of the all other lessons.

Nature of Conflict: Malayan Insurgency can be characterized as an indigenous and egalitarian overture with negligible outside support though branded with communist ideology. The Tamil insurgency is predominantly characterized as a Secessionist (separatist), *ethno-nationalist* conflict rooted in colonization and post-independence political expediencies.

Case of Pakistan: Pakistan faces militancy in FATA and low intensity separatist insurgency in Balochistan. Low Intensity war on terror is different by nature and is driven by ideology of religion which conflicts with all forms of ideologies of the past and is independent of race and cast. Though fueled by ethnic dynamics, it is not dependent on geography alone and takes strength from religion, tradition and governmental neglect. These rapidly changing characteristics make the nature of the insurgency very complex.

Political Primacy

Malaya: In the first insurgency political ownership was colonial in nature, thus not requiring the approval of the masses; however, what was needed was an effort to bring synergy in political and military actions to control the insurgency. However, in the second insurgency the political ownership was complete from the start resultantly the insurgency was tackled effectively.

Sri Lanka: In Sri Lanka up till Eelam war- IV not only was the political primacy insufficient but clear political objectives were not defined. The government undertook 5 major political initiatives for talks which failed. However, complete political ownership in 2006 gave³⁵ legitimacy to the counter insurgency efforts.

Pakistan: In Pakistan political ownership is primarily linked with public opinion and degree of violence in the country. Initially it remained focused on establishing peace through political compromises; however, since Operation Zarb-e-Azb public pressure for political primacy has rapidly increased. Currently the government claims to have political ownership but implementation of NAP points divergently.

Influence of Environment and its Effects

Malaya: In the first insurgency MCPs role in resistance against the Japanese, decolonization movements around the globe and rise of communism gave roots to the insurgency. And it was announcement of Malayan independence by the British which resulted in loss of political space for the insurgents. However, in the 2nd insurgency struggled to gain political space due to effective development initiatives of the government and low international support.

Sri Lanka: Tamil taking up arms was the result of the cumulative effect of domestic political neglect, Indian support and effective global fund-raising³⁶ by LTTE. However, 9/11 changed the global environment altogether and hollowed LTTE as an effective organization by cutting off international support. On the other hand after 2006 improved Armed forces, support from China and Pakistan and defection of key personnel of LTTE shaped the environment in government's favour.

Pakistan: In Pakistan during early 2000s the domestic and global environments remained tangent to each other. The war was perceived as Western agenda and the necessary domestic support was missing. Through immense sacrifices the military has created favorable domestic environment, however, low international acceptability and interference by regional countries is constantly challenging the effort.

Strategic Counter Insurgency Concepts

Malaya: Malaya in the initial phases bore more a semblance to the "annihilation" approach as military operations and police build up were indicative of the political intent to go force-on-force. However, the 'Briggs Plan', bore the trademarks of turning the loyalty of the people and the initiatives like grant of Malayan citizenship proved vital. However, in the 2nd insurgency the counter insurgency efforts remained focused on winning hearts and minds through indirect approach.

Sri Lanka: The deep rooted historic ethnic conflict and political neglect made adoption of indirect strategy very difficult resultantly attempts to win over the Tamil population failed in first three Eelam wars. Thus, in 2006 the direct strategy was adopted and political framework shaped the environment domestically and internationally.

Pakistan: In Pakistan's case the problem is multifaceted. The military has adopted different approaches for FATA and Balochistan. Against the militancy in FATA the strategy remains direct wherein the military operations have paved the way for the political prong to take lead. Balochistan employs the indirect strategy of 'winning the hearts and minds' of the people, however, domestic inadequacies and external influences remain a concern.

Institutional Adaptation / Learning

Malaya: The British army promoted an open learning culture. Bottom-up feedback and suggestions were encouraged and structural changes were made. These institutional practices³⁷ greatly assisted the government forces to adapt rapidly.

Sri Lanka: In first three Eelam wars the Institutional learning was slow as SLA largely followed international practices which were not applicable in Sri Lanka. However³⁸, in Eelam War-IV, the New Radical approach brought in major changes where in the SLA abandoned the 'Hold and Build' strategy and adopted the strategy of Isolate, Identify and Eliminate.

Pakistan: Pakistan military has also shown great ability to learn from its experiences though the learning curve has been slow and long. Operation Rah-e-Rast, and Rah-e-Nijat are two hallmarks in this regard. From publishing of SCW doctrine, pre-induction training, structural adjustments in operations and coordinated joint operations the armed forces have come a long way in harmonizing their efforts.

What Constitutes Victory?

Famous theorist David Galula defines victory in counterinsurgency as military defeat of the insurgents, destruction of their political organization, and their marginalization from the population.³⁹

Malaya: When viewed in hindsight the first Malayan insurgency was not a victory for the British as the insurgency continued till 1989. Though the second insurgency remained largely localized, it did manage to survive is testament to the fact that initial victory was incomplete.

Sri Lanka: In Sri Lanka, LTTE had unified military and political command thus military defeat in 2009 also resulted in political defeat. However, despite government claims that basic demands of Tamils have been addressed, discontent still exists in the community, fuelled by post conflict management of the issues. So for Sri Lanka the question of final victory is still out there.

Pakistan: In case of Pakistan the question of victory is difficult, insurgents have no coherent strategy and are constantly evolving, therefore, control of the overall environment is more important than countering individual incidents.

This necessity at success to be sequential, achieved through attainment of smaller goals like border management, institutionalized anti-terrorist measures, information management and effective coordination. However, the final victory can be defined as:-

- State - To gain writ and stability.
- Society - To attain security.
- Affected Areas - To be secured and integrated.
- Militants - To be militarily defeated, ideologically rejected and futuristically ineffective.

Conclusion

History, as they say, never repeats itself, but definitely rhymes, therefore, we must pick up wherever it rhymes with events in the past and adjust the scales of our notes. The last word belongs to Bernard Fall, a prominent figure in Indochina war:-

There are no easy shortcuts to solving the problems of revolutionary war. In fact, I would like to close with one last thought, which applies, of course, to everything that is done in the armed forces, but particularly to revolutionary war: If it works, it is obsolete.⁴⁰

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PART-II

National Security Issues

- **Critical Analysis of Pakistan's Economy– Is Pakistan heading towards debt trap?**
- **Combating Radicalism and Extremism.**
- **Mainstreaming of FATA.**

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF PAKISTAN'S ECONOMY – IS PAKISTAN HEADING TOWARDS DEBT TRAP?

**Mr. Mushtaq, Lt Col Adil Iftikhar, Lt Col Faisal,
Mr. M Siddique, Col EF Oyinlola & Wg Cdr Mattar**

Abstract

Economy has always been an important element of national power, fundamental to the strength and stability of a state and assurance of its security and sovereignty. Pakistan's economy has been characterized with decades of growth and stability as well as periods of economic mismanagement and stagnation. Lack of economic vision and ownership, based on populism instead of viable economic policies by the successive governments and of course in this globalized world prone to international economy trends. Pakistan's economy remained in ebbs and flows throughout last about six decades. Debt remained the major source of income to meet the deficits of our economic management. Unprecedented surge in the national debt during last decade caused alarms. Emerging global, regional and domestic environment has posed new challenges and as well as created opportunities for Pakistan's economy. Global economic trends, regional connectivity and rising domestic consumer market can be viewed as leading opportunities. Whereas, inconsistent economic policies and fragile security situation resulting into decreased foreign investment lead to over reliance on external debt are posing serious challenges to economy of Pakistan. With a view to develop comprehensive analysis of contours of Pakistan's economy and impact of surge in debt upon its macro-economic management the study will provide a holistic approach on scrutiny and way forward for the issue.

Introduction

National security and economic development have mutually supportive relationship. Strong, growing and highly competitive economy is a prerequisite for creating conducive environments for social justice and wellbeing of the population. During last couple of years before zooming in to see general features of our National Economy a birds' eye view of regional and global economies may set the perspective on right path. South Asian growth indicators remained satisfactory despite a difficult external environment as continued slow recovery in US, EU and Japan. The region is expected to grow steadily at a modest rate of 5.7% in 2016-17. On the global arena world is coming out of financial recession but global economic initiative in the realm of globalization are being diverted towards regional economic alliances. Inward economic initiatives are being prioritized. American's initiative to distance itself from TPP created more space for China to influence Asian economies. OBOR is taking momentum with more and vibrancy in CPEC initiative. Pakistan being a vibrant part of South Asian economies showed positive trajectory in some macro-economic indicators but some alarm bells are also attached to it. On the positive side GDP growth maintained its modest pace, reaching an eight year high of 4.7% in 2016 from 4.0% in previous year. Industrial sector posted a growth in FY 16 on account of increase in domestic demand, low prices of key raw material, a relatively better security situation and improved energy supplies. Inflationary pressure eased considerably as inflation almost halved to 2.6% in this year so far as compared to

5.1% in previous year. Budget deficit improved to 3.4% of GDP in 2016 from 4.5% in 2015. Foreign exchange reserve may also be included in positives of the economy with a record high of \$ 24 b. However it was for the first time in 15 years when value-addition in agriculture sector recorded a decline mainly due to significant losses to the cotton crop. Inflation may inched up due to imposition of new regulatory duties on a wide range of items an increase in gas tariffs, a rise in prices of some non-perishable food items and a recovery in aggregate demand. On the external front a decline in exports, a slowdown in remittance, and capital inflows, an increase in non-oil imports and low volumes of non-CPEC FDI inflows are serious causes of concern for revenue generation. Efforts to increase direct tax collection are either inadequate or not bearing fruit. Moreover despite an improvement in fiscal account country's public debt stock increased by Rs. 1.8 trillion during July-March 2016 reaching Rs. 19.6 trillion at the close of March 2016. Within the external debt overall volume recorded a rise of dollar 4.1 billion during first nine months of the current fiscal. Rising non-oil imports have offset gains from the lower oil import bill. Current account is the broadest measure of trade, covering not only the flow of goods and services but also investment flows. A deficit reflects the shortfall between money paid out by the country and money coming in Pakistan has been facing regular current account deficits due to continued decline in exports and FDI and outflow of profits and dividends by multinationals to their home countries. Debt servicing of about \$ 5 b per year till 2021 is another point of concern. CPEC emerges as a game changer in overall macro-economic environment of the country. IMF programme ends in this year - how deep are the changes it has wrought in the economy? Public debt and circular dept piles up to the boundaries of out of control. Business community is confused (especially exporters) that how to reap the benefits of CPEC. National Security is strongly linked with economic security especially with the launch of CPEC.

Emerging Global / Regional economic trends

Geopolitical competition is reshaping the global economy and unraveling global power relationships and governance. The world is witnessing what Edward Luttwak called the rise of geo-economics, a contest defined by the grammar of commerce but the logic of war. Powerful trends are reshaping the world and changing the rules for competition between countries. There has been a profound shift from a state dominated to a market dominated world. The national economic interest is no longer a question of whether globalization should be allowed to operate. Economic blocks around Pacific rim and in Asia are on the horizon. TPP, ASEAN, SCO, BRICS, Chinese and Indian economic ties in African continent are impacting new economic alliances. Competition between states in the geo-economic era will increasingly be driven by a quest for markets rather than natural resources.

China's infrastructure projects could be as important to the 21st century as America's protection of sea lanes was in the 20th century. Infrastructure finance has thus become a tool of foreign policy, particularly for China. China is presently witnessing economic slowdown which is likely to persist in short to mid-term impacting global demand and supply. Confronted with problems related to migrants' issues, economic crisis Post Brexit and threats to its integration as a Union, EU¹ is likely to look inward while still having potential to moderately influence through economic levers. Existing instability will keep on effecting Middle Eastern economy forcing to have more reliance on structural reforms rather than depending on oil.² The return of volatility, not the fall in prices, is the trend that is expected to persist in

short-term but with supply curtailment decision of OPEC increased demand may push oil prices upward and stability in oil market. Terrorism is likely to continue in conflict areas posing risk to major economies; and security situation in Afghanistan will effect development of regional economies especially in the context of transit projects.³ As extreme weather events become more frequent, the economic costs of climate change continue to grow effecting food security. Emerging markets will contend with outward migration and brain drain, and rapid aging in developed markets will create the greatest depopulation challenges.

Historical Anatomy of Pakistan's Economy

The economy of Pakistan contains all the ingredients of a typical developing economy; a predominantly reliance on agriculture sector for livelihood. Last sixty nine years of Pakistan economic experience reveals various ups and downs.⁴ In Post-Independence Era (1947-1958)⁵ economy of Pakistan remained agrarian with agriculture sharing more than 50 % of its GDP. There was little by way of foreign trade and aid. The six-year development program initiated under the *Colombo Plan* during 1948 could not continue beyond two years. During the period of First Five Year Plan, 1955-60, new industrial units were established. Though, high export earnings during Korean War in 1950 provided some cushion, but ultimately the reserves were depleted and exports declined with GDP growth at 3.3%.⁶ During 1958 to 1968 economy as a whole progressed and GDP increased at the rate of 6.7 % per year. 'Green Revolution' but not the land reforms, helped Pakistan agricultural sector to rise and by 1960 agriculture accounted for 56 % of the national GDP.⁷ In the Second Five Years Plan 1960-65, and Third Five Years Plan, 1965-70, substantial amount was allocated for the growth of industrial sector.⁸ With frequent standby arrangements and multilateral loans, Pakistan external debt at the end of Ayub's era was USD 2.9 Billion.⁹ Bhutto pursued a nationalization programme. The growth rate in the 1970s fell to 3.7 %¹⁰ per annum from the 6 % recorded in the 1960s. By the end of 1977, Pakistan external debt stood at USD 6.3 Billion.¹¹ Government spent roughly USD 12 billion¹² on the counter insurgency operation in Bangladesh, the war with India and the subsequent re-organization of the Armed Forces. Nationalization was abandoned and fresh investment was encouraged in the private sector and thus GDP grew at 5.5 % a year.¹³ During the 1980s, Afghan war helped in maintaining a solid balance of payment position. Assistance from US alone had been around USD 5 billion¹⁴ since 1982, making Pakistan the third largest recipient of US aid in 1980s. Nine different governments (four interim-appointed, four elected and one following the military coup of October 1999) changed hands during this period. In this period the GDP decelerated to averaging around 4.1 %¹⁵, inflation rose to peak rates of 25 %, debt burden escalated substantially, macroeconomic imbalances widened. By end of 1998, Pakistan external debt increased to USD 25.5 Billion and Foreign Reserve declined to only 1.7 Billion after 1998 nuclear tests and Kargil war. Reliance on external resources to finance over 30 percent of investment in the 1990s was both unsustainable and undesirable. During Musharraf's era, the rise of economy was swift but so was the fall especially in year 2007-8. Overall the GDP growth averaged nearly 5.5 % per annum. Investment figures improved as over 17 billion direct investment came to Pakistan during FY 2004-08.¹⁶ By the end of Musharraf's tenure, foreign debts had risen to USD 33.9 billion. Immediately after Musharraf, country witnessed acute power shortages, speedy devaluation of currency from Rs 60 to Rs 85 per USD and simultaneously high inflation rate of 22%.¹⁷ All these factors effected balance of payment and accumulation of foreign debt, hampering GDP growth to an

average at 3.1% per annum, thereby taking country once again towards debt default but the same was averted through loans from multilateral sources.

Overview of Current Pakistan's Economy

Pakistan has a population of over 190 million making it the world's 6th-largest country, giving it a per capita income of \$1,429¹⁸, which ranks 141st in the world. Pakistan is a developing country and is one of the Next Eleven, the eleven countries that, along with the BRICS, have a potential to become one of the world's large economies in the 21st century. Pakistan's economy continues to maintain its growth momentum with a slow pace having real GDP growing at 4.71 % in FY 2016 which is the highest in eight years.¹⁹ The agriculture sector contributed 19.8 % in GDP and it remains the largest employer absorbing sector with 42.3 % of the country's total labour force.²⁰ Industrial sector contributes 21.02% in GDP and consumes 22.6% of total labour force. This sector recorded a growth of 6.8% as compared to 4.81% last year mainly due to CPEC related projects. Share of Services sector in GDP has reached to 59.16 % in FY 2016 with consumption of 35.1% of labour force. The services sector has witnessed a growth of 5.71 % as compared to 4.31 % last year. The investment recovery, combined with expected improvements in productivity, could push the GDP growth rate to around 6 percent per annum by 2020-25. The viability of the critical short-to-medium term scenario depends on three key conditions materializing, namely (a) a significant national saving effort, (b) broad international support to meet the large overhang of external debt payments, and (c) major improvements in productivity.

In the federal budget of 2016-17, total resources available were estimated to be 44.4 billion dollars; whereas expenditures amount to be 57.2 billion dollars, resulting in fiscal deficit of 12.7 billion dollars which is 4.3 % of GDP.²¹ With almost all countries that had traditionally invested in Pakistan now pulling out their investments, on the other hand, China has increased its FDI as part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Total FDI during FY 2015-16 was 1.3 billion dollars only with 46% of it coming from China alone.²² Pakistan is ranked 8th largest recipient of officially recorded remittances in the world with USD 20.1 billion. India leads the ranking with USD 72.2 billion, followed by China with USD 64 billion. The tax revenues for 2016-17 are estimated at 38 billion dollars, which reflects an increase of 15.7%. Total tax base of the country is still around 1.06 Million, which is less than 1 % of the population.²³ The exports for FY 2016 were remained at 20.8 billion dollars as compared to 23.6 billion²⁴ dollars of FY 2015, showing a decline of 12.1%. In the budget 2015-16²⁵ subsidies were 1.9 billion dollars. Since last five years, the trend of giving subsidies is towards decline.

The country's total foreign exchange reserves reached at USD 23 billion. The rise was mainly due to loans from ADB and World Bank. SBP cut its policy rate significantly to 5.75 % in May, 2016 which is the lowest in 44 years to encourage investment. During current year PSX 100-index reached 40,135 point, the highest level in Pakistan stock market history. The present government when came into power sternly focused to anchor the inflation and remained successful in containing inflation at 8.62 % in FY 2014 and further to 4.53 % in FY 2015. Inflation during July-April FY 2016 has been further contained at 2.79 %, which is the lowest in 13 years.

Pakistan's Debt Profile

Growing public debt is a worldwide phenomenon. Almost all developing countries are under minor or high public debt situation. Public debt also known as sovereign or national debt comprises external and domestic debt and liabilities. The External Debt and Liabilities grew at an average rate of 1.4 % adding USD 3.7 billion from 2000 – 2007 but its growth accelerated to an average of 6.2 % per annum during 2008-15 adding USD 24.9 billion. Similarly, government managed to mobilize around \$7.3 billion in FY2016 and intends to garner around \$8.1 billion in FY2017.²⁶ Domestic debt includes Pakistan investment bond (PIBs), Government Ijara and Sakuk bonds, Market related treasury bills and National Saving Schemes. The share of domestic debt increased to 56.3 % in 2010-11 but surged rapidly to 70.3 % in 2016. Within public debt, the share of domestic debt has risen at a very rapid pace since 2010-11 owing to the sharp decline in external flows.²⁷ After hefty repayments in 2013-14 of USD 6.1 billion, public external debt servicing witnessed a decline of 25 % during 2014-15 due to lower repayments to IMF that peaked out and were recorded at USD 4.5 billion. Government paid US\$ 6.6 billion in 2015-16, As the significant portion of the IMF loans has already been repaid, this decline will be somewhat offset by an increase in debt servicing over the medium-term. Government of Pakistan prepared Debt Management Strategy covering the government's financing needs and payment obligations.²⁸ This strategy focuses on gradually lengthen the maturity profile of domestic debt by mobilizing more financing from external sources. Also aims at taking more loans for repayment of debt. The most immediate economic problem facing Pakistan is to cope with the mountain of external debt service payments due during the next few years. A sustainable debt management strategy must be focused on elements of reviving national growth through investment and productivity enhancement, improving debt carrying capacity, reducing rate of future borrowing, improving effectiveness of public expenditures, transparent privatization of SOEs and adopting a medium to long-term debt management strategy with clear goals and monitoring mechanism established with key stakeholders (SBP, EAD, MoF).

Future Scenarios of Pakistan's External Debt (2016 -2020)

In first Scenario Pakistan's depicted as Flourishing Pakistan wherein an improving GDP Growth and Receding Debt are main indicators Most Desirable. Pakistan successfully implemented and pursued long awaited tax reforms and was able to move towards fiscal surplus. Government's enhanced focus on improvement in exports and agriculture, led to achievement of economic targets. Increase in FDI further added to fiscal space. Simultaneously, Pakistan used this fiscal leverage towards debt servicing, thereby reducing the overall debt levels. Additional fiscal space was utilized to improve agricultural productivity, industrial and infrastructural development. While for 2nd which is also most likely Status Quo will be maintained wherein improving GDP growth and Debt Accumulation will continue, Pakistan partially implemented and pursued long awaited tax reforms and managed the fiscal deficit. Government focused on improvement in exports and agriculture which contributed marginally towards achievement of economic targets showing a little GDP growth. Simultaneously, acquired additional loan which were utilized in fiscal management and improvement of communication infrastructure projects, thereby increasing debt burden. Scenario three would be termed as, Debt Reducing Pakistan in which Low GDP Growth and Receding Debt indicators will dominate. Government

took drastic measure to repel the political pressure and reformulated^d its debt management strategy, focusing on debt reduction while compromising on development and growth. To this end, Government of Pakistan cashed on the opportunity of investment coming through CPEC, while cutting down government non development expenditure at prima facie and compromising development funds in per se, to repay the debts. This was primarily crafted to repel political pressure, minimize the criticism on government expenses and also to capitalize the space offered by CPEC. While the most dangerous would be Scenario⁴ i.e. Burdened Pakistan in which Low GDP and Debt Accumulation will be two main features of the economy. Pakistan's inability to implement long awaited tax reforms, failure to exploit the strength of agricultural base and its exports losing competitive value in international markets lead to substantial increase in fiscal deficit. Consequently, Government of Pakistan leaned onto international multilateral financial institutions for additional loans to bridge this fiscal gap. However, these additional loans were misused for politically motivated short sighted economically unfeasible projects, thereby adversely affecting the GDP and Debt accumulation. For most likely i.e. Scenario-2 the whole picture would be like as follows. As per IMF's forecast Pakistan external debt and liabilities in year 2020 are likely to touch USD 104.6 billion with growth in GDP to around 369.4 USD billion. From 2015 till 2020 the external debt servicing would increase from USD 6.6 billion to USD 9.9 billion and correspondingly will have increasing impact of debt servicing to export ratio, since exports bill is utilized to service the external debt servicing. If exports grow at above average pace, then it would have significantly positive impact on external debt servicing. The current account deficit is likely to increase from USD 1.7 billion to USD 8.5 due to increase in imports and stagnant exports thus adding additional burden on external financing requirements in addition to annual debt servicing. Total requirement to fill this gap by 2020 would be around USD 18.4 billion. Pakistan is likely to continue with moderate financial inflows primarily through traditional donors, Chinese financing for CPEC and foreign investment. These inflows are expected to remain between USD 7.75 billion in 2017 to USD 9.6 billion till 2020.²⁹ Investor friendly environment and timely completion of CPEC may boost financial inflows. Total financing requirements and finances available will have impact on the overall financial situation of Pakistan. It is likely to remain manageable till 2019 and even debt repayments will not be a major issue. Thereafter, from 2020 onwards the financing gap will increase substantially to US\$ 8.8 billion. This can only be managed if government pays more focus on basics of economy like agriculture, exports and reducing government expenditures. Basing on the current economic indicators, debt situation and future outlook, it can be concluded that Pakistan is not in a state of Debt trap at present. However, in mid to long term, if existing trend of borrowing continues without substantial economic growth, then Pakistan is vulnerable to fall into debt trap.

Case studies of Turkey & Syria

To better understand debt burden, debt crises and how to cope with it we may have a bird's eye view of two case studies of Turkey and Greece. Being a member of NATO, Turkey has great strength and clout internationally. Fiscal and financial reforms implemented after the 2001 crisis, tightening control mechanisms, and institutional arrangements have consolidated Turkey's financial structure compared to the 1990s, which had an impact on the external debt dynamics. Turkey recorded a Government Debt of USD 449 Billion and Debt to GDP ratio of 32.90%. Government

Debt to GDP³⁰ ratio in Turkey averaged 48.50 % from 2000 until 2015, reaching an all-time high of 77.90 % in 2001 and a record low of 32.90 % in 2015. Turkish economy during the previous one decade has skyrocketed to the extent that Turkey is the member of Group-20 (G-20) and its GDP is \$1.2 trillion.³¹ Since last 3 to 4 years' situation along Syrian border and after math of refugee crisis are directly impacting negatively towards Turkish economy.³²

After the creation of the European Central Bank (ECB), countries like Greece could borrow large amounts of money at very low-interest rates. Interest rates for loans to smaller European countries which were previously above 20% became less than 5%. Greece began to borrow recklessly used it for populist programmes like high pensions, low taxes, higher salaries etc. This led to increasing government debt which Greece managed to repay with even more borrowed money. This cycle continued until 2008, when the US housing market suffered a collapse and the globe became engulfed in financial crisis. The world experienced an acute credit crisis, and borrowing stopped. Greece couldn't borrow anymore, couldn't repay its debts and Europe suddenly realized the mountainous magnitude of the Greek debt which was 175% of the country's GDP, the largest sovereign debt in history. To help Greece pay up its debts (which it owed to ECB, IMF and other EU countries), Germany and other countries agreed to provide it 2 bailouts meaning Germany would pay Greece's bills.

Policy Recommendations

Sectoral reforms, infrastructural development, sound debt management and striking a balance between stabilization and growth will lead towards economic development and debt reduction. The desirable Flourishing Pakistan scenario will be achieved through ends, ways and means as under:

Ends	Ways	Means
Achieve 7% growth on sustained basis	Structural reforms, Economic Governance, accountability	Expanding productivity base, attract FDI and HRD
Reduce fiscal deficit less than 4% in short term, 3% in mid-term and 2% in long term	Fiscal farsightedness, Increase Revenue base, Reduction in expenditures	Curtailing non development expenditures, tax reforms, privatization of PSEs
Reduce trade deficit to less than USD 10b in short term, USD 5b in medium term and trade surplus in long term	Prudent trade policy	Enhance export competitiveness, diversification of exports and export markets
Maintain inflation less than 3 %	Effective monetary policy	Autonomous state bank, good governance, maintaining demand and supply
Achieve tax to GDP ratio 13% in short term, 16% in mid-term & 20% in long term	Tax Reforms	Enhancing tax base, documentation of economy, direct taxation (Property & Agri)
Reduce Debt to GDP ratio less than 60% in short term, 50% in mid -term and below 30% in long term	Viable debt management policy	Avoid reckless borrowing, transparent privatization policy, sensible utilization of aval debt

Pakistan has pursued an austerity program for the last seven/eight years, which has not paid desired results towards economy growth. The time has come to move out from Stabilization first policy to striking a balance between growth and stabilization. Improving agricultural productivity, investor friendly environment, broadening economic base, diversification in exports, less reliance on remittances and attracting FDI from across the globe are main strands for structural reforms. Efforts be made to enhance country's debt carrying capacity. In this respect, serious attention be given to arrest the declining trend in exports through enhancing competitiveness, ensuring required energy supply and removing structural bottlenecks. Create conditions through policies to attract foreign investment. Engagement with foreign and private investors to address problems. Improvement in GDP growth through diversification of efforts across all sector of economy, specially focusing on agriculture.

Long term economic policies focusing on accountability, transparency and consistency be pursued. And regulating remittances and integrating with investment schemes. Non profitable PSEs be privatized to curtail subsidies and simultaneously generating additional revenues for development projects and debt retirement. Considering the potential, major portion of undocumented economy should be channelized to generate additional revenues. There is a dire need to diversify our export base in terms of items and destination markets. Focus is needed on strengthening the capacity to monitor and enforce compliance through market analysis and access to data. This should be coupled with renewed efforts to broaden tax base, bringing undocumented economy into tax net, improving governance and reducing corruption in tax administration. Keeping in view the importance and indispensable nature of debt sustainability, there is a need to revise the existing Medium Term Debt Management Strategy, while meeting cost and risks objectives.

Conclusion

After several years of weak economic performance, most of the macroeconomic indicators witnessed slight improvement in last two years. The short term economic outlook for Pakistan in now broadly favourable, although structural bottlenecks may impede high potential for growth. Pursuance of viable and consistent economic policies will not only help in sustainable economic growth but will also reduce vulnerability of the country to fall in a debt trap.

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COMBATING RADICALISM AND EXTREMISM

Lt Col Waseem, Lt Col Sohail Arshad, Capt Faisal,
Mr. Bilal & Brig Gen Hamidul Haque

Everyone vow to himself and be prepared to sacrifice his all, if necessary, in building up Pakistan as a fort of Islam and as one of the greatest nations whose ideal is peace within and peace without.¹

Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah

Abstract

The September 11 terrorist attacks on US confronted the world with new realities and altered the global geo-political scene. Radicalism, extremism and terrorism emerged as the new threats to the global peace. In Pakistan, the rather neglected issues of radicalism and extremism surged to confront the government as the most serious challenge for our internal security. The extremist forces, having entrenched in our society, take strength from and offer synergy to the terrorist forces. Pakistan is still fighting extremist forces all across the country to safeguard its national interests. Besides, fighting this menace is also an international obligation. This study briefly covers an understanding of the issues of radicalism and extremism as sources of terrorism within the context of domestic, regional and global dynamics and historical perspective. It is a proven fact that this nexus is a serious threat to our survival as a progressive nation. A host of internal and external factors have contributed a great deal to the current state of affairs. Iranian revolution, Islamization process in Pakistan, Afghan Jihad; socio-economic and political factors on our home front have been peeped into for evolving a correct paradigm. It also analyses the impact of the phenomenon on Pakistan in brief, highlights case studies and outlines a response strategy to cope up with the problem. The paper concludes that Pakistan has to fight this evil in its own national interest hence, fight we should with prudence and sagacity. The misdirected zealots can best be defeated with engagement, wider mobilization of society in support; and selective application of force. The thirty years process has to be unwound with care. The strategy must therefore, be comprehensive encompassing political, economic, psycho-social, media and military components for a sure and lasting victory.

Introduction

Radicalism, extremism and terrorism are the phenomena that resonate in the international and domestic security paradigm. These phenomena are neither new to the human society, nor have remained confined to a specific country, region or religion. It has been a method of achieving various objectives. Nature of such objectives could be political, religious, economic or social or combination of these. Similarly, the causes of radicalism and extremism are also diverse with internal and external dimensions. The global environment and socio economic factors have contributed a great deal towards the spread of extremism in the society and created space for extremist elements. 'Radicalism' and 'Extremism' pose a serious challenge

to the stability of the world. According to the Global Terrorism Index, radicalism and extremism have become the main drivers of terrorism in recent years and there has been a fivefold increase in deaths from terrorism since the 9/11 suicide attacks. It also remains an expedient tool for the terrorists fighting against the state of Pakistan. In order to defeat such elements and their skewed ideologies, besides Zarb-e-Azb, a lot is needed to be done by the state and society as a cohesive whole, thus needing consideration for a comprehensive policy.

Conceptual Contours of Radicalism and Extremism

What are Radicalism, Extremism, Militancy and Terrorism?

In recent years, terminologies like Radicalism, Terrorism, Extremism, Militancy etcetera have been used very frequently, yet no universally accepted definitions could be derived. Now coming over to Radicalization: Generally speaking, Radicalization is a process by which an individual or group comes to adopt increasingly extreme political, social, or religious ideals and aspirations that reject or undermine the status quo, contemporary ideas and expressions of freedom of choice.² The US Department of Homeland Security defines radicalization as the process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support, or facilitate ideologically based violence, as a method to effect political, religious and social change.³ Swedish Security Service defines radicalization as a process that leads to ideological or religious activism to introduce radical change to society.⁴ It has potential to overlap with both extremism and terrorism.

De-radicalization: While some view de-radicalization as an effort to prevent radicalization; others emphasize more on de-programming efforts for those who are already radicalized. However, some define de-radicalization as the process of rejecting...its beliefs in the permissibility of using violence against civilians, who do not adhere to the radicals' views.⁵ Counter-radicalization: Counter-radicalization focuses mainly on preventing radicalism. The UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force has defined counter-radicalization as a package of social, political, legal, educational and economic programs specifically designed to deter disaffected (and possibly already radicalized) individuals from crossing the line and becoming terrorists.

Extremism: Merriam Webster Dictionary defines it as, belief in and support for ideas that are very far from what most people consider correct or reasonable. Oxford Dictionary describes extremism as, holding extreme political or religious views, especially those which advocate illegal, violent, or other extreme actions. Dr. Aaron T. Beck, relates the extremism to a regular pattern of cognitive distortions that leads to dichotomous thinking. This pattern is thinking about things in black and white terms which actually exist only in shades of grey. The cognitive approach seems to explain the basis of narrative of extremists.

Militancy: The term Militancy is used in an ambiguous manner in between more legitimate terms such as, freedom fighters or activist groups, and the more loaded terms are extremists or terrorists. Dr George Houghton writes that Militancy, springs from one's values, is an expressed attitude and results in a certain behaviour. One's values are those things in which he strongly believes, considering them fundamentally true and important. ⁶ It describes those who aggressively and violently

promote a political philosophy in the name of a movement and sometimes have an extreme solution for their goal. Protocol 1 of Geneva Conventions gives lawful combatant status to those engaging in armed conflicts against alien or foreign occupation and racist regimes. However, Protocol 1 does not legitimize attacks on civilians.

Terrorism: The word terror is derived from the Latin expression *terrere* which means, to frighten. States and organizations have developed a range of definitions to suit respective interests. Definition by UN Security Council: An action or attempted action that constitutes the intentional taking of hostages; or is intended to cause death or serious bodily injury...or involves lethal or serious physical violence...and the action is done or attempted with the intention of provoking a state of terror in the general public or a segment of it; or compelling a Government or international organization to do or abstain from doing something. Some countries, like US, for example, are yet to find a definition that is acceptable to all its government agencies. According to the US Department of Defence, terrorism is the unlawful use of or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives. On the other hand, the US Department of State defines terrorism as a premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. Few facts that emerge from conceptual contours include; Radicalism, extremism and terrorism are inter-related terminologies. A radical individual when embraces extreme ideologies becomes extremist and when uses violence to pursue his goals becomes a terrorist. Thus, the process can be summarised as Radicalism, Extremism and Terrorism. These have common aim to bring political, social or religious changes in the society. Cognitive distortions and Dichotomous thinking are the words that explain the state of mind behind the radicalism and extremism. Different countries and organizations define them to suit their requirement. Most of the definitions are given by the west and there is a lack of effort by the countries which are direct victims of terrorism.

Historical Perspective and Extremism in Pakistan

Global Historical Perspective: In 6 AD, Judas of Galilee resisted against the Romans and founded Zealots, who fought for the Jewish Revolt. Subsequently in the 7th century, Khawarij adopted extreme doctrines declaring other Muslims non-believers and worthy of death resembling today's Taliban narrative. In 11th century, Fedayeen's were used for assassinations resembling suicide bombers of today. During same period, Pope Urban II declared wars as holy wars. French revolution also witnessed Society of the Friends of the Constitution carrying out mass executions to terrorize enemies. In 1878 People's Freedom in Russia targeted leaders of oppression. The group also assassinated Tsar Alexander II. Zionist operated in Palestine between 1931 & 1948 and was branded as terrorist organization by UK and Jewish Agency. Iron Guard of Romania promoted the Orthodox Christian faith with its death squads. Between 1960 and 1980 violent leftist groups sympathizing guerrilla movement's sparked anti-capitalist revolt. Babri Mosque, Mecca Masjid bombing (Hyderabad), Gujrat violence & Samjhauta Express Bombings are testimony of Hindu extremism. Finally 9/11 - a watershed in world politics which changed the regional and global landscape of geo-politics.

Radicalism and Extremism in Pakistan

Before independence, Khilafat Movement introduced four main tendencies in the thoughts of Muslims of the subcontinent: first, religion could be mixed with politics to achieve certain objectives; second, emotional appeals could be used to achieve political purposes; third, the desire for pan-Islamism could be fulfilled; and fourth, the concept of a contiguous political entity ruled by a Caliph was still valid. Quaid-e-Azam, however, did not support the Khilafat Movement. Quaid-e-Azam, however, conveyed his broad guidelines about Pakistan on 11 Aug 1947 saying that “you may belong to any religion or caste or creed – that has nothing to do with the business of the state. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State. After Quaid-e-Azam’s death, the surviving political leaders came up with a page and a half of objective resolution. The opening sentence of the Objective resolution that Sovereignty belongs to The God Almighty alone alarmed the minorities as they were seeing a foot of clergy on the doors. They feared that gradually non-Muslims will be declared second class citizens. In 1953 Pakistan faced severe food shortage, resulting in agitations. Course of agitation was altered from economic to religious by fundamentalist leaders and ulema. Later on, Lahore witnessed serious riots over Ahmadi issue. 1956 was a period of political turmoil witnessing clash of interpretations over the role of Islam in the affairs of the government. The constitutional drafters followed the guidance of the Objectives Resolution and Pakistan was declared an Islamic Republic in 1956. The preamble to the Constitution prohibited any laws repugnant to Islam as set forth in Quran and Sunnah. In the 1962 Constitution, an additional phrase was added to repugnancy clause that all existing laws shall be brought into conformity to Holy Quran and Sunnah. Further, Article 242 provided that in the application of this clause to the personal law of any Muslim sect, the expression Quran and Sunnah shall mean the Quran and Sunnah as interpreted by that sect. The foundation for sectarian strife was thus laid. The 1973 constitution formally established Islam as the state religion. Baloch issue was poorly handled in 70s resulting into an armed struggle in Balochistan. Atrocities inflicted during this period infused sense of deprivation and alienation among Baloch populous. Post 1979, the politically motivated Islamization policy led to a rise in religious intolerance and sectarianism. Education was used as a political tool to promote a particular worldview. The militant madrasas are also a legacy of this era which changed the character of this traditional institution of learning. Pakistani madrasas were extensively used for the training and recruitment of Mujahideen for Afghan war. USA was also involved in radicalization of education in Pakistan to help the cause of Afghan jihad. The textbooks from USAID and University of Nebraska, promoting a militant worldview were distributed in Pakistani madrasas. According to the Interior Ministry, in 1947, West Pakistan had only 245 seminaries which has increased to some 26,000 madaris in the country with nearly 3.5 million students. Between 1988 and 2000, this increase was 136 percent. During this period radicalism started to take roots in Pakistan. It was from here, that the militant groups and militancy took a political dimension. The Iranian Revolution in 1979 also gave a fill-up to Sunni sectarian militant groups in Pakistan. After the disintegration of Soviet Union, US parted ways from Afghan affairs leaving the mess behind. Meanwhile, in 1993, Taliban Islamic Movement started and succeeded in seeking control of most of Afghanistan and in 1996 Mullah Omar assumed the title of Amirul Momineen. Taliban government imposed their own interpretation of Islamic Sharia rule, which inspired extremist elements in Pakistan. The U-turn against

Taliban post 9/11 started a new era, with Pakistan in the opposite camp that continues till today.

From historical perspective, we can ascertain that; Radicalism and Extremism are as old as the history of mankind. Radicalism and Extremism have no geographical or religious confines; it can originate in any society. Extremists firmly believe in their ideology and vigorously pursue it to achieve their objectives. Religion as the basis of political ideology did not gel well with the practical functioning of politics. Successive governments in the Pakistan evolved policies to manage the religious sentiment for their political gains and survival. Gen Zia's regime not only patronized the sectarian exclusiveness but also introduced militant tendencies. Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Iranian Revolution are key events which accelerated the Jihadi and sectarian aspirations in the country. The incident of 9 /11 and consequent Afghan and Iraq Wars paved the way for extremism at global level. The parameters of radicalism, extremism and terrorism have been redefined in the history due to changing perspectives.

Major Terrorist Organizations, Stakeholders and Their Impact

The US State Department has designated around 60 militant groups as Foreign Terrorist Organizations.⁷ The Government of Pakistan has proscribed sixty one organizations.⁸ We will focus on major organizations in Pakistan in two categories i.e organizations not directly involved and organizations which are directly involved; Al Qaeda and DAESH: Their Objectives are crosscutting and overlapping in nature aimed at overthrowing secular Muslim regimes and monarchies labelling them apostate – the near enemies, and their western allies and supporters – the far enemies. The ultimate aim is to establish Islamic Caliphate extending from North Africa, through the Middle East to Asia.⁹ They have no foot print in Pakistan though they might have sympathisers. Their presence in Afghanistan is however, a matter of serious concern. IMU and ETIM: IMU originated in Central Asia with an aim to establish Sharia Rule in Farghana valley, whereas ETIM has its origin in the Xinjiang's Kashgar seeking an independent state called East Turkestan comprising parts of Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region.¹⁰ Afghan Taliban: TTA was a group of mujahideen who fought the USSR in Afghanistan. USA, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan supported them militarily and financially. They emerged as a political force in 1994 and ruled Afghanistan from 1996 until 2001, when the US-led coalition ousted them out of power.

The organizations that have direct involvement in Pakistan include; Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). TTP emerged in 2002 in FATA in response to military operations. It is getting military and financial support from India. Other financial sources include kidnapping for ransom, extortions and robberies.¹¹TTP draws inspiration from Afghan Taliban and Al Qaida.¹² Its Stated objectives are; Resistance against Pakistan Armed Forces and to overthrow the government and enforce its own brand of Sharia. Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP): It was founded in 1985 by Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi. It is primarily against Shia community. It supports the Taliban and al-Qaida in Afghanistan. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ): Being a sub-group of SSP, LeJ has become the key player in the nexus between Al-Qaeda, Taliban and SSP. With the passage of time, LeJ gave birth to many splinters like Jhangvi Tigers, Al-Haq Tigers etcetera.¹³ Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT): Founded by Hafiz Saeed in the Kunar, Afghanistan

in 1990, the declared objective of Lashkar-e-Taiba is to introduce an Islamic state in South Asia and liberate the occupied Jammu and Kashmir from India. Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM): was founded by Sufi Muhammad in 1992. In its pursuit to enforce Sharia in the country, the TNSM controlled most parts of Swat in 2007. It supported the Taliban in Afghanistan. Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA): BLA was formed in 1999. BLA's stated objectives are independent Balochistan. India is providing arms, financial aid and training to BLA to destabilize Pakistan and check Chinese influence in Gwadar.¹⁴

Interests of International Stakeholders

China: Peace in Afghanistan is to the benefit of China for heavy economic investment in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia. Extermination of the terrorists is the sine qua non for successful completion of OBOR/CPEC.

Russia: Russia is still to win the war on terror in Caucasus and Dagestan. A peaceful region reduces US influence in CARs and Afghanistan and enhances economic opportunities for Russia in South Asia by securing access to the Indian Ocean.

USA: 9/11 afforded United States opportunity to fight terrorists away from its Homeland; enhance influence in South and Central Asia; to achieve containment of China; and to pursue its Regime Change Policy.

India: India has exploited the situation after 9/11 by getting closer to people in Afghanistan, breeding mistrust; and to wage a proxy war against Pakistan. Stable Afghanistan is likely to reduce the Indian influence in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan: Afghanistan's economy is mostly shaped by wars, crimes and informal trade. Most of the war lords, political leaders and tribal elders are beneficiaries of war economy which flourishes in weak governance environment. Narco trade being a major component of the economy enjoys the patronage of influential traders. Peace and security does not augur well for these beneficiaries.

KSA: Saudi Arabia invested \$ 1.5-2 Trillion¹⁵ to promote Wahhabism worldwide. Differences between Saudi Arabia and Iran are of great concern to the muslim world. Saudi Arabia has been directly funding a number of religious seminaries throughout the Pakistan.

Iran: Iran was the 1st country to recognize Pakistan. However, the recent relations have remained on a low note owing to Jundullah, Balochistan Insurgency and Indian spies using Iranian soil.

Impact on Pakistan

Insecure Western Border: As a result of the hostile environment and coercive US diplomacy in the aftermath of 9/11, Pakistan had to change its Afghan Policy and assumed a frontline position in the war against terror. Mujahideen, once allies, became enemies and western border became insecure. Hostile India: Attack on Indian Parliament in Dec, 2001, Mumbai attacks of 2008, the Pathan Kot, and the recent Uri incident continue to be a source of acrimony between India and Pakistan.

The contradictory statements¹⁶ of DG (NIA) and Indian Defence Minister on Pathankot should be enough to understand the obsession of India. Effect of Drone Attacks: Drone strikes have become counterproductive creating negative sentiments in Pakistani society not only against the US but its own government as well.¹⁷ Till now around 3000 people have been killed in 322 US drone attacks during 2005-2016.¹⁸ Situation in Balochistan: BLA is targeting government installations and officials with financial, technical and moral support of India¹⁹. The sectarian environment in Quetta remains quite tense. Economic initiatives including CPEC are likely to suffer if security situation in Balochistan does not improve.

Increasing Insecurity: The extremist organizations have shaped an environment where religious scholars, intelligentsia, political leaders and minorities feel equally insecure. The murder of Mufti Naeemi, Maulana Hasan Jan and Salman Taseer, indicate the drift of Pakistan from the Quaid's vision. Concerns regarding Strategic Assets: Pakistan's nuclear assets are well guarded and protected but some vested interests are creating unnecessary alarms and fears regarding the security of Pakistan's Strategic assets.²⁰ Such wild stories have grave impact on the security situation in the nuclear region. Economic Loss: During the last 14 years, the direct and indirect cost incurred by Pakistan due to terrorism amounts to US\$ 118.3 billion. Besides, the terrorism has inflicted untold human sufferings.²¹ Karachi was also badly affected. Miscellaneous Implications of Extremism: Distortion of national image at international level. Negative impact on Kashmir Movement. Extremists challenging writ of the state. Threat to minorities. Binary stretch on armed forces. Prevalence of lawlessness and instability. Intolerance, exclusionism and hatred in society. Effects on education sector, especially in FATA. Reduction in tourism, cultural and sports activities.

Causes of Ingress and Case Studies – An Analysis

This is Saad Aziz, born in a well to do family, schooling from beacon house & graduation from IBA, the quality of education which many of the audience here will also envy. Saad Aziz was accredited with Safoora bus massacre which resulted in 45 unfortunate deaths. So what drives ordinary Pakistanis to transform into extraordinary terrorists at times even to the point of becoming a suicide bomber? The panel considers 4 x basic elements that define the framework of ingress within our society. These are Grievances, Networks, Ideologies & Enabling Support structure. All subsidiary causes are subset of the given framework: Grievances: Poverty: Poverty within Pakistan is as high as 70% in some areas shown in red²². The inescapable grinding poverty fosters seeding resentment between the haves and have not's. If your choice is to die beggar or a martyr, martyrdom is the obvious choice. Illiteracy: With only 60% literacy rate & majority of children out of school, lack of education remains a strong catalyst for radical ideas. Ignorant individuals are subject to easy indoctrination. Sense of Victimization: International double standards, drone attacks, bombing for democracy & paradigm shift in policies provide emotional surge a necessary ingredient for radical propaganda. Youth Bulge and Unemployment: Interestingly, individuals like Saad Aziz are both well-fed & well-read. A young nation with over 60% population between ages 15-24²³ combined with high unemployment forms a recipe for disaster. Young individuals seek a path out of petty criminality by anchoring themselves in a milieu that can provide them with a sense of purpose & meaning. They want their mundane existence to be converted into an empowered life forging a new world where they are seen as heroes & martyrs not as

criminals or losers. Corruption: Pakistan, ranked 35th as per world bank Corruption Index in 1996 now ranks 117th. Moreover, as per the PEW Research Centre, Washington, majority of Pakistanis has been dissatisfied with the performance and direction of their political leadership. Losing faith in the prevalent system entices individuals to seek alternate paths.

Millions of Pakistanis harbour deep seated grievances; however, not all of them embrace radicalism. That's where networks come in. A grieved individual must be able to connect to radical networks in order to convert his grievances into an extremist ideology of militant action. Whereas Structured Networks in the form of NSA's have already been discussed, a phenomena more prevalent in Pakistan society is called Social Bonding²⁴ or Preservation of Kinship & Friendship Ties. Our society is characterized by a closed knit family system. Humans derive psychological benefits from close associations. Ideology is more likely to resonate within individuals if the same is expressed by a valued association such as a brother or a father. Irrespective of their type, networks mentally hijack the individual through a 3 x step process called spirals of encapsulation.²⁵ Disconnecting individuals from normal world, providing alternate source of information and Severe social ties with individuals not sincere to the cause. Finally, as intergroup bonds mature, the cost of leaving the group rises usually to unacceptable limits.

Ideology: In a highly ideological society like Pakistan, disagreement is discouraged & conformity is praised - creating cognitive enclosures. Religion has been used as a state tool. In politics, it is used as a means to achieve political ends. Sectarianism has seeded a hate culture amongst the Muslim populace itself. As per our analysis, shifting to radical ideology in Pakistan is largely attributable to poor understanding of religion - embracing radical ideas in the name of Islam therefore, is the most likely derivative. Intolerance within our society is on the rise. Mutilated bodies of bomb victims are broadcasted as breaking news. Society has alienated itself from the peace & tranquillity - the true essence of Islam.

Radical narratives are based on the salient's; Provide a clear-cut solution to every problem. Pakistani regime is colluding with the west, further perpetuating the suffering of its people. Pakistan is too weak to defend global Muslim cause - desperate times call for desperate measures. Muslims must step forward and fulfil their obligation to Allah and redeem their lives for eternal paradise. Unlike the solutions offered by the state, radical narratives are simple, palatable and provide an easy way for redemption.

Does our education system play in the hands of radicals? A survey of Punjab Text Board, Grade 6 to 8 was carried out in a publication what we are teaching our children by Mr Amir Riaz.²⁶ Only 6 out of 57 lessons about Islam promote peace & tolerance. No positive reference exists about any non-Islamic character. 7 x references against various Islamic sects exist. This leads us to conclude that; all positive things are to be found only in Muslim culture. People diverging from the path of Islam are condemnable. Muslim history taught makes the minds of children vulnerable to extremists' propaganda. Content about modernity, peace and tolerance is minimized.

Enabling Support Structures: It includes both physical infrastructure and virtual spaces. Physical Infrastructure: General: If networks & radical ideology are

primary schools for radicalization, training camps act as universities providing recruits with the opportunity to cement their radical ideologies and enable transformation into a terrorist. Whereas, such infrastructure within Pakistan has largely been eliminated due to Op Zarb-e-Azb, presence of ungoverned spaces within Afghanistan remain a source of concern. Drug cartels often provide them necessary funding to fuel terrorism. Unsupervised Religious Seminaries: Madrassas are an integral and accepted part of our education system; however a look at some basic facts & figures reveals presence of 14,000 unregistered madrassas with 160 in our national capital alone. Other Areas of Concern: As per unofficial reports, many foreigners studying in madrassas have expired visas. Madrassa graduates have inadequate job opportunities. Emphasis is on mugging rather than understanding. Annual foreign grant of \$ 300 Mn is being directly provided to Madrassas by 12 donor countries bypassing government channels. Does this entail possible covert agendas? Radicals & extremists have adapted by mixing themselves within the normal populace. Abbottabad Commission Report is a startling revelation in this regard. Abbottabad is considered as a modern planned city of Pakistan. Yet the report revealed that almost 8000 houses were not listed with state authorities.²⁷ Who resides in them, is altogether another question. Therefore, in the absence of credible city planning & population metrics, radicals and extremists continue to remain cloaked as ordinary Pakistanis only to reveal themselves when it's too late.

Virtual Spaces

Traditional internet was vertical and asynchronous. Social Media has an allure that surpasses original internet. It is vertical, horizontal & synchronous. Information is shared real-time between group members. Social Media in Pakistan has witnessed 10 fold increase since 2001. Notwithstanding its positive impact, social media is being used by extremist for implanting radicalism and coordinating militant actions as cited by IG Sind Ghulam Haider. The matter is further aggravated as applications like WhatsApp, in an effort to lure in more users, now provide end-to-end encryption allowing extremists to interact in complete secrecy. Before moving on to recommendations, it would be prudent to present a gist of counter terrorism strategies adopted by various countries. Our selection of case studies was restricted – firstly as very few countries document their counter terrorism strategy – secondly, it is difficult to draw parallels keeping in view the varying nature & scale of terrorism being addressed by each country. Counter terrorism strategies have been evolved based on intrinsic needs of each country and are therefore inherently different in structure and content. Therefore, the panel devised a simple framework to enable comparative analysis of these strategies. In our frame work, we consider radicalism as a social ill which like any other disease is tackled sequentially in 3 stages.

Prevention, Detection & Cure

UK's counter terrorism strategy (commonly known as CONTEST) revolves around 4 Ps (Pursue, Prevent, Protect & Prepare) and is suitably equipped for prevention, detection and cure. The strategy is comprehensive, proportionate and transparent. The downside is that it focuses only on fringe elements susceptible to radicalization. US National Strategy for counter terrorism unlike other strategies is target specific & disassociates religion from radicalism. However, it is heavily biased towards securitization with little attention towards prevention. Australia's counter terrorism strategy (embedded in National Counter Terrorism Plan) takes influence

from both US and UK. However, in the absence of any worthwhile threat, its success or failure cannot be ascertained. Nigeria's counter terrorism strategy is not documented. However, informal reviews place it as a reactive strategy mainly focusing on military response. A major criticism has been treating Boko Haram as a purely ideological group without any ethnic support.

From the case studies, it is evident that; a community becomes impervious to radical ideas if sense of national belonging is prevalent within the society. Preventive strategies address the problem at the grass root level hence is both economical and socially acceptable. Identification of type of threat is vital for developing a counter strategy as in Case of Nigeria. Strategies must be formulated in parallel with requisite legislation, so as to address possible infringement of civil rights. Disproportionate use of military component results in increase in grievances promoting more radicalism.

Recommendations

General: Besides internal dimensions, the causes of radicalism and extremism are deeply embedded in conflicting interests of global powers and their interventionist policies. The grey areas at global level causing spread of extremism include; Military Interventions: Domestic issues need domestic solutions and foreign interferences breed resentment. Military interventions must end to prevent radicalization of masses and global community should rather prefer diplomatic means to settle issues.

Kashmir, Afghanistan and Middle East Crises

The crises of Kashmir, Afghanistan, Middle East etcetera will continue to fuel extremism in the world pending a peaceful settlements. These issue must be resolved to take away the motivation from the people to become extremists on either side. Perception of West against Islam: The West should have a relook on their policies. The perception that west is at war against Islam must be removed by demonstrating that they are the enemies of extremists and not the Muslims. Lack of Support to Countries Fighting Extremism: Countries fighting extremists must be supported by global community. For instance, Pakistan has lost around 60000 lives and \$118 billion. After clearing the terrorists' strongholds, a major effort is needed to consolidate the gains. Enabling such countries is important to ensure success against extremists' agenda. Absence of Global Justice: Extremists and their supporters would automatically fade away if a fair amount of justice is practiced in global system. Dual standards, prejudiced approaches and supporting forces of disorder will lead to flawed outcome and trigger extremist behaviours. Divided Muslim Leadership: The leadership of Muslim countries needs to help each other to counter extremism. Muslim leadership needs to get united to combat the evils of sectarianism and extremism. Strategy for Future: Though National Internal Security Policy 2014-2018 is all encompassing, yet the implementation part needs concerted efforts. We propose that our strategy should also be based on Prevent, Detect and Cure.

Prevent

Promote National Integration: Dialogue and political discourse be encouraged at each tier. Local bodies should be empowered to strengthen masses.

Parliament must give a unified stance against extremism.

Create Sectarian Harmony: Focus on countering institutionalized form of sectarianism and passing judgment on other sects is made a punishable act. Scholars of all sects should be engaged to promote sectarian harmony. Election Commission to solicit all political parties to include meaningful agenda in their manifestos to eliminate sectarianism. Expedite FATA Reforms: Force has a limited use and value unless combined with soft power²⁸. Failure to bring reforms and development in FATA will allow the problem to reignite in the future in a more complex and difficult way. **Proactive Cyber Efforts:** Computer programmers can do a lot. They can infiltrate into conversations, so that target users aren't able to differentiate between real and fake content, thus delegitimizing extremists' propaganda. While monitoring extremists' sites is quite useful, it also allows glorification and recruitment. Deploying a proactive cyber strategy to melt down extremists' social media capabilities is worth considering.

Good Governance and Eradicating Corruption: Demonstration of strong political resolve by de-politicizing state institutions particularly bureaucracy and LEAs. Strengthen and broaden outreach of NAB. Set incentives for enforcement of anti-corruption measures. Transparency and accountability should be ensured at all levels. **Creation of Fiscal Resources:** Tax base be widened. Exploitation of minerals and correct prioritization of existing resources may generate a fiscal space for; Human resource development, vocational training and skill development to enhance job opportunity for the youth. Improvement of social services like health, education, water, sanitation and transport facilities in rural areas to reduce sense of deprivation.

Creation of Jobs: We should strive for GDP growth of 5.5% in short term and 6.5% in medium term through objective economic policies. We must; Focus on agriculture and services sector. Continue encouragement for self-financing jobs for the youth. Ensure timely completion of CPEC related projects.

Madrasa Reforms: Ittehad Tanzeemat Madaris Deenia is enabled in a dynamic manner. Growth of Madaris should be controlled and their funding be audited. Madaris found involved in extremism should be sealed and banned. Like Morocco, train imams in the social sciences to widen their horizons.²⁹ **Education Reforms:** Increase in education budget (upto 5 % of GDP) in medium term. Review syllabi critically and reform textbooks to promote tolerance. Gradual removal of regional and stream disparity in standards of education.

Leverage the Media: The media must understand the national interest. It should share testimonies of former extremists and victims and promote a message of peace making. It should be made a partner in propagating the counter narrative. **Countering Indian Interference:** Indian interference in Balochistan must be raised repeatedly at all forums as done in the General Assembly meeting. We should prepare and hand over the dossier of Indian involvement to UN. **Improving Pak-Afghan Relations:** We should support Afghan Government and ensure no safe havens to terrorists on either side. The Afghan refugees should repatriate in consultation with Afghan Government. We should also enhance mutual trade for better political leverage in Afghanistan.

Detect

Research First: It is first necessary to conduct proper research. A recently published study by Quilliam Foundation suggests that counter-extremism approaches have focused negatively on extremists or positively on those vulnerable to radicalization which is not effective³⁰. Questions we must research include, what vulnerabilities are extremists trying to exploit? How can I exploit these vulnerabilities into something positive? Who is the target group? What alternative could we offer to those interested in terrorists' propaganda? Community Approach: As internationally recognized, local solutions to violent extremism through community based approach are critical. This is best done through local representation, which connects government to the locals and strengthens community to prevent extremism.³¹ The local context is paramount as responses cannot be micromanaged by the provincial and federal capital. Improvement of Police and Intelligence Agencies: Police and Intelligence Agencies should be fully enabled and resourced. Training on modern technological lines, forensic investigation, NADRA links, Ability to pin point cell phone location, communication monitoring and traffic analysis capabilities must be provided to the district level. International Cooperative Engagement: Funding for rebuilding and development of FATA. Intelligence sharing with partners. Border Control Mechanism: Checking and registering of all foreigners. Effective monitoring over the borders to intercept any terrorist movement. Proper utilization of biometrical identification system at all entry points.

Cure

Define and Focus the Problem: The NISP glides between the categories of radicalism, extremism and terrorism without even defining them. This results in rounding a large number of people. A coherent and consistent term such as violent extremism, as used by the US and UK³², is necessary to narrow the focus and define the problem in reasonably correct and manageable sense. Isolate Terrorist Organizations: Extremists are a small minority therefore; the environments must not be created for them to get majority status. The strategy should be able to isolate them by removing the misperceptions and addressing their genuine grievances. Judicial System and State Authority: All political pressures are defied while dealing with extremists and sub-nationalist elements. No of courts be increased on population statistics. Accountability within the judiciary must also be ensured. NAP and NACTA: NAP be implemented in spirit. NACTA has issued National Internal Security Policy but Counter Extremism Policy is also needed. Moreover, NACTA needs to be fully resourced and empowered for better results. Coordination of Provincial Counter Terrorism Forces: The provincial counter terrorism forces (Punjab & KPK-CTF, Sind-SSU, Balochistan-ATF) have no coordination mechanism with one another and Federal Intelligence Agencies. All these forces need to be interfaced with NACTA. Creation of Counter Narrative: The roots of extremism and militancy are in the cognitive domain. Creation of a superior counter narrative is essential. NACTA needs to develop it at priority. Squeeze Terrorist Financing: Freezing of accounts of extremists is a correct step in right direction. Monitor the flow of funding to various organization and their offshoots. The 'Hundi System' must be uprooted. De-Weaponization Campaign: Disarm and ban militant wings of all political parties. Prohibited bore arms licenses must not be granted to anyone. Weapon buyback programme be considered by the Government. De-radicalization: There is need to undertake a serious de-radicalization effort, whereby deep religious convictions are

challenged by trained clerics. At present the army in Swat and the Punjab government in Southern Punjab operate the only de-radicalization camps.³³ These need to be expanded to deal with the individuals that are being detained, who need to be rehabilitated.

Conclusion

Radicalism and extremism pose a serious threat to our national security. At present, different extremist outfits are left with little capacity to conduct their activities freely but we need to take it to the logical end to completely dismantle their infrastructure and defeat their ideology. While combating in physical domain is important, the real success lies in defeating it in cognitive domain which requires time, resources and patience. A successful counter strategy should, therefore, focus on prevention of radicalism and elimination of the root causes that precipitate these ideologies.

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MAINSTREAMING OF FATA

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Abstract

After 9/11, FATA has experienced a miserable adventure of War on Terror. Due to Pakistan Army's concerted efforts and sacrifices, finally FATA is free from the menace of terrorist sanctuaries and TDPs return has almost completed. There lies an opportunity to introduce reforms in this neglected area with a view to bring peace and prosperity. The aim of this paper is to analyze the existing governance framework of FATA, options for mainstreaming and way forward. The first part of this paper enlightens the readers about geo and historical perspective of FATA, which includes geography and its significance, demography and difference between PATA, FR and FATA. Hereafter, historical perspectives have been discussed including Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In Part II, analysis of existing governance framework has been carried out. It also includes constitutional and political status, administrative framework, judicial system through FCRs and prevailing socio-economic environment. In Part III, options for mainstreaming of FATA have been discussed. In Part IV, way forward has been recommended. The purpose of reforms is to transform FATA into a nationally integrated, socio-economically developed, politically empowered, and well governed region of Pakistan, where people can live peacefully, have access to basic human rights and needs, and can contribute positively towards a stable and prosperous Pakistan”.

Introduction

FATA lies in the North West of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan, an area which is rich in its customs and traditions and inhabit war veterans. The population is extremely hospitable. Sir Winston Churchill had tenure of service in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) during the British rule in India. He cited, 'Everyman is a warrior, a politician, and a theologian. Due to its geo-strategic location, FATA has been a testing ground of the ambitions. Genghis Khan, Tamerlane, Mahmud Ghaznavi and Emperor Babur traversed this territory on their way to the riches of India.² It has been witness to the Great Game and in the Cold war. Despite being part of Pakistan, the citizens of FATA remained deprived of social facilities and good governance. The major cause of its isolation and deprivation remained the special status, which has been given to this area since its merger with Pakistan in 1947. After 9/11, it has experienced a miserable adventure of War on Terror. Due to Pakistan Army's concerted efforts and sacrifices, finally FATA is free from the menace of terrorist sanctuaries and TDPs return is almost completed. There lies an opportunity to introduce reforms in this neglected area with a view to bring peace and prosperity.

Part I: Historical Perspective of FATA

FATA consist of seven Agencies and six Frontier Regions (FRs).³ The total area is estimated to be 27,220 square kilometers (kms) with a porous border of 450 kms with Afghanistan.⁴ To its east and south lie provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP)

and Baluchistan, and towards west and north it borders Afghanistan. Mountainous nature of terrain compels usage of existing passes and valleys, which run through this territory. These are corridors of invasion and commerce between the Indus plains and Central Asia. There are five rivers namely Swat, Kabul, Kurram, Tochi and Gomal running through FATA. FATA provides land connectivity between Central Asia, South Asia and South East Asia. According to the 1998 census, FATA is home to the population of roughly 3.18 million people with annual population growth of 2.19%.⁵ Pukhtunwali still forms the single most powerful guidance and unifying force in the tribal life today. There are about a dozen major tribes with several smaller tribes and sub-tribes. The tribal areas have cultural and social affinity with the adjoining settled areas that has further strengthened due to recent displacement to these areas. Communication infra-structure radiates from settled areas to FATA, whereas inter agency vertical linkage is less developed. The tribesmen own extensive land, properties, transport and business in the adjoining settled areas. Before proceeding further, it is pertinent to explain that for ease of governance; this vast area has been political distributed into FATA, PATA and FR with variation in their governance system.

The Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) was designated in the Article 246(b) of the Constitution of Pakistan.⁶ With respect to any matter within the legislative competence of the Provincial Assembly, the governor will make regulations for the peace and good governance.⁷ FR: The Frontier Regions are named after their adjacent settled Districts. The administration of the FR is carried out by the DCO of neighbouring named district. Overall administration of the frontier regions is carried out by the FATA Secretariat and it reports to the Governor of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. There are six regions namely Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, Kohat, Lakki Marwat, Peshawar and Tank. FATA: The Federally Administered Tribal Areas comprise seven tribal agencies (districts) and six frontier regions, and are directly governed by Pakistan's Federal Government through a special set of laws called the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR).

FATA remained battle ground of Great Game in the 19th century. To safeguard the FATA against Russian expansionism, British imposed series of special laws between 1871 and 1876. In 1901, British India issued new set of laws called Frontier Crimes Regulation and also created a new administrative unit, the North West Frontier Province (now KP). The institution of the Political Agent (PA) was also created at the same time. In 1947, during its merger with Pakistan, it was mutually agreed to retain its special status by Pakistan and tribal elders. In 1973 constitution, the area was named as FATA, with the continuation of FCRs for its governance. During Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, FATA became nursery for the terrorists. Approx 1.5 million refugees from Afghanistan permanently settled in FATA including Uzbek, Arabs and Chechens. After Russians withdrew, Afghanistan was left in lurch. The refugees were extensively used from FATA to take part in the intra-factional fight in Afghanistan. After 9/11 and consequent US attack on Afghanistan, hardcore Al Qaida Terrorists and Afghan Taliban took refuge in FATA due to porous border and weak governance. Pakistan's decision to join Global War on Terrorism caused eruption of war against Pakistan Army and State with the support of international terrorists' networks and hostile agencies. Successful conduct of series of kinetic operations by Pakistan Army caused elimination of terrorists alongwith their sanctuaries. Presently, large scale rehab operation is underway to restore peace and

normalcy in the area. For mainstreaming of FATA, it is imperative to understand the existing governance framework and its weaknesses.

Part II: Analysis of Existing Framework

Good governance is a prerequisite for social harmony, public order, political stability and economic prosperity. The key attributes of good governance are transparency, responsibility, accountability, participation and responsiveness. Existing Governance Framework is based on the special status of FATA as described in previous part. All the constitutions of Pakistan have recognized the special status of Tribal Areas. Article 247 of 1973 Constitution provides the framework for relationship between FATA and the federal government.⁸ Accordingly, no act of Parliament can be enforced in FATA unless the President may direct so by a notification. The President may make any regulation for the good governance of FATA. The President has the power to end classification of FATA over any area provided that President shall ascertain views of the tribe through a Jirga first. The jurisdiction of the Supreme and High Courts has been barred in FATA unless the Parliament so provides under a law.

FATA is represented in the National Assembly and Senate by 12 and 8 members respectively, however it has no representation in the provincial assembly of the KP. FATA is still governed by the colonial administrative system of Governance. Constitutionally the President of Pakistan is the chief executive for FATA. However, it is administered through the Governor KP acting as agent of the President of Pakistan. The Governor's Secretariat plays a coordinating role between the Federal and Provincial Governments and the Civil Secretariat, FATA. The Ministry of SAFRON and FATA Secretariat deal with issue of Frontier Regions and FATA. FATA Secretariat is headed by the Secretary assisted by an Additional Chief Secretary, four secretaries and number of directors. Project implementation in these areas is carried out by line departments of the Civil Secretariat FATA. Political Agent (PA) is the chief administrator of a Political Agency who also wields the judicial and executive powers for his area of jurisdiction. He derives his authority from the Frontier Crimes Regulation 1901 and exercises it through the tribal elders or Maliks and their tribal councils or jirgas.

Policing functions are performed by the tribal levies and Khassadars under the command and control of the PA.¹⁰ Since British times, the government has administered only protected areas – a small portion of the tribal areas confined mostly to government infrastructure like roads, schools, hospitals, residences and security set ups directly, while the remaining area has been managed by the tribes themselves as per their customs and traditions called Riwaj in the local language. The judicial system in tribal areas hinges on the troika of jirga system, the Political Agent and the FCR 1901.¹¹ The Administration takes care of only those offenses which are committed in protected areas and does not generally interfere in the offenses occurring between the tribes in the Tribal territory except in case State interest is involved. Frontier Crimes Regulations (1901): The Frontier Crimes Regulations 1901 is a hybrid colonial-era legal, administrative and judicial framework that mixes traditional customs and norms with executive discretion. The controversial FCR gives enormous rights to the Political Agents and dubbed by many a Black law. It stripped tribal citizens of three basic rights – the right to appeal their detention, the right to legal representation, and the right to present reasoned evidence. Substantial

amendments were introduced in FCR in 2011 according to which; Right of bail has been provided to the accused. Women, children below 16 years and men aged above 65 cannot be arrested or detained under the collective responsibility clause. Entire tribe cannot be arrested under the clause.¹²

In protected areas of FATA, the PA is judicial authority. After initial inquiries and investigations, a jirga is called with the consent of both the parties. The PA heads the Jirga and gives the final decision. Appeal can be made against the decision of PA to commissioner of the adjoining settled area. Appeal against Commissioner's decision can be made to FATA Tribunal. In non-protected areas the local disputes or issues are solved through the Qaumi Jirga consisting of elders and representatives of the tribes at Agency Level. The local or Qaumi Jirga resolves the issue in accordance with the local riwaj or Islamic Sharia. After decision, the aggrieved party can challenge the decision before another Jirga of their own choice that examines the case to see if the decision is deviating from the Sharia or customary law.

With the successful completion of Operation Zarb-e-Azab, Terrorists' infrastructure has been completely destroyed in FATA. Kinetic operations in FATA have been concluded, except stability ops in NWA, SWA and Khyber Agency. Peace is gradually being restored in the area. However, build and transfer phases are facing challenges due to limited capacity and lack of resolve by government/ political administration causing unnecessary pull on the Security Forces. FATA is one of the poorest regions of Pakistan. The area is scarcely populated with rudimentary infrastructure. Most of the households are engaged in primary level activities such as subsistence agriculture, livestock-rearing, and small scale business conducted locally. Socio-economic indicators reflect FATA as one of the least developed and neglected areas of Pakistan. Trade and business is a significant contributor to the local economy. Smuggling, Narcotics production/ trade, extortion/ ransom and other illegal practices have traditionally been contributing to the local economy; however; after Taliban's uprising these sectors were taken over and institutionalized by them. The revenue thus generated was diverted to Terrorists' war economy from which a sizeable population was being benefitted directly or indirectly.

- Significant activities in this sector include subsistence agriculture/ farming and livestock in fertile valleys, walnuts and pine nuts production in upper parts of FATA.
- Roughly 6.5% male are employed overseas, remittance is one of the major sources of income in FATA.
- Casual mining of Chromite, copper, Gold and Gemstones is also a source of income in the area.
- Significant no of locals are employed in Government Sector, especially health, education, line departments and CAF/ Levies/ Khassadars.

Socio-economic order of FATA is characterized as:-

- Weak writ of state due to poor governance.
- Protracted illegal cross border trade of arms, drugs and militancy.
- Nonexistent industrial set up.
- Non-existent agriculture development schemes.
- Non functional/ inadequate health.

- Rich un-exploited mineral resources.
- Non availability of financial institutions and educational facilities.
- Largely conservative society, female gender is mostly excluded from socio economic activities.

Analysis of Existing Framework and Environment

The major challenge in FATA is to introduce and enforce such political and governance system in FATA, which is in accordance with the aspirations of tribal people as well as the established principles of governance in today's world. However, In view of the region's destabilization over decades, a new drive for reform should rest on an incremental approach towards a change in the legal and administrative structures that should ensure a balance between stability and reform, while moving towards empowerment of the people. It is imperative to carryout in-depth analysis of the prevailing socio-political environment and governance system before analyzing the options available for mainstreaming of FATA. Consideration of Forces of status quo and drivers of change, as emerged from the prevailing situation, is must to find a solution that is acceptable to larger segment of the society. Military operation in FATA is one of the drivers of change, since success attained by Kinetic operations is not sustainable without legal, political and administrative reforms. Due to extension of Political Parties Order 2002 in FATA, there is a growing awareness for political empowerment and demand for mainstreaming of FATA. The local partially educated, unemployed and disenchanted youth is not happy with the established social order and is demanding a change. Accumulation of judicial, administration, and executive powers in Political Agents and their collusions with Maliks has created stakes for them in the existing system. Unruly nature of inhabitants of FATA, their deep reverence to Jirga system and centuries old code of "Pashtunwali" has resulted into inertia against any change into existing system.¹³ Clergy and defunct/ terrorist organizations are also averse to any change in the existing governance system due to obvious reasons.

Provision of basic rights to the people of FATA is mired due to Article 247 of the constitution. FCR is neither a constitution nor the mechanism defined in the FCR, exhaustive and adequate enough to substitute the constitution of Pakistan. Its various provisions are perceived to be inhumane and unjust even after amendments introduced in 2011. Poor governance has been identified as the core reason for citizens' disengagement with the state institutions. Factors considered to affect negatively the governance in FATA are:-

- Non availability of fair and equitable justice system.
- Existence of weak, ill equipped and Complex public administration system.
- The governance tools i.e Levis and Khasadar are neither efficient nor effective. They are lacking resolve as well as capacity to deal with the governance issues.
- Rampant corruption at all tiers in Governance system.
- The joint/ community ownership of land is hindering economic growth besides physical infrastructure development as very small land settlement has been done so far.
- Vast community owned cultivable-land is lying underutilized due to tribal disputes.

- Due to FATA's peculiar status as a territory rather than a province, the prospects of real economic growth are dampened.
- FATA has not been allocated resources under NFC from federal divisible pool.
- Banks cannot approve loans, business cannot be protected, industries cannot be regulated and legal rights cannot be protected in FATA.

There is rampant poverty in the region due to scant opportunities of employment which makes people vulnerable to different kinds of exploitation. After imposing a check on illegal activities a sizeable local population, dependent on Terrorists' war economy, needs to be rehabilitated. Without political reforms economic reforms cannot be introduced in the area. Lack of effective monitoring and accountability of funds released through ADPs is the base of large scale corruption.

Part III: Options for Mainstreaming FATA

Although the Federal cabinet committee has approved the principle recommendations of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) reforms committee, which includes the merger of the tribal areas with Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and repeal of the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) encompassing 10 years plan including setting a schedule for the repatriation of all temporarily displaced persons (TDPs) by April 30 this year, while the reconstruction in the areas would be completed by 2018. However, merger of FATA with KP was strongly opposed by the KP political parties by stating that FATA people should be allowed to decide their fate. In this part, in order to have a better overview, we will discuss different policy options for mainstreaming FATA, assess their merits and demerits and recommend the implementation policy for the government's approved option merger of FATA with KP.¹⁴ Pakistan Army has successfully de-capacitated militants and their command and control centers in the area. Security situation is stable now and the Army is engaged in reconstruction and rehabilitation process. The security responsibilities of the area will likely be handed over to Frontier Corps within next 2-3 years. In this backdrop there is a need to sustain the gains made by the Army against terrorism, militancy and extremism through non-kinetic means also. However, there is little capacity in the existing administrative framework to deliver on this account. Some of the weaknesses of existing framework are:-

- The present system does not have capacity to address severe poverty, poor state of infrastructure and discouraging human development indicators.
- The existing system has alienated a large section of population especially the educated youth due to its oppressive and extractive nature of governance and dispensation of justice.
- The system lacks legitimacy as it is widely perceived as collusive and corrupt; lacking trust of the population.
- In the wake of militancy, authority of Maliks and Political Agents is greatly undermined and diminished; therefore continuation of status quo means continued destabilization of Pakistan.
- Maintaining the status quo is also not a feasible option in view of the fact it will not permit introduction of fundamental changes in its constitutional, political, administrative, judicial and socio-economic status.

- Therefore, in order to ensure smooth implementation of government's adopted option merger of FATA with KP, some basic reforms and changes are must for the implementation of the recommended option.

Political Administrative Judicial and Socio-economic changes and reforms include:-

- Amending the Article 247 of the constitution to allow necessary changes in political and administrative spheres of FATA.
- FCR, which has little relevance in present times, should be replaced with a more suitable law which is in consonance with modern legal principles as well as the local socio-cultural context.
- Introduction of an effective local government system for political empowerment at grass root level and accelerating pace of rural development.
- Restructuring of the local administration, modernization of judicial institutions and upgrading the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanisms to incorporate human and gender rights perspective.
- Revamping of local law enforcement apparatus to improve its command structure, recruitment, training and equipment to enable to become a modern and effective policing institution.
- Bringing a marked and visible improvement in the presently dismal socio-economic conditions of FATA by providing the people of the area with; clean drinking water and sanitation facilities.

To introduce, implement and sustain these critical changes, it is imperative to dispense with the present status of FATA. The options emerged are either through; Merger with KP (Option I, already adopted by the government), Separate provincial status (Option II).

Option-I: Merger of FATA with KP: Option one which entails merger of FATA with KP through a phased transition culminating in bringing it at par with rest of the country, have following merits and demerits :-

- There is a linguistic, ethnic and cultural affinity between FATA and KP which will make the envisaged transition smoother.
- Both units are geographically contiguous and well linked through road and communication infrastructure ensuring easy access to all the tribal agencies.
- The administration of KP and FATA is already interwoven to some extent, with Governor KPK and FATA secretariat overseeing the functioning of Political Agents as well as developmental work in the area.
- Six Frontier Regions are already being administered under the DCs of the adjacent settled districts. These existing arrangements would provide an enabling environment for further mainstreaming.

Adding an under-developed tribal territory will further aggravate the existing socio-economic disparities of KPK. Merger will adversely affect the law and order situation of KP.

Option-II: Separate provincial status for FATA: FATA may be given the status of a separate province. The merits and demerits of this option are;

It will preserve the peculiar historical and cultural identity, of people of FATA. Administratively, as well as from a developmental perspective, a smaller separate province of FATA will be better manageable. It will satisfy aspirations of some tribal elders and other stake holders.

In absence of a properly developed administrative and law enforcement infrastructure it will remain vulnerable to re-emergence of terrorism and militancy. Due to intra-tribe rivalries, it will be difficult to reach at a consensus about political / administrative framework of a separate province. If FATA is given a separate provincial status, then Southern Punjab, Hazara, and parts of Baluchistan will reason that they deserve a similar status as well.

Recommended Option: In view of the foregoing analysis of merits and demerits of different options, it can be concluded that while changing the status quo has become imperative, there are limited alternative options with each one of these having its own short and long term implications. However, in comparative terms option I, that is merger of FATA with KP, appears a more feasible option (Already approved by the government in March 2017).

Part IV: Way Forward

The way forward for the implementation of suggested option (Already adopted by Government) is a challenging task due to culture, traditions and vested interest of elders in the FATA. Due to same reason, this option was opposed by the political parties of KP. Therefore, merger of FATA with KP will entail a gradual pragmatic phased approach with a view to avoid any about turn. Political consent of the locals of FATA through tribal jirga or elected representatives is must to extend acceptance and legitimacy to introduce fundamental changes in FATA. The measures are recommended at National and Provincial level. National Level: Changes in constitution, political reforms and socio-eco uplift to be undertaken at National level. Provincial Level: Good governance, capacity building of institutions, and infrastructure development.

Suitable amendments in constitution to bring FATA at par with other areas of Pakistan and extend jurisdiction of National Legal System. Measures which are deemed necessary in this regard are:-

National level

- Article 246 and 247 of the Constitution should be amended.
- Amended FCRs to be applied during transitional period.
- Extension of legislation to FATA
- Census to be held to ascertain the exact population size of the FATA.
- Extension of fundamental rights to all resident
- Supreme Court jurisdiction to be extended to FATA.

Provincial Level

- Ascertain will of the people through jirga.

- Strengthening judicial and legal institutions with alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.
- Institutionalization of existing Jirga system to ensure provision of justice to the locals and protection of fundamental human rights and gender rights.
- Separation of judiciary from PA office by appointing a Judge through High court, who understand the Riwayat and Jirga system. The judge to be appointed down to Tehsil level to speed up the decision process.
- Formulation of monitoring and implementation committee to supervise constitutional reforms. Land reforms (settlement) to be introduced gradually, initially by demarcation of community owned land and later down to individual level where possible.
- Shift selection of members for FATA tribunal from Governor to provisional government.
- Arrange for visit of circular bench of High Court in the agencies on monthly basis.

Promote political activity in FATA and inculcate democratic culture in the society. Suggested measures are:-

National level

- Representation of FATA in senate needs rationalization after merger with KP.
- Facilitate visits of heads of both ruling and opposition parties regularly to FATA to inculcate sense of ownership.
- To ensure right political representation in the National Assembly, Political Parties Order should be enforced in true letter and spirit to provide independence and right of vote to the local.

Provincial level

- Formulation of monitoring and implementation committee to monitor political reforms.
- Prior to conduct of local bodies election, local government system to be introduced.
- Apart from elected members, experts and women representation must be ensured.
- Conduct of local bodies elections.
- Replacement of PA with DCs, who should be initially from KP and later, can be posted from rest of the Pakistan.
- Increase in number of seats in Provisional Assembly to ensure right political representation of FATA.

Establishment of writ of the government through capacity building of LEAs. Measures are:-

National level

- Extension of (ANF) Anti Narcotics Force to FATA to ensure strict check on drugs smuggling due to close proximity of border with Afghanistan. Initially

the force to operate in coordination with army, FC and PA and later independently.

- Gradual exit of Army from FATA and replacement with FC.(Already in progress)
- Full access to NADRA for the provision of CNIC, Passport etc down to Tehsil level.
- Allocation of developmental funds for construction of line of communication forts and posts at the border with Afghanistan.
- Capacity building of FC for border and line of communication security by raising new wings. (Already in progress)

Provincial level

- Impart training to selected Levies in existing training institutions in KP and Punjab as well existing institution of Army i.e DBS.
- Merger of 17,965 Khasadar force with Levies after necessary training.
- Uplifting of infra-structure at all crossing places to facilitate functioning of state departments.
- Home department to develop legal and institutional mechanism for Levies force for its modernization and capacity building including training institution, police stations and posts at agency level in line with police.
- Enhancement in the pay package of Levies force.

Due to close proximity of border with Afghanistan measures at National level to be ensured are:-

- Increase reliance on technical means of surveillance and intelligence.
- Increase number of border posts / fortified parquets manned by FC.
- All crossing places to be manned and supervised by army / FC.
- Mutually coordinated border crossing control mechanism between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
- Crossing of border only from authorized entry / exit points.

Measures at National level to be ensured are:-

- Provision of additional funds on the recommendation of the implementation and monitoring committee for completion of projects at fast pace.
- Reservation of seats for the youth of this area in all renowned professional colleges and universities.
- Redefining role of Ministry of SAFRON after merger of FATA with KP.
- Creation of reconstruction of opportunity zones (ROZs) as promised earlier.
- Review of financial share in NFC award to the KP government after merger of FATA as per the agreed formula.
- Establishment of taxation department infra-structure in FATA.
- Keeping in view the economic potential of the area, attracting FDI.
- Opening of engineering and medical colleges in FATA.

Measures at Provincial level to be ensured are:-

- Initially to ensure judicious preparation of annual development plan and its execution, an implementation and monitoring committee needs to be organized as an interim measure to monitor / supervise social-eco reforms.
- Rehabilitation to be along two prongs, for mega projects i.e Dams, roads, hospitals, schools, industries the state department will be responsible, whereas, for private house building and local market construction the locals can be given financial aid to speed up the entire process.
- Registration of madrassas, inclusion of subjects like science, geography and social studies, allocation of funds for its running and continuous monitoring.
- Payment of high salaries to the professionals. A comprehensive package should be developed and infrastructure development initiated, with special focus on health, education and employment.
- Capacity building of FATA Disaster Management Authority (FDMA) and FATA Development Authority (FDA).
- Gradual enforcement of provincial taxation regime.
- Judicious distribution of financial assistance to the FATA out of NFC award.
- Existing line departments to be merged gradually with provisional departments.
- Provide accessible credit and other financial services for small businesses including banking facilities.
- In education institutions gender equality, provision of internet access and establishment of libraries for the students.
- Speedy completion of ongoing projects i.e construction of Kurram Tangi Dam, Promote public-private partnership investments in mining infra-structure to develop the mining sector in FATA.
- Provision of electricity, clean drinking water and health facilities to the locals.
- FATA Secretariat may be merged with province as a special unit to supervise and facilitate developmental work in FATA region.
- Promotion of local industry goods at national and international level. FATA professionals on quota seats to serve for a period of minimum three years in any of the agency.
- Access / freedom of Media: Provision of access of information to the locals through media as their basic right.

Conclusion

Mainstreaming in FATA is inescapable. The success of reforms (merger of FATA with KP, as approved by government) will merely depend upon the will of the locals. Government job is to provide the policy framework and necessary infrastructure, but success of any policy lies in its implementation in true letter and spirit. The purpose of reforms is to transform FATA into a nationally integrated, socio-economically developed, politically empowered, and well governed region of Pakistan, where people can live peacefully, have access to basic human rights and needs, and can contribute positively towards a stable and prosperous Pakistan.

Endnotes

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PART-III

Military Strategy

- **The India China War of 1962.**
- **Gray Zone Conflict: Analysis and Implications for Pakistan.**
- **Evolution of Maritime Strategy and Employment of Naval Power in 21st Century.**

THE INDIA CHINA WAR OF 1962

**Lt Col Waheed, Lt Col Habib Ullah, Lt Col Saqib,
Air Cdre Mustafa & Col EI-Hussain Farhat**

Abstract

This article aims at analysing the 1962 War between China and India. While examining the historical roots of border dispute between these two countries, the rise in tensions during late 1950s, the events of the 1962 war itself, yet, the focus remains on analysis of the factors that lead to the war. A brief overview of how the war changed the entire geo strategic construct of the region is an important part of it analysis. At the end an effort is made to draw linkages between environments of 1962 with current developments in Sino-Indian contestation.

Introduction

The roots of the 1962 Border War between India and China extend back to the 19th Century, when British India and Imperialist China first asserted their claims to the borders in remote mountainous areas between the two countries. Military expeditions and uncompromising diplomatic exchanges did not help in resolving the issue. Independence of India and emergence of communist regime in China in late 1940s brought the two countries to friendly relations during 1950s. But strategic and military projections into each other's claimed territory, causing an environment of mistrust, lead to skirmishes and eventually a war between them in 1962. Many factors influenced the conduct and outcome of the 1962 War and their analysis is important to understand the dynamics of Sino Indian relations then and now.

Pre 1962 Environmental Scan

The Cold War between USA and Soviet Union led blocs had just begun and the resulting geo-political power contestation was steadily escalating. That era witnessed violent conflicts like Korean War, beginning of a space race, increased testing of nuclear weapons and ICBMs by USA and USSR creating a politically charged global environment. The post-world war - 2 phenomenon of an accelerated decolonization in Africa and Asia was discernible. Large number of countries had or was in process of gaining independence, focusing on setting up their government structures, constitutions and developmental policies. Non Aligned Movement, an alliance of developing countries not formally aligned with or against any major power bloc was in a benign form but gaining currency. After failure of bay of Pigs in 1961, the communist Cuba sought Soviet assistance against USA. The Soviet decision to deploy nuclear capable ballistic missile in Cuba resulted in a month long confrontation between USA and USSR in October-November 1962 that had grabbed the entire world's attention with near possible nuclear showdown between the two super powers.¹

Regional Environment

The People's Republic of China under communist party had reclaimed Tibet and intervened in the Korean War to support North Korean against the USA,

invoking a global arms embargo by UN. By mid 1950s China and Soviet Union had developed difference over communist ideology and their mutual relations were at the lowest ebb by 1962. US Navy's presence in Taiwan Strait and military assistance to Republic of China (Taiwan) was a major concern for Peoples Republic of China, drawing her strategic focus to the east. By 1961, out of border disputes with 12 countries, China had settled disputes with Nepal and Burma magnanimously; giving away territories claimed by smaller countries. By late 1950s, internally China was struggling to overcome the disastrous effects of famine through agricultural reforms. On the other hand, post-independence, under leadership of Nehru, India increasingly figured at international level as flag bearer of nonalignment movement. Sino Indian relations generally remained cordial in first half of 1950s. China's annexation of Tibet had considerably disturbed India but she swallowed the bitter pill, not being in a position to challenge China. However, later on she gave asylum to Tibetan Government in exile to leverage her position with China, in future. Post 1948 Kashmir war, despite UN resolutions, India had not resolved her differences with Pakistan. The tensions between both sides had not receded and India maintained her military focus Pakistan centric. Under Nehru's philosophy of non-alignment, India was focused on economic development and paid little attention towards improving military capabilities. India was confronting serious domestic challenges like crisis in Portuguese colony of Goa, provincial disharmony, language disputes and inadequate socio-political development.

Causes of the War

India and China share 3,380 kms² of border which is not entirely delimited and remains unsettled till date. Two major areas in contention are the North Western border areas of Aksai Chin and the North East Frontier Agency, or NEFA as was known during 1962. Though, renamed as Arunachal Pradesh by India, in this article, it will be referred to as NEFA. The origins of the border dispute stem from inaccessible terrain, absence of a functioning Tibetan state and lukewarm approach by Imperialist China and British India. In later half of 19th Century, numbers of border claim lines were considered in western sector of Aksai Chin, namely Johnson line of 1864, Andrew's line of 1871 and McDonald-McCarthy line of 1896.³ It is pertinent to mention that the exact border did not matter for British Government, as British interest in Aksai Chin was to create a buffer between British India and Russian empire in the north. Hence, British sought for a more northern boundary (i.e. Johnson line) which was regarded as official boundary by British Empire till 1947. Chinese imperial government had inclination to accept McDonald-McCarthy line in 1904 but British never pursued her formal consent. In NEFA, at the Anglo-Tibetan-China Simla Conference of 1914, British chief negotiator Sir Henry McMahon proposed McMahon line as the boundary. Chinese representatives, refused to recognise it on the plea that the area till the Assam plains was Chinese. However, no formal agreement on any of the border line in Aksai Chin or NEFA between China and British India was ever concluded.

Events Leading to the War

China's annexation of Tibet in 1950 rang the first alarm bells for India. India protested Chinese action on the basis of erstwhile special status of Tibet which only allowed China's suzerainty over it. However, Nehru accepted Chinese authority over Tibet, expecting better relations with China. The armed actions by Tibetan rebels

jeopardized China's eastern strategic communication link with Tibet, forcing her to build an alternative highway during 1956/57, between Sinkiang and Tibetan capital Lhasa, through Aksai Chin. India sent patrols to confirm extent of Chinese presence. They were temporarily detained by Chinese, exhibiting sensitivity to the security of this highway. Diplomatic efforts to resolve the border issue continued from December 1958 to April 1960 including visits of heads of state, but remained inconclusive. In March 1959, disorder and fighting worsened in Tibet owing to the clandestine support by CIA with active approval of India.⁴ Dalai Lama fled to India and was granted political asylum thus proving China's suspicion of Indian support to Tibetan rebels. China thus felt it necessary to seal off the McMahon Line. Indian border police reciprocated to China's effort of sealing border which resulted in two major armed clashes in 1959 in NEFA and Aksai Chin resulting in casualties. There was uproar in both countries about the incidents evoking diplomatic protests. Indian occupation of Portuguese colony of Goa in December 1961, gave her leadership a false notion of their military strength. Under criticism in early 1960s for allowing Chinese incursions, PM Nehru devised the Forward Policy. Based on the assumption that China would not react physically, India established posts in her claimed territory despite presence of Chinese posts. Against the advice of military leaders, 43 posts were established along the Line of Contact in Aksai Chin, some in close vicinity of the Chinese highway while 24 posts along McMahon line in NEFA under Op Onkar.

Mid 1961 till summer 1962 situation on the border remained volatile with skirmishes. In November 1961, confrontation in Chip Chap Valley left seven Chinese soldiers dead; followed by Chinese withdrawal. In July 1962, a post set up behind Chinese claimed line in the Galwan Valley (in Aksai Chin) was surrounded by Chinese troops and pressurised to withdraw but did not physically attack. Such "victories" convinced Nehru that China would not be assertive and his forward policy was the correct course. This, coupled with February 1962 elections, persuaded Nehru to follow the "forward policy" more vigorously. In response, despite distraction from the Taiwan Straits Crisis of May 1962, China also increased border activity. Pursuant to forward policy, India established, Dhola Post in June 1962 in Thagla ridge area well ahead of McMahon Line inside Chinese territory. China protested and demanded an immediate withdrawal. With no response from India, on 8 September, Chinese troops moved down the Thag La Ridge to dominate Dhola post. Indian 7 Infantry Brigade deployed for defence of Towang was moved ahead to Thagla area to persuade Chinese troops to leave Indian Territory and if they don't, take up positions and deny further ingress, with permission to fire only in self-defence.⁵

Conduct of the War

Barring isolated skirmishes, the actual war was fought from 10 October till 20 November 1962 simultaneously on both fronts; in the eastern sector, Walong and Twang areas of NEFA and in the Western Sector, Aksai Chin area. NEFA is broken and mountainous terrain ranging from 10,000 to 18,000 feet interspersed with fast flowing streams and thick forests. Characterised by heavy precipitation in monsoon and heavy snowfall in winters. The movement was slow and restricted to suspension bridges on streams. The only Indian line of communication was Mismari-Bomdi La-Towang; a fair weather jeepable road cum track. Important landmarks along this axis are as shown. No road existed in Walong area with nearest road head 100 kms away. On Chinese side fairly well developed communication infrastructure was present.

A sharp contrast to NEFA, Aksai Chin is a vast, high altitude desert of barren mountains from 14000 to 22,500 feet with no flora and fauna and only 3 to 4 inches of annual rainfall. It is characterised by number of salt lakes and rivers. On Indian side, the road link was Srinagar to Leh and then tracks leading to Chushul, Kyol and Demchok but no road link to the northern region towards Karakoram pass existed. There were landing strips at Leh and Chushul. On Chinese side, beside strategic Sinkiang-Lhasa highway, number of roads and track upto Line of Actual Contact existed. Chairman Mao issued his war directive on 6 October 1962. The main assault was to be in NEFA sector while forces in Aksai Chin sector were to coordinate with the Main. The concept of operations was to advance along multiple approaches, encircle the bypassed positions and reduce them subsequently while ensuring continued logistic maintenance of forward troops.⁶ On 10 Oct, a light Indian force ex 7 Brigade crossed Namka Chu River to bypass the Chinese positions on Thagla ridge, resulting in fire fight in Tseng Jong area. Both sides suffered casualties. This gave Chinese enough evidence of Indian offensive designs and evoked Chinese Counter attack in Defence on 20 October. The entire conduct of war can be divided into 3 distinct phases.

Phase-1: Initial Thrusts (20-24 Oct)

On night 20 October, three Chinese Brigades attacked 7 Indian Brigade, over ran positions on Namka Chu and captured Hathung La and Tsangdhar. By 22 October, the Brigade ceased to exist. Following Namka Chu, Chinese developed a three-prong attack on Towang on 23 October. Towang was poorly suited for the defense and meagre Indian troops evacuated it, to be occupied by PLA on 24 October. Indian forces had now withdrawn to SeLa Pass, which they planned to reinforce and defend in strength. Chinese aim in the Aksai Chin sector was to reach her Claim Line of 1959 to increase perimeter of security of their strategic communication link. There were no large scale battles here. From 20-22 October, Chinese attacked Indian posts in Chip Chap Valley, Galwan Valley, and Pangong Lake area which were soon overrun with least resistance. Indian Western Command, recognizing the magnitude of the Chinese attack, withdrew the remaining posts to the southwest. After 24 Oct, China halted her offensive, giving a chance for diplomatic efforts to bring India to negotiation table.

Phase-2: Diplomatic Efforts to Solve the Crisis (24 Oct-13 Nov)

On 24 October, Chou en Lai sent a letter to Nehru, proposing a negotiated settlement of the boundary and a mutual withdrawal 20 kms from line of actual contact in NEFA, while no crossing of line of actual contact in Aksai Chin. Nehru's reply objected the mutual 20 km withdrawal and proposed, instead, a return to the boundary prior to 8 September 1962 as a pre-condition for talks. Thus diplomatic effort remained inconclusive. India used this respite to muster external military support mainly from UK and the United States. Meanwhile air supply and manpower build-up continued in NEFA. SeLa Pass, a good defensible position dominating the only road from Towang to Bomdi La, but was far from supplies in Bomdi La. The high altitude and harsh weather made air drop of supplies quite difficult. Indian Eastern Command made numerous changes in both command and grouping of forces after the October defeat. India had considered tactical air operations against Chinese positions, but ruled out because of fear of Chinese retaliation.

Phase-3: Decisive Battles (14-20 Nov)

11 Brigade ex newly raised 2 Division responsible for Walong sector, instead of preparing for defense of Walong, with an estimated Chinese division poised in front, attacked Chinese positions on 14 November, on personal instructions of General Kaul to gain first major success against the enemy as a birthday present to Nehru. Chinese fiercely retaliated taking over key Indian defensive positions. Remnants of the Indian Walong brigade withdrew to Assam plains. Chinese forces pursued the retreating troops till their acclaimed boundary line. The flashed message of Gen Kaul to PM Nehru amply describes the psychological impact of Chinese counter attack in Walong Sector. After Indian Walong defeat on 16 November, fighting resumed in both Aksai Chin and Se La sectors. By 17 November, Indian 4 Division with ten infantry battalions had taken up defences to deny Chinese advance along the line of communication, spreading the entire force over 100 kms of the road between Se La and Bomdi La, with main defenses at Se La. Chinese simultaneously attacked main defences at SeLa and cut off the Dirang Dzong– SeLa road approaching from Poshing La. Reinforcement from BomdiLa, sent to remove Chinese blocking positions failed. Chinese had eventually cut the road between Bomdi La and Dirang Dzong. Indian forces at Se La fought valiantly but with main supply route cut, their position became untenable. The key decision whether to hold Se La, OR withdraw the forces breaking through the Chinese roadblock was delayed due to non-availability of Corps Comd. Due to ambiguous and unclear orders, the local commanders ordered a general withdrawal rearward, but turned into a rout under heavy Chinese pressure. On 18 November, depleted 48 Brigade at Bomdi La, was attacked and over run. The Brigade withdrew to Chaku just above Assam plains. PLA forces struck at midnight 19 November and comprehensively defeated the Brigade. On 20 November, no organized Indian military force was left in NEFA. Militarily, Chinese victory was complete, while Indian defeat absolute. As a result of build-up during the lull period, 114 Indian Brigade was deployed in Chushul sector to prevent Chinese advance towards Leh. On 18 November, PLA attacked Indian positions to the east of the Chinese claim line, overran and forced the evacuation of every Indian post there. Withdrawing Indian troops regrouped in Chushul village, but Chinese stopped at their claim line. The war in western sector was over on 18 November and all of Aksai Chin was with China.

Ceasefire

On 20 November 1962, China unilaterally declared a ceasefire announcing withdrawal of Chinese forces in NEFA to positions 20 kilometres behind the line of actual contact of 1959. Same day, PM Nehru made an urgent and open appeal to the USA and UK for armed intervention against the China. China unilaterally returned entire disputed territory of NEFA to India while keeping Aksai Chin. The Casualties on Indian side were 1,383 killed, 3,968 captured and 1097 wounded. China did not release any casualty figures but some of the unofficial estimates suggest that 722 were killed and 1400 wounded.⁷

Analysis of the War

Policy and Strategic Domain

The political and military leadership had significant role in Sino-India war; therefore their analysis is necessary to draw pertinent lessons. Indian political leadership was headed by Jawaharlal Nehru who was Prime Minister since 1947. His political strength and national persona coupled with strong belief in own judgment made him non receptive to dissenting views. He practically enjoyed absolute authority in all matters. Krishna Menon, defense minister since 1957, was ambitious, ruthless and insufferable, well known for disrespecting senior military officers in open forums. A very close associate of Nehru, he was considered second most powerful man in India. The personality traits of both the leaders led to a series of faulty decisions which had a direct impact on the war. The salient include; they assumed that the Himalayas made an effective barrier against China, India's size, her geo-strategic location and interests of the great powers in seeing that India did not fall under foreign dominion again would keep India immune from any significant external threats.⁸ Their response to logical reservations of senior Indian military officers on forward policy; was to replace them with more subservient ones. The military leadership of India was with General VM Thapar, Chief of Army Staff since 1961. He preferred not to get into confrontations with his superiors. He was hardly instrumental in decision making process leading to flawed decisions by Political Leadership, and lowering of military's morale. On the other hand Lieutenant General BM Kaul, CGS / Commander IV Corps were well known for direct access to Nehru. He was appointed Chief of General Staff though he did not possess the operational experience for such a key appointment.⁹ He was over ambitious with total disregard for ground realities and often bypassed the chain of command. As CGS, he aggressively pushed for the forward policy stating in June 1962 it is better for us to establish as many posts as we can in Ladakh; even though in penny packets, rather than wait for substantial buildup, as I am convinced that the Chinese will not attack any of our positions even if they are relatively weaker than theirs.¹⁰

Chinese leadership, headed by Chairman Mao, assisted by PM Chou en Lai, had planned and guided every detail of the operation on both diplomatic and military fronts. He appointed one of the best, Korean fame General Zhang Guohua to lead the war effort in NEFA. The decision making of Chinese leadership was more rational, logical, and realistic which can be concluded from a number of indicators. The 1962 war was a classic case of Sun Tzu's Wait for It, Choose the most opportune moment. They were aware of the prevalent geostrategic situation and acted accordingly. As Cuban missile crisis had grabbed the world's attention during October 1962, China was certain that the possibility of outside direct interference in the dispute was remote, if it escalated further. Notwithstanding desire to settle the dispute peacefully on reasonable terms, military buildup as well as improvement of communication infrastructure continued simultaneously in view of aggressive Indian designs.

Decision Making and Dissemination

Indian Defense setup after independence lacked institutionalized system for decision making at the national level. Though the Defense Committee of the Cabinet existed, it was ineffective primarily due to overbearing personalities of Nehru and Menon.¹¹ This kept Military on the sidelines in critical national security and force

development matters. Under direction of Krishna Menon, neither minutes were ever taken of any of the meetings nor instructions or operational orders were issued in writing. Same was followed down the chain often resulting in confusion. Chinese decisions related to border issues were properly processed, analyzed and decided on merit. All political and military key figures including commanders of Tibet and Sinkiang were part of the meetings. The institutionalized and logical decision making process manifested itself in smooth execution of the operations by PLA.

The Forward Policy

A detailed analysis of the Forward Policy reveals; the Indian Government, by propagating Chinese presence in Indian Territory as an act of aggression, had brought upon herself the obligation to do something by force. Upcoming general elections in India influenced political leadership to pursue forward policy more vigorously to draw political mileage. Policy based on the assumption that PLA would not react was self-defeating. The major flaws in Forward Policy were correctly summarized by Lt General Daulat Singh, Commander Western Command, when he wrote to Army HQ in Mid-August 1962 Militarily we are in no position to defend what we possess, leave alone force a show down... therefore it is vital that we do not provoke any clash. China does not wish war with India on the border issue provided we do not disturb the status quo.¹² He emphasized that Aksai Chin road was a vital strategic link for the Chinese, and they would react forcefully to Indian moves which threatened it, however distantly. He concluded by writing It is imperative that political direction is based on military means. If the two are not coordinated there is a danger of creating a situation where we may lose both in material and moral sense much more than we already have. There is no shortcut to military preparedness to enable us to pursue objectively our policy.¹³ Where the forward policy was looking at the end in the form of reclaiming the historical Indian Territory, the ways being adopted under political as well as higher military pressure by establishing posts with no tactical logic were not commensurate with available means. The risk factor thus grew completely out of proportion.

Chinese Notion of Victory / War as an Instrument of Policy

The Chinese had advanced south of disputed lines to thoroughly root out the Indian troops, shatter their plan of altering the border status quo and create conditions for a negotiated settlement. Post war, rather than keeping the spoils, China kept only what was strategically vital: the area surrounding her critical road in Aksai Chin. Chinese were not sure that the kinetic application could force India to negotiate, but that could wait; the military instrument had made sure that in the mean time for several years, the status quo would not be disturbed through any misadventures by India. It was enunciated clearly by this statement of Mao Zedong on 7th October 1962 during Military meeting in Peking.¹⁴

Military Capabilities

Despite the faith or false assumption of Indian political leadership in their military strength, Indian Military comprising only 7 Infantry and one Armored division was a story of long neglect and budgetary constraints, which was thoroughly exposed during the conduct of war. The false notion of Indian Military strength was reinforced; Withdrawal of PLA troops from Chip Chap Valley in November 1961 after

a brief encounter convinced Nehru that the Chinese would not be assertive and his forward policy was the correct course for India. Successful Indian Military invasion of Portuguese colony of Goa notwithstanding the opposition that tiny state could offer, the false perception of Indian Military strength was further engraved among Indian leadership as well as public as reflected in the statement given by Lal Bahadur Shastri during election campaign. If the Chinese will not vacate the areas occupied by her, India will have to repeat what she did in Goa.¹⁵

On the contrary given the regional environment post Korean War, US support to Taiwan and Tibet Insurgency, despite budgetary constraints, PLA was given right priority as an important element of national power. With around three million strength, well equipped, well trained and well led, PLA had over 100,000 troops in Tibet alone. PLA concentrated over two divisions in NEFA and one in Aksai Chin. In view of Chinese political and military objectives, these forces were sufficient to undertake the task. Though India used air for the logistic purposes, offensive use of air by both countries was not resorted to during the entire war.

Operational Domain

Intelligence

Indian forces were largely ignorant of Chinese strength, capabilities and intent. Rather than the Military Intelligence (MI), Intelligence Bureau (IB) enjoyed the confidence of decision makers. It was the assertion of Mr BN Mullick, Director IB that Chinese would not react to the forward policy. However, neither the civilian nor military had any worthwhile capability for the technical intelligence collection. Weekly intelligence summaries were often quoted verbatim from Intelligence Bureau reports without any assessments and would take 3 to 4 weeks to reach to reach lower formations. General Henderson Brooks, in his report on 1962 war states about the input of Intelligence Bureau as haphazardly collected, badly processed, unimaginatively put across and inefficiently disseminated.¹⁶ Chinese on the other hand owing to prolonged Tibetan insurgency had a well-established human as well as technical intelligence set up in the region. They were more familiar with the terrain, correctly ascertained the Indian army capabilities, identified unfrequented routes and used them to their advantage.

Logistics Aspects

India was logistically poorly prepared, especially for cold weather and mountainous operations. Indian troops were deployed at high altitudes in summer uniforms. They were ill equipped and mostly dependent on pouch ammunition and hard scale rations. Chinese had established forward dumps and recruited thousands of Tibetan porters organized into proper labour battalions. Their road head with a capacity of 7 ton vehicles was just few hours distance from forward deployments. Even PW Camps were prepared with complete logistics.

The notion of balance was completely disregarded by India due to wrong assumptions, non-availability of adequate troops and their deployment without tactical logic. Hence, no reserves were available at any tier to maintain balance. Whereas, Chinese forces maintained balance throughout the operations due to availability of sufficient troops and deliberate planning.

India mainly relied on bayonet strength throughout the war with insufficient support echelons particularly Artillery and communication. Inadequate ammunition, insufficient arty pieces with limited ranges which were lesser than even Chinese mortars resulted in virtually no artillery fire support. Chinese on the other hand had brought forward enough Artillery to support ground operations till the end. They also had established reliable communication with forward troops.

Indian Army was neither trained nor prepared for mountain warfare. Until Nehru's assertive forward policy was initiated, few Indian soldiers had operated in mountain areas. The 7 Brigade deployed at Thagla Ridge had never carried out an exercise in last 3 years prior to deployment. The 3 Brigades inducted from plains during war were neither trained nor acclimatised for mountain warfare. Whereas, the Chinese forces were operating in Tibet for more than 3 years fighting insurgents besides having experience of Korean war in similar environment. They were much better accustomed to mountain warfare.

Lessons Learnt

- All matters of importance finally boil down to the quality and capability of the leadership. Especially when it comes to national security and national interests, the political as well as military leadership has to show commitment and capacity to dispassionately apply all elements of national power in a synergetic manner to achieve national objectives. Selection of leadership has to be on merit rather than based on personal biases and conveniences.
- Where the policy looks at the ends, the strategy must be developed to achieve that end through ways and means. To achieve this, either ways and means are to be provided to meet set objectives or the ends need to be altered to maintain balance. Imbalance in either of the three will prove disastrous.
- The Higher Direction of War must be clear and unambiguous and must come from the highest political body of the country. There can be no deliberate planning if Government thinks that threat is non-existent. No Military can plan without clear Government orders.
- At times, political leaders act on issues either to save their public image or to draw certain political mileage. However, national security issues cannot be seen through the same prism and must take precedence over popular demand or self-serving political interests.
- The Military stands out as the most important element of national power, especially for countries with hostile neighbours. While quest for peace is good, there cannot be any compromises on development and maintenance of strong military forces to ensure territorial integrity as well as stability. The military must have a substantial role in arriving at a decision related to war fighting, even when it is being taken by the political leadership.
- Is essential for accurate and logical decision making. Resolution of bilateral territorial disputes is a long drawn process. Lasting peace can only be achieved with a win solution for both parties.
- Neglect towards merit and tendency to promote only Yes Men in the institutions concerned with National Security is a blunder. National security is a sacred and collective responsibility which cannot be left to the men of ordinary character and intellect.

- A robust, integrated and well-coordinated mechanism, at all levels for gathering intelligence, its apt and timely analysis and providing feedback to the decision makers is an absolute essential to prevent from being humbled in the battlefield.
- Is vital for success of military operations at any level. It can only be achieved through deliberate planning and allocation of corresponding resources which must never be overlooked. Proper Preparation for the War including detailed planning, Logistic readiness and mission oriented training are absolutely essential for any military operation, a fact and an experience that needs no elaboration.

Impact of War on the Region and Semblance with Contemporary Environment

The 1962 War had significant impacts in shaping the regional environment in the realm of geo-politics, international alliances and military arms race in south Asia during the years that followed. Let's first look at the immediate impacts. End of Nehruvianism in India: Nehru's philosophy of statecraft commonly referred to as Nehruvianism, characterised by non-alignment and economic progress even if development of military capability is neglected, nonviolent competition and avoidance of war saw its logical end. India took a U-turn on its non-alignment stance and focused on development of armed forces. Revival of Indian Military: India recognized serious weaknesses in her military system and capabilities. Besides receiving foreign military aid, India increased her military strength more than two fold and improved the military's training and logistic systems.¹⁷ US Tilt towards India: Indian appeal to USA for urgent military help during the war and a split between China and USSR was regarded by USA as an opportunity to foment a strategic partnership with India to contain communist China. USA assisted raising and equipping six Indian mountain divisions besides helping her to increase local arms production. The US efforts to win over India while ignoring Pakistan, suffered a setback once India struck a defence deal with Soviet Union in 1964. Nuclearization of South Asia: The realisation, after 1962, to match Chinese military might in any future conflict, not only forced India to develop conventional military capability but also embark upon nuclear weapons programme particularly after Chinese nuclear tests in 1964, resulting in Indian first nuclear test in 1974. India stated the 1962 war as a reason for her nuclear tests.¹⁸ Pakistan was forced to follow suit leading to nuclearization of South Asia.

The Indian defeat in 1962 brought Pakistan and China closer to each other. Pakistan concluded a mutual border settlement deal with China in 1963 that symbolised beginning of a strategic partnership. PIA's maiden flights to China and US-China rapprochement facilitated by Pakistan effectively ended Chinese isolation. China reciprocated by extending her support to Pakistan's cause against India, providing military support and constructing 1300 km long Karakoram highway connecting the two countries.

The 1962 War also had significant impact on India Pakistan relationship. Both U.S. and Britain considered resolution of Kashmir as important to prevent Pakistan joining the Chinese camp thereby undermining US interests in the region. Under their pressure six rounds of Indo-Pak talks were held on Kashmir in 1964 but remained inconclusive as India had joined the Soviet camp. Seeing Indian military

performance in 62 and failure of talks on Kashmir coupled with Indian increasing military strength, Pakistan felt that time was running out and sought politico-military solution in 1965.

Semblance of 1962 War in Current Sino-Indian Relations

The shadow of 1962 war still influences Sino-India relations. With a deep sense of embarrassing defeat it continues to act as a traumatic moment for Indian elite. India has not yet liberated herself from the shadows of 1962 wars and strategic perception of considering China as a threat and adversary still persists. Despite their geo-economic interdependence, the geo-political factor continues to dominate their mutual relations even today, more so when the border issue is still unresolved. The occasional skirmishes along Line of Actual Contact do take place. Notwithstanding seventeen rounds of talks since 2003 and numerous Confidence Building Measures, it is still the longest unsettled border issue. The events of 1962 war created a balance of power, altered the alliance structure and gave way to the perpetual arms race in South Asia. India is wary of China's unprecedented economic and military progress particularly her nuclear capabilities and economic initiatives like OBOR and CPEC. India has embarked upon extensive up gradation of military and nuclear capabilities to match China, becoming the world's largest buyer of arms. China looks at India's ambitions not only from the perspective of an emerging peer competitor but also as a form of strategic collusion with the US in their overall ambition to contain China. Convergence of US strategic interests with India culminating into a bilateral military strategic alliance is semblance of US tilt to India witnessed in 1962. Some of the recent developments in Sino-Indian mutual relations can be termed as India's new Forward Policy at geo strategic level. It is once again irking China to a great extent. China's stance on inclusion of India to NSG and strong protests on many of these steps reflects the same. China and India also remain loggerhead over Tibet and Dalai Lama issue. India is still leveraging Tibetan government in exile against China. Tibet being a source of three major Indian rivers i.e. Sutlej, Ganges and Brahmaputra has added another dimension to the Himalayan security environment. The water management capability offers China enormous influence and leverage over downstream riparian Indian state.

Conclusion

The significance of studying the China-India Border War lies in two areas: the implications of the faulty higher direction of war and the military lessons to be learned which are still relevant. In addition, the war had a significant impact on the region that still continues to influence the geo strategic regional environment.

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GRAY ZONE CONFLICT: ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN

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Abstract

Gray Zone Conflict (GZC) is a relatively new terminology in the military lexicon, which is already cluttered with multiple overlapping terms related to conflict environment in the irregular warfare paradigm. The big picture of GZC is all about geo-politics and evolution of the world order. GZC is one of the many concepts defining this evolution and it has generated significant attention and controversy within the broader strategic studies community. Within the Gray Zone, Hybrid Wars and Color Revolutions are new phenomena which are increasingly defining contemporary warfare. International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is in a legal predicament to assess whether these situations amount to an 'armed conflict' or not, endorsing the manipulative duality of interpretation by actors. With diversifying means available to multiple countries, the complex interplay of geo-strategic and geo-economic contestation may not remain restricted to current conflict zones, and new conflict theatres may emerge. Core interests of US, Russia, China and other emerging powers face strategic risk, threatening strategic disruption and even possibly upending the established politico-economic orders, with possible attendant implications for Pakistan.

Gray Zone Conflict (GZC) Definition

Arab Spring, Crimea/ Eastern Ukraine, Iraq/ Syria and the South China Sea are significant markers for GZC.¹ The GZC terminology is exclusively a US concept and not shared by both Russia and China. Michael J Mazarr defines it as measured aggression employed by states dissatisfied with the status quo and determined to change important aspects of it while staying below thresholds that would generate a powerful US or international response.² He cites examples of Russia's intervention in Crimea, Chinese assertions in the South China Sea and Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons as at least compatible with such an understanding. The US Special Operations Command defines it as competitive interactions among and within state and non-state actors that fall between the traditional war and peace duality. Characterized by ambiguity about the nature of conflict, opacity of the parties involved or uncertainty about the relevant policy and legal frameworks. Gray Zone challenges are aggressive, perspective-dependent, and ambiguous.³

Defining Characteristics of GZC

- Ambiguous regarding ultimate objectives, participants (proxies), whether international law violated (threshold) and role of the military forces in response. GZCs cautiously calibrated not to cross adversarial Red Lines.
- Inherently aggressive, but measured/ incremental aggression below thresholds soliciting conventional military response.
- Deniability/ non attributable (implies role/ use of proxies).
- Moderately but not radically revisionist. Province of revisionist powers.

- Gradual, applying steady cumulative pressure.
- Seeking faits accompli through tactics of erosion.
- Disregard to sanctity of borders and sovereignty.

GZC Level of War and Spectrum of Conflict

From the standpoint of classic military theory, GZC does not meet the traditional criteria for warfare. Its character and challenges will be specific to its nature, and must be thought of differently than war itself.⁴ However, the perspective driven Hybrid Warfare and Color Revolutions both operate at the strategic level of war, in view of the strategic scale of objectives, levels of decision making, desired ends and the scale of resource allocation. GZC is a US perspective terminology, coined to represent the space ceded to/ wrested by Russia, China and Iran in the geo-strategic contestation, primarily in Ukraine, Syria and South China Sea. Hybrid Warfare and Color Revolutions are synonymous in character, however, representing competing perspectives. Both operate at the strategic level of war, within the Gray Zone. GZC is still an abstract concept in the Irregular Warfare classification, and not a distinct form of war. GZC as a combination of Hybrid Warfare and Color Revolutions can be projected on the overall Spectrum of Conflict as given below:-

Political/ Ambiguous Warfare (Least)	Irregular/ Terrorism	GZC (below conventional threshold)			Conventional Warfare (Highest) Response warranted	
		Color Revolutions	Hybrid Warfare			
			Unconventional	Cyber		Conventional
						Overlap zone (transiting into conventional warfare without crossing adversarial red lines/ overt violation of International Law)

Likely Global and Regional Implications of GZC

Ukraine will possibly be a frozen GZC, unless major changes take place in the Russian government. Vital Russian economic interest for flow of energy towards Europe, is disincentivizing Russian belligerence. Fresh US / NATO GZC will render the Baltics, Balkans and Eastern Europe vulnerable to Russian GZC responses. The Syrian situation is hardest to predict within a GZC future perspective. Russian desire for continued access to naval bases, KSA-Israeli possible thaw, Iranian sectarian belligerence, Turkey's Kurdish vulnerability, US sponsored anti regime forces and DAESH are debilitating factors, projecting extensive future GZC. However, from a competitive geo-political perspective, as long as Syria remains fluid, Asia rebalance and DAESH project in Afghanistan cannot effectively take off. South China Sea may also largely remain a frozen GZC. While the emerging Quad (US-Japan-Australia-India)⁵ will aim to exert pressure, reactive Sino-Russian alignment is already on the anvil. Despite US backing, no single conflicting country or bloc willing to up the ante against China.

The likely impact of GZC on trade and energy can generally be found through identifying contiguous trade/ energy mosaics and geo-political flash points, projecting emerging GZC. World energy choke points mainly lying in the Eastern Hemisphere i.e Straits of Hormuz, Malacca and Bosphorus, Bal al Mandeb and the Suez Canal have already been wholly or partially militarized.⁶ China already has the first overseas base at Djibouti as well as the US. OBOR visualizes overland and

maritime connectivity over the identified conflict prone mosaics (maritime trade and energy), simultaneously incentivizing GZC from an Indo-US perspective and disincentivizing it from a Sino-Russian, Pakistani, Iranian, Turkish and even an Afghani perspective. The energy Great Game, unstable Muslim arc straddling the Sino-Russian vulnerable regions, and inner societal vulnerabilities define the regional complexities. Turkey holds immense value for both NATO and Russia. Iran's belligerence effectively circumvents internal vulnerabilities temporarily. Monarchies can no longer justify their existence in a globalized world. However Afghanistan, wrecked by perpetual conflict, is the most important geo-political real estate in the region, radiating excellent regional prospects for GZC.

Likely Impact of GZC

Emerging GZCs may target the trade/ energy potential of rivals and regional realignments. Economic hitmen may increasingly assume the role of proxies employing strategic and criminal cyber threats. Paradoxically, it could hasten the Asian Century due to increased security-economic consciousness among geographically contiguous regions as a response to GZC. OBOR and RCEP offer optimal potential for economic win-win options in comparison to TPP/ TTIP. While emerging GZCs will be aimed to target regionalism and critical choke points, OBOR will possibly absorb or integrate with RCEP, CAREC, ECO, D-8, SAARC, EEU, ASEAN as well as the EU, downplaying GZC fears.

The greater the velocity of change ushered in by the competitive GZC, the sooner US/ NATO and SCO may be rivalling each other as collective security blocs. Interestingly, India is currently at odds with SCO perspective due to her US nexus. GZC will have a direct impact on great power capability to maintain deniability for proxies. In order to optimally utilize proxies in GZC, they would have to operate below reaction thresholds of the adversary. Ironically, the proxy value of Islam, within the sectarian duality, would still remain optimally relevant, as well as private mercenary armies, employing former Special Forces.

Emerging GZCs will pose tremendous challenges to countries for doctrinal overhaul, force restructuring, training and coping with the increased requirement of Special Forces for employment in and combating GZC. For engagement in GZC or protecting against it, Special Forces are increasingly the principal means, but currently even the US is seriously handicapped in terms of Special Forces availability.⁷ In the emerging GZC scenario, the driving design logic of the belligerents will have increasingly lesser to do with firepower and maneuver and increasingly more with information.⁸ The trinity of elements of firepower, information and their combined effect upon the war within the people could increasingly define operational art in the future GZC perspective.

Effect on Pakistan

While India remains Pakistan's enduring rival, Pakistan's security paradigm underwent a radical transition post 9/11. Pakistan suffered the cumulative scourge of terrorism, 4th/5th Generation, Non-Kinetic, Political, Criminal and Informational Warfare, forcing a monumental triple stretch on Pakistan. According to Anatol Lieven, the US led campaign in Afghanistan was responsible for increasing Islamist insurgency and terrorism in Pakistan since 2001.⁹ However, in today's radically

transformed environment, Pakistan's insecurity syndrome has genuinely receded. Pakistan's success story is societal in its character. The comprehensive security paradigm of today's Pakistan, inclusive of economic security, is fairly stable and progressive, reinforced by the emerging regional and global environment.

When strategic equilibrium is disturbed, termed as potential bifurcation in Chaos Theory, the dynamic changes require a much more responsive strategy.¹⁰ Also, paradoxically, periods of major instability are the best time to advocate bold, broad strategies but provide the least time for consideration, thus magnifying the risk.¹¹ Despite tremendous odds and fraught with risks, Pakistan's learning curve has been pragmatic and responsive. In Pakistan's internal security context, a bold strategy formulation and application process has logically informed Policy, in spite of irritants posed by the supposed civil-military divide. At the systemic and dyadic levels, conflict spirals are fueled by power shifts, arms races, alliance formation and dysfunctional learning that results from repeated crises.¹² From an Indian perspective, once the recent spiral began, post Uri Incident, contributory factors from the environment at all five levels of analysis were seemingly favorable towards India. However, the Indians misread the environment completely. The Indian assessments on power shifts, benefits of alliance formation with a declining hegemon and scapegoat tactics/ diversionary incidents all faced a stark reality check and project virtually no capacity for India to wage GZC.

Transformed Environment in Balochistan, Karachi and FATA

The tide has visibly turned in FATA, Karachi and Balochistan. However, in the current environment, the nature of the problem is directly related to political ownership, governance and administrative issues. For waging war within the people, GZC would require large scale overt violation of sovereignty, popular insurgency/ insurrection, massive perceptions of social injustice and ethno-sectarian divide within a specified geographical territory. The projected successful management of Afghanistan border along with a transforming Balochistan, Karachi and FATA do not offer these prospects for GZC.

Critical National Security Threats

In the current environment Pakistan's most likely five critical national security threats could possibly be India, terrorist organizations built up on the bigoted foundation of religious extremism, corruption, water crisis and unguided youth bulge/ urban boom.¹³ India is a state sponsor of terrorism and the US neo-cons are apt to believe that India can somehow be used by the US to control Pakistani behavior.¹⁴ Even the most rabid critics of Pakistan like Christine Fair openly acknowledge that Indian consulates sponsor terrorism from Iran and Afghanistan against Pakistan.¹⁵ Anne Patterson, a former US ambassador was innately rational when she stated to her government that only Pakistanis can control Pakistan, and the behavior of the Pakistani security establishment will always be determined by what they see as the vital needs of Pakistan and the Pakistan Army.¹⁶ The nature of none of these critical national security threats in the current environment, allows them to be manipulatively exploited for the possibility for GZC.

In the geo-political grand chessboard, deterrence has been both a success and a failure in the GZC context since it allows GZC operations below conventional

threshold with deniability. However in the Pakistan-India enduring rivalry, post nuclearization conflict spirals have remained below conventional thresholds, validating the success of deterrence. With no room for deniability in the Pakistan-India context, unless deterrence breaks down, there cannot be any GZC at all.

Potential GZC Actors/ Maximum Means vis-à-vis Environment

In the current environment, maximum envisaged GZC means by potential actors are hypothetically projected. It is virtually impossible for potential GZC actors to maintain ambiguity regarding objectives, participants, whether international law violated or not and deniability. This is even without factoring in Pakistan’s punitive responses, firmly ruling out any chances of GZC in Pakistan.

Potential Actors	Application of Maximum Means in Current Environment				
	Economic	Military/ Covert	Informational	Political/ Diplomatic	Cyber
CPEC Enemies/ ERF	Limited/ ineffective sanctions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Drone strikes (without deniability) • Sponsoring proxy violence 	Major propaganda campaigns	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coercive diplomacy • Support for domestic opposition, exiles, terrorists, proscribed organizations 	Major cyberattacks
India		Sponsoring proxy activities	Propaganda campaign with Western support		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cyber harassing • Targeted cyber actions

Andrew Korybko, the author of *Hybrid Wars: The Indirect Adaptive Approach To Regime Change*, writes that Pakistan is actually one of the supercontinent’s most important economic hopes, as it has the potential to connect the massive economies of the Eurasian Union, Iran, SAARC, and China, thereby inaugurating the closest thing to an integrated pan-Eurasian economic zone. Russia recognizes Pakistan’s prime geopolitical potential and has thus maneuvered to rapidly increase its full-spectrum relations with the South Asian gatekeeper.¹⁷ With this projected massive convergence, GZC against Pakistan can be ruled out and DAESH will not be able to operate out from Afghanistan.

Likelihood of Hybrid Warfare and Color Revolution in Pakistan

The case for Hybrid warfare can be ruled out altogether since it would be impossible for both ERF and India to operate simultaneously in the conventional, unconventional and cyber domains without responses from Pakistan, China and possibly from Russia as well. With regards to Color Revolutions, Anatol Lieven makes a compelling case that revolutions cannot take place in Pakistan due to its thoroughly homogenous character and the immense strength of the society in its various forms.¹⁸ Moreover the resilience of the Pakistani society in the post 2001 fightback against 4th/ 5th Generation and NKW has shaped the Pakistani consciousness and identification of friend and foe very clearly, disincentivizing GZC or war within the people/ society.

Major Environmental Conclusions for GZC Likelihood in Pakistan

- It can be safely concluded that GZC cannot be employed against Pakistan since there is no Brzezinski vacuum and resultant suction. However, corruption, political governance and the information/ cyber warfare domains portend most distinct challenges in the current environment.
- In spite of the Western media's tirade of Pakistan's diplomatic isolation, the regional environment is increasingly supportive of Pakistan's diplomatic effort. The Kashmir freedom struggle is thriving and India is hopelessly short of options to respond coherently. India's only lifeline is the hopelessly compromised and farcical Western democracy, human rights values and mainstream media.
- The international law cannot be selectively applied to Pakistan, since China and Russia are increasingly sensitive to exploitative coercion of IGOs in the existing global environment.
- While India already suffers perennially from status discrepancy, India has adopted precisely the same credentials she always accused Pakistan of possessing. India's adoption of Hindutva terrorism, increasingly militarized politics/ society, class failure and rhetorical hyper-nationalism without capability to deliver, project increasing possibilities for India's internal conflict.
- It is absolutely imperative for Pakistan to act against corruption and regulate the media in line with information warfare realities.

Conclusion

Provided a nation is successful in maintaining national integration which can bring together the varied social, ethnic, religious, and economic demographics residing within the state, it can remain protected against GZC. The Long/ Power Cycle theories and status discrepancy dilemmas of emerging powers confirm the decline of the West. We are faced with the most important question of our times, Is the peaceful decline of the west and the rise of the Asian Century possible?

Endnotes

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EVOLUTION OF MARITIME STRATEGY AND EMPLOYMENT OF NAVAL POWER IN 21ST CENTURY

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Abstract

Nearly two thirds of the world is covered with water, creating a strong bond between civilisations and their innate desire to dominate the world. From time immemorial nations have exploited the maritime realm to rule world. Global maritime trade and its protection and later on, the race to dominate the oceans led to the naval contestation and consequently to the formulation, refinement and advancements in the naval strategy. As the technology evolved over the ages so did the maritime and naval strategies. In the 21st century, geo-politico-economic contestation is centred on the maritime dominance of the Indian and Pacific oceans. At the regional level, Pakistan also needs to capitalise on its maritime potential. Increasing Indian maritime power threatens the delicate regional maritime balance. Such a scenario coupled with enhanced demands of providing security to Gwadar port, the Pakistan Navy is faced with a challenge to enhance its own role and influence in the region. There is also a need to engage friendly regional countries in this regard. This paper intends to look at the global and regional maritime and naval trends and examines the situation to draw pertinent lessons for Pakistan.

Introduction

In the present century of geo-economics, the role of the maritime sector in the development of nations and their dominance of the global economics has gained even more significance. China's Maritime Silk Road and its extension through Pakistan's Gwadar port, and the legal contestation in South China Sea are a few examples of the same. Since ages, great maritime nations have depended on ocean-going commerce for economic prosperity and have also traditionally maintained strong navies to protect their interests, ensuring safe flow of shipping, thus giving rise to maritime and naval strategies. Throughout history many historians have used the term maritime strategy interchangeably with the naval strategy. The maritime strategy, however, is that part of the overall national strategy which deals with the sea and its use. It may be said that maritime strategy is the conviction of a nation to put to use her political, social, economic and maritime assets with the aim to promote her maritime interests. Maritime strategy therefore, regulates all the elements of sea power, while naval strategy deals primarily with one element i.e. the Naval Forces. Naval strategy forms part of the overall military strategy under the defence policy. Both the strategies are closely linked and interact directly at the naval forces level. With the naval warfare entering into the 21st century the nature and role of naval operations is also changing. While the oceans remain a major global hub of international economic activity, several strategic studies have shown that the two most important regions of the 21st century are likely to be the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions, where maritime power will be the most important measure of military and diplomatic influence. Like many other nations Pakistan too is blessed with requisite potential necessary to become a significant maritime power however, our

predominant continental orientation; our environment and traditional threat, pose serious challenges and impediment in realizing the maritime potential of Pakistan. Notwithstanding, the panel opines that our evolving national security imperatives dictate the need for development of dynamic naval capability to protect and promote our national interests in the maritime domain.

Evolution of Maritime Strategy

In order to study the evolution of Maritime strategy it would be prudent to analyse the various thalassocracies which prevailed during different eras. Minoans were the first maritime community, and evolved during the third millennium B.C by developing sea trade. Their economic gains encouraged piracy, which was countered by creation of navy by King Minos of Crete.¹ During the first half of the new millennium, the Phoenicians and then the Greeks took to the seas which led to the Golden Age of Athens.² The Athenian strategy was based on the concept of command of the sea. Athenians were defeated in the 27 years Peloponnesian war, only when Sparta changed its strategy from continental to maritime and destroyed Athenian navy in 405 BC.³ Romans developed first-class navy after Punic wars in 260 B.C.⁴ Rome's legions could never have been victorious against Carthage without the security and mobility provided by the navy for continuous supply to the army through sea. From 7th century onwards Muslims became the major naval power in the Mediterranean Sea. Muslims mariners' contribution such as *The Benefits and Principles of Oceanography* (1489) and *Fundamentals for the Mastery of Naval Science* (1511) demonstrate the Arabs' early proficiency at sea. During the fifteenth century, the Turks took to the sea to conquer the coastal waters of the Black, Red and Eastern Mediterranean seas and control strategic choke points of Bosphorus and Dardanelles. Ottoman Navy under Khairuddin Barbarossa defeated seven Western united powers in the famous naval battle of Preveza in 1538 AD.⁵ However, it never made to adopt the new sailing ships of Europe, which plied the blue waters of the Indian Ocean and giving birth to European Colonialism in 16th century. Spain led the overseas imperial ventures and became indisputably the most powerful nation in the world by 1550.⁶ In parallel, the Portuguese established bases at key coastal points and crucial strategic waterways in Africa, India and Indonesia.⁷ From 1515, Portuguese remained unchallenged by major European powers for another century. At the turn of the seventeenth century, The Netherlands became a leading thalassocratic state and the first nation to systematize its maritime policy, embracing political goals, economic gain, maritime law and strategy.⁸ In 1630 the Dutch naval blockade of Portuguese cities of Goa and Malacca, spelled the doom of the Portuguese Empire in the East, giving the Dutch absolute supremacy over Eastern sea-lanes for the rest of the seventeenth century. In 1660, the blue water policy, was made official. Under which, commercial wealth and naval power became seen as mutually sustaining, resulting into rise of Great Britain as a maritime power.⁹ The period thereafter saw a complete transformation in naval technology as rival powers imitated Britain with their own merchant fleets, colonies and navies. By mid-19th century steam power transformed sea trade. Introduction of Submarine in 1898 and aircraft on ships in 1910 added different dimension to the naval warfare. First and Second World War saw significant changes in the naval warfare with the indiscriminate sinking by German U Boats, Convoy System by Allies to counter U Boats and German counter measure in form of Wolf Pack Tactics. Dawn of the Nuclear age brought nuclear propulsion in submarines, cruisers and nuclear

propelled aircraft carriers with improved speed, endurance and ability to carry unprecedented number of weapons.

Maritime Strategists

The evolution of maritime and naval forces led to the development of maritime strategy which gained pre-eminence with strategists like Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan who in 1890 wrote a book laying down the foundations of written Maritime Strategy and Sir Julian Corbett in 1904 who took the concept further. The two thinkers highlighted the significance of ports and sea trade to the economic prosperity and progress of the nations. The 20th century saw many more practitioners of maritime strategy who have talked about the subject as it evolved with the evolving nature of maritime environment. Mahan's explained Britain's success by developing a simple deduction that greatness and strength is the product of wealth derived from trade whereas navies protect trade and urged United States to emulate the example of Great Britain. Corbett was concerned primarily with the effectiveness of British sea power and the first naval strategist who thought seriously about the direct contribution that maritime strategy could make to a war on land. Corbett based his theories on war and the relationship between strategy and policy on the writings of the Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831). Some of the salient aspects of their writings can be compared under various concepts, first (a) Fleet Concentration; Mahan was of the view that a fleet is much stronger as a homogenous body as it would lead to a decisive defeat when divided. Corbett on the contrary, was of the view that a fleet was not necessarily stronger as a homogenous group. The more a navy concentrate, the fewer the sea lanes of communications and the less space it can secure and control. The concept of fleet concentration is consistent with the concentration of forces as a principle of war. Modern naval operations have always adapted this principle with naval forces operating in different theatres under a central command system to ensure effective coordination and mutual support to each other. (b) Offensive and Defensive Action; Mahan was of the view that offensive and defensive actions were separate and distinct. He posited that defensive positions ceded offensive initiative to the enemy. Corbett differed with Mahan and stated that it is a fundamental truth of war that offensive and defensive actions are mutually complementary. The modern concept of warfare desires that initiative and tempo is maintained to achieve success through offensive action by naval force. Consistent with strategic thoughts of Mahan and Corbett, the concept of offensive action as a principle of war is being employed by naval forces in the conduct of an operation or campaign. (c) Command of the Sea; Mahan contemplated two main methods in obtaining and maintaining command of the sea: blockade and decisive battle. Corbett with more elaborate understanding of the concept posited that command at sea may exist in various stages such as general or local and permanent and temporary. He went further to state that permanent control of the sea means that the enemy cannot interfere with one's maritime trade and overseas operation to seriously affect the war's outcome. Command of the Sea in modern times is impracticable. Control of the sea is only possible at a given place and time as advocated by Corbett. Consequently, in contemporary times, naval forces consistent with the thoughts of both strategists exercise their rights over the sea through sea control and sea denial. (d) Joint Operations; Mahan thought that navy's support for friendly forces is not the best utilization of resources and a violation of the principles of concentration. The navy according to Mahan was to exercise dominance and control the sea by engaging enemy ships. Corbett insisted that inhabited land was the

most important strategic space, and he underscored the significance of joint operations by the navy and army. He also insisted that the maritime and continental strategies should not compete against, but complement each other. This is in line with the current practice of manoeuvre warfare which emphasizes the employment of more than an arm of service in the conduct of operations. (e) Attack on Enemy Commerce; Mahan believed that victory at sea can only be accomplished by engaging and defeating the enemy naval forces. Thereafter the enemy's merchant shipping would not be able to utilise the sea. Corbett on the contrary stated that the primary method to ensure victory at sea in order to force the enemy to secure peace is by the capture or destruction of the enemy's public or private property. Corbett qualified this action as economic pressure. The attack on commerce in contemporary times is still a function of naval forces. Though, such actions are premised on a declaration of war while enforcing a naval blockade.

Apart from Mahan and Corbett, French Vice Admiral Raoul Castex (1878–1968) and German Vice Admiral Wolfgang Wegener (1875–1956) gave ideas on naval strategy. Some of their salient concepts are (a) Vice Admiral Raoul Castex (1878 - 1968); Raoul Castex wrote that in addition to land and naval strategy, there is also what he called general strategy (Strategy General) which transcends and coordinates them. He was perhaps one of the first theoreticians who believed in the possibility of employing aircraft against enemy maritime commerce and commercial ports. Castex firmly believed in the need for close cooperation between the navy and the army. (b) Vice Admiral Wolfgang Wegener (1875 - 1956). Wegener was a strong proponent of the need to have an offensive naval strategy which can have no other objective than attaining a geographical position from which to initiate the battle for the commercial arteries of maritime traffic. (c) Admiral Sergei Georgiyevich Gorshkov (1910-1988). Admiral Gorshkov became Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy in 1956. He advocated long-range naval operations against the enemy's shore, such as strategic strike and amphibious landings. Gorshkov grasped the optics of sea power and described navies as symbols of great power status and should be used as an instrument of policy.

Geoffrey Till a British naval historian and professor of Maritime Studies in King's College London, summarized the constituents of maritime strategy as; Decisive battle, Fleet in being and Blockade. During peacetime the constituents include Coastal tasks, Protection of Trade, Projection of Power ashore, Naval diplomacy and Strategic deterrence. He also suggested that by taking aircraft to sea, sea powers were able to take on and perhaps even defeat stronger land based air forces. Air power thus forms part of sea power, strengthening it and ensuring increased in its reach.

Takeaways

History always brings out pertinent lessons that can be applied in the contemporary times. Major takeaways of the maritime history includes (a) Civilizations that developed their maritime power were able to project their influence beyond their borders and dominate the region. Rise of Greeks and Romans in the ancient times and the colonial powers in the recent history are pertinent examples of the same. (b) Historically, shifting of focus from maritime to continental mind set by dominant nations resulted in loss of their dominance and reduced sphere of influence. Fall of Phoenicians is a classic example in this regard. (c) Failing to adopt

and effectively utilise modern technology has resulted in downfall of many maritime nations. Failing to recognise the effectiveness of the new faster European sail ships led to Turkish naval decline in the Mediterranean. At the same time these new ships led the way for colonisation by the European powers. Increasing maritime interests like trade and economy has always necessitated enhancement in naval power. Use of navy by Minoans in 3rd millennium BC, use of trade convoys from South America and escorting naval ships by the Spanish are pertinent examples. The most fundamental factor around which the whole concept of the maritime activities developed is the economic gains which were accrued from the seaborne trade protected by navy. Transportation through water is the easiest and most economical way to conduct trade. The interaction amongst the trading nations enabled exchange of ideas and knowledge and became motivation for further progress and prosperity. The maritime environment, driven by the interests of various nations and supported by the technology, economy and will of the nations is continuously evolving and shaping the future maritime arena.

Future Trends of Naval Power

In order to see the efficacy of these maritime strategies let us see the prevailing Maritime Environment. Strategic Scan of Maritime Environment: 90% of global trade is through maritime medium and any disruption is likely to have dire consequences for the global growth. China, Japan and South East Asia have become hub of Global seaborne trade. Indian Ocean, East and South China Seas are likely to emerge, as contestation regions, while Pacific and Atlantic are likely to remain relatively calm. Sharply increasing demand for energy and resources highlights the criticality of the free flow of commerce through strategic maritime choke points including the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca, as well as the Panama and Suez Canals. US economy and security are inextricably linked to the immense volume of trade that flows across the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Hence it intends to maintain forward naval presence to protect its interest in the Indo Pacific region. The Re-balance to Asia-Pacific policy has intensified US - China strategic competition. Naval forces of US and its allies would play a lead military role in US Re-balance to Asia policy. US interest in the region and resultant Indo-US strategic partnership has tilted the balance in India's favour. India is investing in its navy and there is a visible shift in its attitude towards its maritime outlook. The improving internal security situation in Pakistan and operationalization of CPEC provides opportunity to rebuild our economy and trade including the maritime sector. Coalitions have emerged as ideal frameworks for fighting menaces like piracy, illegal arms and drugs trafficking and other illegal activities. Lawfare at sea is being used successfully and is likely to assume greater importance in the future. Naval battle space has evolved from Platform Centric to Network Centric warfare and is driven by hi-tech unmanned vehicles, information dominance, smart ships and weapons. Naval weapons have increased in range, speed and accuracy to pose greater challenge to the opposing forces. Let us see how environment affected the contemporary maritime developments by focusing on three leading countries.

China following Mahan's precepts is realigning itself to become a Maritime power. She is reaching out into the Indian Ocean and connection through OBOR (Maritime Silk Road). Former Chinese President Hu Jintao highlighted Malacca Dilemma and the need to secure China's strategic and economic interests in the region. China has invested in port facilities in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and

Burma, while at the same time strengthening its political ties with the Maldives, the Seychelles, and Mauritius deployment of Chinese naval ships from these ports in the future has the potential to generate effects to counter any containment strategy. Moreover, in order to counter any aggressive forces in the region the Chinese have adopted the Anti Access / Area Denial strategy or A2AD. This entails that the enemy maritime units are denied the use of the area contiguous to mainland China by use of weapons like the Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles the Carrier Killer DF-21 that beat all the defences of all the ships of present day. This however, requires long range surveillance, precision targeting, secure and real time communications to manifest. In addition, Chinese submarines are a capable tool to deny the use of sea by surface fleet units. Chinese fleet is evolving and the emphasis is being laid on aircraft carrier force. In addition, developing ports along the countries in the South Asia indicates that China is looking to project its influence and safeguard its interests beyond its borders.

The US maritime strategy entitled *Forward, Engaged, Ready: A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea power (CS-21R)*, released in March 2015, updates concepts and strategies to make them more relevant in the post Asia-Pacific rebalancing maritime environment. The new maritime strategy, offers some pointers in terms of operational imperatives and trends like emphasis on cyber warfare, electro-magnetic spectrum operations and battle-space awareness. In June 2012, strategic guidance specifically tasked the US military to project power despite A2/AD. United States Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) is working through United States Pacific Command (PACOM) to evolve ASB concepts into doctrine and operational action as a counter to A2/AD practices and as a means of prevailing in the face of informationized warfare. US presence in the Arabian Sea is likely to continue in the foreseeable future. No significant change in deployment in Pacific region is expected.

Russian president Vladimir Putin on 26 July 2015 announced the approval of a new Maritime Doctrine-2015, for the Russian Federation. Maritime Doctrine - 2015 divides Russian maritime policy between six regions: Atlantic, Arctic, Antarctic, Caspian, Indian Ocean, and Pacific. Within each region, the doctrine assesses four maritime functions: operations, transport, marine-science, and the development of natural resources. The focus of the doctrine is on two of these regions: the Arctic and the Atlantic. The Arctic focus is on the growth of the Northern Sea Route, the need for free entry into the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and the wealth of the continental shelf. There is a huge potential for offshore oil and gas, two-thirds of which is envisaged to be in Russian basins. Russia plans to build 13 airfields as well as 10 radar posts along the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and replenish Soviet-era bases and airfields. It is opined that Russia is mainly looking to consolidate its footprint in its north and focus on its economic stability while maintaining its only warm water port in the Mediterranean at Tartus.

Based on these global naval trends, the employment of naval forces in the 21st century is likely to be (a) The traditional naval role of securing maritime trade, sea lines of communications, ports and harbours is likely to gain further importance in future. (b) Global competition for resources is likely to increase the importance of undersea resources and navies will have to play a greater role for their protection. (c) Asymmetric threats at sea are likely to persist in the future and navies will remain committed to fighting this menace. As a consequence, coalitions at sea are likely to expand and engagement of navies in such tasks will increase. (d) Latest

developments in weaponry will out date the erstwhile classic fleet engagements. (e) Use of naval air power will remain to be a dominant facet of naval war at sea. (f) Naval forces will be employed in integrated, cross domain operations.

Maritime Strategy in Indo-Pak Context

US ally is India ... Our new area of operations is the Indian Ocean. That's where the United States Navy's going to concentrate. Its principal ally is the Indian Navy It is where we believe the strategic focus of the world is right now.

Lawrence Wilkerson, Chief of Staff to US Secretary of state

To emerge as a regional power and subsequently a global power. Increase influence through trade and commerce for enhanced role in future. Linking nuclear & security concerns to China, gain acceptance as nuclear power, retain nuclear deterrent equating China & achieve regional status. Portray itself as bulwark against Chinese influence & Islamic militancy in region. Dominate Indian Ocean Region for power projection through a potent Blue Water Navy. In this context, 6 Documents have been published which includes; Strategic Defence Review: The Maritime Dimension in 1998. Indian Maritime Doctrine 2004. The Maritime Dimension: A Naval Vision 2006. Freedom to use the Seas: India's Maritime Military Strategy 2007. Indian Maritime Doctrine 2009. Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy 2015. The new strategy complements evolving security dynamics in Indian Ocean and reflecting a bold Indian navy with a renewed outlook on India's maritime security needs. The document formally acknowledges the accepted concept of the Indo-Pacific & its implications on India's maritime security.¹⁰

Initially India's primary area of interest encompassed the northern Indian Ocean Region,¹¹ however, it now expands by bringing South-West Indian Ocean and Red Sea within its primary area; and the western Coast of Africa, the Mediterranean Sea and other areas of national interest within its secondary area. India seeks a role as a net security provider' in the region. To realize this, Indian Navy has embarked on an ambitious development plan to transform into a Blue Water force by next 10-15 years, capable of influencing the outcome of land battles and performing constabulary role in Region. The revised strategy emphasises on maritime sector as well as navy, accordingly; Indian government plans to develop 10 coastal economic regions as part of plans to revive the country's Sagarmala (string of ports) project. India, with coastline of about 7,517 km has 13 major & about 187 minor ports. India with a merchant fleet strength of 844 ships is ranked 17th in the world. India has huge offshore oil and gas infrastructure. Mumbai High produces about 52% of the total Indian domestic crude oil production. India's vibrant ship building industry, with 27 major shipyards was ranked 7th in the world.

India followed Mahan's principle and capitalized on opportunities offered by Sea to boost economy with gradual transition to maritime strategy. It has established security pacts with Maldives and Seychelles and has set up communication and electronic intelligence outposts in Madagascar. Signed Defence Co-operation pact with Mozambique for joint patrolling and with Mauritius for surveillance of its EEZ. Reflective of Mahan's principle of strategic bases and out posts. Her recent alignment with US has led her to venture even beyond Indian Ocean into South China Sea. Indian Navy's emancipation of Collaborative Approach and Reach is exemplified by

joint patrols in Malacca Straits, counter-piracy operations in HOA.¹² Cardinals of Indian Maritime Doctrine are aimed at strategic deterrence, acquiring littoral warfare capacity, enhanced influence over Indian Ocean Region from Malacca to Persian Gulf & acquisition of land attack capability to influence events on land.

The first National Maritime Policy of Pakistan was promulgated in November 2002. However, it never got implemented & was relegated / side-lined. After 18th amendment, Maritime Policy was revised in 2010. The draft was tabled six years ago, however, still awaiting approval. The major thrust of maritime policy is on: Maritime trade and shipping, Ports and harbours, Ship building and repair industry, Ship recycling industry, Bio resource potential, Integrated coastal zone management and Maritime security. Pakistan has over 1000 Km long coastline spanning from Sir Creek to Jiwani. The Exclusive Economic Zone extends out to 200NM and with addition of Continental Shelf, additional 55,000 Sq Km of sea area has been included to EEZ. Pakistan's maritime sector is backbone of our national economy as more than 95% of our trade and 100% of our oil imports are transported through sea. We have two co-located ports of Karachi & Bin-Qasim which together handle our overall trade. The upcoming Gwadar Deep-Water Port in close proximity to Gulf is the most significant addition to our maritime landscape. As part of CPEC initiative, the maritime activity off Gwadar and at North Arabian Sea will increase exponentially. China's energy imports from the Gulf & Africa are to transit through Gwadar Port. The CPEC success would largely depend on Gwadar Port as viability and assured dividends are intrinsically linked with maritime domain. Any attack on ship carrying vital cargo such as LNG or POL could deter the commercial maritime activity. Therefore, while providing security to CPEC on land is important, making its maritime prong safe is considered vital. Accordingly, Pakistan Navy's responsibility to ensure secure & conducive maritime environment along the coast, Gwadar Port and for the maritime trade will increase manifold.

Merchant ships are one of the most important segments of maritime sector. At the time of independence, Pakistan's merchant marine fleet had four ships which increased to 71 in 1971. Presently, Pakistan has merchant fleet strength of merely 10 ships. Pakistani merchant ships can transport only 5% of the total maritime trade as against the 40% minimum requirement for national carriers. It is relevant to highlight that availability of shipping services to meet country's trade in war is essential as Foreign Flag Carriers do not risk operating in war zone. Pakistan has fish and seafood industry worth \$2.0 billion. Exports alone fetch about US\$ 300 million per annum. Similarly, the Indus basin constitutes the 2nd largest delta in world after Bay of Bengal. The delta covers nearly 600,000 hectares and is rich in fish, oil and gas, and is home to mangroves. The only ship-breaking yard of Pakistan at Gadani. Provides employment opportunities to about 15,000 workers. Pakistan, despite being one of the fore-runners in ship breaking industry, has not accorded requisite focus to this important revenue generating area. New EU regulations discouraging countries not employing the desired methods of dismantling, Pakistan would need to either conform or lose business.

Appraisal of Indian - Pakistan Naval Assets

While India continues to pile up military hardware, the growing naval imbalance translates into a fragile regional security environment and the consequent threat perception carry navy-wide implications. As per new Maritime Strategy,

Indian Navy by virtue of its capability, strategic positioning and robust presence in the Indian Ocean can be the catalyst for peace, tranquillity and stability in IOR.¹³ The Indian navy development plans include long list of acquisitions from Russia, US, UK, France and Israel. Indian Navy by the year 2020 would have 50 major warships including 3 Aircraft Carriers and 22 conventional & 5 nuclear submarines.

Analysis of Indo-Pak Maritime Strategies

The force differential between two navies is continuously increasing. The growing imbalance between two navies may bring serious ramification for Pakistan as hegemonic Indian designs and unquenchable ambitions to dominate the Indian Ocean have the potential to escalate into confrontation at sea anytime. Indian approach to maritime strategy is based on its designs of becoming a regional hegemon. Indian Navy has stepped up the diplomatic manoeuvre for influencing the region, by making alliances with regional countries & Island nations of the Indian Ocean region. Sea based Nuclear Deterrence is the only assured second strike option. Thus Indian acquisition of sea based deterrent has completed her nuclear triad, through nuclear submarines. Pakistan on the other hand, constrained by its finances and thinking, has visibly struggled in maritime domain. Activities off Gwadar port bring challenges as well as opportunities for both Pakistan & Pakistan Navy. China's rising maritime power and growing reach in Indian Ocean offers opportunities for strategic maritime cooperation between China & Pakistan. However, our naval strategy can make significant contribution to land campaign by acquiring littoral warfare capabilities.

Recommendations

In view of the Indian efforts to expand its influence in the region, particularly in the Gulf and along the Arabian Peninsula, it is considered imperative to capitalise on our long standing relations and ongoing naval engagements with GCC countries to devise a collaborative maritime security arrangement for policing, anti-piracy, anti-smuggling etc. in the Arabian Sea and Gulf region. A similar arrangement with Iran can also be sought to secure the Makran coast. With a growing requirement for Pakistan to project its maritime influence beyond its usual area of influence at sea, Pakistan Navy should enhance its core capabilities and modernize existing conventional capabilities in ASW, long range anti ship and land attack missiles defences. Pakistan needs to acquire second strike capability in an early timeframe to ensure strategic balance in the region.

Conclusion

Maritime strategy has evolved over millennia under the influence of evolving technology and prevailing environment at that time. Evolving Naval Operational thought has influenced different navies in different manner, mainly influenced by their environment, economic independence, access to technology and most of all the national maritime character. In line with the emerging trends of enhanced role of regional countries in multilateral coalitions, Pakistan Navy has an important role to play, in regional maritime security. Moreover, as Gwadar becomes a hub of maritime activity, maritime security of this region will assume higher priority and place greater demand on our Navy. In the overall Military strategy context, a dominant continental approach dictated by our geographical reality has generally remained a limiting

factor for naval development. However, Navy has the potential to complement the Land strategy through application in maritime domain. Thus, instead of a purely continental approach, development of a balanced naval power can prove to be a strategic advantage.

Endnotes

- ¹ Reynolds, Clark G, *Command of the sea; the history and strategy of maritime empires*, Morrow 1974, p 42
- ² Ibid, p 51
- ³ Ibid, p 62, 65
- ⁴ Ibid, p 85
- ⁵ Ibid, p 175
- ⁶ Ibid, p 170
- ⁷ Ibid, p 159
- ⁸ Ibid, p 179
- ⁹ Ibid, p 273
- ¹⁰ The Diplomat Magazine, *India's Evolving Maritime Strategy*: www.thediplomat.com/2015/12/indias-evolving-maritime-strategy/
- ¹¹ Centre for International Maritime Security: <http://cimsec.org/>
- ¹² Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy), 2009, *"Indian Maritime Doctrine"*, (New Delhi), 2009.
- ¹³ Indian Maritime Security Strategy 2015.

PART-IV

Views

- **Are there lessons from the United Kingdom's Northern Ireland Conflict and peace process that could be applied to Pakistan's efforts to deal with Nationalism, Separatism and Militancy in Baluchistan today?**

ARE THERE LESSONS FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM'S NORTHERN IRELAND CONFLICT AND PEACE PROCESS THAT COULD BE APPLIED TO PAKISTAN'S EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH NATIONALISM, SEPARATISM AND MILITANCY IN BALOCHISTAN TODAY?

Colonel Rob Forster, UK Royal Marines

Abstract

This essay will argue that some of the British experience of the Northern Ireland conflict and Peace Process could be useful when looking at domestic insurgency and terrorism in Balochistan. The hypothesis will be to argue that, in certain cases of domestic terrorism/insurgency/militancy, it may be counter-productive to push the military/security force campaigns too far, with the aim of defeating the belligerent. Rather, it is more productive in the long run to 'force a stalemate' with the terrorist before they are comprehensively defeated. Thus creating the effect whereby Political wings/leadership of militant organizations can enter negotiations without feeling defeated or humiliation. With an accompanying comprehensive peace process, power-sharing, reforms and even positive discrimination for certain social groups, a lasting peace can be found.

Introduction and Background

After a challenging 30 years, Pakistan is starting to show positive signs for the future. Although levels of terrorist violence remain high, concerted efforts by Pakistan's Security Forces have made great strides to improve security. Meanwhile, the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and other mega projects have the potential to be the catalyst for an economic renaissance for the growing, young and ambitious population. However, much is dependent on the security improvements continuing and setbacks will have detrimental impact on these ambitions. Balochistan is central to these economic aspirations but remains susceptible to violence and unrest. Radical Islamic violence aside, the dominant characteristic of the domestic Baloch militancy/insurgency that hinders the Province is that it is perennial in nature, with at least four/five insurgencies¹ to date. This does not bode well for the future and concomitant national economic ambitions, unless a permanent peace is found. The need to develop CPEC and to unlock the mineral wealth of the Province must have a stable and secure environment to be a success. Operation Zarb-e-Azb, and the National Action Plan have seen significant progress, especially against Jihadist terrorism. But these efforts have not adequately addressed the current 5th domestic Baloch insurgency, which threatens the long-term security. One way to help create an enduring peace-process in Balochistan is to look at other domestic terrorist/militant/insurgent conflicts and associated peace-processes.

Today, perhaps the most, successful and enduring domestic peace process is that of Northern Ireland. In this small Province of the United Kingdom, a vicious domestic insurgency and sophisticated terrorist campaign waged throughout the 1970, 1980s and early 1990s. With its roots in the long history of British involvement on the island of Ireland, the Catholic based Nationalist movement sought to drive the British out of Northern Ireland and re-unite the Province under the Republic of

Ireland. Also perennial in nature, the conflict broke into vicious and protracted violence in 1969, spawning highly capable terrorist groups backed by bitter sectarian and mob violence. It claimed over 3700 lives in 30 years and tied up a huge amount of resources of the British Army/Security Forces fighting primarily the Provisional Irish Republican Army and other terrorist groups on both sides of the sectarian divide. The Security Forces finally suppressed the terrorism, creating the space for a peace process and solved this historic, seemingly intractable dispute. The Peace Process that emerged in 1998 aimed for a lasting peace and saw the belligerents on both sides brought into the process and given power and responsibility. Despite setbacks, verbal disputes and crises, violence has not returned significantly and the process has endured. And with this have come revival, institutional reform and critically a generation of young people who have grown up without violence. Wealth, economic growth, employment and education all prosper in Northern Ireland today.

Parallels

Some would argue that there are few lessons from Northern Ireland that could meaningfully be used in other domestic sectarian/separatist/terrorist conflicts in the World today. The conflict was just too small, too localized and too Western European to be meaningfully applied elsewhere. Furthermore, post 9/11, terrorism and insurgency are different, more widespread, brutal and apocalyptic in character. But much depends on what and where the conflict is, and the nature of the relationship with the state; how domestic, how internal, how solvable is it? On the surface, there is a gulf of difference in terms of geography, culture, religion, social cohesion and economic development and between Northern Ireland and Balochistan. Northern Ireland is tiny compared to vastness of Balochistan and contains few of the tribal dynamics of the Baloch and the other ethnicities. There are also huge differences between wealth per capita, education, social welfare, health care and governance. But if one looks beyond these dissimilarities and at the root causes of the Northern Ireland conflict and compares them to the domestic Baloch insurgencies, there are arguably more similarities that might be first thought.

Both disputes are essentially separatist focused. Though the protagonists also have a more pragmatic fall-back position of a desire for greater autonomy. Both conflicts are domestic in the nature, which is key to the way in which the State should temper and focus efforts in order to find alasting resolution. Just as for the Northern Ireland Catholic/Nationalist, the Baloch believe they are marginalized in their own Province; overwhelmed, discriminated in their own land; down-trodden by Punjabis and Pathans. Similarly, the Northern Ireland Catholics/Nationalists, like the Baloch, have often been the poorest segments of the society, discriminated in education, social welfare, health provision and ruled by a distant Government. As was the case of Northern Ireland the Catholics/Nationalist, the Baloch believe they are kept in check by an overly aggressive Security Forces, (especially the Police and Frontier Force), which are unrepresentative of the Baloch people. Similarly the make-up of the Provincial Government, with Baloch under-representation is often seen as an issue. Northern Ireland had the challenge of how to successfully bring the Nationalist/Catholics fully into the political process and Provincial affairs. Finally, just as the British found in Northern Ireland, Pakistan's governments when dealing with Baloch Insurgencies over the decades, have found that suppressing uprisings and violence has always been possible, but it does not stop it re-emerging.

Themes and Lessons from the Northern Ireland Conflict Which Might Help Guide Pakistan in Its Work in Balochistan

Most of the Northern Ireland lessons revolve around three common themes, to deal with *domestic* militancy/insurgency/terrorism.

Restraint and Legitimacy: Northern Ireland showed that Restraint and Legitimacy must be the guiding principles for all the Security Forces involved with tackling domestic terrorism/militancy. This includes the Police, Law enforcement Agencies, the Army if deployed and especially Intelligence Services. Without Restraint and Legitimacy the fight is lost from the outset. Not Defeating the Militant/Insurgent outright may have its merits: In domestic terrorism/militancy, arguably the aim of the State and Security Forces should not necessarily be to defeat the terrorist/militant but neutralist him and force a stalemate. Getting the conflict to a position where militants' actions become irrelevant can make for more productive dialogue and negotiations. Positive Discrimination and the Power of Generations: Though sometimes controversial, positive discrimination in social, political, economic and security can help address root causes of a conflict. If violence can be reduced significantly the effect of positive discrimination and a newly enfranchised generation who do not know violence, becomes powerful indeed.

These themes run through many of the experiences of the British in Northern Ireland, and under-pin some key lessons:

Lesson One: Military Intervention Must Not Make Things Worse

Northern Ireland showed that a military force, if called upon to intervene in a domestic terrorism/insurgency situation, must not make things worse. Whilst this seems self-evident, it is often ignored. The British Army learned that over reacting especially in the early stages can create bitterness, hatred and extreme views that can last for decades.² By not understanding the situation when they arrived in 1969 meant that: the IRA was allowed to develop into an effective insurgent organization over the next two years.³ The British also learnt that the role of the military once deployed should be to stabilize a situation rather defeating the terrorist and play a balancing role, even with the police. Arguably, several incidents in Balochistan point to where the Military and Para-Military (Frontier Corps) forces once deployed have made things worse⁴ and an initial intervention to defeat the terrorist has been counter-productive thus prolonging the situation. In this respect it appears similar to the mistakes made early days in the Northern Ireland Campaign.

Lesson Two: When the State deviates from Restraint

Britain also learnt that misguided policies and individual actions can set a tone that lasts for a whole campaign and beyond and that ill-gotten tactical actions could have a strategic impact. The prime examples being: Bloody Sunday and Internment without trial; one a tactical event on the ground, the other a clumsy, attempt to take the terrorist/militant off the streets. Both backfired in a spectacular fashion and became rallying cries for the nationalist terrorist and reciprocal propagation of Loyalist militant groups. A similar criticism could today be levelled at the Baloch authorities and military. For example, by not effectively addressing the rape of the female doctor in the Sui, the State deviated from the tenet of legitimacy

and fuelled the current insurgency. And, allegations of when rule of law has not been fully observed such as the accusations of 'kill and dump' in many media reports damage legitimacy significantly, irrespective of whether they are true or not. Britain is still dealing with the consequences of Bloody Sunday incident and cost estimates for the inquiries into the events of 1972 range from £200 to £400 million pounds. But this is deemed necessary in order to address the injustice of the time, as without which grievances endure.

Lesson Three: Police must have Primacy, but if necessary must also Reform

During the 1970s, the British soon realised that restoring normality as much as possible was also key to success. A key step was the restoration of Police Primacy in 1977, even when the situation on the ground remained serious and deadly. From that point onward the Police would lead the fight irrespective of the levels of violence/terrorism and the Army would support. Police Primacy was a crucial step in the psyche of the conflict to move it into the realm of criminality; from abnormality into normality, strained though it was at the time. Although the dynamics of law enforcement differ greatly in Balochistan, there is much evidence that the Police and Frontier Corps are not yet representative of the populous over whom they enforce law and order. While the local levies are familiar within the community areas, the Police are predominantly non-Baloch sometimes seen as heavy handed and unfair.⁵ Whether such accusations are true, it matters not, as the damage is done.

Lesson Four: Playing the terrorist at his own Long War game, and Forcing a Stalemate

Playing the Long War game and Forcing a stalemate: Perhaps the most important lessons from Northern Ireland concerning the role of the British Army came about by evolution rather than operational design. It centres on the widely held view (though debatable), that British Army did not defeat the terrorist but rather neutralized him over a protracted period, continuously reducing violence, via restraint and legitimacy, to tolerable, non-destabilizing levels; psychologically making the terrorist understand that he would never achieve his objectives. This created two supporting effects: (a) Firstly, it created an environment whereby the terrorist/militant started to become irrelevant to the population from which they drew their support. (b) Secondly, it created space for negotiations to take place. And when these happened, the political wings came to the table not as defeated parties, but with an understanding that their aims could not be achieved through violence.

This approach of forcing a stalemate, could be contrasted to the employment of the military in Balochistan where the aim is more one of defeat the terrorist/militant rather than wearing him down. (Though a distinction between the Baloch militant should be made when dealing with irreconcilable, radicalized, jihadi terrorist group.)

Lesson Five. Negotiating: the way forward in Domestic Insurgency Crisis

Those involved in the Northern Ireland Peace Process, stressed the need to talk to terrorists⁶ and that only through a negotiated settlement can a lasting peace be made. And crucially, if the political wings do not enter the negotiations as

defeated parties, then, as in Northern Ireland, negotiations will bear greater fruit. This, coupled with 3rd party foreign help such as key negotiators like US Senator George Mitchell, Diplomat Richard Haass and Presidents Clinton and Bush, brought expertise to this very domestic terrorist conflict. For Balochistan in different ways, eminent foreign help to broker more lasting peace say from China, the US or even UN, would not only help work towards a better peace but also aid in exposing foreign elements using proxies within the Baloch Insurgency movements as a way to damage Pakistan.

Lesson Six. Power Sharing, Positive Discrimination, Social, and Economic Development

Positive Discrimination was also seen as a powerful tool to combat some of the root causes in a domestic insurgency/militancy situation in Northern Ireland. It was used in areas such as in Provincial/local government, jobs and crucially Police reforms. The prime example was in Police where quotas were set to significantly increase the Catholics in the new Police force, making it more reflective of the population. As Balochistan is facing large economic growth and an influx of workers from other Provinces and the way in which Policing and Law Enforcement is conducted, the feeling of alienation and discrimination of the ethnic Baloch might be offset by a policy of Positive Discrimination to help stop the current feeling of the Baloch being economically and security marginalized.

Lesson Seven: The power of Generations

Finally there is the Power of the Generations; young people who grow and see no evil nor hear no evil. With over 21 years since the violence ceased, a 'Generational' factor that has come into play with the 16 – 22 year old that has never experienced violence. If Balochistan could get to this state, where violence ceases for sufficient time that the new generation of youth in the Province has never experienced its corrosive effect, then the future really could be bright.

Way Forward

Balochistan's approach to dealing with the insurgency, militancy and terrorism, so prevalent since 2005, has been difficult and complex. The Provincial and National Governments have had to confront the challenge of the two distinct types of conflict simultaneously; the re-emergence of a 5th Baloch domestic insurgency/militancy and the ruthless Jihadist terrorism with its national, regional and international dimensions. Pakistani responses have had to address the violence and the root causes, namely: radicalisation and nationalism; both quite different. It has been a case of a robust (sometimes arguably too robust) approach by the security forces contrasted with well-intentioned, intelligent approach by the State and Province, which all too often then becomes diluted and withers, before being really effective. But can it benefit from looking at Northern Ireland? Leaving aside the fight against the jihadi terrorism, there are some things that might help and change the status quo whereby the Baloch Insurgency/militancy remains perennial. Key drivers are: (a) Balochistan as an independent State will not happen; Forty years ago Baloch Independence might have been a slim possibility, today it a non-starter. Baloch Liberation movements must realise this once and with moderate Baloch should work for more autonomy within the system. (b) Baloch's mineral wealth will be exploited;

Domestic and international demand from the World will mean that these minerals will be extracted. It is how the wealth is distributed that is the critical factor. (c) Gwadar and CPEC will happen; The mega projects must work. It will be how the wealth is shared and the participation of ethnic Baloch in such projects that is crucial. (d) The Baloch people as a percentage of the Province will decline significantly; the development of Balochistan will result in a demographic shift in the population with outsiders coming in. This must be managed carefully by both the Provincial leadership and by the Sardars. (e) The Sardars' rule cannot continue in its current form; The transformation of the Province will alter the tribal dynamics. If wealth and social change is made for the good of the Baloch people, the Sardars will need to adapt their leadership for the new Balochistan.

So what could be the way forward, drawing from the lessons from Northern Ireland? The following is offered: (a) while the tenets of the National Action Plan should continue to be applied to address jihadist terrorism, the current separation of the Baloch militant from the jihadist terrorist is a sensible, pragmatic step and should continue. Northern Ireland's policy to treat the terrorist as a criminal and not as a political fighter was at the heart of the fight. The aim should then be not to defeat the Baloch Militant/Insurgent, but to bring him to justice, allowing the political wings/leadership into the Political and Economic domains, so long as there is a realisation that progress must be without a need to resort to violence. (b) The Security Forces including Local Law Enforcement Agencies must be scrupulous in their actions and follow the principles of legitimacy and restraint when dealing with Baloch Militancy. Northern Ireland showed how vital this was in the fight against domestic terrorism. Legitimacy and restraint must be applied to all areas of the security, Law and due process. While this is understood in Balochistan, it has to be done and seen to be done at every level. A single malign action could have disproportional effect. (c) On the same note, the very notion, actual or perceived of a kill and dump actions or heavy handed tactics of the State in Balochistan must be eliminated. Irrespective of whether there is truth in these allegations, the very perception that elements of the State might be involved in extra-judicial killing is a barrier to lasting peace. Such allegations must be openly investigated and findings reported on with transparency no matter how long the process is. Without this, animosity and grievance will remain raw and will always be a weakness to gaining a lasting process. (d) There might also be merit in re-introducing the conventional Pakistan Military into the Province on a wide scale deployment for a limited period to really hold and build the peace. This might sound counter-intuitive, but the professionalism of the Pak Army could be a stabilizing force as recent peace measures are cemented. While police reforms are undertaken, the A Districts further developed and the Frontier Corps are engaged in the fight against militancy, a measured deployment of the Army at this time could greatly help in the stabilization of the Province; even more pertinent with the introduction of the new 17,000+ CPEC force. However if this is done, it is vital that the mind-set of the soldier is as that of a law enforcer and the Army should be subordinate supporting the Police/Frontier Corps. (e) Unpinning the security dynamic, should be a move to having one lead on Policing in Balochistan, which is accepted by the people. Ensuring there is a form of Police Primacy to which all other Security Forces works would be an important step forward; whether this is Frontier Corps or local Police. This will ensure that a form of normality prevails, which was a vital step in Northern Ireland to re-establish legitimacy. (f) If the Pakistan Army did increase operations in Balochistan once again playing a stabilizing role, the idea of forcing the stalemate of the Insurgent/Militant

could occur. With the recent renewed efforts to bring the Baloch Insurgent leaders into the mainstream, a more stable and restrained levels of security could see the Security Forces can play the militant at his own 'long game', lowering the levels of violence to 'acceptable' levels. As happened in Northern Ireland, this could make the Baloch Insurgent/Militant irrelevant in the eyes of his support and power base. (g) Consideration should also be given to introducing some selected Positive Discrimination into areas of the economy, politics and security domains of Balochistan, including a form Power Sharing as a good way to addressing the issue of marginalization in the eyes of the Baloch; even mitigating the calls for greater autonomy. Positive discrimination in jobs, the Police, Frontier Corps, local community bodies in favour of the Baloch, could be used to better represent the Baloch population. This is especially urgent as the demand for workers on the Gwadar/CPEC projects is set to increase. In Northern Ireland positive discrimination and in particular powers-sharing reduced the calls for a united Ireland and has been important for the economic development. (i) Power-sharing and Positive Discrimination can also be helped by Balochistan fully embracing the 18th Amendment, giving more power to the Provinces. Though often drawing criticism from many areas in that the 18th Amendment gives too much power to the Provinces, in Balochistan it could be an excellent vehicle to help give more autonomy to the Baloch and in turn, also help give a greater sense of ownership to the Baloch people. (j) The tribal powers of the Sardars should also be looked at with a view to diplomatically reducing their power in this new Balochistan. The 1976 Abolition Act, should be re-looked and if possible re-introduced, so that the influence of Sardars over their people gradually reduced by creating socio-economic awareness amongst the population. A reduction in Sardar power with concomitant up lifting of the socio-economic benefits Balochistan could huge positive effects.

If violence associated with the Baloch Insurgency can be brought under control and last, then the power of the Generation can come into effect, as it did in Northern Ireland. If polices that address the animosity and grievances of the most recent insurgency can be forged, if the security forces can play a balanced and restrained role in security, and if the predicted wealth of the future mega projects can be spread within the Province, then peace could last. Once there is a considerable cessation in violence, it will have an effect on a generation of young Baloch and non-Baloch in the Province. Like Northern Ireland that would be a powerful way to ensure a lasting peace with all the benefits of wealth, education and employment can bring.

Conclusion

For Balochistan, this is a pivotal time. With a number of mega projects underway, most notably CPEC and Gwadar, the Province is set to become the most important region to drive Pakistan's future growth. But at the same time Balochistan is plagued with another domestic insurgency, serious jihadi terrorism and an ethnic Baloch population wishing to have greater autonomy, even separation, whilst still being in the clutches of the Sardar system that is arguably in need of reform. Without down-playing the serious fight against jihadi terrorism, arguably, the most important issue for Balochistan is to stop the domestic insurgency re-occurring. The perennial nature of this problem blights the prospects for the Province irrespective of what progress is made on the other forms of terrorism. With much recent progress, the domestic insurgency needs to be reduced and prevented from reoccurring. And while

there has been significant progress some key mistakes have been made that might still result in another 6th Insurgency reappearing in the not too distant future. Northern Ireland stands out as a most successful and enduring Peace Process and might help. The Northern Ireland success has shown that with peace and reconciliation come hope, prosperity and a new generation that grows up without experiencing violence. There are still setbacks in the political process, but keeping violence at bay, has given space for economic prosperity to occur and social equality to build.

Central to the way in which the conflict and Peace Process in Northern Ireland came to a successful conclusion were several key lessons. Firstly are the central tenets of Restraint and Legitimacy as necessary requirements for all elements of the Security Forces engaged in fighting the militancy/insurgency? This includes the need to treat the domestic terrorist as a criminal. Then there is the role of the Security Forces, who may be best used in forcing a stalemate with the militant, making the acts of terrorism irrelevant. This creates conditions to bring political wings or leadership into meaningful negotiations not as defeated parties but as potential partners in a political process. Then through negotiations which do not stop until all grievances and issues have been resolved, a lasting peace could be achieved. Balochistan, as was the case in Northern Ireland now need to get security right, with Restraint, Legitimacy and the right rule of law, led by a Police forces taking primacy in the fight against domestic militancy would be a good pragmatic step and complement the good measures already being brought in. Coupled with this might be the idea that a re-introduction of the Pakistan Army to act as a stabilizing force to better support the Police and Frontier Corps. This could bring the level of violence down, making the Baloch militant irrelevant and making the space for the already started negotiations to flourish and grow. Furthermore, there should be consideration as to whether reform and positive discrimination ought to be introduced in areas of Baloch society. Chief among which would be positive discrimination in the Police, provincial administration and the workforce of the mega projects to ensure the ethnic Baloch are fully represented, have a share in the future wealth and reduce the perception of marginalization in what they see as their land. This could be also extending to some form of Power sharing within the Balochistan Provincial Government. Done correctly it could see a lasting peace in terms of Baloch, where, CPEC, Gwadar and the mineral wealth are be the prize, not the bargaining tool. With that, the generation effect might come in and make a bright future for Balochistan and Pakistan alike.

Endnotes

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- ¹ Note: There is some debate as to whether the current Baloch Insurgency is the 5th Insurgency to date or whether it is a resurgence of the 4th Insurgency which commenced in the 1970s. For the purpose of this essay, it will be viewed as the 5th Insurgency.
 - ² (MOD July 2006)
 - ³ (MOD July 2006)
 - ⁴ (Gare 2013). pp 1.
 - ⁵ (International Crisis Group 2007) pp 12.
 - ⁶ (Powell 2014)