CHALLENGES FORUM REPORT 2009

A New Horizon for Peace Operations Partnerships – What are the Next Steps?
International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations

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List of Contents

Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................... 9
Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 13

CHAPTER I

Challenges Forum Studies

Command and Control Arrangements in UN Peacekeeping Operations
Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Patron, Challenges Forum / Former Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations and Mr. Jake Sherman, Centre on International Coordination, New York University, United States ............... 17

Broadening the Base of UN Peacekeeping: Proposals for How the UN Can Attract and Support New, Expanding and Returning Troop- and Police Contributing Countries
Ms. Fatemeh Ziai, Research Adviser, Challenges Forum / Former Chief of Integrated Training Service, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations .................. 29

A Review of Peacekeeping Initiatives in 2009: Strengthening Consultation among the Security Council, Secretariat and Troop- and Police Contributing Countries
Ms. Fatemeh Ziai, Research Adviser, Challenges Forum / Former Chief of Integrated Training Service, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations .................. 53

Implications of Peacebuilding and Statebuilding in United Nations Mandates
Mr. Jake Sherman, Centre on International Coordination, New York University, United States and Mr. Benjamin Tortolani, Series Coordinator, Annual Review of Global Peace Operations, Centre on International Cooperation, New York University, United States .................................................. 81
Providers, Platforms or Partners? Possible Roles for Peace Operations in Fighting Organized Crime
Mr. James Cockayne, Senior Associate, International Peace Institute ................. 89

CHAPTER 2
Opening Address and Welcome
H.E. Mr. Anders Lidén, Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations 97
H.E. Mr. Amjad Hussain B. Sial, Acting Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations ................................................................. 99
Mr. Henrik Landerholm, Director General, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden ...... 99
Ms. Annika Hilding-Norberg, International Coordinator, Challenges Forum, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden ......................................................... 101

Challenges of Peace Operations 2009 – Trends, Facts and Figures
Mr. Benjamin Tortolani, Series Coordinator, Annual Review of Global Peace Operations, Centre on International Cooperation, New York University, United States ................................................................. 103

CHAPTER 3
A New Horizon for Peace Operations Partnerships – What are the Next Steps?
H.E. Mr. Henri-Paul Normandin, Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations / Chair of the Working Group on the United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (Facilitator) .................................................. 109
Mr. Alain Le Roy, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations ........................................................................................................ 110
Ms. Susana Malcorra, Under-Secretary-General for Field Support, United Nations ... 115
Discussion ........................................................................................................ 119

CHAPTER 4
Multidimensional Peace Operations – Early Peacebuilding and the Need for New Strategies and Partners
Focus: What are some of the most critical challenges for modern multidimensional peace operations? How can we meet the requirements? How do we prioritize and sequence our efforts?
Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Satish Nambiar, Senior Adviser, Challenges Forum / Former Head of Mission and Force Commander UNPROFOR, India (Facilitator) ......................... 129
Chapter 5

Mandate-Making and Mandate-Implementation

Focus: How can mandate-making and mandate-implementation evolve to meet the challenges of multidimensional peace operations? How do we address the peacekeeping – peacebuilding interface?

Mr. Edmond Mulet, Assistant Secretary-General for Operations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations (Facilitator) ................................................................. 151

Mr. Jake Sherman, Associate Director, Centre on International Cooperation, New York University, United States ..................................................................................... 152

H.E. Mr. Maged A. Abdelaziz, Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations ................................................................................................................................. 157

H.E. Ms. Sylvie-Agnès Bermann, Director, United Nations and International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, France ........................................ 159

Amb. Jacques Paul Klein, Former SRSG UNTAES / Former SRSG UNMIL ............ 161

Lt.Gen. (Retd.) V.K. Jetly, Former Force Commander UNAMSIL / United Service Institution of India ........................................................................................................ 164

Mr. Ihab Moustafa, Senior Officer, Peacebuilding Support Office, United Nations ... 166

Discussion ........................................................................................................ 169

Concluding Remarks of Day 1

Maj.Gen. (Retd.) Robert Gordon, Senior Adviser, Challenges Forum / Former Force Commander UNMEE .................................................................................................................. 183
Chapter 6
Enhancing and Facilitating the Partnership with Troop and Police Contributing Countries

Focus: How can member states’ military and police perspectives be better integrated into the mandate-making and planning process? How can the sense of partnership in and ownership of UN peacekeeping be enhanced?

Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, Director, Policy, Evaluation and Training, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations (Facilitator) ............................................................... 187

Ms. Fatemeh Ziai, Research Adviser, Challenges Forum / Former Chief of Integrated Training Service, Departement of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations ................. 188

H.E. Mr. Yukio Takasu, Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations .......................................................... 195

Brig.Gen. Muhammed Feyyaz, National Defence University, Pakistan .......................................................... 199

H.E. Mr. Philip John Parham, Deputy Permanent Representative of United Kingdom to the United Nations .......................................................... 202

Discussion ................................................................................................................................................. 204

Chapter 7
United Nations Effective Mission Command and Control

Focus: How can robust command and control arrangements contribute to the success of multidimensional peace operations?

Maj.Gen. (Retd.) Patrick Cammaert, Former Division Commander, MONUC / Former Military Adviser, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations / Former Force Commander, UNMEE (Facilitator) ................................................................. 213

Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Patron, Challenges Forum / Former Under-Secretary-General of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations .......................................................... 214

Maj.Gen. (Retd.) Anis Bajwa, Former Director of Change Management, Policy, Evaluation and Training, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations / Pakistan ........................................................................................................... 219

Gen. (Retd.) Martin Agwai, Former Force Commander, UNAMID / Former Chief of Defence, Nigeria / Former Deputy Military Adviser, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations .......................................................... 221

Brig.Gen. Jean Baillaud, Chief of Staff, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations .................................................................................. 224

Mr. Henrik Stiernblad, Former Police Commissioner, UNMIL / Special Adviser, Ministry of Justice, Sweden ......................................................................................................................... 225

Discussion ................................................................................................................................................. 228
Chapter 8

United Nations and Regional Arrangements Effective Mission Command and Control – Issues of Relevance for Cooperation with Partners in Action

Focus: How can command and control arrangements contribute to the success of multidimensional peace operations? How can enhanced interoperability strengthen their effectiveness?

Mr. David Harland, Director, Europe and Latin America Division, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations (Facilitator) .............................................. 243

Lt.Gen. Chikadibia Isaac Obiakor, Military Adviser, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations ....................................................................................... 244

Mr. Seyyuile Bam, Head, Peace Support Division, African Union ......................... 250

Lt.Gen. USAF (Retd.) James Soligan, Deputy Chief of Staff, Transformation for Allied Command Transformation, North Atlantic Treaty Organization .................... 251

Mr. Stefano Tomat, First Secretary, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union to the United Nations, European Union ........................................... 254

Discussion ...................................................................................................  256

Chapter 9

Concluding Session of the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations 2009

Invitation – International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations 2010

H.E. Mr. Gary Quinlan, Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations ...................................................................................................................... 267

Concluding Remarks

Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Patron, Challenges Forum / Former Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations / France ............................................. 269

Maj.Gen. (Retd.) Anis Bajwa, Former Director of Change Management, Policy, Evaluation and Training, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations / Pakistan ............................................................................................................... 274

Closing Remarks and Looking Ahead

Ms. Annika Hilding-Norberg, International Coordinator, Challenges Forum / Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden ........................................................................... 275
Acknowledgements

A New Horizon for Peace Operations Partnerships – What are the Next Steps?
The multinational Partnership of the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations gathered in November 2009 for their Annual Forum to address this fundamental, yet promising question.

As substantive challenges faced several United Nations missions around the world, leading diplomats, practitioners and academics met in New York to provide further impetus to the development of better ways for countries and organizations cooperating in the area of peacekeeping and peace operations, to tackle these challenges. Relevant representatives of the African Union, European Union, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization also shared their concerns and possible solutions at the Forum which focused on promoting more solid and effective partnerships for future peace operations.

As Mr. Alain Le Roy, United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, said at the opening of the Challenges Forum 2009: “...a substantive dialogue has begun about the future of UN peacekeeping and how we can make it a better and more relevant instrument for the 21st century.... At the root of this discussion is the recognition that we need a renewed peacekeeping partnership to build a vision and a practical agenda to meet the challenges of modern peacekeeping. This Forum could therefore not come at a more appropriate time."

The aim of the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations is to enhance the effectiveness of multidimensional peace operations, and to widen and strengthen the international network of actors involved in the peace operations endeavour.

On behalf of the Challenges Partnership, we would like to thank our Pakistani Challenges Partners, the National Defence University in cooperation with the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence for their contributions to the overall Challenges effort, which have included cooperation on contributing to the development of the United Nations Principles and Guidelines Document as well as to the Challenges Study called “Considerations for Mission Leadership in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations”. Most relevant to this Report, the Partnership deeply appreciated Pakistan’s offer to Co-Host the Challenges Forum 2009 with Sweden.

Thanks are also owed to the Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations who were key contributors as a Co-Host of the Challenges Forum 2009. H.E. Amb. Anders Lidén, H.E. Amb. Per Örnéus, Mr. Staffan Hemrå, Mr. Anders B. Svensson, Ms. Birgitta Ekelund and Ms. Anna Pettersson, provided important support to the undertaking, as did our Swedish Challenges Partners at the Armed Forces, National Police, National Prison and Probation Service, the National Defence College and supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We would also like to express our thanks to our contributors at the Folke Bernadotte Academy. They included, but were not limited to, Mr. Jonas Alberoth, Maj.Gen. (Retd.) Robert Gordon, Ms. Fatemeh Ziai, Brig.Gen. (Retd.) Muhammed Asim Malik, Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Satish Nambiar, Mr. Andreas Sugar, Ms. Anna-Linn Persson, Ms. Anna Wiktorsson, Dr. Louise Ohlsson and Dr. Jibecke Jönsson.

This report presents the findings of the Challenges studies and records the deliberations held at the Challenges Forum 2009. The report contains substantive presentations on key challenges of relevance to the current United Nations reform agenda as well as detailed recommendations on possible ways forward, which the international community may wish to pursue in order to enhance multidimensional peace operations and their effectiveness.

Finally, we would like to pay tribute to the Challenges Partnership of leading organizations coming from the civilian, military and police world of peacekeeping, spanning all continents and determined to make a difference for the benefit of people caught up in violent conflict. As stated by the Challenges Forum Patron, Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, former Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations: “Challenges is about creating a partnership between countries that may be very different in their outlook, but who are all committed to peacekeeping, and who are prepared to discuss it not superficially, but to go to the heart of real
issues.” The Partnership is indeed the core of the Challenges effort, without which, none of what is contained in this Report, would have been possible. Thank you.

Mr. Henrik Landerholm
Director General
Folke Bernadotte Academy

Ms. Annika Hilding Norberg
International Coordinator
Challenges Forum
Over the years, the Challenges Forum has made considerable progress. Starting with three member organizations and countries, the erstwhile Challenges Project transformed to become the ‘International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations’ comprising Partners from 17 countries from all regions of the world. The Partnership includes leading academic, research, diplomatic and policy institutes and colleges, as well as foreign, defence and justice ministries. In several countries, there is a combination of organizations and ministries involved.

The Forum’s continued pursuits map a wide spectrum of multifaceted engagements aimed at contributing to the global dialogue on various aspects of United Nations (UN) and regional peace initiatives ranging from preparation, implementation and evaluation of peace operations to discussions on challenges confronting planners and practitioners alike. In other words, the Forum provides a venue for enhancing bilateral and multilateral exchange of experiences and practical cooperation through regular input and advice on possible policy options and practical recommendations for consideration by various stakeholders involved in the broader UN peacekeeping enterprise. Major regional organizations have also been involved throughout the effort.

Traditionally, Pakistan prides itself on not only providing a lion’s share to the UN Peace Support initiatives, but also earning recognition for its endeavours in a myriad of diverse conflict regions ranging from Indonesia and Kosovo to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Haiti, to name a few. Therefore, as part of a rotating responsibility mechanism, the Challenges Partnership invited Pakistan, the largest Troop Contributing Country, to host the 2009 Forum in Islamabad. Unfortunately, the Forum, planned for July 2009, could not be held due to administrative reasons. However, in a modified arrangement, it was decided to jointly co-host the Forum with Sweden; which too enjoys highly respected credentials in the UN community for its traditional and financial, material and intellectual support to global peace support initiatives. Thus, the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations 2009 was co-hosted in New York by the Permanent Missions of Pakistan and Sweden to the United Nations on 12–13 November 2009, a joint undertaking that turned out both novel and particularly fruitful.

The theme of the Challenges Forum 2009 was *A New Horizon for Peace Operations Partnerships – What are the Next Steps?* The event provided a platform for discussing some of the key recommendations of the United Nations New Horizon
initiative. The goal was to contribute to a better understanding of the challenges facing the international community of peacekeepers, to identify realistic solutions and to promote their effective implementation.

Several background studies by experts and scholars were presented on a wide range of topics including. The Forum also included a presentation on the Challenges Partners common study project titled. The main event was preceded by a Challenges Partners’ Meeting and Workshop 9–11 November held at the Permanent Mission of Pakistan.

During the main event, a total of six thematic sessions engaged prominent scholars, academicians, diplomats and practitioners. The United Nations Under-Secretar-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr. Alain Le Roy, and the Under-Secretary-General for Field Support, Ms. Susana Malcorra, shared their visions and concerns on the New Horizon process with the participants of the Forum. Each session was then opened with a brief introduction by a facilitator followed by a brief exposé of a background paper by its author and short presentations by the panelists followed by interactive discussions. A total of twenty eight speakers expressed their views and engaged on different dimensions of multidimensional peacekeeping operations including. About 160 participants from diverse spheres of policy, academic, practice, research, and organizational backgrounds attended the two day event.

Several delegates expressed their regret over the postponement of the Challenges Forum in Pakistan, reflecting a desire to maintain and continue interaction with Pakistan at all levels. Presentations by delegates and officials highlighted challenges faced by the UN and regional organizations, including the gaps in perception and reality in conceptual, structural and organizational spheres. The discussion revolved around. A number of possible solutions were discussed, while there was also a general understanding that these issues warranted further exploration at appropriate fora. The Challenges Forum Patron, Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, shared his reflection on the key value addeds of the Challenges Forum 2009 deliberations. In the concluding session, Australia invited Partners and participants to the next Challenges Forum to be hosted in Canberra in 2010. There was a note of thanks by Maj.Gen. (Retd.) Anis Bajwa on behalf of the National Defence University of Pakistan.

The structure of the Challenges Forum Report 2009 is as follows. The Challenges Forum Studies are followed by background studies and papers are followed by eight chapters with the first and last chapters dealing with the opening and concluding sessions. The remaining chapters cover the thematic sessions of the event. Importantly, Chapter 8 synthesizes major conclusions drawn from each
session. These are by no means a list of agreed recommendations, but provide a conceptual map of the challenges faced and probable courses of action required to steer peace operations out of its present predicament.

We are hereby pleased to offer the present Challenges Forum Report 2009 to our peacekeeping colleagues around the world, as one contribution to the broader international dialogue on possible ways in which to make international peacekeeping more collaborative, comprehensive, effective and efficient.

Lt.Gen. Agha Muhammad Umer Farooq  
President  
National Defence University  
Pakistan

Mr. Henrik Landerholm  
Director General  
Folke Bernadotte Academy  
Sweden
Introduction

Demand for UN peacekeeping as a tool for maintaining international peace and security has continued to rise in recent years. DPKO and DFS currently support 18 peace operations, fielding nearly 87,000 military personnel, over 12,000 police, and some 20,000 civilians worldwide.1 A growing share of deployment has been for robust missions in complex environments where there is often no peace to keep.

From Darfur to the DR Congo, peacekeepers are encountering more sophisticated spoilers and operating with limited consent – not only of rebel groups, but of host governments as well. The prospects of effectively responding to military challenges – whether protecting civilians or deterring attacks against peacekeepers themselves – are further complicated by the dispersion of UN forces across vast territories with little infrastructure, and without critical force enablers like helicopters.

As the size of UN deployments and the complexity of mission environments have increased, so have the demands on – and importance of – command, control, and oversight mechanisms. Mounting high-risk operations requires an unprecedented level of planning, coordination, and, critically, political guidance if they are to be carried out successfully and with minimal danger to personnel. The potential for crises that threaten civilians and peacekeepers alike is also higher in such environments; effective command and control is vital not only for timely and appropriate response – whether to localized attacks or large-scale emergencies, like the siege of Goma in 2008 – but also for minimizing their occurrence.

1 This includes 15 peacekeeping operations, two special political missions (UNAMA and BINUB), and DFS-supported AMISOM, with 5,250 AU troops.
UN command and control arrangements, emphasizing flexibility and civilian leadership, have historically served peacekeeping well. Yet, the growing gap between increasingly ambitious mandates and limited military capacities creates new dilemmas for the leadership of peacekeeping, in the field and at headquarters. Difficult decisions have to be made on when and how to show or to use force. It is impossible to address all situations – even when a show or actual use of force might be warranted. Priorities have to be set and a rigorous assessment of each situation needs to be made. Meanwhile, longstanding troop contributors of the UN have expressed some dissatisfaction with the way UN mandates are operationalized and have complained about the lack of transparency of the Secretariat.

Assessing those dynamics, some Member States have argued that the United Nations should shift away from the existing mission-based model of command and control towards a stronger operational headquarters, comparable to NATO, the European Union, and many national militaries. And indeed, UN command and control arrangements are a source of serious concern for military establishments that have been trained according to the completely different model of NATO developed during World War II and the Cold War and, more recently, the EU. The crises that have repeatedly plagued a mission like MONUC have been interpreted as a confirmation among certain troop contributors that stronger strategic military backstopping is essential and that deployments in a UN context carry excessive and poorly analyzed risks. At the same time the experience of Yugoslavia, where members of the Security Council ensured that some key military decisions would be under the control of the SRSG while others would be referred to the strategic level (dual key mechanism) are powerful reminders of the dangers of undue political interference in military matters. The UN model thus seems to combine the worse of two worlds: too much military decentralization and too much political control over the conduct of military operations. The Strategic Military Cell (SMC), which was created by secondment of officers from major troop contributors to UNIFIL when the mission was reinforced, is a first attempt to address some of those concerns by providing an additional oversight capacity at the strategic level. Importantly, it augmented, rather than supplanted, field-level operational command. The recent expansion of DPKO’s Office of Military Affairs has enabled it to assume many of functions provided by the SMC to UNIFIL, and across a wider range of missions.

Obviously, it would be wrong to point to inadequate command and control arrangements as the sole cause of the various crises encountered by the UN: overstretch and insufficient military capacities are a much more important factor. At the same time, it is important to look at UN command and control arrangements to see how they might be improved, if only to make sure that they address the concerns of all Member States (irrespective of the military tradition that informs their organization and doctrine) so that the pool of contributing nations can be
broadened at a time of great demand on peacekeeping. Three dimensions need to be addressed: (i) the role of the Secretariat in planning and supporting missions; (ii) the relationship between headquarters and the field (the strategic and tactical levels); and (iii) the orchestration of different peacekeeping components in the field.

Preparation and Planning Phase

“Traditional” military operations have clear objectives – defend this territory, defeat that opponent. These goals are relatively straightforward, if not always easy to achieve. “Traditional” peacekeeping – monitoring cease-fires, interposing a force between two well-disciplined and well-defined armies – is similarly well understood by national militaries. Since the 1990s, these missions have become the exception rather than the norm, however.

The mandates of today’s peacekeeping are far more ambitious, involving protection of civilians, electoral assistance, extension of state authority, strengthening rule of law, and undertaking security sector reform. In such environments, the end state is unclear. Rather, it is a multidimensional undertaking. The military is only one tool among many, alongside increasingly vital police and civilian dimensions. In Haiti, for example, police operations to take down gangs in Port-au-Prince have been critical to strengthening government authority in the capital and reducing criminality. Determining the right mix of military pressure and political engagement is an evolving process; the UN’s military posture therefore must not only be tailored to the political goal, but must be adaptive. Rupert Smith has observed that the objective of military force in a peacekeeping operation is not “to produce a clear end state,” but to create enabling conditions for reaching an end state. This is a very different goal than traditional military operations; one that is more complex and more closely related to evolving political considerations.

In such complex undertakings, the quality of the military answer depends in large part on the quality of the question put to the military. The planning process therefore requires not just more military planning capacities – a need that the SMC and then the reinforced OMA address in part – but also more sophisticated political thinking, and a capacity by the policy makers to ask the right questions from the military. It is the responsibility of the political side to develop political scenarios and to request from the military clear answers on what military force can achieve in specific circumstances. It is the responsibility of the military to translate political requests into a set of well-defined military tasks, and then to determine the military

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resources needed. The political side can then further adjust the political strategy on the basis of the answers it has received from the military and the resources it is prepared to contribute. The planning process, as far as the military component is concerned, should therefore be an iterative and interactive process.

The present reality is a far cry from that ideal planning process. The size of forces is largely determined by political considerations that reflect the degree of political support of major powers rather than the actual needs. Liberia, for instance, was allocated almost as many troops as the DRC, although the size of the challenge in DRC was considerably greater. The moral imperative of human solidarity influences the drafting of mandates without a serious discussion of its operational implications. For instance, the “protection of civilians” mandate does not provide any strategic direction: it would require, if it was to be systematically and seriously implemented, military forces of a different order of magnitude, which the international community does not have the capacity nor the will to mobilize. Such broad mandates therefore transfer to the UN the strategic responsibility of defining operational priorities. But, because it is politically uncomfortable to admit such limitations, because troop contributors are understandably unwilling to make open-ended commitments, and because there is not enough detailed, pre-deployment knowledge of the politico-military situation, the process through which priorities are identified is the result of circumstances rather than methodical thinking. This is deeply unsatisfactory.

Instead, a well thought-through strategy would identify the critical situations where a limited show of force, or use of force, would have a demonstrative effect, creating momentum that will sustain a self-reinforcing peace process, eventually leading to effective protection of civilians. The drafting of rules of engagement also becomes a much more complex exercise. Rules of engagement are always a ceiling, they are never a floor. In the absence of adequate military capacities – e.g., sufficient force enablers and multipliers, the gap between the ceiling and the actual practice of troops may understandably widen, however. It is therefore an illusion to expect the rules of engagement to decisively shape the posture of the force. The posture will be determined by the combination of the rules of engagement, the actual military capacities, and the will of the troop contributors. This consideration is another reason why it is so important to have more clarity in the politico-military discussion that will shape the mandate, the concept of operations, and the rules of engagement.

How can such clarity be achieved? The top level of command and control is the Security Council itself. The issue, then, is whether the Council is prepared to be part of that iterative discussion with the Secretariat and the troop contributors that would allow it to adjust the mandate to the realities on the ground. The
Security Council has a vested interest in the conduct of operations, as the recent UK-French initiative has underscored. This is encouraging. The recommendation of the Brahimi report that resolutions be adopted in two steps – a framework resolution first, and a second resolution, once the troop contributors have been identified, could be a possible answer to the concerns reflected in the initiative. However the lack of support in the Council for that key recommendation may indicate that the Security Council is not yet ready for such a sweeping reform. (*Nb. The issue of mandating-making is covered in greater detail in the accompanying Challenges Forum Study on mandate-making and implementation.*)

In the absence of radical progress at the top level of command, some progress can nevertheless be achieved in the UN Secretariat. On one hand, the military component should continue to be strengthened, and that strengthening can open the way to a better interaction with the troop contributors. Drawing on the experience of the Strategic Military Cell and the subsequent reinforcement of the Office of Military Affairs, it should be possible to strike a balance between the need to involve the key contributors of a specific mission and the principle that UN operations are not coalitions of the willing but the expression of the whole membership. The reinforcement of OMA with officers seconded by the troop contributors of each specific mission, in a proportion that would not overwhelm the core structure, is a possible solution. It is important, if challenging mandates are to be effectively implemented, that the troop contributors who will carry the risk be involved in the planning process.

On the other hand, a reinforcement of the military component of DPKO that would insulate it from the political side would not lead to real progress. It must therefore be accompanied by a parallel strengthening of the interaction between the military and political components of DPKO. The development of formal military committees, modeled on the initial concept of the UN Charter, or on the NATO or EU model, may not provide an effective answer if it consolidates an independent military planning process that makes continuous interactive and iterative exchange with the political side more difficult. The way in which NATO was tasked to develop a plan for the withdrawal of UN forces during the Yugoslavia war without consideration for the political implications of such action is a good illustration, well described by Richard Holbrooke, of the dangers of sequential rather than ongoing communications between the political and the military sides. (*Nb.*

The specificity of multi-dimensional peace-operations requires a planning process that integrates the military and police components in a broader effort where they become levers in support of a broader multidimensional strategy.

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Consequently, peacekeeping operations depend on strong strategic vision. How will the multiple parts of a mission work together in such a way that maximizes the likelihood of achieving the overall strategic goal? This must be planned from the outset. Other organizations are grappling with this problem as well – witness the discussions within NATO on defining a comprehensive approach to Afghanistan. The UN, NATO, the EU, the African Union should compare notes on the experience of their respective institutions. They should include in the discussion the Bretton Woods institutions, which are major actors in post-conflict situations. In the UN, the integrated mission planning process (IMPP) is the first attempt to bridge the gap between a broad political direction that informs a peace strategy and the more detailed guidance needed by the various components of a mission. It needs to be further developed and systematized.

Lastly, the rapid growth of the police component in UN operations raises specific questions. While the advisory, monitoring, and mentoring roles of UN police do not raise major command and control issues, the deployment of formed police units (FPUs) does. These issues need to be addressed first at the strategic level, if police commissioners are to exercise effective authority over FPUs, and if FPUs are to coordinate effectively with military units. The use of FPUs, when available, for the maintenance of law and order and crowd control is always preferable to the use of military units. But the tactics used vary considerably from one country to the other. Inevitable differences in training of FPUs must be managed through effective standard operating procedures that likely need to be developed by the UN. The Police Division has been engaged in a major effort to address this issue. As for the coordination between FPUs and military units in situations where they have to work together, the UN has, in particular, the experience in Haiti upon which to draw. Following discussions with troop and police contributors, it could further refine procedures that clearly define, based on the level of violence, the command and control arrangements applicable.

Strategic versus Theatre Level

Under the system of command and control for UN peacekeeping, the Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations has overall responsibility for UN missions. UN Headquarters provides strategic level guidance and light backstopping. Operational authority rests with mission leadership – usually civilian – in the field. Force Commanders and Police Commissioners, answering to the SRSG, wield enormous control of their respective forces, independent from the Military Advisor and Police Advisor in New York. Vesting the SRSG with autonomy to create strategies for mandate implementation has proven an effective format of command for most mission environments. Decentralization
of decision-making power to the mission level empowers the SRSG to make context-specific decisions on complicated issues. Decisions can be taken quickly, without having to be referred back to national capitals, as is the case with deployments by NATO and the European Union. In peace operations, decisions of a tactical nature can have strategic consequences, as they affect political perceptions that in turn can have a critical impact on the credibility of the mission. The strategic level cannot possess the detailed knowledge required to effectively manage such situations. “All politics is local” and the management of a peace-consolidation strategy is a highly political endeavor. The high level of decentralization of UN command and control structures rightly recognizes that fact. From this standpoint, the flat command structure of the UN, with a high degree of decentralization, is appropriate.

Yet, the model of UN command and control has shown signs of strain in the complex, highly fluid operating environments of contemporary, robust peacekeeping. Military contingents in DR Congo, Sudan, Somalia, are often required to enforce failing peace agreements.

First, where the threat to peacekeepers is high, both SRSGs and Force Commanders have faced challenges in maintaining authority over large forces. Mounting tactical operations which go beyond a purely defensive posture comes with higher risks that some Member States are unwilling to bear. In times of crisis and danger, the authority of the Force Commander is often challenged, implicitly or explicitly, as national chains of command tend to assert themselves. When the senior commanders are nationals from one of the major contingents, the possible tension between their authority and the national chain of command may be minimized, but tensions may then develop with the civilian leadership of the mission or with UN Headquarters in New York, as different understandings of the implementation of the mandate clash. Too much decentralization may then lead to a breakdown of effective communications between headquarters and the mission.

Second, while in some circumstances, Member States have imposed informal caveats with the full knowledge of UN Headquarters, through their Memoranda of Understanding, by limiting where their national contingents will deploy or what operations they will undertake, units have sometimes also quietly made clear to the Force Commander the limits of their engagement, including through a restrictive interpretation of their rules of engagement. While this is, in part, a matter of whether contingents have the right profile for the task requested of them, it is also an issue of command. The distance between HQ and the theatre level can only facilitate such tendencies, possibly leading to a dramatic weakening in the effectiveness of force, and to a weakening of efforts more generally. It is therefore important not only that the Security Council, the Secretariat, and troop
and police contributors have the same understanding of the mandate, but also that
the strategic level be fully informed at all times of developments in the field and of
the real posture of the force. Striking the right balance between creating a sense of
ownership in the mission and maintaining UN control is a delicate, but essential
task. Too much decentralization can make such control difficult.

Thirdly, where multiple peacekeeping missions are operating in a region, as across
the Central Africa – “Greater Horn” of Africa axis, operational decisions made
in one mission can negatively affect another. For instance, the Lord’s Resistance
Army impacts on MONUC as well as UNMIS: the two missions have had regular
discussions on the issue, but there is an obvious need for strategic direction coming
from HQs.

Fourth, where missions concern regional or great powers, as in Kosovo and the
Middle East, decisions may reverberate globally, and excessive decentralization
may be manipulated by major powers with influence over the mission. Different
members of the Security Council may have different expectations with the mission,
and they may try to influence it directly, through their nationals in the mission.
It may then put the Secretariat in a delicate situation if a high-risk operation
encouraged by a Member State goes wrong, or if it is seen as contradicting the
interpretation of the mandate made by other Member States.

Fifth, sexual abuse and exploitation of civilians by peacekeepers is another
area where greater oversight from the Secretariat is warranted. Following such
incidents, difficult decisions concerning repatriation of units or sanctions against
commanders need to be closely coordinated with troop or police contributors. All
troop contributors have stated that misconduct, if not criminal action, not only
undermines the legitimacy of peacekeepers, but also, by violating the very values
of human rights upon which the United Nations is founded, the legitimacy of
the Organization as a whole. Decisive action needs to be taken, and it has to be
coordinated and consulted at the strategic level to be effective.

Such examples point to the need for strengthening the grip of UN Headquarters
on missions, above all for peacekeeping missions with robust mandates. This can
be designed in a manner that preserves the day-to-day autonomy of the SRSG, the
Force Commander, and/or Police Commissioner. And it should enable peacekeepers
to better manage high-risk operations, to deconflict regional dimensions of
operations, and to facilitate better information sharing, satisfying Security
Council members and countries with personnel on the ground. OMA still remains
comparative small, however; additional complex missions – or simultaneous crises
would still strain existing capabilities.
How can greater operational oversight be achieved? So far DPKO has used the instrument of “inspectors general,” often with extensive experience of peacekeeping, appointed by the USG DPKO and supported by a multidimensional team provided by DPKO. This tool has proven to be flexible and effective. It has helped re-direct mission strategies at critical moments, as well as adjust command and control structures in a mission, correct support deficiencies, and identify issues of conduct and discipline beyond the area of sexual exploitation and abuse. It should continue to be used and strengthened. But, certainly, it is not enough.

Planning, because of the evolving nature of peace processes, is not a one-off event that happens when a mission is launched. It should be a process, in which the initial assumptions and policy responses of the early planning phase are continually reviewed and up-dated. Integrated Operational Teams (IOTs) have helped to bring together military, police, political affairs, and support staff in a formal structure to support integrated planning, mission management, and support. Since the first IOT was established to assist with planning UNAMID in 2007, six others have since followed and support other peace operations. The teams serve as the core for Integrated Mission Task Forces, and provide a hub for information sharing and cross-component liaising, enabling delegation of decision-making. Nonetheless, they remain more focused on day-to-day support provided by operational staff in the Office of Military Affairs, Office of Operations, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, and the Department of Field Support. A greater involvement of senior leadership, leading to a genuine strategic dialogue between the mission and HQs would be useful. Once a mission is launched, the strategic level relationship between functional parts within DPKO – OMA, for example – to the Integrated Operation Team (IOT) needs to be further refined. In response to developments in the field, concepts of operation may need to be adjusted, directives to the force commander and rules of engagement need to be regularly reviewed through an iterative process similar to the one described for the initial planning phase. Here, maintaining distance between the strategic level and the field is useful – the strategic level can focus on the bigger picture, without being caught up in the day-to-day minutiae.

However, for that dialogue to be substantive, DPKO HQ needs to strengthen its policy capacities as well as its information base. The strengthening of policy capacities requires that the directors in the Office of Operations, under the guidance of the Assistant Secretary-General for Operations, be able to focus on major policy issues, on keeping abreast of the political thinking among Member States, on liaising with non-Secretariat stakeholders (UN system, Bretton Woods Institutions, Security Council, Member States, major troop contributors and donors, independent think-tanks and experts) – and on avoiding being caught
in day-to-day management issues, which should be dealt with at the level of the IOT leaders (who need to be appropriately empowered). The strengthening of the information base requires that a regular and effective dialogue be developed between the Joint Mission Analysis Centers (JMACs) that are established in missions and the Situation Center at HQ. Both structures are presently evolving and they are both key assets for an effective conduct of peacekeeping. They should leverage what should be a key asset of the UN, namely a capacity to consolidate information from a range of sources, military and non-military.

Political versus Military Primacy in Theatre

Military and police operations need freedom from interference, but they also require political guidance. Balancing the two is one of the greatest challenges facing a mission’s civilian leadership; knowing when to assert control and when to defer can make the difference between success and failure.

Too often, the default is in fact to leave military matters to the military, to offer little more guidance than “do your best.” Where peacekeepers are mandated to use force, the assumption is that they will do so when circumstances dictate. But absent a strategic vision of what military force is intended to achieve, the military cannot blindly intuit its operational priorities.

Weighing immediate options – whether to engage a militia when civilians may be caught in cross-fire, or to wait for a safer, if uncertain chance later on, for example – and their possible consequences are not decisions that can be readily made, nor operations that can be managed, from the strategic level or an intermediate operational headquarters. Military operations by peacekeepers can have very real strategic implications for the mission as a whole, and therefore must be made with well thought out political guidance. The consequences of operations are often most immediately felt by civilian personnel in regional offices, who may be cut off from populations or present a softer target for retribution. Greater attention must therefore be paid to the relationship between peacekeepers and civilian leadership at the regional and local levels.

Leadership is a critical, if highly variable, factor of effective command and control. The selection of SRSGs is inherently political – and there are few prospective candidates, let alone candidates with the right combination of political and management skills. The selection of Force Commanders has also been politicized at times, but with greater consequence. National militaries are rightly wary of placing their personnel and assets under the command of a foreign national – yet this is precisely what is required of them in UN peacekeeping. The authority of
a Force Commander over national contingents – particularly large contingents – might be enhanced in robust environments where use of force is required by having a Force Commander of the same nationality as the largest contributor, but it should not become a rule: there may be situations where several major troop contributors are present and having a force commander from another nationality may be preferable to rotation between the major troop contributors of a mission.

The interaction between the civilian and the military and police in UN operations is therefore highly dependent on personalities. This is inevitable, but can be dangerous if the responsibilities and authority of the respective actors are not clearly defined: SRSGs can overstep their role and get involved in military decisions for which they have no expertise, while military commanders must be willing to listen to political directives and understand the political implications of their decisions. How can the present state of affairs be improved, so that the benefit of civilian leadership at theatre level is maintained, without creating a risk of unwarranted political interference?

First, clear directives on command and control at the mission level should be drafted: they should define the extent of authority of the SRSG over the Force Commander; they should protect the Force Commander against undue interference by allowing him to refer to UN HQ in New York in case of disagreement, without being censored by the SRSG. They should also define the interface between military and civilian components at lower levels (e.g., regional heads of office and battalion commanders) – the relationship at lower levels should never be a command relationship. Rather, a cooperative relationship should be encouraged and procedures should be established in case of disagreement so that the mission leadership is duly informed and the SRSG can take appropriate action to resolve differences.

Second, mission implementation plans with appropriate benchmarks should systematically be drafted at the mission level and continuously updated through a rolling process. The military and police components of the mission implementation plan should be drafted in the same interactive and iterative process that have been described for the mission plan. This would bring greater clarity on what is expected from the military and allow the military component to develop tactical plans without unwarranted political interference.

Third, more attention should be given to training. SRSG and dep. SRSGs, Force Commanders, unit commanders, and senior personnel from HQ should, on a yearly basis, participate in a crisis-management exercise where their command capabilities would be tested and sharpened. Such exercises, which could also include non-UN personnel, would help improve performance as well as procedures.
Conclusion

Empowering the SRSG, on balance, appears to be the appropriate model of command and control for UN peacekeeping. Alternative models, despite many advantages, would risk compromising the flexibility, greater situational awareness, and ability to orchestrate the multiple components of a mission that are the main strengths of peacekeeping missions. Nevertheless, the challenges of newer, robust missions have clearly indicated that refinement of the existing model is needed if UN peacekeeping is to effectively and efficiently carry out its mandates. Multidimensional peacekeeping is a highly political activity that requires continued and intensive interaction between different professional groups. The specific expertise of each profession – military, police, civilian – must be respected, but success depends on their capacity to interact effectively. That interaction needs to be further developed in the planning phase, in the relationship between HQ and the mission, and within the mission itself.
Broadening the Base of Contributors to United Nations Peacekeeping: Proposals for How the United Nations can Attract and Support New, Expanding and Returning Troop- and Police Contributing Countries

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Introduction

United Nations peacekeeping remains one of the international community’s most effective tools to manage threats to international peace and security. The demand for personnel, equipment and enabling assets for UN peacekeeping operations is thus likely to continue, and even grow. Yet, even today, the Organization struggles to find the capabilities it requires.

In 1993, which was one of the peak periods in UN peacekeeping with large missions deployed in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the United Nations deployed an estimated 80,000 military, police and other personnel. Today, over 116,000 personnel are deployed across 15 missions. The size and increasing complexity of many of these operations and led to a proliferation of new peacekeeping tasks that require new, and often scarce, military and police capabilities. In the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) for example, less than 70 per cent of the nearly 20,000 authorized troops have been deployed, more than two years after the Security Council established the mission, and key capabilities such as helicopter support are still missing, impeding the Mission’s ability to implement its mandate. Robust mandates, some of which include the protection of civilians, have also raised concern among leading troop contributors, contributing to uncertainty around the resourcing of operations. At the same time, the global economic crisis has placed strains on Member States and further threatens contributions to peacekeeping.

This crisis was highlighted earlier this year, in an internal analytical process launched by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS), aimed at identifying challenges and opportunities facing United Nations peacekeeping. A non-paper issued on 17 July 2009, entitled “A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping” (“New Horizon”), sets out a broad agenda for peacekeeping
reform. One of the points it stresses is that the UN can no longer rely so heavily on a small number of key contributors of police and military personnel and other assets, and must strive to ensure a globally representative mix of contributors that would provide both legitimacy and flexibility to peacekeeping. It also warns that meeting today’s needs is not enough; dependable and sustainable capacities are also needed to meet the challenges of tomorrow.

This study, conducted for the Challenges Forum, examines how DPKO and DFS can expand the base of peacekeeping contributors by attracting and assisting countries that are interested in becoming first-time contributors to UN peacekeeping, expanding their contributions or returning to peacekeeping after a hiatus. In addition to looking at factors that might increase the base of contributors, it proposes steps the UN can take to provide, or mobilize other actors to provide, more effective support to interested Member States. These include streamlining of procedures, policy changes, increased political outreach and the strengthening of bilateral and regional partnerships. The Challenges Partnership and DPKO/DFS can consider these proposals and select any that merit further research and development. The Partnership can also discuss ways in which it might assist DPKO/DFS with implementation of the proposals made in this study.

Interviews for this study were conducted from July – October 2009, with a range of new and emerging troop- and police contributing countries, major contributors and former contributors, as well as officials in DPKO and DFS.

Challenge 1: How can DPKO/DFS Broaden the Base of Peacekeeping Contributions?

There are no quick and easy responses to the challenge of expanding the base of contributors to UN peacekeeping. At present, there is no set template or strategy for approaching different categories of member state contributors, although there are some established practices. The New Horizon highlights the importance of forward looking analyses of the willingness and readiness of countries to contribute and commits DPKO and DFS to improve strategic planning to identify medium and long-term capability requirements. DPKO and DFS are already engaged in thinking on this issue and it would, therefore, be premature for this study to propose a specific strategy. However, to the extent that DPKO/DFS thinking is aimed at developing a strategy, the following considerations, which emerged in the course of this study, should be taken into account:

Understanding the Problem: Most contributions come from a small pool of developing countries. Nearly 90% of military and police personnel deployed in peace-
keeping operations as of August 2009 came from developing countries.\(^4\) And nearly 60% of total military and police contributions to peacekeeping as of August came from the top ten contributors, which are all developing countries.\(^5\)

These figures reveal two problems: First, that the majority of current UN contributions do not come from a “globally representative” pool of countries – indeed, the developed world is largely physically absent from UN peacekeeping today, although it does pay most of the bills. As indicated in the New Horizon report, this has implications for the international character of peacekeeping and its underlying legitimacy and ability to deploy the right combination of personnel and capabilities.

Second, since the UN currently has 116 contributing countries, the fact that nearly 60% of contributions come from the top 10 countries also indicates that there is very heavy reliance on a small pool of top contributors to provide the bulk of contributions. Given the growth in demand, this approach is clearly not sustainable, and the UN must expand both the current pool of contributors and the scale and range of contributions.

Analyze Motivations and Barriers. In order to appeal to T/PCCs, DPKO and DFS need to understand the motivations Member States have for becoming contributors, as well as what holds them back. The Secretariat already has some useful data on this issue and much external research exists as well, but it is worth noting some of the factors that surfaced, during discussions with Member States for this study, as common motivations for and barriers to becoming a T/PCC:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motivations</th>
<th>Barriers</th>
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<tr>
<td>a. Public opinion</td>
<td>a. Public opinion</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. Financial profit (including,</td>
<td>b. Financial burden</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mission Subsistence Allowance,</td>
<td>c. Cultural/historical/legal/constitutional reasons</td>
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<td>for police)</td>
<td>d. Insufficient understanding of</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. National interest</td>
<td>requirements/standards/flexibility</td>
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<td>d. Geographic proximity</td>
<td>of UN support arrangements</td>
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<tr>
<td>e. National profile/prestige</td>
<td>e. Absence of required personnel/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Keeping armed forces gainfully</td>
<td>equipment</td>
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<td>occupied and trained</td>
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</table>

\(^4\) Contributions to United Nations Peacekeeping, Monthly Summary of Contributions (military observers, police and troops) by Continent, as of 31 August 2009.

\(^5\) Contributions to United Nations Peacekeeping, Monthly Summary of Contributions (military observers, police and troops) by Country, as of 31 August 2009. It should be noted, however, that Italy and France rank 11\(^{st}\) and 15\(^{th}\), respectively, due to their contributions to UNIFIL.
### Motivations

| g. Training/equipping/professionalizing armed forces or police |
| h. Armed forces or police gain experience in new areas, e.g. humanitarian activities, human rights, gender, community policing, diversity |
| i. Recovery of prestige/respect for armed forces or police |

### Barriers

| f. Lack of specialized capabilities |
| Lack of training and equipping programmes |
| Capabilities tied up in other theatres |
| g. Command and control |
| h. Robust mandates |
| i. Protection of civilians mandates |
| j. Security/troop casualties |
| k. Perceived lack of UN credibility |

### Strategy Must be Targeted

The list above is based on a limited sampling, but illustrates the wide range of factors that might influence a Member State’s decision to contribute to UN peacekeeping. It also underscores the fairly obvious fact that the United Nations cannot have a single strategy aimed at attracting different contributing countries. Rather, it must devise a range of approaches tailored to different categories of Member States, that may have different motivations and interests, different levels of experience with peacekeeping and bring different capabilities to the table.

Three categories of contributors have been identified by DPKO:

### Three Categories of Member State Contributing Countries

| a. Current T/PCCs who could be encouraged to contribute more |
| b. New and emerging T/PCCs that never provided troops/police |
| c. Former contributors who could be persuaded to return to peacekeeping |

In addition, the UN may need to target specific countries based on criteria including the following:

### Criteria for Targeting Potential T/PCCs

| a. Military/police capabilities |
| b. Regional/geographical issues |
| c. Political priorities |
| d. Language, culture, familiarity with mission conditions |
| e. Interoperability with other contributors |

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6 Another set of categories that could be considered are: (i) countries that might lead an operation; (ii) countries that might provide a critical mass of troops/police; and (iii) countries that might provide niche capabilities.
Many current contributors are, in reality, making a very small contribution to peacekeeping, often in the form of a handful of military observers or police.\(^7\) Indeed, of the top 116 contributors, only the top 24 contribute more than 1,000 troops, police and observers, and only the top 64 contribute more than 100 troops, police and observers. Some of these countries are proceeding slowly, for political or other reasons, and may just be familiarizing themselves with UN peacekeeping for the moment. Others may face some of the other barriers listed above, such as a lack of equipment and training that would allow broader integration into complex UN operations. Since they are already participants in the system, however, this pool represents great unrealized potential that could be further tapped into. Thus, many of the proposals below with respect to countries that are not yet contributors would apply equally to those that are currently making small contributions. The obstacles for former contributors are somewhat different, but addressing those could help ease the way for new and emerging T/PCCs as well.

**Strategy Must be Proactive.** If it hopes to broaden the base of peacekeeping contributors, DPKO/DFS need to be proactive in pursuing potential contributors, and not just respond to potential contributors that approach the UN. There is also a need, as recommended in the New Horizon non-paper, to conduct forward-looking analysis to assess the willingness and readiness of countries to contribute in the future. In this connection, it may be useful for DPKO and DFS to review the UN Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS), which is currently not used proactively either by Member States, in coming forward with UNSAS-related capacities, or by DPKO, to test whether pledges can actually be converted into offers. The UNSAS database itself, which already contains a great deal of useful data, could also be reviewed in this connection. With regard to police, the current database is not adequate. Both military and police generation and deployment could also benefit from advanced IT tools, databases and programmes, to ensure greater efficiency.

**Strategy Must be Resourced.** DPKO/DFS must ensure that there is adequate preparation before and effective follow up after discussions with Member States, which has sometimes not been possible in the past due to overstretched resources. To implement the strategy properly, DPKO/DFS will need to allocate dedicated resources, or seek new capacity. This will also require reflection on where in DPKO/DFS this capacity would best be located if it is to have the range of expertise required to operate in an integrated manner and have easy access to all necessary information.

\(^7\) Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations, as of 31 August 2009.
Strategy Must Include Political Outreach and be Integrated. DPKO/DFS has tended to treat the generation of troops and police as a technical exercise, but force/police generation requires political outreach and an integrated military/police/political strategy. While consultation does take place with the political side of DPKO, responsibility for force/police generation lies almost fully with the Office of Military Affairs Force Generation Service and the Police Division, respectively. The two main ways in which they do this is by sending out Notes Verbale when personnel are required for a mission, or calling meetings with potential T/PCCs. In addition, due to the pressing needs and their limited capacity, the Force Generation Service and the Police Division are focused on current, rather than future, demands. Even so, despite the current demand for police, the Police Division has been able to hold very few meetings with potential PCCs to encourage their participation.

One of the main impediments to contribution is the lack of national interest or political will on the part of Member States. For DPKO and DFS to address this, contribution to peacekeeping must be approached as a highly political matter, which is how it is viewed by Member States. Not only is political buy-in needed at various levels of different ministries in the capital, but legislative approval can also be required. Often, successful engagement must take place over a period of time, and cannot be limited to one particular mission or one specific DPKO need. This demands concerted political engagement and outreach at all levels, beginning with the Secretary-General engaging with Heads of State and Heads of Government to obtain political commitments on contribution. Any military or police strategy must also be aligned with an overarching political strategy. It should also be noted that increasing the contributions to UN peacekeeping is not a “Secretariat problem” – indeed, it is the Security Council that issues mandates and authorizes the strength of missions. Accordingly, the DPKO/DFS strategy should also address ways to involve the Security Council, the C-34 and other bodies in dialogue with potential contributors and on the need to increase contributions.

With regard to the re-engagement of former TCCs, many of them Western nations that left peacekeeping in the 1990s, there is a new generation of officials who have no first-hand experience of UN peacekeeping and still refer to the problems of the 1990s. Yet peacekeeping has changed in important and commendable ways and DPKO and DFS need to reach out to these countries and explain the new way of doing business. The number of police contributions from Western countries has also decreased dramatically with the closing of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). These countries need to be re-engaged as well, and encouraged to contribute to other missions. If the goal is to have more global representation among contributors, this outreach needs to be considered a UN priority.
For police, there is such a pressing need for specialized skills and backgrounds, and for a larger volume than ever before seen in UN peacekeeping, that a targeted police strategy is critical. Many of the police requirements are for “formed police units” (“FPUs”), which few Member States have; those that do often require equipment and other support before deployment. The Police Division now has, for the first time, a dedicated capacity for recruitment of police, and will be working to develop a police recruitment strategy. Again, to be effective, this work will need to be done in conjunction with a political strategy and outreach.

PROPOSAL: DPKO/DFS need a proactive, integrated and properly-resourced political/military/police strategy for generation of troops, police and other capabilities, which is tailored to different categories of potential contributors and addresses both current and future needs. The strategy should also look at data collection/analysis and IT tools.

Challenge 2: New T/PCCs are Unfamiliar with United Nations Peacekeeping

This section sets out the key challenges that Member States and DPKO/DFS face when seeking to provide new or expanded contributions to peacekeeping and proposes ways for DPKO/DFS to assist further in this process. This study did not find any evidence to suggest that the UN is losing potential troop or police contributors because it has poor procedures and policies. On the contrary, Member States reported that the Force Generation Service (FGS) in the Office of Military Affairs, the Police Division (PD) and the logistics and finance divisions of DFS are extremely responsive and dedicate a great deal of time whenever approached by a Member State. The issue is how current practices and procedures can be further streamlined and targeted.

Peacekeeping can be Intimidating. For Member States that have little experience with peacekeeping, the prospect of becoming a T/PCC can be an intimidating one. These countries often have small, under-resourced permanent missions in New York and may lack a military or police adviser, who would normally have familiarity with the technical and military issues involved. Navigating the UN Secretariat, its rules and regulations, and even the jargon, can be challenging.

Even established T/PCCs report that they have an ongoing need for information. Because of the high turnover rate (most military or police advisers remain for two years) at permanent missions in New York, and depending on the size of the permanent mission and the background of the military/police adviser or the
individual in charge of peacekeeping, many new advisers encounter many of the same problems in navigating the system.

Oral Briefings and Lots of Documents can Sometimes Overwhelm.

a. Oral briefings. At present, a Member State that walks into the UN seeking information about becoming a contributor will be referred, in the first instance, to the Force Generation Service for TCCs, or to the Police Division for PCCs. These offices provide an initial oral briefing and then refer the Member State to other parts of DPKO and DFS for further briefings, e.g. on financial and logistic aspects. A number of guidelines, policies and PowerPoint are also made available. Recent and emerging T/PCCs report that they find the briefings to be informative, but those who are not familiar with peacekeeping or, in some cases, with military or technical terminology, have found it difficult to process all the details and convey these accurately to capitals. They would prefer to have the contents of the briefing and any key points in the accompanying documents provided to them in the form of a single, self-contained document, which they could then transmit to capitals. Ideally, this would be a generic document about peacekeeping contribution, with annexes for specific missions; these annexes could draw on existing mission-specific materials, that would be revised and supplemented for this purpose. There is, of course, no substitute for a tailored oral briefing that answers the specific questions that a Member State has, particularly with regard to specific missions, but that should be a second step, and further detailed discussions should ideally, take place in the capital (see section on Assessment Visits, below).

b. Accompanying documents. With regard to the accompanying documents that are currently handed out to Member States, there is no set “packet” that has been vetted by the two departments and deemed appropriate for new or expanding T/PCCs. Thus, FGS and PD hand out the documents they each produce, such as the generic and mission-specific TCC guidelines or policing-related policies, and DFS does the same. If the Member State does not visit the Integrated Training Service, for example, or the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, they might not be aware of the new peacekeeping training standards and modules, or the “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines” and other key guidelines/policy documents, elements of which are also relevant for new T/PCCs. (See Annex 1 for partial list of relevant materials for new T/PCCs). Moreover, the materials that are handed out to Member States were created for other purposes and are pitched at different levels; thus, they do not specifically target the concerns of new T/PCCs. Many of these materials assume a certain level of understanding of UN procedures and systems and are
written in fairly technical language, which has been difficult for new T/PCCs to understand. Member States report that extracting the key points from this abundance of documents can be confusing and overwhelming.

Contributors can Start Small and “Contribution” Does Not Just Mean Troops. One of the key messages that potential contributors need to be aware of is that a Member State need not contribute a battalion or formed police unit in order to be a T/PCC. Indeed, FGS encourages most countries to start by contributing a few military observers. In the case of police, potential contributors are encouraged to begin by contributing a few individual police officers. Second, peacekeeping is not just about contributing troops or personnel, because the UN needs equipment, enabling assets and niche capabilities as well. Finally, a country that wishes to go down the road of contributing to the UN is advised to assign a military or police adviser to New York for 6–12 months. These messages need to be provided in writing.

Member States Need to Know What’s in it for Them. Potential contributors may be aware of some, but not all, of the benefits that contribution to peacekeeping can bring to them. The UN needs to agree on a message and communicate these benefits to new/emerging T/PCCs at the outset.

DPKO/DFS need to streamline current practices and procedures as follows:

**PROPOSAL: Develop generic introductory reference manuals (in French and English) with mission-specific annexes, to introduce Member States to the requirements of becoming a T/PCC.**

These manuals should:

- introduce potential contributors to UN peacekeeping
- selectively draw from and supplement relevant existing materials (e.g. on reimbursement, logistics, training, etc), but not just be a collation of all existing materials
- be written in clear and simple language that is appropriate for newcomers to peacekeeping
- include a flow chart showing the sequence and timelines for required steps
- explain the different forms that contribution can take
- describe the benefits of peacekeeping to Member States
- list related materials, including guidance material, and where they can be accessed
- list key contacts in DPKO/DFS
- mission-specific annexes could be in the form of a CD-ROM, with footage of the mission, examples of achievements of specific units, etc.
PROPOSAL: Develop a page on the DPKO website dedicated to T/PCCs

This page should:
- contain the generic reference manuals and mission-specific annexes
- have links to other materials, policies and standards relevant to T/PCCs
- have a “frequently-asked questions” section
- include a generic email address to which queries can be submitted and directed to the correct office in DPKO/DFS

PROPOSAL: Provide basic training to military, police and political advisers at permanent missions to introduce them to peacekeeping and the requirements of being a T/PCC.

This training:
- could constitute one module of the annual Military Police Advisers’ Community (MPAC) training
- should have an integrated approach
- should complement more specialized training provided at HQ, such as on COE requirements

Challenge 3: Capitals Do Not Have Easy Access to Information on Peacekeeping Contribution and Standards

One of the big challenges DPKO/DFS face is that their most critical interlocutors in contributing countries are located in capitals, or at the headquarters of regional organizations, as are the key decision-makers. Personnel in the permanent missions in New York have a different set of responsibilities and backgrounds, and are not always the appropriate interlocutors for detailed discussions on logistics capabilities, equipment, training, etc. In addition, depending on the information flow between the capital and the permanent mission, DPKO and DFS have sometimes experienced a disconnect between what the permanent mission and the capital are saying.

Capitals and regional organizations need access to immediate information about general or mission-specific peacekeeping issues, contribution requirements and standards, to enable them to rally support within the capital and make contributions materialize. As pointed out in the New Horizon, since DPKO and DFS do not have representation in the various regions of the world, there is no opportunity for the Organization to build relationships with ministries and other constituencies in capitals (such as parliaments, citizens’ groups, the media, etc.) or “sell” peacekeeping
to them. Nor is there a dedicated office at UN Headquarters identifying a capital’s needs and pulling together the information it requires. (See proposal above about establishing an integrated office within DPKO/DFS for this purpose). Instead, the permanent mission of the T/PCC must make the rounds of the various DPKO/DFS offices, seeking information piecemeal. Finally, T/PCCs that approach the UN are usually more diligent in passing information on to their capitals, while there is less certainty about subsequent information flow when it is the UN that is targeting a potential T/PCC and contacts the permanent mission in New York.

If DPKO/DFS could to set up outposts in different regions, many of these objectives could be achieved. Consideration could be given to attaching centres to existing regional UN offices, as appropriate. DPKO/DFS would also have to give thought to how to staff these centres, to ensure the right range and level of skills. In addition, the terms of reference of the centres would have to be very clear to avoid any duplication/overlap with the role of Permanent Missions or DPKO/DFS offices at UN Headquarters. Finally, there would have to be clear reporting and communication lines with Headquarters.

PROPOSAL: DPKO/DFS could establish regional centres that would serve as a single point of entry for queries from potential contributors, and provide outreach/information on peacekeeping requirements, standards and training.

Staff would:

a. be up-to-date on a range of peacekeeping issues and reach back to NY Headquarters for any technical advice required, or to request an assessment visit from NY.

b. conduct outreach to difference constituencies, including ministries, parliament, the public, etc. , including possibly a public information component

c. advise on peacekeeping standards and training
d. provide quality control of preparedness and training
e. build contacts and long-term relationships with current or potential contributors

f. liaise with HQ and third countries on capacity-building issues
g. speak relevant regional language(s).

Member States would have to agree to funds these posts, perhaps beginning with:

a. pilot centres in one or two key regions; or

b. initial short-term deployments to a contributor or regional organization, to work on capacity-development of UN Missions
Challenge 4: Assessment Visits are Critical but Little Funding and No Guidance Exists

**Assessment Visits Need to be Prioritized and have Clear Guidelines.** Whenever possible, DPKO/DFS carry out “assessment visits” to prospective military contributors. There is, however, currently no provision for visits to PCCs that are considering contributing formed police units. These visits are different to high-level political visits and are conducted either for assessment of general capabilities or for contribution to a specific mission. They are also distinct from “pre-deployment visits” (PDVs), which are carried out to inspect a particular capability that has is to be deployed to a specific mission.

All DPKO/DFS staff and recent T/PCCs interviewed confirmed that assessment visits are the most indispensable step in the process of signing on new contributors or new contributions and can achieve much more than discussions in New York. Because these visits are so important, DPKO/DFS may want to review how they are framed and conducted. At present, assessment visits are carried out in an ad hoc fashion, when funding and staff are available. The assessment visits are aimed at providing expert advice and answering detailed questions the prospective T/PCCs might have, as well as assessing their capabilities (including structure, composition, enabling units, training, etc.) once a strong declaration of interest has been made. With some exceptions, the teams carrying out these visits are composed of military, finance and logistics experts only, with no political or training experts present, which participants have indicated is not always effective.

The key issues that prospective T/PCCs want explained to them in detail are not the military tasks per se that they will be asked to carry out, but rather UN procedures, which can be complicated, and specificities of mission mandates. The issues Member States often request detailed information on include, but are not limited to, the following:

a. Command and control
b. Rules of engagement/concept of operations
c. Compatibility/Inter-operability
d. Contingent owned equipment system and reimbursement arrangements
e. Logistics system and flexibility of arrangements
f. Translation of mission SOPs and force orders into tactical level tasks
g. Local language, customs and conditions of specific missions

Because of the complexity of the issues involved, these discussions are more effective if they take place early on in capitals, between UN and Member State experts, rather
than with permanent missions in New York. At the same time, DPKO and DFS need to establish the country’s capabilities with regard to training, equipment, personnel, command and control and support, and need clear standards for doing so.

Facilitate Visits of Prospective T/PCCs to Missions. In certain case, it might be worthwhile for DPKO/DFS to invite a delegation from a potential T/PCC, or a team of senior military/police officers from different prospective T/PCCs, to visit one or two missions to which they are considering contributing, to observe the needs and conditions on the ground first-hand. This would require funding and planning, but if the countries are carefully selected it could be quite effective.

PROPOSAL: DPKO/DFS need to budget for assessment visits by HQ as a priority activity, both for military and FPU contributions, and also consider budgeting visits to the field by prospective T/PCC delegations. Member States need to understand how critical assessment visits are and fund them accordingly.

PROPOSAL: DPKO/DFS need to develop SOPs/guidelines for assessment visits.

These should include:
- the purpose and outcome of such visits
- link to DPKO/DFS military/police/political strategy
- who is in the lead
- who else participates and in what capacity, with a view to having an integrated team
- key topics/areas for briefings
- clear standards against which DPKO/DFS will measure operational capability
- funding

Challenge 5: How Can DPKO Make Better Use of Bilateral and Regional Partnerships?

Training and Capacity-building by Donors Needs Coordination. At present, significant global resources are spent on bilateral and regional capacity-building and training initiatives that target new and emerging T/PCCs. These are largely ad hoc initiatives that are neither coordinated among themselves nor with the UN. Nor is there necessarily a correlation between the peacekeepers being trained and
equipped through these initiatives, and those who are slated for deployment to peacekeeping operations and may require support.8

Because of the UN’s limited capacity and resources, these partnerships among Member States, which can serve to provide a global training network, are essential and should be encouraged. They could be more effective, however, if they were coordinated with and reflected the UN’s actual and projected needs. Examples abound of expensive and well-intentioned training programmes that are not targeted to personnel who are actually deploying to critical operations like those in Darfur and the Congo. Another specific need relates to countries that are considering the development of FPUs for UN peacekeeping, but require bilateral assistance and currently cannot approach a coordination mechanism to assist them in identifying available support.

UN Standards Must Exist and Serve as Basis for Training and Capacity-building by Donors. It is essential that any bilateral or regional assistance programmes that aim to prepare peacekeepers for UN service be based on UN operational and training standards. Clearly, this presupposes that the UN has clear, up-to-date standards in place. Where that is the case, DPKO/DFS must ensure that those running these programmes have access to and fully understand the standards. In other areas, the UN must engage Member States in the development of clear standards that would support pre-deployment preparedness.

Coordination Mechanism Could Assist in Dissemination of UN Standards. A coordination mechanism, if developed, could be one means of distributing the latest standards and policies. Too often, assistance is being provided on the basis of outdated UN standards, or based on the donor country’s own standards and procedures, which then creates problems down the road. Donor countries should be aware that UN standards are constantly undergoing change. Thus, even their own national personnel or other experts with past peacekeeping experience who are retained to assist with capacity-building and training, may not be fully aware of these changes.

Explore Working With or Within Existing Coordination Mechanisms. Another option is for the UN to work within the limited coordination mechanisms that already exist. The International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centre, and its African chapter, the African Peace Support Trainers’ Association (APSTA), are information-sharing bodies that could potentially be tapped into for coordination and dissemination purposes. They could also be provided access to DPKO/DFS’

8 There has, however, been some coordination with regard to support being provided to countries deploying police and FPUs to UNAMID.
database of training modules and policy and guidance documents. At present, however, the only existing coordination mechanisms are the annual meeting of the “G-8++ Africa Clearinghouse” and the more recently established Global Clearinghouse, in which the UN, EU, AU, and NATO participate along with G8 members and other member states seeking to develop peacekeeping capacity. Both fora meet annually with the objective of enhancing global information exchange and coordinating activities in order to enhance global peace operations capacity building efforts and avoid overlapping of donor programmes. Despite the intention to develop a website for information exchange and dissemination of relevant information when the Africa Clearinghouse was first established, this still does not exist, although there has been a recent resurgence of support for the idea which could open the door to improving coordination.

Another mechanism that has been proposed is the development of an African Union comprehensive plan for long-term capacity-building. This was recommended in the 31 December 2008 Report of the African Union-United Panel on Modalities for Support to African Union Peacekeeping Operations, and the Secretary-General’s Report of 18 September 2009 on Support to AU Peacekeeping Operations Authorized by the United Nations. The goal is to develop a long-term road map for capacity-building, indicating priorities, structural requirements and benchmarks, and for the UN to facilitate discussions with the AU and other actors on development of a harmonized framework to consolidate funding.

The UN and Member States must assess whether the UN’s needs can be adequately addressed through these mechanisms, or whether a mechanism specifically targeting UN operations is warranted. Such a discussion should consider whether the existing mechanisms could be improved if they had full-time Secretariats, websites for information exchange, etc.

PROPOSAL: Explore whether the UN (or another actor) can/should serve as coordinator of a bilateral/regional partnerships, to bring about a coordinated and targeted approach to allocation of resources for delivery of capacity-building and training for UN peacekeeping.

   a. Mechanism should be used to communicate UN standards to partners
   b. Should include an effective information management system to communicate information about upcoming deployment numbers and dates.
   c. If the UN is in charge of coordination, it would need resources to carry out this function.
Joint Training and Deployment by T/PCCs. Capacity-building and training partnerships are usually between a donor nation and a new or emerging T/PCC. Another model that could be considered is partnerships between T/PCCs in the same region or sub-region, whereby the two countries would train and perhaps even deploy together. For example, for its first foray into peacekeeping, a new TCC might attach several units to the battalion of a more established TCC from the same region. Argentina and Chile, for example, began forming a joint force (“Cruz del Sur”) in 2008, for future UN operations. Another example, in 1999, was New Zealand’s deployment of a battalion to the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), to which several other countries (Canada, Ireland, Nepal, Fiji and Singapore) attached forces at various times. Finally, this is beginning to happen in the African context with preparations for the African Standby Force (ASF).

PROPOSAL: Explore partnerships in which a new or emerging T/PCC and a more established T/PCC from the same region train and deploy jointly.

Experienced T/PCCs Should Share Experiences With New/Emerging Contributors. While DPKO/DFS should serve as the primary source of information for new or potential T/PCCs, current contributors also have a wealth of experience and information they could usefully share. Some emerging T/PCCs stated that, before approaching the UN, they felt more comfortable turning to an existing T/PCC in their region, or to another T/PCC with whom they had strong ties, for advice and guidance on becoming a contributing country. These partnerships can be effective and should be encouraged.

PROPOSAL: The UN should facilitate a mechanism whereby new or emerging T/PCCs would, voluntarily, partner with a leading T/PCC for guidance through the process of preparing for and deploying to a peacekeeping mission.

Member-state Run “Training” Workshops. The UN does not have the resources or capacity to organize regular workshops to train Member States on becoming contributors, but these could be useful if run by experienced T/PCCs, with some participation by UN experts. The UN should determine the location and timing of workshops to ensure that the greatest needs are being covered.
PROPOSAL: Leading T/PCCs could organize regional workshops to share experiences with emerging or smaller T/PCCs.
   a. The workshops would be organized and run by Member States.
   b. UN experts could present on some key issues, but current T/PCCs would share experiences on participation in UN peacekeeping operations, including requirements, deployment preparations, training, etc.
   c. Workshops would be funded either by the hosting country or a third party donor.

Challenge 6: Which Existing Policies should be Modified to Attract Contributors?

A number of DPKO/DFS policies, or practices with policy implications, pose obstacles to contribution. These are concerns both for leading troop-contributors and for former contributors to peacekeeping – for the most part Western nations that left peacekeeping in the 1990s. Others were raised in the New Horizon and cannot be removed overnight, but both the Secretariat and Member States need to be committed to pursuing solutions.

Mission Planning and Command and Control. European and North American countries have had long-standing concerns with command and control arrangements in UN peacekeeping operations, many of which are now shared by other TCCs as well. Those interviewed cited a range of concerns:
   a. Lack of continuity/consistency in UN senior leadership
   b. Lack of consistency in UN management of missions and military operations
   c. Force commander has only operational control; does not command forces, which are under national command
   d. Military assets and support are under civilian control
   e. Inability of DPKO Headquarters to exercise command and control over peacekeeping operations; only provides guidance and assistance
   f. Concerns about the effectiveness of DPKO and the DPKO – field relationship, leading to concerns that DPKO may not be able to provide the necessary support/back up at critical moments
   g. Despite recent advances, lack of military and planning doctrine, as compared with NATO, etc.
   h. Reluctance to get involved in an operation if the Member State has not been involved in mission planning
i. Planning processes (especially for new missions) differ from planning doctrine of many countries, whereby Headquarters provides strategic guidance but operational planning is done by Mission Headquarters
j. Reluctance to participate unless the Member State is given senior command positions, but realization that they will not get these positions unless they contribute troops, which creates a vicious circle
k. Judgments about command and control are being made based on these countries’ involvement in peacekeeping in the 1990s.

Addressing concerns about command and control is a real challenge, given the unique structure of UN operations and the need to maintain impartiality in order to preserve the UN’s legitimacy. However, the New Horizon acknowledges the need to strengthen contributors’ confidence in mission planning and command and control arrangements, and makes some important proposals:

a. DPKO and DFS will engage with members of the Security Council and contributing countries on strengthening mechanisms for consultation and interaction on mission planning processes within the framework of UN command and control.

b. With regard to robust concepts of operations, DPKO/DFS will develop, in consultation with Member States, a strategic guidance note and guidance for mission planners.

One model that could be further explored is the Strategic Military Cell (SMC), established in 2006 in connection with the expansion of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). One of the key conditions of European contributors for participation in the expanded force was that a special cell be set up at New York Headquarters to provide “strategic military guidance” to UNIFIL. The SMC liaises directly with the UNIFIL Force Commander and reports directly to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. It comprises representatives from the various TCCs present in UNIFIL as well as the Permanent Five members of the Security Council.

This parallel structure contains many of the elements that leading TCCs have long demanded – i.e. involvement in headquarters planning or command functions – which would provide some confidence to their national command. A Secretariat review found, however, that while the temporary reinforcement that the SMC provided for rapid planning was potentially valuable, its large and unwieldy structure and its disconnect from the Office of Military Affairs were problematic, and concluded that any future mechanisms would have to fall under existing command and control structures. The Special Committee on Peacekeeping, or C-34, has also made references to the need to follow established frameworks.
Nevertheless, the experience merits further study to determine whether this model, or something approximating it, can be replicated in future operations to partially address concerns about information exchange, command and control and mission planning.

**Need to Move from Numbers to Capabilities.** As highlighted in the New Horizon, to generate more resources, DPKO needs to “move from a quantitative focus to a qualitative approach emphasizing the generation of capabilities.” As discussed above, this requires that clear operational standards exist, and that these are linked to training and to delivery on the ground. Changing the UN’s approach would require work, but would offer both short and long-term benefits.

This discussion is particularly relevant when it comes to efforts to re-engage former TCCs. These countries can, at least in principle, offer many of the enabling and niche capabilities that the UN requires and are in such short supply. As they point out, however, the quantitative approach of the UN system regarding configuration of requirements may reflect the way in which leading TCCs configure their forces but differs sharply from the practice followed by most Western/NATO countries (e.g. for engineering and mechanical units). Although there have been some improvements in this regard, UN requests to Member States, particularly in subsequent MOU negotiations, still tend to focus on standardized numbers and quantities needed for a particular mission, rather than providing a framework for more diverse capabilities and expected outcomes. This incompatibility can make it difficult for Western countries to respond to UN needs.

**COE and Self-Sustainment Standards.** Troops and police arrive in the mission area with their own equipment (contingent owned equipment) and self sustainment capabilities. UN standards in this regards are reviewed every three years with Member States, but many still find them to be cumbersome, confusing and difficult to meet. The New Horizon laid out some of the problems: Some contributors are unable to rapidly assemble the equipment for modern operations or to cover initial investment in equipment. Others have been unable to sustain the required levels of capability in the field, particularly in difficult environments. Still others argue that reimbursement rates do not reflect today’s demands and do not sufficiently recognize the cost to contributors of deploying higher quality equipment or high-end expertise. As such they create further disincentives for the provision of already scarce requests.

The new Horizon recommended that Member States and the Secretariat engage in a senior-level dialogue on this issue in order to better define the requirements and make necessary changes in current policies.
Job Descriptions for Police. At present, the Police Division recruits most individual police, with a few exceptions, on the basis of a very generic profile, including five years of police service, one year in a peacekeeping or other peace operation. For certain missions, DPKO asks PCCs to identify specialists or experts, with expertise ranging from administrative and budgeting issues to border management and organized crime. Once they arrive in the mission, however, these officers are often used in a generic capacity, such as patrolling. This has made some PCCs, especially Western countries, reluctant to deploy specialists, who are needed in their own countries. This raises questions about DPKO’s future ability to fill posts in missions that require specialized police and requires that PD and field missions review their procedures and resources for matching what are now thousands of police officers to specialized tasks.

PROPOSAL: The Secretariat and Member States will need to pursue, without delay, dialogue on changes in some key policy/procedures that would help attract key contributors:

a. Mission planning for robust operations
b. COE and self-sustainment standards
c. Operational standards underlying required capabilities
d. Move from a quantitative to a capabilities-driven approach to resource generation
e. Procedures for recruiting and deploying police, especially specialists, on the basis of job descriptions

While the Secretariat will engage formally with Member States on these issues, other informal processes that encourage debate and put different perspectives and possible solutions on the table can be useful.

Specific Concerns Raised by Former TCCs. Some concerns specifically raised by former contributors, are ones that the UN has little power to affect. These are worth noting, however, as DPKO/DFS develop a strategy for expanding contributions.

a. Interoperability, and UN vs. NATO/EU cultures and structures. Many Western countries state that one of the barriers to their participation in UN operations is that they bring certain expectations with them based on their EU/NATO experiences, including involvement in command and control and planning processes but also other cultural and structural differences. These expectations cannot be accommodated by the UN, and the adjustment to the “UN way” of doing things poses practical difficulties for these nations. There are also issues related to interoperability. As one country put it “we normally only work with countries we are used to working with. So unless
there is a critical mass of European forces in a UN operation, it is difficult for us to participate”.

b. **Lack of spare capacity.** For NATO countries, all spare capacity is currently earmarked for reinforcements to Afghanistan and other non-UN operations, leaving limited resources for contribution to the UN. In addition, in light of NATO and EU expansion in Eastern Europe, many of these countries are prioritizing contributions within a NATO or EU framework over UN peacekeeping.

c. **Political will.** Western countries are unlikely to get involved in high risk operations in distant countries unless there are national interests at stake and a national political will for involvement. This, rather than the availability of suitable military capabilities, is what determines their participation in peacekeeping. Certain countries, such as Western ones, or EU members, may also make their decisions regarding participation in UN peacekeeping based on an analysis of who else is contributing, resulting in a “crowding in” effect.

**Conclusion**

United Nations peacekeeping is stretched to its limits today and there are serious questions about whether it will be able to identify the personnel and other capabilities it needs for future operations. The UN thus has to be proactive in its efforts to broaden the pool and scale of contributions of its T/PCCs.

This will require a solid strategy that is focused not just on technical police and military needs, but aligned with political priorities. It will mean streamlining the procedures used to respond to Member States’ information needs, and revising some key policies that are holding back contributors. It will mean that the Organization must do more outreach, ideally through DPKO/DFS representatives based outside of New York, who can develop long-term relationships with capitals and regional organizations. And finally, it will require that donors have a more coordinated approach to bilateral and regional training and capacity-building programmes, and really target countries and personnel who are likely to deploy to peacekeeping operations.

The New Horizon process provides an opportunity for both Member States and the UN Secretariat to respond to these needs, both through dialogue and concrete action. The Challenges Partnership can also play an important supporting role.

**How can the Challenges Partnership support this agenda?** The New Horizon non-paper calls for “a renewed UN partnership to set a new horizon...to help configure
UN peacekeeping to meet the challenges of today and tomorrow”. The Challenges Partnership is a key stakeholder in this process, and its unique perspective and support can make a valuable contribution to the pursuit of a strengthened peacekeeping partnership, with a shared vision and unity of purpose, as outlined in the New Horizon agenda. Many of the recommendations made in the New Horizon and discussed in this study require further dialogue and consultation, which the Challenges Partnership can encourage and support. Some examples are:

Support/sponsor further research and opportunities for dialogue on:

- Modalities for increasing engagement and information sharing with Member States on mission planning processes, especially for robust operations
- The development of clear operational standards for uniformed personnel
- Strengthening bilateral and regional partnerships
- Providing strategic direction to discussions on contingent owned equipment and self-sustainment standards
- A move from a quantitative to a capabilities-driven approach to the generation of peacekeeping capabilities
- Procedures for recruiting and deploying police, especially specialists, on the basis of job descriptions

Development of Specific Products or Initiatives: Other proposals in this study call for the development of specific products or initiatives, which the Challenges Partnership could support. Any of these initiatives would have to be closely coordinated with DPKO/DFS and would require that the Secretariat assign counterparts to work with Challenges. Some examples of specific products or mechanisms that Challenges could support are:

- Creation of introductory manuals and CD Roms (in English and French) for new/emerging T/PCCs
- Development and piloting of mission-specific annexes/CD Roms (in English and French) for one or two critical missions that need contributors
- Development of SOPs/Guidelines for assessment visits
- Pilot project deploying DPKO/DFS representative to a key region, or a short-term deployment to a contributor or regional organization

Funding: The development of these products/mechanisms will require resources. Challenges Partners could consider covering, or assisting DPKO/DFS in seeking, the general temporary assistance (GTA) needed to carry out some or all of these projects. Any funding requirements would need to be addressed in proposals for moving forward, and aligned with any DPKO/DFS reallocation of resources.
1. Existing DPKO/DFS materials that reference manuals for new T/PCCs could draw from

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<th>Existing documents for new TCCs</th>
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<td>a. Capstone doctrine</td>
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<td>b. Generic TCC guidelines</td>
<td>b. Guidelines for UN police officers on assignment</td>
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<td>c. UNSAS guidelines</td>
<td>c. Contingent-Owned Equipment (COE) manual</td>
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<td>d. Contingent-Owned Equipment (COE) manual</td>
<td>d. Contributing Countries Reconnaissance visits policy and guidelines</td>
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<td>e. Contributing Countries Reconnaissance visits policy and guidelines</td>
<td>e. Pre-deployment Visits (PDV) policy and guidelines</td>
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<td>f. Pre-deployment Visits (PDV) policy and guidelines</td>
<td>f. UN Selection Assistance Team (UNSAT) pre-deployment procedures and Standards and Assessment Procedures for Formed Police Units in UN Peacekeeping Operations (SPAT)</td>
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<td>g. Mission Start-up Guide</td>
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<td>i. Core Pre-deployment Training Materials (CPTMs)</td>
<td>i. FPU Policy</td>
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<td>j. Guidelines on Roles and Training Standards for Military Experts on Mission and Military Staff Officers</td>
<td>j. Core Pre-deployment Training Materials (CPTMs)</td>
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<td>k. Directives on the Use of Force</td>
<td>k. UN Peacekeeping Pre-deployment Training Standards for Police</td>
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2. Existing mission-specific materials that annexes to reference manuals could draw upon

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<td>b. Mission plan</td>
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<td>c. List of resolutions/SG reports</td>
<td>c. Pre-deployment Information Packages (mission-specific)</td>
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<td>d. Pre-deployment Information Packages (mission-specific)</td>
<td>d. Mission-specific training requirements</td>
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<td>e. Concept of Operations</td>
<td>e. Footage of mission (for CD Rom)</td>
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<td>f. Force Requirements documents</td>
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<td>g. Rules of Engagement</td>
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Ms. Fatemeh Ziai, Research Adviser, Challenges Forum / Former Chief of Integrated Training Service, Department for Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

Introduction

The basis for consultation with contributing countries is found in Article 44 of the United Nations Charter, which provides that if a Member State not on the Council provides armed forces, the Council shall invite that member “to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member’s armed forces”.

The Security Council and Troop Contributing Countries (henceforth TCCs) have been grappling with the issue of consultations and information sharing since at least since the early 1990s, when enormous setbacks to peacekeeping in Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia lent urgency to resolution of the problem. From the start, the Council has acknowledged, in a progression of presidential statements and resolutions on this issue, that its decisions have important implications for Troop and Police Contributing Countries (henceforth T/PCCs) and that it supports the need for enhanced consultations and information exchange. Indeed, whereas no formal consultation mechanisms existed in the early 1990s, various structures were gradually introduced, beginning with regular and ad hoc meetings jointly chaired by the Council President and the Secretariat. Over the next years, a number of meetings were held to discuss this matter and presidential statements issued providing that consultations had to be timely, that there needed to be reporting on the outcome of consultations with T/PCCs, and highlighting the particular need for consultation when the Council was considering new mandates or significant changes to an existing mandate.9

Yet, T/PCCs continued to raise the inadequacy of consultations, leading to constant reiteration, examination and modification of existing procedures. Two Security

Council resolutions eventually set out a framework for consultations. Resolution 1327, adopted on 13 November 2000, underlined the importance of improved consultations and committed the Council to hold private meetings with T/PCCs, “including at their request, for a new or ongoing peacekeeping operation, during the implementation phase of an operation, when considering a change in, or renewal or completion of a peacekeeping mandate, or when a rapid deterioration in the situation on the ground threatens the safety and security of United Nations peacekeepers”.10

On 13 June 2001, resolution 1353 laid out an extensive set of procedures for (i) public and private meetings of the Security Council with the participation of T/PCCs, including at their request; (ii) consultation meetings with T/PCCs, convened and chaired by the president of the Security Council; and (iii) meetings between the Secretariat and T/PCCs, with high-level field participation, where appropriate.11

A presidential statement of the same day announced the establishment of a “Working Group of the Whole on United Nations peacekeeping operations”, as a complement to private meetings with T/PCCs. The working group would “seek the views of the T/PCCs … with a view to their views being taken into account by the Council”, in order for “members of the Council, relevant T/PCCs and the Secretariat to engage in a closer and more interactive dialogue”.

A presidential statement of 17 May 2004 further observed that TCCs “through their experience and expertise, can greatly contribute to the planning process and can assist the Security Council in taking appropriate, effective and timely decisions on peacekeeping operations”.

These resolutions and presidential statements provide more than enough mechanisms and detailed procedures for meaningful consultations between the Council and T/PCCs. The problem, from the point of view of T/PCCs, was that these were never adequately implemented.

Review of Recent Peacekeeping Reform Initiatives

The New Horizon. The key development related to peacekeeping reform this year has been the “New Horizon” process. The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS) initiated an internal analytical process aimed at identifying challenges and opportunities facing United Nations peacekeeping. As part of this process, a non-paper was


The New Horizon calls for “a renewed UN peacekeeping partnership to set a new horizon – a set of achievable immediate, medium and long term goals – to help configure UN peacekeeping to meet the challenges of today and tomorrow”. It seeks in-depth engagement with all peacekeeping stakeholders with a view to devising a shared and workable forward agenda for peacekeeping.

The paper details the challenges UN peacekeeping faces, with over 116,000 personnel deployed across 15 missions, stretching the UN’s personnel, logistics, finance and administration systems, while costs continue to grow. It highlights the difficulty of identifying the military capabilities the UN requires, coupled with the scarcity of specialized police and civilian skills its operations increasingly need. On the ground, UN mandates call for stabilization and the protection of civilians, although critical capabilities are lacking and underlying peace processes are often troubled or absent, complicating the UN’s transition and exit strategies. And amid continuing global political and security instability, all indications are that the need for peacekeeping will remain or grow.

The non-paper makes 20 proposals, some broad and others more detailed, to the Security Council, T/PCCs and the Secretariat, aimed at strengthening this global partnership. It outlines a broad reform agenda and includes a number of recommendations aimed at addressing the issue of consultations between the Security Council, the Secretariat and T/PCCs. The non-paper’s proposals include the following:

- **Political Strategy and Direction**: Peacekeeping operations should only be deployed if accompanied by an active political strategy. Support should be built through a consultative process, using coalitions of Member States to maintain unity of purpose and sustain support for the mission.
- **Planning and Managing Missions**: Sound mission planning and management require sustained dialogue between the Secretariat and Member States and between the field and Headquarters, while maintaining the impartiality of Secretariat planning and the integrity of command and control.
- **Rapid Deployment**: Rapid deployment is ultimately a function of political will but can be enhanced by focusing on the establishment of a mission Headquarters, a sequenced roll-out and prioritization of tasks.
- **Clarity and Delivery on Critical Roles**: Consensus on policy and requirements for robust peacekeeping and protection of civilians, as well as clarification of critical roles for peacebuilding tasks is required. Recurrent gaps and challenges to transition and exit for peacekeeping missions must also be addressed.
e. Crisis Management: Peacekeeping missions must be prepared to respond through accurate and detailed security risk assessment, scenario-planning and reliable reserve capacities.

f. Projecting Future Needs: Critical shortages in peacekeeping resources already exist and will be further constrained by the global financial environment. A new and comprehensive approach to resource generation and incentives is required to deliver results in the field.

g. A Capability-Driven Approach: UN peacekeeping needs to move from a quantitative focus to a qualitative approach emphasizing the generation of capabilities. This demands the development of standards and their systematic linkage to training, equipment and delivery on the ground.

h. Expanding the Peacekeeping Partnership. An expanded base of troop- and police-contributing countries is required to enhance collective burden-sharing and to meet the future requirements of UN peacekeeping.

i. A New Field Support Strategy: The complex, fast-paced nature of UN peacekeeping today requires a new support strategy, already underway, that includes the shared use of assets and the creation of regional service centres; a better use of technology to support lighter, more agile deployment; and improved financial arrangements for greater operational flexibility.

During a thematic debate of the Security Council on peacekeeping held on 5 August 2009 during the Presidency of the United Kingdom, the New Horizon non-paper was widely welcomed by Member States. Its key recommendations, including those concerning consultations among the Security Council, T/PCCs and the Secretariat, were endorsed in a presidential statement. At the same time, Member States noted the need for DPKO to prioritize and sequence the many proposals contained in the non-paper, and to provide further detail on some of the specific proposals. Since the non-paper was issued, DPKO/DFS have engaged in a number of meetings and briefings with Member States to brief them on the New Horizon and elicit their views.

In the New Horizon, the Secretariat has made significant commitments toward a “renewed partnership” among peacekeeping stakeholders. On the issue of consultations, DPKO/DFS have committed to “more systematically fulfill the requests of the Security Council in SCR 1327 and SCR 1353 to strengthen consultations with the Security Council and troop-and police-contributing countries on proposed tasks affecting their personnel ….” and “include information on consultations with troop- and police-contributing countries in regular reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on individual operations”.

Following the release of the non-paper, a DPKO/DFS strategy set out the immediate, short and medium term steps, as well as longer term issues that would need to
be tackled in connection with the New Horizon proposals. It also stressed the need for continuing consultations with Member States, field missions and UN and regional partners in elaborating the medium and longer term steps.

A communication was sent to all field and headquarters staff in October 2009 instructing them to implement a number of immediate “changes in practice” resulting from the New Horizon recommendations and implementation plan. These concern the structure, elements and preparation of formal briefings to T/PCCs and the Security Council; the reflection of T/PCC consultations in SG reports; briefings to Member States on Technical Assessment Missions (TAMs) to the field; and the elaboration of mission-specific benchmarks.

A number of these changes were immediately put into practice in the process leading up to the consultations on Liberia, Haiti and Lebanon that followed the 5 August Security Council debate. For example, the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations instructed staff to check with T/PCCs before the consultations to identify specific issues contributing countries wanted raised in the briefings and to ensure that these were included.

In some of the meetings, the advance consultations improved the quality of the dialogue, while in others, there was no discernible difference. It was felt that the Liberia meeting on 3 September, for example, was not qualitatively different to past consultations. This might have been because there were no really divisive issues related to Liberia at the time, or because the procedures were still quite new and it would take time before some T/PCCs grew accustomed to this way of doing business and take full advantage of it. The meeting on the mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), however, which took place the next day, was considered to have been a vast improvement as compared with past consultations between the Security Council and T/PCCs. At least ten T/PCCs participated, some at the Ambassadorial level, and the US Ambassador presiding over the meeting called it an “excellent discussion.” Based on conversations with contributing countries, it is clear that the Secretariat’s commitment to improving the quality of the debate has created considerable goodwill. The discussions around renewal of the mandate of the mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) at the end of this year could serve as a test case for how well both the Secretariat and the Council are translating new commitments on T/PCC consultations into practice.

Another significant proposal in the New Horizon commits DPKO and DFS to review, before the end of 2009, current reporting and information exchange procedures, for the benefit of both Member States and the Secretariat. In this regard, the Secretariat will be producing a proposal for updated and streamlined
reporting procedures. This will include a survey of Member States to determine their priorities in terms of reporting, and will also go a long way to show T/PCCs the Secretariat’s efforts to be responsive to their needs.

The UK/France Initiative. The Security Council has held three important thematic debates on peacekeeping this year. France held a debate during its Presidency of the Security Council in January 2009, during which it launched, together with the United Kingdom, a six-month process to review peacekeeping. The review was to focus on three themes:

a. The need to improve strategic oversight of peacekeeping operations, including planning, benchmarking and information flows between the Security Council, T/PCCs and the Secretariat;

b. Proposals for addressing resource constraints; and

c. Gaps between mandates and implementation.

The UK-France initiative drew increased attention to UN peacekeeping and encouraged a number of other countries to come forward with their own ideas and initiatives. Indeed, in the ensuing six months there was a strengthened dialogue, both in the Security Council and in several informal fora, on ways to monitor and evaluate progress in operations, and sessions with UN senior leadership on the strategic challenges facing peacekeeping operations.

With regard to the issue of consultations with contributing countries, however, many T/PCCs have pointed out that the increased focus on T/PCC consultations as part of this initiative was an evolving process. Indeed, the first “concept paper” in January focused on Council oversight and only touched on the subject of consultations. The latter was only incorporated into the review process at the insistence of T/PCCs, other Council members, including Costa Rica and Turkey (see below), and following recognition by Permanent Five members of the Council such as the United Kingdom and the United States of the importance of the issue. In the end, however, the review provided numerous useful opportunities for discussing how to engage meaningfully with T/PCCs.

The Turkish Security Council Debate. Building on the UK/France initiative, Turkey convened a thematic debate during its Presidency of the Council in June 2009, focusing on the Council’s relationship with T/PCCs and other stakeholders. The debate framed relations between the Council and T/PCCs as a critical one and a “cross-cutting element that touches on almost all aspects of peacekeeping”. It sought to address how communication with T/PCCs on tasks and capabilities could be improved and how cooperation could be strengthened on both generic aspects of peacekeeping and technical aspects relevant to specific missions. Contributing countries welcomed the opportunity to weigh in on these issues and made clear,
in their statements, the impact of consultations on the success of peacekeeping missions and mandates.

The United Kingdom Security Council Debate. During its Presidency of the Council in August 2009, the United Kingdom followed up on the UK-France initiative launched in January, by holding another thematic debate on peacekeeping. The debate was intended to be “forward-looking and focused on practical recommendations”.

The debate allowed for a valuable stock-taking of the review process over the past 6 months, with statements focusing on the themes that had been prominent the whole year, including the value of better consultation with contributing countries, the need for better planning and clear and achievable mandates, and the importance of benchmarking.

The presidential statement of 5 August listed the practices that had been developed over the past six months to improve the Councils’ dialogue with the Secretariat and T/PCCs and stressed the need for the following:

a. Ensuring that mandates are clear, credible, achievable and appropriately resourced;
b. Reviewing and adjusting mandates and missions;
c. Better information sharing on military operational challenges, better Council access to military advice and increasing its interaction with the Secretariat; and
d. Weighing the full range of responses and engage in peacekeeping only as an accompaniment to a political strategy; and
e. Increased interaction with the Secretariat in the early phase of mandate drafting and throughout mission deployment.

In addition to showing its commitment to the issue by hosting three thematic debates on peacekeeping that all touched on or focused on the issue of consultations, the presidential statement of 5 August also demonstrated that the Council intended to take real steps to improve consultations. These would include:

[Earlier and more meaningful engagement with troop- and police-contributing countries before the renewal or modification of the mandate of a peacekeeping operation. The Council welcomes practical suggestions to deepen such consultations. It recognizes that through their experience and expertise, troop- and police-contributing countries can greatly contribute to effective planning, decision-making and deployment of peacekeeping operations. In this regard, the Council welcomes the interim report of the Security Council Working Group]
(S/2009/398) and encourages it to continue to address the issue of cooperation with troop- and police-contributing countries and other stakeholders. The Council commits to making progress on this issue, and to reviewing its progress in 2010.\textsuperscript{12}

The Council also indicated that it would conduct a further review of peacekeeping in 2010.

When asked about the presidential statement, T/PCCs expressed the view that it seemed to demonstrate that the Council wanted to engage seriously on this issue, but most preferred to reserve judgment for another six months or so, to ensure that concrete changes came about. They pointed out, however, that the new timetable the Council had adopted for consultations (beginning with the discussion of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in August, under the UK Presidency, and continuing into the US Presidency in September), according to which T/PCC consultations are held, followed by Council deliberations the following week, and a Council decision the third week, actually allows time for the Council to listen to T/PCCs before its own deliberations and decision. This practice has been met enthusiastically by other Council members and T/PCCs alike, and it is hoped it will continue.

The Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping. Another important development this year was the revitalization, under the chairmanship of Japan, of the Security Council Working Group of the Whole on Peacekeeping (the “Working Group”). The Working Group was established in January 2001, during an earlier effort by the Council to strengthen cooperation with T/PCCs. When Japan resumed chairmanship of the Working Group in January 2009, it held a first meeting at the ambassadorial level to discuss how the group could be revitalized. It was agreed that a series of thematic discussions would be held around specific missions and that the Working Group would seek “first-hand feedback from T/PCCs on conditions on the ground”.

The second meeting of the Working Group took place on 29 April 2009, with the participation of T/PCCs, Security Council members and other stakeholders, and addressed the issue of “gaps between mandates and their implementation”, including the presentation of case studies by the Secretariat on MINSUTAH and MONUC. Five other meetings have since followed.

One of the key issues raised in these meetings has been how to enhance cooperation with T/PCCs. In the course of the discussions, it has been proposed that more
meaningful use be made of existing mechanisms, such as Security Council meetings with contributing countries and the Working Group itself, rather than creating new mechanisms. The need for information-sharing with T/PCCs, the need to advance a common understanding of peacekeeping among the various stakeholders, and to expand the base of T/PCCs to ensure geographical balance have also been raised.

By all accounts, the meetings held so far this year have allowed for a high-quality, interactive dialogue among the relevant actors. The important contribution that this dialogue has made to strengthening the consultation process between T/PCCs and the Council was widely cited in the statements of contributing countries in the 5 August thematic debate on peacekeeping, as well as in interviews for this paper. The Working Group planned to begin, in October 2009, an in-depth consideration of how it could further enhance cooperation with T/PCCs and other stakeholders.

As pointed out by Costa Rica in its statement at the 5 August debate, “the level of interaction and participation of T/PCCs has been greater and more substantial in the meeting of the Working Group than in private meetings of the Council with T/PCCs. This experience leads us to suggest that greater use be made of the consultation mechanisms and the Working Group”. Following the changes implemented by the Secretariat based on the New Horizon, the quality of discussion in the private meetings is also likely to improve. Nevertheless, the Working Group offers a forum for in-depth and interactive discussion, and its focus on thematic issues allows for a common understanding to be achieved on key peacekeeping issues. The Working Group is also mandated to discuss technical aspects of individual peacekeeping operations, which it has done in the past and could usefully continue. In addition, as one Security Council member stated, “informal settings are best for meaningful consultations. The format of the Security Council consultations tends to be very formal and even the set-up of the room can make people reluctant to talk.”

At the same time, a few TCCs have remarked that some Security Council members have been reserved in their enthusiasm for the Working Group’s discussions of thematic issues. Although several Council members praised the Working Group at the 5 August debate on peacekeeping, and have thus made a commitment to support the mechanism, T/PCCs have noted that these mechanisms place an additional burden on the Security Council – a necessary burden, in the minds of T/PCCs, but a burden nonetheless – and that the Council might, therefore, soon revert to its old habits of having mechanisms in place that were not really implemented.

Moreover, the Working Group risks overlap with the C-34, which sees discussion of the thematic and cross-cutting peacekeeping issues as part of its own mandate; therefore, the Working Group should continue to focus on operational issues. And finally, while the efforts of Japan as chair have been highly appreciated, T/PCCs understand that, as a member of the Security Council, Japan, and future chairs, would not want the Working Group to turn into a divisive body among Council members. This can be avoided if the Security Council is fully engaged in the Working Group’s discussions and proactive in following up on them.

The Canadian Initiative. Underlining the importance of a substantive discussion with all stakeholders, the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, together with the Center on International Cooperation in New York, launched a series of panel discussions to explore critical issues confronting the future of UN peacekeeping operations. The series draws on expertise from practitioners, NGOs, academics and the UN community. At the first event, which took place on 26 May 2009, the Under-Secretaries-General for Peacekeeping and for Mission Support addressed the symptoms and causes of peacekeeping overstretch. A second event took place on 11 September 2009, examining the “Political Dimensions of Peace Operations”. A further three or four panel discussions are planned over the next eight months to allow more in-depth discussion of priority peacekeeping challenges. Each event is preceded by a concept note, which is circulated to all Member States, and the discussions are also open to the full membership.

These events have presented yet another forum where the Security Council, T/PCCs, the Secretariat and other stakeholders can engage in a more in-depth discussion of common concerns related to peacekeeping. One of the goals has also been to support a higher quality debate in the C-34, especially on peacekeeping policy issues, and ensure that the various actors have a shared view of the challenges being faced, particularly on some of the issues that have proven divisive to date.

Changing US Policy. One important sign of a new Council approach is the clear change in policy that the United States has signaled vis-à-vis the UN, and peacekeeping in particular, since the election of President Obama. In a series of speeches, the Permanent Representative of the United States has made clear that the United States is “dramatically changing [its] approach to the United Nations” and entering “a new era of engagement” during which the United States “is willing to listen, respect differences and consider new ideas”.14

In an important symbolic gesture, President Obama met with leading TCCs at UN Headquarters on 23 September, in the margins of the General Debate of the General Assembly, to “express appreciation for their sacrifice, and to exchange views on how to strengthen our efforts to meet common challenges”. This provided a clear signal that the US’s relationship with other Member States, including T/PCCs, would be very different moving forward.

This reinforced the message that the Permanent Representative had been conveying in the Council. During the Turkish debate, she stated that the US would be “open-minded about practical suggestions to deepen consultations among troop and police contributors, the Security Council and the Secretariat…. In these consultations, we should also be clear about what we are asking of troop contributors and what we are willing to do to assist them”. During the 5 August debate she stated that “The T/PCCs bring a wealth of experience to discussions related to adopting new mandates or renewing old ones”. She also noted that mandate renewals for the missions in Haiti, Liberia and the Congo were approaching and promised that the United States would “welcome early dialogue with T/PCCs”.

In August, under the United Kingdom Presidency of the Council, the UK Permanent Mission made some important changes in T/PCC consultations. In a departure from past Council practice, consultations on the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) were scheduled one week before the Council was to renew the mission’s mandate. The Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom opened the meeting by encouraging participation and discussion and speaking highly of the contribution of T/PCCs. For T/PCCs, this represented a clear change of tone with regard to consultations.

The US took up the Presidency of the Security Council in September, just after the UK-chaired UNIFIL meeting and following the series of changes announced by the Secretariat regarding the conduct of consultations. The US Permanent Mission made a great effort to include the views of T/PCCs in the consultations it was to chair that month, by mobilizing contributors to attend the meetings in large numbers and to speak up. Taking its cue from the United Kingdom, the US Ambassador went to great lengths in her opening remarks at the first consultations of the month, on the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), to encourage T/PCCs to be vocal, stating that the purpose of the consultations was genuine interactive dialogue with T/PCCs and for them to have an opportunity to share their experiences and concerns. That meeting, and a subsequent consultation scheduled for that month, also took place one week prior to mandate renewal, following the UK example and making good on commitments in the New Horizon and the 5 August presidential statement.
The efforts made by the US Permanent Mission, coupled with the broader policy changes announced, have created a sense of promise that the US will have a positive impact on peacekeeping moving forward. Another positive sign is that the new US direction furthered efforts already begun by the United Kingdom the previous month. The coming months will tell whether the Council as a whole can build on this approach.

Why T/PCC Consultations are Still an Issue

Motivations behind T/PCC Calls for Consultations. “In reality”, as one TCC stated, “each T/PCC wants something different when it raises the lack of consultations”. For some, there are political considerations at play – their contribution to peacekeeping is so significant that they feel it is only appropriate to consult them on significant political and policy issues, especially when these will impact on their troops. Others may be seeking a more prominent profile within the UN, or more command positions in the field, based on the scale of their contributions. On the other hand, not all T/PCCs are preoccupied with the issue of consultation. Some are more concerned that the costs and complexity of peacekeeping are growing, while the reimbursement scheme has remained stagnant. Others are more focused on political and policy concerns such as the core principles of peacekeeping and the perceived intrusiveness of modern peacekeeping mandates on national sovereignty. In fact, there is no one T/PCC position on any issue, or even a united approach.

The T/PCCs that have been most vocal regarding consultations state that they are not asking to be consulted for the sake of being consulted; rather, their primary concern is that Security Council mandates, instead of being “clear and achievable”, as recommended in the landmark report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the “Brahimi Report”), are increasingly unrealistic and not implementable. Nor do mandates adequately consider the conditions on the ground and the limited pool of resources available for UN peacekeeping.

TCCs feel that they are asked to put troops on the ground and in harm’s way, but are then not adequately consulted when mandates for complex missions are developed, changed or extended. Yet, they feel they know the situation on the ground better than the Security Council, which usually includes few, if any, TCCs, and could thus help the Council make more informed decisions. Instead, complex mandates are adopted or changed and large number of troops authorized, with insufficient thought given to the operating environment, the assets those troops will require to carry out their tasks, and how many TCCs will even sign up for that particular job.
One Member State agreed that “since TCCs are present on the ground and the Security Council does not always have TCCs as members, a ‘reality check’ from TCCs would be useful. But what we cannot have is the TCCs vetoing what the Council thinks needs to be done”. Nevertheless, unless discussions about sensitive issues such as robust peacekeeping and protection of civilians take place in an inclusive manner before mandate development, the problems will persist.

The Security Council’s Position. These demands point to some fundamental questions that underlie this debate, and complicate its resolution: What constitutes a “major” T/PCC? What are the criteria for having a seat at the table – is it based purely on numbers? Or is it based on the complexity of the mission in which a T/PCC participates and the role its personnel play? And finally, who determines whether a change in mandate or approach will affect all T/PCCs equally and whether and when each one must be consulted?

The Security Council has traditionally treaded carefully when it comes to the issue of T/PCC consultations. Its main concern is that as the organ with primary responsibility for international peace and security, it is wary of T/PCCs encroaching on its decision-making prerogative. The Council is generally open to hearing from prospective contributors prior to mandate adoption, when T/PCCs have not yet pledged their personnel or deployed, because it wants to determine what it is likely to end up with in terms of contributions. T/PCCs then decide whether to sign up once the mandate and the mission’s “concept of operations” have been issued, and must then follow those.

The issue of post-mandate and post-deployment consultation, however, is a different one: the Council is reluctant to engage T/PCCs at this stage, whereas T/PCCs feel that if there are developments on the ground, the basis on which they deployed could suddenly change, placing their personnel at risk. This is precisely when they feel they should be consulted, and their experience and knowledge of the situation on the ground taken into account by the Council.

As one TCC put it, “Everyone knows there is a gap between mandates and resources. Recent events, such as the fact that the Somalia mandate was not approved, show that the Council is beginning to understand that they can’t just authorize a huge number of troops without knowing what they will get and whether those troops will be properly-equipped.” The Council is, of course, keenly aware of the gap between the supply and demand for peacekeeping, and has come to realize that the issue needs to be addressed. As India has made clear, for example, its capacity to contribute to peacekeeping is enormous, but it will not continue to do so unless it sees fundamental changes in this relationship.
The possibility that early consultations with T/PCCs will show that there is a lack of support for a mandate poses a clear dilemma for the Council. Equally damaging, however, is when T/PCCs agree to deploy but are then unable to deliver on the ground when the situation gets tough, as has happened in Darfur and the Congo. Thus, the Council’s authority must be balanced with its effectiveness as an actor, because nothing undermines its credibility as much as T/PCCs departing from a Council mandate or refusing to perform in a peacekeeping operation.

Thus, the need to keep T/PCCs on board is certainly one of the key factors motivating the Council to engage in this discussion. However, there is also a recognition, in the words of one Council member, that “the credibility of the UN as a whole suffers when mandates are not implemented”, so it is in everyone’s interest to address this issue.

Lack of Meaningful Consultations. Although a number of positive changes have recently taken place concerning consultations, which are fully acknowledged by T/PCCs, the longstanding practice is described by T/PCCs as follows. First, although elaborate mechanisms for consultation have long existed, T/PCCs feel that these have generally not been adhered to. As one TCC put it, “The problem has been one of institutional culture. There is a feeling that dealing with TCCs and scheduling meetings just creates more work for the Council and especially for the Secretariat”.

As a result, T/PCCs feel that consultations have been pro forma and formulaic, with no opportunity for an interactive discussion. At times, key political developments to which the Council was privy, and which affected its decisions, were not even mentioned at meetings, and T/PCCs learned of these after the fact. Meetings have also tended to be very brief – often as short as 30 minutes – leaving little if any time for Council members to react. As one TCC expressed it “We do not want it to be a one-way street; we also want to hear the reactions of Council members to what we say or what is being decided, but there is never enough time.”

Of even greater concern is that consultations have generally taken place just before a mandate is about to be adopted or extended, making it nearly impossible for the Council to take into account T/PCC feedback and input. One TCC described the process as follows: “Typically, we would be invited to a ‘consultation’ at 2 p.m. in which we would basically be briefed on the resolution the Council was going to adopt at 3 p.m. at a closed meeting. This gave us no time to go back to our capital or provide real input. What is the point of speaking at such a meeting or raising any problems?” This frustration echoes the views of all T/PCCs interviewed for this report.
Most Security Council members agreed that this format was far from ideal, but explained that meetings were scheduled this way because senior officials from the field were in NY for the Security Council meeting and could conduct the T/PCC briefings as well. One Security Council member, who agreed that the timing was not workable, actually suggested that consultations with contributing countries should really take place 90 days before mandate renewal.

Following the Council’s statement in the presidential statement of 5 August and the changes implemented by the Secretariat in New Horizon, it is believed that a genuine effort has been made to address many of these problems. Another positive change, introduced by the United Kingdom in the closed consultations on UNIFL in August, was that a conscious effort was made to refer, in the UK’s national statement, to the issues and concerns that had been raised by TCCs in the UNIFL consultation the prior week. This showed that TCCs were not just being asked to state their views in the consultations, only to be forgotten when decisions were being taken, and is an important practice for the Council to follow in future.

Insufficient Secretariat Engagement. T/PCCs have also been dissatisfied with briefings by the Secretariat. They feel that the Secretariat has not approached meetings and consultations with a view to dialogue, but rather as an obligation that must be carried out as quickly as possible, allowing them to return to their “real work”. This attitude, which some T/PCCs feel is prevalent among Secretariat staff, also applies to requests to Secretariat desk officers for information. Often, T/PCCs complain, DPKO staff members do not return calls and treat requests from T/PCCs as something they will respond to if they have time.

T/PCCs recognize that the Secretariat is overstretched but believe that “a change in attitude” is required to build confidence among contributing countries and bring about an effective dialogue. In short, a culture of service is required. Some in the Secretariat point out that the deadlines set by the Council have made meaningful engagement by the Secretariat nearly impossible. The Secretariat is also reliant on the input that it receives from field missions when responding to the queries of permanent missions. When this information is late or not sufficiently detailed, the Secretariat’s hands are tied. This points to a critical need, also highlighted in the New Horizon, for Member States to help strengthen the operational to strategic link in UN command and control, in particular between mission headquarters and DPKO.

Another complaint by T/PCCs is that the focus of the meetings is not made clear by the Secretariat. Is it to discuss political issues or operational ones? Is it to brief on what has already happened or been decided? Or is it to consult with T/PCCs
prior to future decisions? This lack of clarity was acknowledged by one Council member, who added that when the focus of the meeting is not clear, T/PCCs may not know whether it is best to be represented by a political or military/police adviser; as a result, the right people are not always present in the room.

Again, the commitments made in the New Horizon, and the changes immediately implemented in the consultations following issuance of the non-paper have convinced T/PCCs that the Secretariat is committed to changing past practice.

Repercussions on the Ground. A lack of consultations has obvious repercussions for the operations of national contingents on the ground. As stated by the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations during the 5 August Security Council open debate, “Unrealistic mandates have led to situations in which mission personnel are forced to ask national contingents to undertake tasks and utilize contingent-owned equipment in a manner inconsistent with the legal framework under which they were employed”.15

He then referred to India’s recent experience in the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), where “changes in the rules of engagement and concept of operations were communicated to the TCCs after they had been authorized. I reiterate that being informed is not the same as being consulted”. In a later discussion, India stated that although the Secretariat had argued that it had consulted the contingents on the ground, this was not adequate, because it was the Government of India that needed to be consulted.

Absence of T/PCC Perspective. Another concern is that the formal consultation structures do not allow for the “T/PCC perspective” to feed into ongoing discussions and decisions on peacekeeping mandates and operations. In its statement during the 5 August open debate, for example, the Permanent Representative of Pakistan stated that what was required was “not only enhanced dialogue and consultation but also adequate representation of the major TCCs at the leadership level in the field and, particularly, at Headquarters”. This would feed the perspective of “professional soldiers who have already carried out these tasks on the ground” into the planning and management of missions.16

Uruguay also stressed, in its statement, the need to increase the level of T/PCC representation, especially at the senior level, at Headquarters and in the field, “because we fully believe that communication in the field and between the

15  S/PV.6178, Statement of India to 5 August thematic debate of the Security Council.
16  S/PV.6178, Statement of Pakistan to 5 August thematic debate of the Security Council.
field and Headquarters regarding the implementation of mandates would be significantly improved by enhanced feedback between national systems and the Organization” 17

The Indian Permanent Representative linked the issue of consultation to the success of the broader goals of peacekeeping, stating that “…the future effectiveness of peacekeeping lies in its ability to harness national governance capacities in affected countries. The challenge lies in applying … the capacities and knowledge of countries that have undergone successful post-colonial nation-building exercises. The Council therefore needs to expand the ambit of its consultations to include these countries.” 18

Consultations not Effectively Used by T/PCCs. Security Council members concede that consultations with T/PCCs have not taken place early enough and that there has not been enough time for a Council member to change his/her speech or the text of a resolution, no matter what a T/PCC might say during the consultation.

However, both Security Council members and the Secretariat believe that T/PCCs have not made effective use of the consultations either. They note that many Military Advisors do not attend consultations; those who do often remain silent or raise minor technical issues instead of strategic or critical operational ones. In short, they are not always prepared to engage on issues that might influence the Council’s decision-making, such as flaws in the concept of operations. In some cases, it might reflect the fact that some T/PCC Permanent Missions are modest and under-resourced, and thus lack the capacity to contribute as larger missions might. In other cases, this might be due to a simple lack of preparation.

At times, however, the lack of participation could indicate that Permanent Missions, and Military Advisers in particular, are not receiving the key messages, often political, from their capitals and need to build better ties with the political and military establishments in their capital. It could also indicate that a proper chain of information from the contingents on the ground to the capital and then on to New York needs to be developed or improved. As one Secretariat official stated, “Capitals need to own a mission for its life – not just each time there is a crisis”. This would require a regular and reliable chain of communication. This problem is certainly not unique to T/PCCs – indeed, the disconnect between permanent missions and capitals, as well as between the same country’s representatives sitting on the Security Council and the General Assembly, or on different committees of the General Assembly, such as the Fifth Committee and the C-34, has long

18  S/PV.6178, Statement of India to 5 August thematic debate of the Security Council.
been considered a structural weakness of the system in New York, and has real implications for future consultation mechanisms.

Several T/PCCs acknowledged that their fellow T/PCCs often come to meetings unprepared and uninformed, thus forfeiting a valuable opportunity to influence the Council’s decision-making. In part, however, they believe these habits have formed due to a history of *pro forma* consultations, where the opportunity to convey useful input to the Secretariat or the Council has been so limited. Thus, a vicious circle has developed whereby each side assumes the other is not committed to serious dialogue.

Another dimension, raised by an SRSG, is that the dialogue in the field between national contingents and the mission actually tends to be quite good, because “everyone in the field sees themselves as part of the UN”. The situation gets more complicated at Headquarters, where the UN’s agenda and national interests are often seen as divergent. Yet “T/PCC representatives at Headquarters prefer to engage with DPKO than with the field, and the only contact they actually have with the field is the perfunctory briefings that SRSGs provide at the consultations. They know when SRSGs and Force Commanders are in town – they should ask for meetings and get briefings. They should also consider travelling to the field to have more first-hand knowledge of what is happening”.

There are, of course, other mechanisms for consultation outside of New York permanent missions. TCC commanders and the Embassies of their countries could, for example, be consulted in the field, and the Permanent Five members of the Council could even use their diplomatic presences to conduct bilateral consultations with key T/PCCs in capitals, well in advance of mandate adoption or renewal.

**Mission Planning and Command and Control.** Concerns over DPKO/DFS mission planning and management and whether command and control arrangements between UN Headquarters and the field are robust enough surfaced as a central theme in this year’s peacekeeping debates and led to questions about whether more Member State oversight is warranted.

Much of this was brought on by the crisis in the Congo in late 2008, following which the TCCs involved made clear their dissatisfaction over their troops suddenly being drawn into operations that had not been contemplated when they initially deployed. They expressed dissatisfaction with Secretariat management and planning of the mission and made clear that there were certain lines their troops would not cross in the field. As one TCC put it, “If there is a change in the concept of operations, major TCCs should be consulted first. Because if we do not
agree, we are later blamed indirectly for not doing what they had decided”. The demand of major T/PCCs was clear: “We want to engage with the Council and the Secretariat from the very inception of the mission, including the initial planning stages and changes in mandate”.

The Congo crisis also brought home for the Council how little oversight it actually has over missions, prompting it to demand more involvement in planning. The presidential statement of 5 August states that the Council “intends to increase its interaction with the Secretariat in the early phase of mandate drafting”. While the Council’s growing concerns over Secretariat planning had more to do with the impact of planning on the outcome and success of missions, for T/PCCs, the questions raised about planning reflect concerns about what their personnel will be asked to do on the ground. Thus, while the concerns of the Council and the T/PCCs are different, they have both been framed with the debate about command and control and the strengths and weaknesses of planning.

As missions have grown more and more complex, the Secretariat has realized that it is unrealistic to expect T/PCCs to continue to engage in complex and risky activities without consulting them. The New Horizon thus commits DPKO and DFS to “review and strengthen mechanisms for more inclusive planning for robust…. operations” and that “[t]his process must include a dialogue with Member States to ensure that troop and police contributors deploying to missions with robust concepts of operation are consulted and understand and accept assigned tasks and rules of engagement….” It also states that when a rapid response is called for due to conditions on the ground or the deployment of significant new capabilities, a greater level of information-sharing with T/PCCs is required. Thus, it commits to “strengthen contributors’ confidence in mission planning and command and control by [engaging] with members of the Security Council and contributing countries on strengthening mechanisms for consultation and interaction on mission planning processes within the framework of UN command and control”. All of this will take time to develop but could represent a significant shift from past practice.

With regard to Technical Assessment missions (TAMs), DPKO/DFS has undertaken, in the New Horizon, to consult Member States systematically on the objectives and parameters of a TAM before deploying, and to include T/PCCs in this dialogue once their personnel have deployed. The question is whether and how this process could be further opened up to T/PCCs in the initial stages of planning.

Thus far, the Council has agreed that the concept of operations should be presented to T/PCCs and welcomes a discussion of it, but not that contributors be involved in developing or revising it. The Secretariat has also balked at engaging T/PCCs, or the Council, for that matter, in each and every aspect of mission planning,
which it feels would impede the Secretariat’s ability to plan and manage missions. A Secretariat official expressed the concern that “there are only a limited number of people out of the 192 Member States who can be seated at the table before the process becomes completely unwieldy”. One TCC agreed, commenting that, “TCCs have to understand that they have to delegate command of operations to the Secretariat. You cannot have unlimited consultation with 192 Member States. But TCCs need to be able to express their concerns and provide real feedback – the two are not [mutually exclusive].”

The issue that arises, as the non-paper points out, is how to maintain the proper balance between inclusiveness, on the one hand, and the impartiality and efficiency of the Secretariat and the need to preserve unified command and control, on the other. At the same time, in view of the complexity and risks of the tasks being asked of peacekeepers, the Secretariat may have to be less protective than ever before with regard to its own impartiality. Simply put, an impartial mission plan that does not work is a less desirable outcome than a mission plan influenced by key T/PCCs, but which stands a chance of success.

Since some T/PCCs have been quite vocal on this issue, they could present involvement in planning as a precondition to participation in peacekeeping. And if DPKO/DFS hope to re-engage those T/PCCs, primarily Western countries, who left peacekeeping in the 1990s, those countries are likely to do the same. In light of the commitments made in the New Horizon and with the threat of under-resourced peacekeeping operations looming large, the key questions are no longer about whether T/PCCs should be involved in planning, but how: How early should consultations with potential T/PCCs begin before establishment of a new mission or before mandate renewal? Would all T/PCCs be involved and, if not, how would a ceiling be set? Would T/PCCs who have not made a commitment yet be included? Or would only the major T/PCCs participate? And what would be the actual modalities for consultation? Could some initial forms of direct involvement in planning be considered, which could then be extended to other missions if successful? A fallback position has been to call for replication of structures and procedures of other organizations such as the European Union, but this is not a feasible solution for the UN. Instead, the Secretariat and Member States will need to engage in some difficult discussions in the coming months to find a realistic way forward.

The Strategic Military Cell for UNIFIL. One example of an effort to address concerns about consultation and planning was the Strategic Military Cell (SMC), established in 2006 in connection with the expansion of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Following the cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006, the Security Council authorized an almost
eight-fold increase in the strength of the mission to 15,000 troops. It was expected that a significant number of the new troops would come from European countries, representing the most sizable European deployment in a UN peacekeeping operation since the early 1990s.

One of the key conditions of the European contributors for participation in the expanded force was that a special cell be set up at New York Headquarters to provide “strategic military guidance” to UNIFIL. The SMC liaises directly with the UNIFIL Force Commander and reports directly to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. It comprises representatives from the various TCCs present in UNIFIL as well as one each from the Permanent Five members of the Security Council; the SMC is approximately two-thirds European, as three of the four largest contributors to UNFIL are Italy, France and Spain.

The creation of this unprecedented parallel structure initially prompted some leading T/PCCs to ask whether a double standard exists for European contributors, since no structures involving headquarters planning or command functions exist for the missions in which developing countries are deployed; indeed, they have had to struggle even to be consulted on critical changes to mandates. A Secretariat review found that while the temporary reinforcement for rapid planning was potentially valuable, the SMC’s large and unwieldy structure and its disconnect from the Office of Military Affairs were problematic. It concluded that any future mechanisms would have to fall under existing command and control structures. The C-34 has also made references to the need to follow established frameworks.

The experience raises certain important questions for the future: Could the SMC model or something approximating it be replicated in future operations where non-Western countries are involved, if it can serve the important purpose of providing a degree of confidence to their national command? If so, is the composition – representatives of the P-5, together with the leading TCCs – the right one? What other means can be found to make available to the Office of Military Affairs the guidance, lessons learned and information exchange that the SMC provided?

The Military Staff Committee. A suggestion put on the table by Russia, and supported by France, is to revitalize the Security Council’s Military Staff Committee (“MSC”), composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the Permanent Five members and which, according to the UN Charter, shall “advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council’s military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security [and] the employment

19 The United Kingdom has never exercised its option to serve on the SMC.
and command of forces placed at its disposal….” 20 Russia has proposed that the Military Staff Committee be expanded to include all 15 Council members, so that “the work of the Security Council on the military aspects of peacekeeping [is] further systematized”. 21

There has, so far, not been much movement on this proposal within the Council. The Secretariat feels that better military advice could enable the Security Council to produce a more workable plan for missions, but it is rightly concerned about the feasibility of continually bringing military plans before the Council for an expert opinion. As for T/PCCs, such a mechanism simply reinforces the current imbalance between them and the Council. Thus, proponents of this proposal on the Council need to demonstrate exactly how it would lead to better mandates, which would presumably also be in the interest of T/PCCs.

The Charter does provide, however, that Member States not represented on the MSC can be “invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee’s responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work”. 22 This would allow the Council to invite the ten elected members of the Council, as well as military advisers from major TCCs, to participate in informal meetings, when appropriate. One occasion might be the period leading up to the renewal of MONUC, when TCC military experts could provide the Council with very useful military expertise.

Otherwise, the focus will probably remain on a new initiative, welcomed in the 5 August presidential statement, whereby increased use is to be made of meetings between Council Members and the Secretariat at the political-military expert level. While this mechanism, which has been used this year to increase expert-level interaction between the Council and the Secretariat, is not a substitute for consultations with T/PCCs, it could achieve the same objective by assisting the Council in making more informed decisions.

The Role of the C-34. The Committee of 34, or the Special Committee on Peacekeeping, is the General Assembly committee that is mandated to conduct a comprehensive review of all issues relating to peacekeeping, and report on these to the General Assembly. The C-34 is comprised of 144 Member States that are mostly past or current contributors to peacekeeping operations.

21 S/PV.6178, Statement of Russia to 5 August thematic debate of the Security Council.
The relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly has been difficult at times, with the C-34 feeling that the Council has overstepped its authority in addressing broader peacekeeping issues and policies beyond specific operational mandates. Thus, many T/PCCs, which are members of the C-34 but not the Security Council, as well as the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), whose members contribute 87% of troops and police to peacekeeping operations have pushed for a more prominent role for the C-34.23

As Uruguay stated in its statement at the 5 August debate, “...seeking as broad a consensus as possible among all Member States would not only ensure the greater legitimacy of and weaker resistance to such action, but would also generate stronger commitment among all those involved in its implementation. Thus, the role of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping must be re-evaluated, and to that end we must all strive to build confidence among those involved”.24

The NAM has also called for the C-34, the Security Council and the Secretariat to “coordinate all efforts in a coherent and strategic direction for peacekeeping”.25 In this context, it has underlined that the C-34 remains “the only United Nations forum mandated to review comprehensively the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects....” and noted that the C-34 is, therefore, the appropriate forum for discussing the ideas and suggestions put forth in the New Horizon non-paper.

The 5 August presidential statement recognized that “further debate is required among Member States, including in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, to develop a wider consensus on a range of issues....” This would seem to be a good opportunity for the Council and the C-34 to engage in a dialogue to achieve consensus on key issues and find more effective ways to work together.

**Ad Hoc Groups.** One mechanism that both Member States and the Secretariat cite as being effective in maintaining unity with regard to a mission are the informal “groups of friends” or ad hoc groups that are established in support of a peacekeeping operation or a peace process. The Groups of Friends of Haiti and the Core Group for Timor L’Este are considered to be particularly effective. The Core Group for Timor L’Este, for example, usually meets several weeks before a mandate renewal, providing participants with a real opportunity to affect the direction to be taken. The Haiti group includes all the leading TCCs and, perhaps because of the regional ties of the leading TCCs, has put forth unified

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23 S/PV.167 (resumption1), Statement of Morocco to the 5 August thematic debate of the Security Council.
25 S/PV.167 (resumption1), Statement of Morocco to the 5 August thematic debate of the Security Council.
TCC positions and contributed to useful discussions about the political direction of the mission. Both the Timor L’Este and Haiti groups have also been involved in drafting and defending resolutions. This model has been pointed to as quite effective in giving TCCs a voice and allowing opinions on a mission’s future direction influence the decisions of the Council. The fact that the September consultations on Haiti were particularly effective has also been attributed to the existence of this mechanism.

At present, key missions such as the one in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan do not have a Groups of Friends, and Member States and Secretariat staff alike agree that the establishment of such groups could be very useful. The Group of Friends for Darfur, meanwhile, does not include T/PCCs, and does not, therefore, provide an opportunity for hearing the T/PCC perspective.

The New Horizon non-paper states that such coalitions are “critical to building a purposeful partnership and a clear political strategy behind a peacekeeping mission”. It proposes that the Security Council “consider establishing, with interested Member States, informal mission-specific coalitions of engaged stakeholders to assist the Secretary-General in securing or sustaining the necessary political and operational support”. The Security Council and the Secretariat will need to discuss, in the coming months, how this proposal can be realized.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Significant progress has been made this year, in a relatively short period and largely within an environment of consensus, in bridging the gap between the Security Council and T/PCCs on the issue of consultations. The Security Council has made noteworthy commitments and begun to put these into practice. T/PCCs also believe that there is now very serious engagement on the part of DPKO and DFS. Significantly, it has become clear that participation of T/PCCs in the debate on the challenges facing peacekeeping operations is crucial – not as a concession to T/PCCs, but because a true, high quality debate can qualitatively improve Security Council mandates and a peacekeeping operation’s chances of success. To be sure, the discussions for this report made clear that much remains to be done, but there appears to be real momentum and the environment around the issue has become markedly positive.

In the past decade, significant reforms have changed UN peacekeeping in far-reaching ways. And yet, as the New Horizon demonstrates, many of the challenges identified at that time remain unaddressed and require a renewed commitment from Member States and the Secretariat if they are to be properly tackled. In the
next three years, the New Horizon process will engage the Secretariat, the Security Council, the C-34 and individual T/PCCs, as proposals are reviewed and decisions taken. As far as the issue of consultation is concerned, the changes and good practices that have already emerged during this year of reflection on peacekeeping should be systematized and further built upon. This should be done with a view to addressing not only the problems being faced today, but also those likely to surface in the coming decade of peacekeeping.

The Security Council, T/PCCs and the Secretariat each have a distinct role and set of responsibilities but they need to work in partnership, as advocated by the New Horizon. In supporting this new partnership agenda, the Challenges partnership may wish to discuss the following proposals and what steps Challenges can take to support the Security Council, the Secretariat, the C-34 and capitals on this issue.

The Security Council:

a. The Council has committed to making progress on “early and meaningful engagement” with T/PCCs. This should take place over the entire life of a mission. The Council should continue and step up the efforts made thus far, and systematize any positive changes introduced. It should be supported in the review scheduled for 2010 of its own progress on this issue.

b. The Permanent Five members should hold informal MSC meetings around key missions such as MONUC and invite military experts from the ten elected Council members and major T/PCCs to participate.

c. To inject more perspectives in the Council’s decision-making, elected members should ensure that their contributions reflect the views of their regional groups.

d. The use of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations should be encouraged and expanded, and it should develop a focused agenda around a limited set of concrete and achievable objectives (such as the issue of informal coalitions).

Secretariat:

General:

a. The Secretariat should continue the new measures to improve consultations with T/PCCs and the Security Council, including advance discussions to identify T/PCC priority issues for briefings.

b. The Secretariat will need to move forward quickly with its proposal to survey Member States for their priority information requirements. This undertaking, which aims to streamline and improve reporting, should not be used by Member States merely to propose additional reporting requirements, but rather to honestly and transparently take stock of
existing mechanisms and help build a more effective system for information exchange.

c. The Secretariat could also take advantage of the presence of senior official (SRSGs, D/SRSGs, FCs, Police Commissioners) in New York to propose or provide additional briefings, including bilateral ones, and ensure a regular exchange of information.

Mission Planning:
Some of the modalities that could be considered to involve T/PCCs at an earlier stage include:

a. Engage in an internal dialogue on command and control and how to increase inclusiveness in mission planning, with a view to implementing the commitments made in the New Horizon non-paper.

b. Establish a “Core group” of the largest current and future contributors and engage in a systematic exchange when planning a new mission, or if there is a crisis or potential significant change in mandate, to receive their input and understand limitations and strength of troops. When T/PCCs are deployed, they, together with the Security Council, should be consulted in advance of draft revisions and/or new planning documents.

c. Consult T/PCCs before TAMs to identify specific questions they would want answered in deciding whether to deploy or not, and report back to T/PCCs on these issues.

d. Establish a mechanism whereby the findings of T/PCC’s own pre-deployment visits are fed into the Secretariat planning process.

e. Consider, on a case-by-case basis, secondments of T/PCC personnel to HQ, when appropriate, to assist with planning within existing chains of command.

f. Revisit HQ-field communication, including IOTs, to ensure timely provision of information and channeling of MS requests to the field.

Engagement by T/PCCs:
Capitals should:

a. Remain engaged and have regular consultations over the entire lifecycle of a mission, not just at times of crisis.

b. Encourage their permanent missions in New York, if they have serious concerns about a mission, to seek meetings with SRSGs, Dep. SRSGs and Force Commanders when they are at Headquarters to raise these concerns.

c. Encourage field visits, and include political-military representation on both Security Council and MPAC visits, to gain more first-hand knowledge of the situation on the ground. Findings of these visits should be shared with IOTs.

d. Ensure that T/PCC representatives attending the consultations:
i. are at an adequately senior level (some have suggested Ambassadorial level) supported by staff with experience of complex UN peacekeeping operations;

ii. have consulted on both political and military aspects; and

iii. have received input from both the field and the capital prior to attending meeting.

e. Consider basing one official within their contingents in the field to serve as a liaison with the Permanent Mission in New York.

Informal Coalitions:

a. Member States and the Secretariat should have further discussions on the establishment of informal coalitions of interested actors to support specific missions. This could take place in the Working Group, and include lessons learned by the Secretariat and Member States who have participated in successful groups. A first step could be to establish an informal and inclusive group for a key mission such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), where most actors agree that such a group could be of assistance.

Committee of 34 (C-34):

a. The Council and the C-34 should engage in a dialogue to achieve consensus on key issues and find more effective ways to work together.

b. The C-34 should provide “practical suggestions” to the Council, as requested in the PRST of 5 August 2009, to further improve consultations.

c. The C-34 should consider a report of its own in 2010, in parallel to the Council’s report, on progress made in consultations. This should include steps taken by T/PCCs.
Implications of Peacebuilding and State-building in United Nations Mandates

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Introduction

Between 1945 and 1990, the Security Council mandated just 18 missions. With the exception of the UN Operation in Congo (ONUC), mandating peacekeeping operations prior to 1990 was a relatively straightforward exercise. During this era of “traditional peacekeeping,” UN missions were mostly unintrusive operations, deployed to monitor cease-fires and peace agreements and rarely straying from the core peacekeeping principles of consent, impartiality, and non-use of force. As William Durch notes, these missions were mandated by the Security Council to serve three sets of functions:

a. As fair witnesses to peace accords, observing and reporting on compliance, but with no ability to impact events on the ground;

b. As referees to a peace accord, overseeing compliance with some nominal authority to enforce it, and;

c. As police to a peace agreement, endowed with the power to impartially implement the agreement with the option of using force in the short term, but leaving-long term political decisions to other actors.26

The era of traditional peacekeeping is over, however. Of the 17 UN peace operations currently deployed, only five (UNFICYP, UNIFIL, UNDOF, UNTSO, UNMOGIP) can be considered “traditional” operations. All six predate the end of the Cold War. Of the 50 UN peace operations deployed after 1990, the overwhelming majority have followed internal conflicts. Most of these conflicts have occurred in weak states without credible or effective state institutions.28

In order to re-establish peace and stability, the range of mandated mission functions rapidly expanded in scope and the complexity in response to the needs of devastated post-conflict states. Tasks like disarmament, demobilization, and

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27 Including BINUB and UNAMA.
reintegration (DDR), electoral assistance, human rights monitoring, and police monitoring were once anomalous, but set precedents for mission structures and mandates. Multidimensional operations are now the rule rather than the exception, with UN peacekeeping operations currently tasked to implement some 300 individual functions that fall under 21 broad categories (See table below).

Categories of Mandated Tasks for Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations

| a. Ceasefire, Monitoring and observer roles | h. Institution-building and support | o. Protection of UN personnel |
| b. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration | i. Mine action | p. Provide support to state security |
| c. Deterrent operations | j. Mission logistics, support and training | q. Public Information |
| d. Development, coordination and assistance | k. National Dialogue/Reconciliation | r. Public order/ support to police operations |
| e. Elections | l. Peace process management/ good offices/ Political | s. Rule of Law |
| f. Human Rights/Protection | m. Police reform | t. Security Sector Reform |
| g. Humanitarian support | n. Protection of civilians | u. Support and extend of State security and control |

Whereas traditional missions were impartial observers and occasional enforcers, peacekeepers in multidimensional operations missions are frequently mandated as statebuilders, helping to create legitimate, functioning state structures in the aftermath of violent conflict. In certain instances, missions also function as state surrogates, extending the authority of fragile states challenged by spoilers to the peace.29 This includes both civilian functions to support the state’s administrative authority and military/police functions to assisting it to (re)establish a monopoly on force.

29 Durch, *op cit.*
Extension of State Authority. Although there are parallels between civilian and military/police operations to extend state authority, there are also clear differences between the two. The use of force implies a different level and form of international commitment. At present, the concept is being stretched to its limits, as the UN is being asked to face increasingly daunting opponents, often with insufficient means.30

Recent experience has demonstrated that effective operations to extend state authority cannot be undertaken without substantial advanced capabilities. The militaries of Western countries disproportionately possess the requisite force multipliers and enablers relative to the majority of UN military and police contributors. Western militaries do participate in UN-authorized peace operations – notably the NATO mission in Afghanistan – but have been largely absent from UN-led missions outside of Europe. This has contributed to the recent setbacks in UN peace operations, including the UN-backed African Union mission in Somalia.

Advanced capabilities are necessary, but not sufficient. Force must be used in support of a viable political framework. The centrality of “a peace to keep” and its implications for what a peace operation might realistically achieve was a core lesson of the Brahimi Report. Meanwhile, the global peacekeeping landscape has changed dramatically since 2000. As peacekeeping has grown in size and complexity, so too has the nature and organization of spoiler groups – from comparably rag-tag rebel groups to organized armies or fighters using asymmetrical tactics. In cases where there is no adhered peace agreement, UN peacekeepers are increasingly the object of spoiler violence – including from the state itself. This trend gives pause to existing T/PCCs, as well as to Western militaries concerned that UN command and control arrangements are insufficient for the task at hand. (See the separate Challenges Forum Study on UN command and control arrangements.)

One factor in the willingness of Member States to support extension of state authority mandates is whether the state in need of support is perceived as legitimate and viable. The Security Council will not authorize such mandates for a state without sufficient international legitimacy. This is also important for T/PCCs, who will not commit forces to undertake such an operation if the dangers of the operation outweigh the support that the state enjoys, or if the viability of the state is in doubt. The legitimacy of a state may evolve over time – or may be contested, as well Afghanistan demonstrates. The imperative of securing peace – combined with the state-oriented bias of the UN (as an organization of states) – may, at times, place the UN mission in a delicate position, particularly in the latter instance. How close should the organization be to the “legitimate” state,

30 "Building on Brahimi," op cit.
versus reaching out to non-state actors and encouraging them to join the political process? Statebuilding and, more so, extending state authority requires a degree of alignment with the state. But too much proximity may compromise perceptions of impartiality, with implications both for the security of UN personnel, as well as the integrity of the mission – particularly if the legitimacy of the state wanes. Reaching out to non-state actors may help the state to become, through inclusivity, more legitimate – but also poses dilemmas concerning the UN’s relationship with the state. In several contexts, the nature of non-state actors – the Taliban, for example – may have international implications, as well. How the balance is struck, and how it is managed over time must depend on the specific context.

In the absence of consultations that would permit design of mandates based on available resources, the Secretariat has tended to recommend large forces, conscious of the fact that numbers may be required to make up for a lack of mobility and capacity to employ deliberate force. The consequence of this, however, has been increased costs, and a Security Council that is often wary of DPKO’s military estimates. This is not to imply that more mobile forces will result in cost-savings, but may be more cost effective – an important distinction.

Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. Several UN missions are deployed in contexts where the government does not have the capacity to project its authority across the entire country and so does not have the capacity to ensure the rule of law and protect civilians across the entire countryside. In such contexts, military operations can play important roles in extending state authority (though setbacks on the ground also demonstrate the difficulty facing the UN). In the longer term, rebuilding and reforming national institutions responsible for upholding rule of law (among other functions) is necessary for consolidating peace – and for enabling the drawdown of both UN military and police forces and civilian personnel.

These tasks are more complex and, thus, more challenging to successfully implement (and to gauge the progress thereof) than the bulk of multidimensional tasks added during the 1990s – organizing and monitoring elections, coordinating assistance, demining, delivering humanitarian aid. They are also overwhelmingly political in nature (if too often addressed technically), directly concerning state sovereignty and the maintenance of power.

Further, the time-span required for many of these tasks – reintegration of ex-combatants, security and justice sector reform, rebuilding administrative institutions, transitional justice – exceeds that of security-oriented peacekeeping operations, while the competencies required have necessitated additional expertise, mostly civilian and mostly in short-supply.
By authorizing peacekeeping missions to undertake many peacebuilding and peacekeeping tasks, the Security Council expanded peacekeeping responsibilities into the realm of immediate post-conflict peacebuilding. In the process, the authority and competence of the Council were de facto extended beyond traditional boundaries of “peace and security.” The High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change acknowledged this trend, and expressed concern that the Security Council did not have sufficient relationships with IFIs necessary for broader post-conflict recovery, that strategic coordination among UN and non-UN actors was insufficient, that timely financing – especially for rule of law activities – was absent, and that medium term political attention to countries emerging from conflict was absent.

The establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission and Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) was intended to explicitly address the nexus between security and development and remedy these gaps. Within DPKO, the creation of the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (ORoLSI) capacities to develop policy and provide mission guidance on the ‘security side’ of the rule of law. And the Security Council has begun authorizing smaller, longer-term, peacebuilding missions – both to situations where a large security-oriented peacekeeping force is no longer warranted – like Sierra Leone, and to those where a large peacekeeping force may be unwarranted – like Guinea Bissau. This transitional marks a significant change in the means by which the UN supports consolidation of the political process – from the strategic use of security to the strategic use of development and institution building.

De Facto Expansion of Security Council Authority. Authorizing UN operations to undertake peacebuilding tasks generally is widely accepted. Nonetheless, as peacekeeping has become more multi-dimensional, the integration of longer-term peacebuilding tasks, and de facto expansion of the Security Council’s competence has had political, financial, institutional, and bureaucratic implications that have yet to be addressed.

Politically, the UN Charter provides the Security Council with “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.”31 What tasks fall under “peace and security”? At present, there is no consensus among Member States. Many members of the Non-Aligned Movement and the G-77 have reservations regarding the intentions of Western countries with respect to state-building; concerns that exist despite the fact that most mandates are intended to reinforce the authority and effectiveness – if also accountability – of state institutions.

Financially, the budget of a peacekeeping operation is no longer determined solely by the size of the force on the ground. Discussions in the Ad hoc Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) and the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly (GA) – the budgetary organs of the UN – now have a much greater policy impact. Detailing tasks in the mission mandate provides DPKO a means of balancing the increased role of the budgetary organs on peacekeeping policy, but has also led to increased financial scrutiny.

Financing mechanisms for the increased diversity of peacekeeping activities is another issue linking the policy debate and financial debate: for example, how much of demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) activities – or security and justice reform, or institution building – should be funded through assessed contributions versus how much through voluntary contributions? One logical division would be to fund mission-critical tasks from assessed funds, non-critical from voluntary – but defining what is critical depends on an agreed definition of success – something so far lacking.

Institutionally, as the above demonstrates, there is disconnect between the policy discussion in the Security Council and the financial discussion in the General Assembly – not to mention non-UN sources of funding that may be critical for success of a mission.

There is also a gap between the evolution of UN policies and that of its institutions. With the establishment of the PBC and the Peacebuilding Support Office, there is a need for further discussion, clarification, and agreement on the relationship of these institutions with the Security Council. As CIC has noted elsewhere, earlier engagement by the PBC might provide a means for the Security Council to explore earlier but still sustainable exit from the military phase of peacekeeping. This would require a more engaged stance by the Security Council – above all by the P5 – on the role and agenda of the PBC, as well as a more genuine partnership with its non-Security Council members.

Once a mission is mandated, how does the Security Council know when the political and security situation has stabilized sufficiently for it to hand off to the Peacebuilding Commission? How does the Peacebuilding Commission know when its engagement would be productive? Even when there are no or very few troops, the fact of being on the agenda of the UNSC creates some leverage, although less and less as troops withdraw. In establishing the PBC, the Security Council and the General Assembly also authorized the creation of the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), explicitly mandating it to “measure progress towards meeting short
and medium-term recovery goals.”32 There are several challenges to measuring “success” through benchmarking, however. First, there is diverse, if converging, understanding of what constitutes minimum progress towards stability. Second, there is a substantial risk that benchmarks driven by the political imperatives of the Security Council (and of donors) result in goals that have no national ownership, are unrealistic in content, and/or ambiguous enough to declare success when political and donor fatigue sets in. Third, the critically relevant measures – emergence of a viable national political process – is both fluid and, not unrelated, exceedingly difficult to measure.33

Bureaucratically, multidimensional mandates are predicated on integration of efforts, both in the field and at UN Headquarters – but the extent of actual integration within the UN (or among the UN, IFIs, and lead donors) is woefully inadequate. Neither DPKO, the PBC, PBSO, nor any other UN entity has sufficient bureaucratic leverage – or control of financial resources – to coherently orchestrate the various actors within the UN and beyond. This is problem without ready solution; one that significantly weakens the leverage of the international community in a post-conflict situation.

Conclusion

Multidimensional missions, especially those that extend state authority or have explicit protection of civilian tasks, have raised fundamental questions about the purpose of peacekeeping, its limits, and the appropriate use of international resources.

In both cases, a collaborative mandating process appears to be the most promising way to ensure that the political consensus that supports UN peacekeeping operations is maintained. Nevertheless, overcoming the current dysfunctional mandate-making process will require a distinct change in attitude on all sides and an overall commitment to making peacekeeping function up to its stated aims.

33 CIC has suggested elsewhere that the Security Council and DPKO, along with the PBC and PBSO – and possibly the World Bank and other non-UN actors, should examine the feasibility of regular, in-country stock taking against key political and security/stability goals, rather than approaching “benchmarks” in metric sense. “Building on Brahimi,” op cit.
Providers, Platforms or Partners?
Possible Roles for Peace Operations in Fighting Organized Crime

Mr. James Cockayne, Senior Associate, International Peace Institute

Introduction

From Haiti to DRC, and from Kosovo to Afghanistan, it is increasingly clear that dealing with organized crime – the illicit economic and financial activities that many political, military and social actors use to underpin their power – can be central to effective peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.34 As the UN Assistant-Secretary General for Rule of Law and Security Institutions, within DPKO, Mr. Dmitry Titov recently recognized: “Efforts to combat organised crime and assist host state authorities to combat organised crime have become a significant element of peace operations around the world.”35

Organized crime can flourish in conflict-affected states and states in political crisis. Their poor economic prospects, weak governance and rule of law, and pervasive insecurity spawn corruption and can allow local armed groups to flourish. Organized crime entrenches corruption and undermines democratic development. It perverts micro-level financial incentives and distorts macro-level economic development. Globalization sustains the growth of these criminal networks by helping local armed groups and their political sponsors connect to foreign markets for drugs, minerals, diamonds, guns, cars, timber, sex and illicit labor, and by providing money-laundering and trafficking services.

Organized crime can even undermine a state’s control of its territory, leading to potential threats to international peace and security like those recently identified by the Security Council in drug-trafficking through West Africa may.36

Left unchecked, local organized crime groups and gangs can undermine the state’s institutional or territorial cohesion (as occurred in Cité Soleil in Haiti, Afghanistan and eastern DRC), or even pose a force protection issue for a

peacekeeping operation (e.g. in Bosnia, Kosovo, eastern DRC). In the immediate post-conflict phase, organized crime’s penetration of state institutions (the executive, parliaments, the judiciary, police, corrections) and non-state institutions (political parties, banks, labor unions) may plant the seeds for later mission failure (e.g. the repeated failure of police reform in Haiti). Groups that have grown fat on the proceeds of conflict and crime during war and political crisis may use the arrival of an international intervention to launder their ill-gotten gains and increase their control of the local economy – especially through internationally-supported privatization schemes, construction of housing stock to accommodate expatriates, provision of illicit services (especially sex and drugs) in the local market, and control of import industries (for example for fuel for international forces’ transportation assets).

But how far should peace operations be expected to go in dealing with these problems? Developing effective responses to organized crime also requires efforts beyond policing and law enforcement:

a. Social and economic responses, providing alternative economic opportunities to wean communities away from activities the international community has criminalized;

b. Governance responses, developing effective border, coastguard, customs, financial oversight, electoral oversight and judicial institutions – amongst others; and

c. Especially political strategy, since many of the same individuals that seem likely targets for law enforcement in anti-organized-crime effort may also be potentially key partners for peace.

Tackling organized crime should consequently be understood as a long-term exercise in which the international community seeks first to understand the complex local relations of power and authority that produce organized crime, and only then, second, to transform these political-economies, shifting power and authority away from illicit economic activity to the licit. Such an effort will require a multi-faceted effort by multiple actors using multiple entry points – and over a period that may stretch beyond the mandate of a peacekeeping operation.

Policing and Beyond

There are three possible roles for peace operations in fighting organized crime. They could serve: as providers of all the different types of capacity needed to fight organized crime, at least while their mandate lasts; as platforms for states and other actors to deploy such capacity in a coordinated manner, helping to stand up a longer-term strategy of engagement; or as equal partners working with many
other bilateral, international and host state agencies to identify, mobilize, develop, deploy and manage the capacities and strategies needed.

The paper argues that peace operations key role as a ‘provider’ may be in the area of policing, investigations and analysis, where there have been important efforts in recent years. Since its inception, the Standing Police Capacity (SPC) within UN DPKO has included 2 posts dealing with transnational organized crime. UNPOL is currently expanding that expertise. In 2008, the International Policing Advisory Council, which advises the UN Police Adviser, discussed methods to improve police peacekeepers’ capacity to deal with organized crime. In October 2009, an INTERPOL Ministerial Meeting during the INTERPOL General Assembly in Singapore will focus on collaboration between INTERPOL and police peacekeepers. The UN Department of Political Affairs has paid increasing attention to these issues, for example through cooperation with the Guatemalan government on the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala, and through increased attention to these issues in West Africa and Central Asia. UNODC has also played a crucial role in drawing attention to the convergence of conflict, crisis and crime. Beyond the UN, the EU has made anti-organized crime efforts central to missions in Bosnia (EUPM) and Kosovo (EULEX), and the OSCE, SCO and OAS are paying increasing attention to these issues.

Beyond policing, investigations and analysis, there are a number of reasons to think that we should see peace operations as part of a larger, multi-actor ‘partnership’ approach. First, peace operations have a mandate that is limited in time, and also usually relates to the occurrence of armed conflict. International efforts to deal with organized crime may also occur outside such contexts, as we have seen for example in parts of West Africa. Second, peace operations will likely find it difficult to muster adequate numbers of police and law enforcement officers with the requisite skills to analyze and respond to organized crime, especially once language and other cultural barriers are considered. And an effective response to organized crime requires developing not just a policing response, but also providing all the other institutional machinery that a criminal justice system requires – such as an uncorrupted judiciary, an effective witness protection program, and incarceration capacity. Third, peace operations currently struggle analytically with organized crime.

A multi-faceted analytical approach is clearly needed. Yet illicit finance and organized crime are not routinely considered by the political actors that conceive, design, mandate and resource peace operations. And where they are considered, they are often considered as an issue best addressed through technical law

37 Ibid.
enforcement responses. One notable exception in recent years has been Liberia, where, for example UN sanctions were retained through the post-conflict period to help break the connection between illicit armed groups and political and economic power, especially by controlling the timber trade. But this also required military responses (to deal with resulting tensions), DDR efforts, regulatory reform (GEMAP) and numerous other efforts.

Developing strategies for such a multi-pronged response requires analytical capacity. Yet even where peacekeepers have been asked to deal with organized crime, they have generally been given limited access to the information-gathering and analytical tools that are needed. Peace operations have limited ability to be the ‘providers’ of the information needed for an effective international response to deal with organized crime. Nor have peace operations thus far served as ‘platforms’ for bilateral partners to share and coordinate such information. Peacekeeper access to nationally-held criminal intelligence relating to conflict-affected territories is haphazard, to say the least.

Instead, peace operations seem likely to serve as ‘partners’ to other specialized agencies (UNODC, INTERPOL, the World Customs Organization, FATF, sanctions bodies) and states in developing a shared strategy for dealing with organized crime in specific locales. The Standing Police Capacity within UN DPKO may provide the seed for such partnerships, by helping ensure that UN missions have ongoing access to some expertise on organized crime issues, and that such issues are increasingly addressed in mission start-up. But more could be done.

Towards a ‘Partnership’ Strategy

Six measures could be taken to improve peace operations’ capacity to deal with organized crime: Mainstream Organized Crime in Conflict Assessment, Political Analysis and Mission Design.

a. Efforts to deal with organized crime should be mainstreamed throughout international actors’ conflict and crisis assessment and the design of their responses. The role that organized crime plays in rewarding and prolonging armed conflict, or in shaping armed actors’ decision to cease hostilities (sometimes in the hope of access to increased criminal revenues) must become a factor in mediation efforts and peace operations conception, mandates and planning.

b. Strategic Assessment and Planning Frameworks should include organized crime as a specific issue to be considered in mission design.

c. Peace operations doctrine and guidance should consider the impact that organized criminal activity may have on:
i. security and stability (especially where it threatens the state’s effective control of territory, or poses force protection issues);
ii. political governance (especially the relationship between organized crime, corruption, independent judiciaries, parliaments, electoral financing and SSR); and
iii. economic recovery (especially the impact of organized crime on financial systems integrity, low-skilled industrial development and primary industry).

**Improve Operational Analytical Capacity.**

- Relevant organized crime expertise should be provided within the peace operations, through improved information-sharing between peace operations and T/PCCs and other states with access to relevant criminal intelligence. It might also involve standardizing attention by JMACs or political affairs officers to these issues.
- An alternative model may be for UN DPKO or other peace operations to house staff seconded from other relevant agencies, perhaps within a dedicated cell within DPKO at UNHQ.
- A third alternative would involve developing protocols for sharing relevant information between relevant agencies and conducting joint analysis based on differentiated analytical inputs by, for example, UNODC, UNICRI, UNDP, DPA, Interpol and other relevant bodies, or through use of common tools such as a common Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessment template.
- Better use could also be made of sources of information already at peace operations’ disposal – such as open source information, commercially-provided threat analysis, trade data, or multilateral human rights reporting – for evidence of trends in criminal markets and organized crime activity.

**Think Beyond Law Enforcement.**

- Those designing, mandating and resourcing peace operations may need to consider the provision of an array of services that peace operations are not usually set up to provide, broker or manage: anti-corruption efforts, witness protection arrangements, defense lawyering, detention and correction services, border control, customs capacity, and financial sector oversight.
- Peace operations managers should establish standing protocols for collaboration and cooperation with a range of external partners who may be better positioned to provide these services, such as the World Customs Organization, Interpol, International Aviation Transport Association, UNDP, UNCTs, the World Bank, and IMF.
- Further thought may, in particular, need to be given to methods for connecting peace operations’ law enforcement strategies to political and
strategic decision-makers in senior mission management and above. Otherwise, over-zealous law enforcement may place political partnership strategies in jeopardy.

Consider Creating Rapid Response or Standby ‘Untouchable’ Policing Arrangements.

a. Consider creating a rapid response or standby policing capacity designed specifically to investigate and prosecute high-level organized crime, available on-call by peace operations and/or special political missions. Such a unit would increase the prospects of the use of justice tools in marginalizing potential peace spoilers.

b. This unit could be developed within the existing Standing Police Capacity and/or with other UN bodies (UNODC, OLA, DPA), building on lessons learned in Lebanon, Guatemala and the international tribunals.

c. Such a unit could have the capacity to work with member states to develop a casework file that could then be transferred to a member state for formal prosecution and trial. That might require secondments from national institutions, to work on specific cases which might then be referred back to those jurisdictions for trial.

d. Another approach would be to establish such ‘Untouchable’ units at the regional level, perhaps through partnership with regional organizations. The benefits of such an approach would include the improved expertise and affinity that would come from using regional staff, as well as possibly improved popular legitimacy for such work. Additionally, developing such capacity at the regional rather than national level might be more cost effective, and help insulate such groups from intimidation and corruption – though they would no doubt need ongoing professional, financial, technical and moral support from the broader international community.

Develop Full-Spectrum Local Capacity.

a. More attention should also be paid to the need for local ownership and local capacity. As experiences in the EUPM and EULEX have shown, anti-organized crime capacity is particularly hard to foster, given the active and violent resistance organized crime groups often mount to the emergence of effective state response capacity.

b. This could involve a formal lessons-learned process, and improved dissemination of existing insights from EUPM, UNMIK, Haiti (UNMIH, UNSMIH, UNTMIH and MIPONUH), and beyond.

c. More attention could be paid to reducing the frequency of policing personnel’s rotations through police training missions, and to ensuring personnel qualified in mentoring or training are given priority in selection processes.
d. Efforts need to reach beyond policing to develop social resistance to organized crime through economic, social and political transformation programs. This might include fostering efforts to work with local communities to woo them away from organized crime groups, for example Viva Rio’s efforts in Haiti’s slums, the National Youth Volunteer Service Programme jointly established by the Government of Liberia and UNDP in 2007, and the REDES (Reconciliación y Desarrollo) Program developed by UNDP in Colombia since 2004.

e. It might also require working with the World Bank to foster Community-Driven Development models that develop grassroots justice and mediation arrangements that can displace the dispute-resolution function many protection rackets and organized crime groups play.

f. The Peacebuilding Commission and Fund may have important roles to play in buttressing such efforts.

Acknowledge and Act on the Highly Political Nature of any Effort to Tackle Organized Crime.

a. Any effort to uproot organized crime will meet with resistance from all those who benefit from it – from those engaged at the bottom, perhaps in a survival strategy; to the architects and profiteers at the top.

b. Accordingly, peace operations should predicate any effort to deal with organized crime in a country on a carefully-designed political and social strategy to build support for tackling organized crime.

c. This will require careful analysis of regional crime networks, discussions with the major financial, political, military, policing or other sponsors of a mission, and close engagement of key mission staff.

d. It may require a broad effort – from early in the mission conception, assessment and design process – to work with relevant regional organizations, diaspora communities and financial and trading centers to raise the political prominence of the issue, build support for dealing with organized crime, and take the necessary multi-faceted and long-term steps to tackle it.

e. This will require both a political strategy for engagement with such communities, and specific training and mandates for relevant peace operations personnel – not only civil affairs officers but also police officers on the beat and military personnel on patrol – to reach out to traditional authorities, elders and local communities to help them find a path away from the pernicious and often violent embrace of organized crime.
Conclusion

Effective and responsible states are ultimately better placed to deal with the needs of their own citizens than the international community is. Peace operations, already overstretched, should not now be expected to become the primary or sole provider of the wide range of services needed to tackle organized crime – or the developer of such services at the national level.

There may be specific areas where peace operations could, with some adjustments, provide added value in such service provision, such as policing, investigations and analysis in the immediate post-conflict period. But a better overall approach may be to consider peace operations first and foremost as one of many ‘partners’ that must cooperate – perhaps in the short term through use of a peace operation as a start-up ‘platform’ – to develop a long-term, multi-faceted strategy for dealing with organized crime in a particular context.
Chapter 2

Opening and Welcome – Objectives and Issues

H.E. Mr. Anders Lidén, Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations

Good morning, Ladies and Gentlemen, and welcome to the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations 2009. It is a pleasure for me as the Ambassador of Sweden to co-host this event with my colleague from Pakistan and the Folke Bernadotte Academy.

To host the Challenges Forum 2009 in cooperation with Pakistan is indeed a source of great pleasure to us. Pakistan is the largest troop contributor to United Nations peacekeeping and, together with other countries in that region, they provide the majority of peacekeepers in the world, and we salute them.

These days, there are not many Europeans participating in UN peacekeeping. On the other hand, we are active in Afghanistan, Kosovo and elsewhere in missions under UN mandates. A mandate from the United Nations is always compulsory for our peacekeeping participation anywhere in the world. These different operations have similarities with one another, but as the Swedish Ambassador to the UN, I feel that we should seek to be more active in UN peacekeeping as well. It is important to have participants from all parts of the world participating in UN peacekeeping.

We are facing a situation where peacekeeping has become much more complicated, including with regard to the need to use force when a mission is targeted, not perceived to be neutral, and when there are other multidimensional challenges facing the UN engagement in an area. There are often issues linked to lines of communications, command and control structures and other related topics. Suitably, our Forum is called the Challenges Forum, because there are so many challenges for which we need to find solutions.

In the old days, the peacekeepers’ main task was merely to operate on the frontline between two parties, parties that were easy to identify. In short, peacekeeping was much easier in those days. Having said that, we also had some very troublesome and difficult experiences in the 1960s in the Congo, where the international community got a taste of how complicated peacekeeping could be.

These issues have already been discussed, but recent developments have made them more urgent than ever before. Recently, the New Horizon initiative was
introduced by the Secretariat, which we welcome. We also appreciate the initiative by the Security Council members themselves that have engaged in discussions on peacekeeping, a dialogue primarily led by France and the United Kingdom.

Dialogue on the need for enhancing the effectiveness, efficiency, and impact of peacekeeping and other operations are also taking place within the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), and in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In the Fourth Committee a few days ago, I had the honour to speak on behalf of the EU in the Security Council on the theme of protection of civilians, which is at the forefront of the current debate. There is always a need to exchange views between actors out in the field and those who do the political work in capitals and here at the UN. The Challenges Forum adds to this reform process. Over the next few days, we have an opportunity to discuss the multidimensional character of peacekeeping; how mandates are formulated and how the command and control arrangements should be organized. We will focus on the need to improve consultations with troop contributing countries (TCC), police-contributing countries (PCC) as well as with the various regional organizations.

In our work within the Challenges Forum, we generate ideas about policy. We reflect on policy, but we do not make policy, and that very fact might make it easier for us here to come together and have these discussions with fewer preconditions. We can avoid unnecessary politicization and suspicion, if there is any. We can have a free-flowing and fruitful discussion on important matters here at this Forum. We hope that this opportunity for leading practitioners, diplomats and academics to meet and hold deliberations on key issues will result in a very engaged discussion that can contribute to the meeting of minds and also provide input to the current reform efforts in peacekeeping.

Last year, the first International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations was organized by France in Paris. The findings of the Challenges Forum 2008 is captured in the First Annual Report of the Challenges Forum. The Challenges Forum is co-owned by seventeen Partner Organizations. The Government of Sweden is pleased to support the Challenges Forum initiative by funding the Coordinators and the Secretariat of the Forum, which is located at the Folke Bernadotte Academy in Sweden.

Thank you again for coming. I wish you a good and fruitful discussion.
Respected Partners, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, good morning. As a co-host of the second International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations, I would like to extend a very warm welcome to all of you. This occasion is a reminder of the need to address the growing global challenges of peace and security through effective partnership.

Peacekeeping in this era has become multidimensional. Today, we see diverse and complex conflicts that require deeper political and economic engagements. The resulting challenges are: devising realistic and achievable mandates; envisaging innovative partners of employment of troops; re-evaluating command and control arrangements; and thinking through emerging rules of engagement. We also have to be mindful to check any factors that compromise a mission’s operational effectiveness or focus with respect to basic tasks of peacekeeping.

Over the years, the United Nations has launched quite a few initiatives on the reform of peacekeeping. In this context, we value the deliberations of this Forum and hope that it will complete and complement all previous initiatives while distilling synergies, with a view to meeting the existing and emerging challenges. I am certain that we all will benefit from the session in the next two days. I thank you all for being here, and also our partners and the Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations for co-hosting this event. I thank you very much.

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, dear Challenges colleagues and not least, dear Challenges Patron. On behalf of the Challenges Forum Partnership, it is a true pleasure to welcome you all to the Second International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations, and it is a particular privilege to co-host this Forum with our colleagues from Pakistan which, as the Swedish Ambassador mentioned, is providing a key component to today’s UN peacekeeping missions.

This has been an extremely important year for UN peacekeeping, with a number of noteworthy initiatives aimed at identifying challenges for and opportunities in peacekeeping today. The Security Council has held several thematic debates on peacekeeping and the Secretariat launched the New Horizon process, which aims to develop a set of shared and hopefully achievable goals for the global peacekeeping partnership. In other words, it has been a year of debate and dialogue
but fortunately this has also been accompanied by concrete change in some areas and commitments to pursue change in others.

Most of the issues that have been at the centre of this year’s debate are not new. Yet, they continue to cause daunting challenges in peacekeeping. These are the very questions that we will be addressing over the course of the next two days. How can we achieve greater clarity and consensus in multidimensional mandates, particularly where peacebuilding activities are involved? How do we prioritize and sequence a peacekeeping operation’s support to the establishment of basic safety and security in the immediate aftermath of conflict? How can peace operations serve as a partner in the fight against organized crime? How can the relationship between the Security Council, the Secretariat, and troop contributing countries be further enhanced? How can current UN command and control arrangements be improved? We are especially pleased that we will be covering a critical issue that the Challenges Forum has not extensively addressed in the past, namely field support, and how essential it is to successful peacekeeping.

But among these challenges also lie important opportunities. The New Horizon paper calls for a renewed UN peacekeeping partnership to help UN peacekeeping meet the challenges of today and tomorrow. Indeed, this is the theme of this year’s Forum and many of our discussions will be linked to the opportunities that can be created if we are only able to enhance and expand existing partnerships, and to build new ones.

I would like to take just a moment to recall how the Challenges initiative came about. It began thirteen years ago as a joint effort by academic, diplomatic and defence organizations from Sweden, the Russian Federation and Jordan, which were later joined by a think-tank from South Africa and military organizations from the United States and India. Japan was the first Ministry of Foreign Affairs to join. Over the years, new partners from across the globe, spanning the academic, diplomatic, and practitioner spectrum, have joined together to collectively reflect on the challenges of peace operations and to share best practices. Rather than seeking out our differences, the Challenges Forum has worked across the traditional geographic, religious, political, cultural, and economic divides, searching for common denominators in our various experiences, and seeking to learn from each other’s successes and mistakes.

Today, the Challenges Forum of 2009 is intended to provide a platform for an intensive dialogue aimed at moving forward some of the New Horizon recommendations. The goal is to contribute to a better understanding of the challenges facing the international community of peacekeepers, but also to
identify realistic solutions, and last and most importantly, to promote their effective implementation. Once again, I would like to welcome you all to this year’s Forum. We very much look forward to a rich and interactive dialogue. Thank you.

Ms. Annika Hilding-Norberg, International Coordinator, Challenges Forum, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden

Good morning, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, Partners, and Colleagues. Allow me to join the earlier speakers in warmly welcoming you to this Challenges Forum 2009. We feel quite fortunate that this year’s Forum is taking place not long after the launch of the New Horizon non-paper, which highlights the importance of partnerships for peacekeeping. Indeed, that is what the Challenges Forum is all about: stimulating dialogue and working in partnership to develop a shared agenda on peacekeeping.

The programme for the Challenges Forum 2009 was developed in close cooperation with our Partners in Pakistan. It was proposed that we sound out the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations what issues they thought would be useful for the Challenges to prioritize and address. Coincidentally, but not surprisingly, the issues proposed by DPKO largely coincided with the ideas of our Pakistani Partners, reflecting the perspective of top troop contributing countries. They included, but were not limited to, the inadequacy of current peacekeeping mandates; the need for better consultations with troop- and police-contributing countries; and challenges related to the UN command and control arrangements. The overall theme for our deliberations is: A New Horizon for Peace Operations Partnerships. What are the Next Steps?

I would like to thank our Pakistani Partners for our very close and on-going positive cooperation, and I would like to pay particular tribute to our Pakistani colleagues for their continued sustained contributions to peacekeeping around the world, a contribution without the ‘if’s’ and ‘but’s’ often associated with peacekeeping. This Forum is hosted in New York, but we are still very much looking forward to a future Challenges Forum hosted in Islamabad.

The Forum is global and open to leading practitioners, diplomats, and academics from all countries. The Challenges Partner Organizations form the Forum steering group and co-owns the Challenges Forum. You can find the Partners listed in the files that you have received, and I warmly encourage you to contact any of

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38 For a list of Partner Organizations, see Annex 1.
them with any questions, suggestions, or ideas that you may have concerning the Forum. We are particularly pleased to benefit from the unique advice from our Challenges Forum Patron, Jean-Marie Guéhenno. We hope that you have found the background studies and papers that have been prepared by Challenges advisers and leading colleagues in the field to be of interest. The goal was to provide you with analysis on the issues to be discussed in advance so that we could focus on the way forward. A facilitator will open the discussion by highlighting key issues to focus on, and what he or she suggests should be achieved by the end of the session.

What will make the sessions truly valuable is the knowledge and perspectives of Forum participants. We encourage comments and questions from the floor and look forward to an inclusive and interactive dialogue. Building on the First Annual Report of the Challenges Forum, based on the Forum hosted by our French Partners in Paris last year, we intend to publish a similar volume after this gathering.

Regarding the value-added of Challenges – there is no shortage of conferences on peace operations around the globe. However, what we like to think distinguishes the Challenges Forum from many conferences, is its focus on partnership. Not only are Partners united in the goal of supporting and improving UN peacekeeping and peace operations in general, but we have among our ranks experts with a wide diversity of experience and perspectives, spanning the continents. This, I would argue, is what enables the Forum to make a unique contribution.

The Concepts and Doctrine Development Project we have embarked upon is just one example of how Challenges seeks to support UN peacekeeping. The project aims to provide DPKO with conceptual underpinnings for its development of guidance for senior mission leaders on how to operationalize the guiding principles of peacekeeping. It fills a gap that the UN has identified as important, but which it does not have the resources to tackle at present. As such, it focuses on conceptual development rather than politics and guidelines.

I would like to express appreciation for our cooperation which began last year with the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations. This is now a standing item in our opening session, and participants have found that the overview of current operations provides a valuable framework for our discussion.

We have a lot of ground to cover in the next two days, as we discuss some of the most challenging aspects of modern peacekeeping and peace operations. These are not problems that can be easily resolved. But what is important is that both Challenges Partners, colleagues and all of us seek to follow up on the problems raised and solutions proposed, in order for us to make real progress with regards to at least one or two of those next steps. I look forward to what I am certain will
be a useful and inclusive discussion, and I am now very pleased to hand over to Benjamin Tortolani of the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations. Thank you.

Challenges of Peace Operations in 2009 – Trends, Facts and Figures

Mr. Benjamin Tortolani, Series Coordinator, Annual Review of Global Peace Operations, Center on International Cooperation, New York University, United States

Good morning, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen. The following represents a preview of the findings of the project that I work on – the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2010, which is made possible by the generous support from the Governments of Canada, Germany, and Norway, and the Compton Foundation. This year’s edition covers an interesting time for peace operations. The pressures from continued demand and changes in global conflict have had an evolutionary impact on peace operations where balancing between both new realities and perennial challenges will be crucial to ensuring future success.

The fact that peacekeeping remains a vital international tool was reinforced during 2009. Following one of the worst years in peacekeeping in over a decade, coupled with the growing impact of the global financial crisis, fears of retrenchment were real. But despite remaining in a deep period of uncertainty, global peacekeeping deployments continued to grow, rising by about nine per cent and expanding on already record-high deployment levels.

The UN and NATO continue to serve as the main platforms for peacekeeping deployment. At the same time, the share of peacekeepers deployed by regional organizations and ad hoc arrangements dropped by about 20 per cent. But overall growth does not necessarily mean that the global peacekeeping enterprise has improved. The range of problems related to resource overstretch and lacking political processes that plagued peace operations in the most high profile theatres of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Afghanistan, and Somalia during 2008 are even more acute now, as violence in those theatres continues to be focused on civilian populations and the peacekeepers themselves. This has elicited a multitude of peacekeeping reform initiatives from the UN and its Member States, aimed at ensuring that peacekeeping is up to meeting these contemporary challenges.

The main driver in growth during 2009 came in response to the spiralling situation in Afghanistan where, in the absence of a significant political process, the discredited government, combined with a resurgent Taliban, elicited the need for
increased military deployment. Over the course of the year, NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) grew by 30 per cent and continued to represent a major draw on the overall pool of available resources for global peace operations.

While there were some notable expanded contributions by Germany and United Kingdom, ISAF’s deployment level jump largely reflects a 40 per cent US enhancement in its engagement. This is despite the persistent call for more contributions from other alliance partners whose militaries are largely stretched to their operational limits. As a result, the US remains the largest deployer of UN-mandated peacekeeping during 2009, followed by deployments from Pakistan, Bangladesh, the United Kingdom, and India. In total, the Security Council mandated peacekeepers in NATO’s deployments during 2009 are roughly equal to the total military peacekeepers deployed in the nineteen field missions overseen by the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Relative to the next largest peace operation in the field during the year, ISAF’s deployment of UN-mandated peacekeepers is more than four times as large.

The UN’s deployments grew by roughly nine per cent during the year, but this increase reflects a significant slowing down exactly when UN peacekeepers were needed the most. The operational, logistical, and political challenges of getting troops to the field in a timely manner drew questions about the efficacy of the UN’s support structures and overall available resources for global peace operations, and the political will to mount these operations despite authorizations from the Security Council. This is by no means a novel problem facing peacekeeping operations, but the disconnect between Security Council mandates and the available resources in reality remains large and continues to create unrealistic expectations of what peacekeeping operations can achieve.

This was most true in the Democratic Republic of Congo during 2009. Following the 2008 crisis in the Kivus, the Security Council authorized an increase of roughly 3,000 additional peacekeepers to the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) to help stabilize the situation. Nevertheless, as of the end of October 2009, only a portion of those additional forces had arrived. Meanwhile, the security situation remained tenuous throughout the year and perceptions held by the Congolese of the UN’s ability to provide security on the ground continued to deteriorate as they bore the brunt of the ongoing conflict. Compounding the lack of troops, the additional helicopters pledged to MONUC also failed to materialize during the year. And in Somalia, where only 60 per cent of the AU’s UN-supported force had arrived, it is questionable if any military force in the country could have an impact, as a political solution to the conflict seemed ever more remote and the transitional government’s authority was consistently rebuffed. MONUC was not the only operation to struggle fielding its
full complement of forces during the year. In contrast to the sharp deterioration of security that preceded MONUC’s augmentation, the UN and its Member States had a year’s notice that the EU would hand over in March 2009 its military operation in Chad. But today, the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) remains only halfway deployed, and of those on the ground, half were already in theatre, re-hatted from the EU operation.

Some two years after its mandate was authorized, the military strength of the joint UN-AU operation in Darfur (UNAMID) only stood at three-quarters deployed. While open conflict has slowed, shifting attention from the delayed military deployment during the year, banditry and criminal activity have risen considerably, having a sharp impact on the delivery of humanitarian aid and overall civilian security. This highlights the fact that only about 65 per cent of UNAMID’s mandated police force had deployed, and additional helicopters had also failed to materialize.

In contrast to the stalled deployment, and the difficulties associated with establishing security throughout the year, is the equally daunting challenges facing peace operations associated with consolidating peace after conflict, in particular building rule of law systems through the reform of the judiciary, security, and corrections sectors. It is an area of growing concern as the era of large military deployment of the first half of the decade gives way to longer-term peacebuilding operations. This significant challenge was identified as a priority as far back as the Brahimi Report and features centrally in the current reform initiatives. However, due to a still poor understanding of the task at hand, and insufficient resources, the challenges of establishing rule of law systems will implicate all of our primary good intentions if not properly addressed.

Whether through partial success stories like Sierra Leone or repeated failures like Timor-Leste and Haiti, building the foundation of the rule of law has been recognized as a direct corollary of drawing down peacekeeping operations. As a result, building the rule of law, conventionally conceived as a long-term peacebuilding function, has become a central aim for the majority of modern peacekeeping operations.

Among currently operating UN peacekeeping missions, 100 per cent of those established in 2000 are mandated to form either security sector and/or justice sector reform. While establishing and maintaining security remains the overriding priority of post-conflict interventions, crucial for guaranteeing ceasefires and political settlements for demobilization and disarmament and the protection of civilians, rule of law systems are now seen as necessary to safeguard many of these political processes and extend the state’s authority.
These peace operations’ activities have taken on a new saliency in contexts such as Haiti, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kosovo where drug trafficking and organized crime threaten to overwhelm nation-state institutions and undermine stability. Areas where over a quarter of the UN’s expensive military peacekeeping deployments are deployed, despite their theatres remaining relatively calm throughout the year.

At the moment, these activities are being conducted by a global pool of some 16,000 police and civilian peacekeepers and include restructuring the security agencies, and vetting, training and mentoring security and justice sectors; modernizing corrections systems; redrafting legal frameworks; and rebuilding courthouses, police stations, barracks, and other infrastructure. The increasing and necessary focus on establishing the rule of law through peace operations, however, is beginning to encounter real challenges and have brought the international peace operation architecture’s ability to deliver these ambitious goals into question.

This operational reality has demanded increasing numbers of specialized police and civilian mission personnel – experts in extremely short supply. While quantities have largely been met, the quality of the deployed personnel has become diluted as the demand has grown. This has become a particular concern with police deployments during 2009, primarily deployed by the UN. Moreover, the UN, EU, NATO, and deployments through bilateral arrangements, are all competing for the same limited pool of experts. In Afghanistan, for instance, the dearth of police trainers for the EUPOL operation jeopardizes efforts to build a credible police service and has resulted in an over-reliance on military trainers.

Despite its prevalence, it is also acknowledged that building the rule of law via peace operations remains in its infancy, with much to be learned at the strategic and tactical levels. These activities are politically extremely sensitive, and the issue of consent of the host country and general sovereignty issues need to be balanced. Furthermore, strategically, and to their detriment, justice and security sector reform programmes have also remained overwhelmingly technical in their approach, despite the fundamentally political and sensitive nature of the task at hand.

Complicating matters further, establishing rule of law systems through the reform of judicial and security sectors is a crowded field. Of the nearly 60 peace operations covered in our forthcoming volume, more than half are working towards establishing the rule of law in the presence of another like-minded, yet operationally disconnected, mission. Here, harmonization and mutual dependence is of a premium, but remains elusive. Differences in approach and poor coherence in coordination are also apparent within multilateral institutions.
Since the establishment of the United Nations Office of the Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI), OROLSI has been the lead organization for building rule of law systems. But its mission remains confined to peacekeeping environments and short-term mandates. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), with its long-term country presence and development mandate has limited capacity in resources. Coordination between the two has improved, but there is still much to be done. Meanwhile, articulating the role of the UN Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) in relation to peacekeeping operations is in need of further development.

Clearly, the test of the multidimensional peacekeeping era is upon us. Managing the transition from heavy peacekeeping presences to longer-term peacebuilding operations is, and will remain, a core challenge. Ultimately though, all of the challenges facing peace operations in the coming years are going to be political, regardless of the tasks at hand, be it military, or building the rule of law. Unless they stand on solid political foundations in the operational theatre and at headquarters, their impact will remain limited.

Finally, no one likes to talk about money. But the effects of the global financial crisis of 2008 are just coming to bear on national budgets. It will impact the future contributions to peacekeeping operations. It is important to note that despite the generally gloomy portrayal of the peace operations situation, much would be lost if resources for peacekeeping operations become even more scarce. While peacekeeping has become more expensive, it has also served to bring greater stability and development to conflict-afflicted countries around the world. Peace operations are admittedly flawed, yet they are ever evolving, and I presume that is why we are all here today. Thank you for listening and I look forward to addressing these issues over the course of the next two days.
Chapter 3

A New Horizon for Peace Operations Partnerships – What are the Next Steps?

Facilitator: H.E. Mr. Henri-Paul Normandin, Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations / Chair of the Working Group of the United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations

Good morning everyone. It is now my turn to wish you a warm welcome to this morning’s session. The very first thing to do, on behalf of all of us, is to express our thanks to our co-hosts – Sweden and Pakistan. As you know, the Challenges Forum is an undertaking of many partners, but in order to pull together a meeting like the one we are having today and tomorrow, you require the work of a number of countries and individuals a bit more on the forefront. So thank you very much to our hosts.

Thank you very much for providing all of us with an opportunity to discuss very substantive and relevant issues. Very substantive and relevant, because what we do, or do not do, with peacekeeping operations has a direct impact on the lives of many people around the world; people in situations of conflict. It is also an opportunity to meet in a very timely fashion given everything that is on the agenda currently in terms of changes in peacekeeping.

Over the years, the Challenges Forum has contributed to a better understanding of peacekeeping, better knowledge of the facts, better understanding of the issues, better understanding of the problems, and of the challenges. The Forum has managed to gather researchers, academics, and practitioners as well as policymakers, on one platform.

The problems, issues, and challenges of peacekeeping are by now well-understood and well-documented. But all of this has to contribute to change. We have to make the link with the work of the Forum, which, as Ambassador Lidén mentioned earlier, is not a policy-making undertaking, but all the work of the Forum has to contribute to changes in policies and changes in operations. The Forum has to contribute to decisions and actions by all those involved in peacekeeping; and they are indeed many. First of all, Member States in our different incarnations: as TCCs and PCCs; of the UN and the General Assembly; the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, the C-34, the Fifth Committee; and the Security Council and the UN Secretariat, which carries a heavy burden in trying to pull all of this together.
Hence the relevance of the theme for this year’s Forum: *A New Partnership for UN Peace Operations – What are the Next Steps?* It is only fitting that we begin today’s meeting by having with us two of the people who are in a leadership position on the changes that are to come: Mr. Le Roy, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, and Madame Malcorra, Under-Secretary-General for Field Support. They will present their views on the next steps: what are the plans; what are the proposals; and how will all of this unfold? They will talk about the substance of the changes that need to take place, and also some of the processes.

Essentially, we want two things from this session. First, a better collective understanding of the plans that the Secretariat is putting forward – on the New Horizon and the Field Strategy. Second, tapping into the experience, the expertise, and the wisdom of this group for ideas and suggestions as to what are these next steps in developing better partnerships amongst peacekeeping actors.

*Mr. Alain Le Roy, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations*

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, Colleague Peacekeepers – I see many present, former and maybe future peacekeepers around the room. I am very pleased to be here and, above all, I am very impressed by the number and quality of the peacekeeping expertise gathered here today.

First, I would like to thank Sweden and Pakistan and the Folke Bernadotte Academy for this important gathering which comes at a very timely occasion when we have so much on our plate. I am very pleased with Sweden’s involvement and Pakistan’s continuous commitment. I was in Islamabad recently and was glad to see the renewed and continuous support for peacekeeping from Pakistan, despite its internal challenges. Pakistan remains, for many years, the largest contributor to UN peacekeeping operations. Thank you very much, and thank you also to Canada for chairing this session, and to all the Partners of this Challenges Forum.

Since the Paris Challenges Forum was held last year, much has been done in the field of peacekeeping. It is always a lively undertaking. We have expanded operations in Darfur with UNAMID. We have taken over from the EU Force in Chad. We have closed some operations and are drawing down the Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). At the same time, there is clear additional demand for peacekeeping all over the world. We remain very active facing all the political, operational and administrative challenges linked with UN peacekeeping. We continue to search the globe for critical capabilities. In addition to the critical helicopter shortage in
MONUC, UNAMID and MINURCAT, we still struggle to deploy full police units at the required levels, and we are still missing critical engineering and intelligence capacities.

There is also a new development. Over the past year, a substantive dialogue has begun about the future of UN peacekeeping and how we can make it a better and more relevant instrument for the 21st century. The Security Council, the Secretariat, and the General Assembly have been addressing in detail and in a very frank way, some of the most important policy issues facing UN peacekeeping. At the root of this discussion is the recognition that we need a renewed peacekeeping partnership to build a vision and a practical agenda to meet the challenges of modern peacekeeping.

This Forum could therefore not come at a more appropriate time. We are eight months from the tenth anniversary of the landmark Brahimi Report. It is a significant moment to embark together on a joint effort to shape the future of UN peacekeeping, and the upcoming C-34 session will be critical in this regard. The message of partnership is the agenda that the Challenges group has been promoting for many years. This makes you well-placed to actively contribute to this effort.

The launch of the New Horizon process was my first initiative, when I took over from Jean-Marie Guéhenno in late August, a process which I decided to launch together with Susana Malcorra. After having carefully read the Brahimi Report and the Capstone Doctrine formulated under the leadership of Jean-Marie Guéhenno, it became clear to me that, since 2000 when the Brahimi Report was published, it has remained a Bible for all peacekeepers. But at the same time, many things have changed.

We have seen the figures. In 2000, the budget for peacekeeping was around $2 billion. We are now not far from an $8 billion budget. At the time of the Brahimi Report in 2000, 25,000 peacekeepers were deployed in the field. Today, they number 115,000. As far as complexity is concerned, the MONUC mandates are no longer one or two pages, but ten with 41 different tasks to implement. The complexity of the operations has drastically increased. Consequently, it was clear to me that it was the right time, nine years after the Brahimi Report, to launch the New Horizon initiative.

We welcome the British-French initiative in the Security Council, and we were very pleased with the provisional statement of the Fifth Committee in the Council in August. We are also very pleased with Japan’s contribution in the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping. We are very grateful also to Canada
for all the seminars that you are organizing and to the Challenges Forum for your contributions today. It all goes in the same direction, trying to increase the consensus on how to deal with the new challenges.

We are making good progress on developing a shared agenda. After several months of sustained dialogue, we are now moving to detailed concepts and strategies that can be implemented. In moving from rhetoric to action, it will be crucial to maintain momentum and focus. The Challenges Forum, and the background papers that have been prepared, are excellent examples of what we now need: a direct discussion and concrete thinking that can lead to real progress with regard to specific challenges, such as expanding the troop-contributor base, consultation with contributors, organized crime, and command and control issues. I hope that our discussion will match the papers in terms of their pragmatic and concrete approach. To do that, we must be frank and open. It is our responsibility to put all the issues on the table in a very transparent manner.

The background papers provide a thoughtful policy analysis and practical and action-oriented recommendations. Some of the recommendations are already undertaken in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and in the Department of Field Support (DFS), such as entering into meaningful and substantive dialogue with troop and police contributors, and supporting new contributors. We hope to act on a number of the other very sensible recommendations put forward in the papers.

Within the Secretariat we have already taken a number of very concrete steps to enhance the consultation. On 1 October, DFS and DPKO issued a detailed instruction to all staff concerning steps to improve consultation practices in mission planning, and in Secretariat support to mandate renewal procedures. In the same directive, we also laid out some implementation steps for issues, such as benchmarking that were promoted by the Security Council in the very important 5 August Presidential Statement.

The New Horizon paper further stimulated the dialogue and discussion in the Fourth Committee, and now DPKO and DFS are zeroing in the priorities. We hope to submit these officially for our Member States’ consideration at the start of 2010. We are committed to conducting a series of informal briefings leading up to the C-34 to continue our discussion with Member States and ensure that the Secretariat benefits from the perspective and knowledge of Member States on detailed issues. We have heard that message very clearly, and we acknowledge it. We hope that such dialogue, well ahead of that session, will help us in focusing our discussion and maximizing our efforts before the formal C-34 sessions. We have already started to lay out our thinking on four major priority areas that will
be the focus of DPKO and DFS energies throughout 2010 and which will be a centrepiece of our Report in January.

The first focus is policy development, particularly in the very difficult areas of the protection of civilians. We all are grateful for the resolutions that were adopted yesterday unanimously by the Security Council. It is now our task to define, release and discuss a clear operational concept for the protection of civilians and from that derive guidance through the formations. Our policy focus also includes robust peacekeeping, and the peacebuilding tasks undertaken by UN peacekeepers in coordination with other actors.

In the areas of the protection of civilians and robust peacekeeping, DPKO is working to produce initial concept notes for Member States’ consideration in advance of the C-34 to ensure we have the best possible substantive debate in February. Following the C-34, we will need Member States’ support as we examine in detail the operational implication of these. In the area of peacebuilding linkage for example, we are undertaking internal research and analysis on lessons of early critical peacebuilding tasks and other challenges for moving to the transition phase in peacekeeping, when the peacebuilding effort has not yet been engaged fully. We are also working with the PBSO to better articulate the linkage between peacekeeping and peacebuilding as several of our peacekeeping missions – Timor, Haiti, Liberia, and other cases – also have many peacebuilding tasks as part of their mandates.

After policy development, the second major priority will be capability development. This work will in 2010 focus on developing a roadmap for future peacekeeping capabilities and enhance performance from those capabilities. We will seek to address some critical questions in capability development, such as how to improve training; how to align capacity-building programme with critical needs; how to find ways to build and expand a sustainable base of contributors for the future; and in the medium term, the UN peacekeeping community must also look to the question of incentives for contributing the needed capabilities, and for delivering effective performance in the field. By 2011, I believe that the UN peacekeeping community needs a clear strategy for capability development and management that will help guide those discussions. This is an area where support from Member States will be clearly critical.

Susana Malcorra will elaborate on the third priority, explaining how she is driving ahead a major overhaul of the strategy for supporting field missions which presents a range of important and pragmatic new ways of supporting peacekeepers in the field. This field support strategy addresses a reality of supporting a global field-based enterprise and finding ways to realize possible economies of scale. This
session of the General Assembly will be crucial in considering the UN Secretariat’s field support strategy that Susana’s team will be laying out in a report of the Secretariat in early 2010.

Fourth and finally, we will remain committed in the context of our on-going missions to examine Member States’ consultation, reporting, and also command accountability issues. We will maintain a dialogue and hope to continue to maximize the strength of the UN command and control and planning systems, while scrutinizing their limitations carefully. Some of those issues will be discussed in more detail here, and I welcome the dialogue and look forward to hearing the results. Several members of DPKO and DFS will address the challenges during the day. Dmitry Titov and Izumi Nakamitsu will give more details on that.

So in conclusion, this year has been a very busy year both on operational and policy fronts. I believe that we have more cohesive partnerships today than we did yesterday. On the protection of civilians’ debate, important and some difficult questions are on the table for authorization in a very transparent manner, and we, in the Secretariat, believe that there is a healthy and constructive dialogue among the partnerships. In the face of the realities of modern peacekeeping demands, there is a growing recognition that a new pragmatic and problem-solving approach is required.

With more than 115,000 peacekeepers in the field, and sometimes in the most difficult places on earth, and almost $8 billion invested in operations, our peacekeepers demand that we take up the challenges of helping them to be as effective as possible on the ground. I am hopeful that 2010 will be a year that will turn policy ideas into practical action to support our missions in the field; to deliver the tasks we have entrusted them with; to protect civilians; to respond to threats; and to support countries to put in place the foundations of peace.

I am extremely grateful to the Challenges partnership for continuing to marshal support from your governments, and for investing your own time and resources in bringing practical thinking and support to the table. I know that you will boost staunch supporters as we move forward to realize the priorities that we have laid out in the coming years. Thank you very much for your attention.

Facilitator: H.E. Mr. Henri-Paul Normandin thanked Mr. Le Roy for outlining both the plans that are in the making, in terms of what we want to do with peacekeeping and also how things will unfold between now and the C-34 and beyond. It is an encompassing agenda from broad policy and orientation to very operational issues, some of which are very down-to-earth. This leads us into our next presentation on field strategy.
Good morning, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, Colleagues and Friends. It is very good to be here today. I would like to thank the Forum, an din particular the Hosts, for giving us this opportunity. I will emphasize that choosing the partnership word for the theme of today’s and tomorrow’s discussion seems the most precise and most pertinent approach to our conversation. This is such a difficult task, and challenge for all of us, that only through really partnering and coming to share views on these challenges and possible solutions, are we going to be able to address them.

I have come to peacekeeping only over a year ago to head the Department of Field Support (DFS), which was created after a long discussion and based on different views from Member States. Here we stand today. The Department has been alive for two years, and hopefully, we are starting to prove that the system works. The Department’s mandate is really focused on delivering services to the field, which enhance the capacity of peacekeeping overall to get things done.

We do not only serve peacekeeping missions. We serve fifteen missions led by DPKO, thirteen missions led by the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), and one mission led by the AU. We have a variety of clients among the ones we serve and we need to work with all of them.

To give you a sense of the scope of our enterprise, we have approximately give you a sense of the scope of our enterprise. We have approximately 22,000 international staff that we manage, and the combined budget of all of these missions together exceeds $8 billion. We manage over 300 medical facilities. We have more than 300 aircraft, 17,000 vehicles, and we have an extensive network of computers and technology to serve the missions.

We face huge challenges in bringing all of these together, not only operational challenges of on-going missions but even greater challenges of deploying new missions. Darfur has been one of the focus in the past few months. The re-hatting in Chad has been another one. I did hear the reference made that we all knew that Chad was going to be re-hatted one year in advance, but it is also true that we only got the mandate from the Security Council at a very late stage. It has been a nightmare for us to be able to bring all the pieces together, because we were only allowed to really effectively engage after the Security Council’s mandate was issued. I will address this in more detail when I talk about strategy.

The evolution of the mandate of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has been another key logistical challenge for us. The fact that we have reformed some
of our battalions, that we have divided them into smaller highly mobile teams, has meant a lot from a logistical standpoint. It was really difficult to adjust our priorities in the vastness of DRC. We are coping with the situation of Afghanistan, and as we cope with the deteriorating security situation, we are expanding our presence. We have downsized Kosovo, which has been an excellent example of handling a very tricky situation, particularly vis-à-vis staff, without major problems. As we learnt overnight that the Security Council had made the decision to terminate the mandate for the mission in Georgia, we also closed down that mission very successfully in four months without much noise. We are transitioning from traditional peacekeeping to peacebuilding missions in Guinea-Bissau, the Central African Republic and Chad. We are supporting the AU in Somalia, which is really a totally different ballgame for us. Having said that, we have been able to bring resources to the AU peacekeepers that otherwise would not be available. In the meantime, we support the more traditional, stable missions – Haiti, Timor-Leste, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, and others.

Clearly, we have seen that the current model to serve and support peacekeeping missions is not the right model. When you think of the size of the challenges and the size of the operations, you realize the complexities. With specific needs of each mission, we also need cross-cutting services and a base to support missions in a shared approach, which in our view is critical. This is part of what we are going to address with the support strategy that represents a shift in the mindset. Because the way we have operated so far recognizes the fact that missions come and go, that their lifespan is short, everything is done and contained within missions. However, experience shows that missions are here much longer than originally expected. Somewhere between five and 10 years is the average lifespan of a mission. At the same time, we are starting to see that missions evolve and transform, e.g. a traditional peacekeeping operation may become a peacebuilding operation. We need to recognize that and find ways to serve that transition better.

The present model is not good enough for the challenges we are facing today. In fact, it is absolutely inadequate for the challenges we anticipate for the future. When I hear Alain talking about what we lay out as part of the New Horizon, it becomes obvious to me, to all of us, that we need to adjust the way we work. There is no way we are going to be able to address the questions coming out of the conversation on robust peacekeeping, out of the new propositions on the protection of civilians. We have to adjust the way we serve the missions in order to be able, on the one hand, to comply with all our internal rules and regulations, and, on the other hand, to deliver on what is required on the ground and to achieve the mandates set for us by the Security Council.
Clearly, we have to strike a different balance between the risks of managing resources properly and the risk of not delivering our mandates properly. We have worked for so long in the framework that has been established for the Secretariat. It is a good framework for Headquarters. But it is not necessarily the appropriate framework to serve missions on the ground. I think the lack of empowerment, the lack of delegation of authority, the lack of ability to introduce flexible approaches, hinder the capacity of our peace missions to deliver on their mandates properly. Unless we find a way to strike a balance between these two notions, we will always be running behind what the demands are.

It is much easier to shy away from the financial risk than what it is to shy away from the risk of not delivering on the mandates. When we discuss delays, we need to introduce the concept that some of those delays are related to the intrinsic cumbersome processes that we have within the United Nations. This is part of what we are trying to address with our global delivery strategy. We are trying to establish a new framework. We are trying to establish a framework that sets a different way to support missions. We are trying to, and in doing so, we also find economy of scales. For example, we are trying to define global delivery service centres and regional delivery service centres. We believe that, today, more than ever before, there is an opportunity to share support activities amongst missions, which will give us opportunities of economies of scales that will have a positive impact on the requirement for resources.

We also believe that we have to further streamline our planning, and in doing so, formulate a much more standardized approach to some of the support requirements, at least in the initial phases of deployment. I think this notion of starting everything with a white piece of paper and delineating for every single mission does not work any longer. We have an opportunity to become much more modular, to define a plug-and-play approach where we bring those modules together. With the pieces being brought together to address the needs, not only of headquarters, but also of team sites across the mission landscape, the modules could satisfy a small and a bigger size mission.

This should improve planning and give us the opportunity to preposition not only goods but also services and staff. Missions will be properly planned so that we can deliver the prefabricated goods on the ground and set them up, making sure that they really are available. This will require some changes in the rules and regulations, for which we will be seeking approval. I do not want to take you into the minor details, but it is important that we continue a very strong engagement and conversation. We have done it with the C-34. I was there yesterday with the Fifth Committee. We will have to agree in principle that this shift is the right one. Here, I count on your support for the C-34.
Then we will have to discuss in detail the resource implications, or hopefully, the resource opportunities, because we are very mindful that resources, even if nobody likes to talk about money, at the end of the day, it is a key driver for the decision-making process. Hopefully we will be able to prove to you that some of these proposals – very creative, very different from the way we have done business so far – will help us to tackle resources in a much more thoughtful manner – effectively, but also efficiently. And most importantly, they will help us support our colleagues in peacekeeping deliver on the substantive mandates in a better way.

I deeply believe that, unless we move forward with a very measured and holistic approach, which is not piecemeal, we will not be able to address the challenges that were put before us in the initial presentations, and most importantly what Alain lay out as part of our New Horizon work. We are working hard to deliver a document by the end of the year, so that there will be a Secretary-General’s report in the beginning of 2010. We will have an engaged first semester, hopefully leading to an approval by the General Assembly in June, which will allow us to adjust the budgets to a new framework, and will allow us to start working on a new approach that will take us five years to implement. It is not going to be overnight. Again, it is a major overhaul. But hopefully, it will make us stand up as a very differentiated, qualitatively, but also resource-wise organization. Thank you very much.

Facilitator, Mr. Henri-Paul Normandin Thank you very much, Ms. Malcorra, for outlining your plans for the new field support strategy which has the potential to be very transformative in terms of the way in which we conceive and manage peace operations. Hopefully, it will lead to speedy deployments and also more effective use of resources. I should also thank both Mr. Le Roy and Ms. Malcorra for your leadership and your initiative in bringing forward these proposals, at times bold as well as innovative. Your leadership is very much appreciated. In addition to your personal contributions, there is a strong team working with you in DPKO and in DFS and many of them I recognize are right here in the room. So please do engage with them, not only formally in the sessions, but also informally during the breaks.

Bearing in mind the objective of our session, the question and answer session will address first the plans that the Secretariat is putting forward; and second, ideas and proposals which may facilitate the way forward.
Discussion

A Forum participant suggested that, although the Secretariat in the last ten years had made some fantastic progress, which one should not forget, the challenges ahead were going to be difficult to overcome. The speaker referred to two key challenges that had not yet been raised. The first concerned leadership, a key lesson that came out of almost every analysis on the UN. The second issue related to the problem with staffing. Some people maintained that the United Nations Volunteers (UNV) system often seemed to work better than the actual recruiting system. “How do we improve the recruiting system, and get the right people in place, in time, in the UN?”

On the issue of the protection of civilians and new policies and capacity-building possibilities, the participant asked what the plan was in the interim. In response, Ms. Malcorra referred to Darfur and DRC and the on-going problems related to the protection of civilians. Although the mandate very clearly included the protection of civilians, not only to address against rebels but also against government forces, the problem was that in Darfur you were dealing with a force that did not have the required capacities. In DRC, on the other hand, the force was quite capable.

Another participant raised the issue of the upcoming tenth anniversary of Resolution 1325, its relevance to what had been discussed, and what part it played in the very important reform process.

Mr. Le Roy stated that, with regard to the protection of civilians, the mandates were very clear. Ten years ago, the first protection of civilians mission had been launched in Sierra Leone with the mandate to protect civilians “under imminent threat.” The mandate was very clear, but its implementation much more challenging. While the UN was still working on the concept paper and the operational guidance to the field missions, much had already been achieved. In fact, Mr. Le Roy had just returned from DRC where the problem was at the core of the Mission. Among the 41 tasks of MONUC, the protection of civilians was the number one priority.

“At the same time, as was clearly stated in the independent study which was released a few days ago, namely, that it is impossible for any mission to protect all civilians from all threats. Let me give you some figures. MONUC is the largest UN peacekeeping mission, with altogether 20,000 troops. However, just in the Kivus, we have to protect ten million civilians, and we are at risk both from the threat from the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and, in some cases, by some elements of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC). So we have 20,000 peacekeepers concentrated in the
east to protect at least 10 million people, that is the North Kivu Brigade under Indian command and the South Kivu Brigade under Pakistani command. When I was there, I witnessed their tremendous work under tough field conditions and heavy criticism, which in my opinion is not always completely fair. Because, again, we have 20 peacekeepers per 10,000 civilians, so we will not be able to put a peacekeeper behind everyone.

At the same time, it is very clear that we have to improve the way in which we perform in Sudan and DRC. In the case of Sudan, our mission, especially in southern Sudan, has now established a draft strategy. In the case of DRC, much improvement has taken place, and quite an innovative approach has been demonstrated. In fact, in the field of the protection of civilians, MONUC is a pioneer mission. Because, as was clearly stated yesterday in the Security Council, no army in the world has ever been trained to protect civilians. Soldiers are trained to fight wars, not to protect civilians. The troops deployed to UN missions are not trained to protect civilians, although we have to. I will give you some examples of MONUC’s efforts in this regard.

First, while it is not only a military task to protect civilians, physical protection is a pure military action although it does also encompass civil-military cooperation. That is why MONUC has created what we call the JPTs – Joint Protection Teams, comprising military, police, and child protection and human rights officers. They visit villages, trying to elevate and evaluate the threat and prevent hostile action. One very practical way in which they do so is by giving cell phones to chiefs of villages to ensure that, when they have a problem, they can call us immediately. MONUC’s reaction time is very rapid, in some cases, just eight minutes. That is, if we have the requested helicopters.

We have many early warning services, as well as well-established troops. The 3,000 troops that we are getting (I have already seen the advance party in the Congo) will be used very much as both special forces and quick reaction forces. Because, clearly, to protect civilians, the key issue is mobility, i.e. being able to react very quickly and be present in the field. We have to be present as much as possible, scattered all over the place. For the military, this is not always easy because we remember last year, we had that very important debate on MONUC, especially in the North Kivu, when we decided that, in order to protect civilians, the forces had to be scattered in as many, comparative operating bases (COB) or temporary operating bases (TOB) as possible. At the same time, COBs and TOBs are vulnerable to threats, and last year when there was a severe attack by the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), those small bases were very fragile. Thus, we are facing a dilemma; should we scatter the force to be able to protect the civilians, or should we regroup our forces to be more able to defend
against spoilers? It was not an easy choice, but we decided to continue with the small scattered bases.

One additional point. The on-going operation in MONUC called Kimia II is under heavy criticism by NGOs. I understand their point of view that we cannot support the operation, and that we could be accused of violating human rights. We fully support that. Last week, I decided together with the leadership of MONUC to suspend our cooperation with one specific unit, the 213th Brigade, because we just had information from our human rights officers that it had clearly violated human rights when a civilian group was attacked by the Brigade. We decided to stop our support. At the same time, there was a debate in the Security Council on 16 October during which we presented the state of the Kimia II operation, and we received the full support of the Security Council to continue with this operation; with three important caveats, however. The operation could be supported only when there was joint planning between the Congolese forces and ourselves; when there was no violation of human rights; and when it would improve our ways of protecting civilians.

When I hear that there is a demand for us to stop completely our support for this operation, I say two things. First, we have a clear mandate from the Security Council to continue with that operation. Second, if we were to stop completely our support for this operation, the civilians would not be better protected in the Kivus. Maybe the UN would have cleaner hands, but the civilian population would be much more at risk. For example, we are giving food rations to 16,000 Congolese forces in the Kivus every day. If we just stopped feeding them, the consequences would include immediate looting and civilians being at risk. Thus, our support is key to continuing to enhance the protection of civilians. We do not protect the whole population, but we reduce the risk. The complexity of the matter means that we must pioneer ways to deal with it, and maybe Major General Cammaert who was in a different sector in Kisangani can elaborate more on this very extremely difficult issue, which we try to address in new ways every day.”

Ms. Malcorra agreed with Mr. Le Roy pointing out one of the soft aspects of reform. “No doubt that we need to address the overall staffing and leadership question. Leadership is a problem in any organization. If you do not find ways to provide the organization with the right level of leadership, then you have a problem. You face a difficult and tricky situation in managing the organization right.” Ms. Malcorra said that the UN was challenged with building many teams for very difficult places. “We have started a database from which we draw names that is continuously updated. We do face the challenge of not having enough qualified people to put together fitting teams. What we are trying to do is to find ways in which to reach out to a broader basis so that we can enrich our alternatives
and decide on the right combination of gender, geographical representation, and likeliness that the team will work well together. It is a very difficult process on which there is much focus from our side. We have a team dedicated to this, and as senior managers we also devote much time to the process. Alain and I meet the senior team once a week to discuss senior leadership. But the more difficult the places where we have to deploy, the more complex the mandates are, the more multidimensional the challenge is, the harder it is to find people willing to take the risk. Because at the end of the day, leadership involves a lot of risk taking. They are high profile positions with much associated risk.

On the general staffing issue, we did go through a discussion on staffing with Member States last year. The General Assembly partially endorsed a human resources reform that the Secretary-General had put forward. This reform had essentially two main objectives. One of them was to bring our staff in the field at par with those in the Secretariat. To eliminate that historical divide between first class and second class staff – first class being here, or in Geneva, or in Vienna, and second class being in the field. He felt very strongly about this, and we agreed that it was wrong. So the Secretary-General put it forward as one of the staffing requirements. The second one was regarding the recognition of a second household. Somehow the system should recognize that. Member States and we understand the context of a very difficult struggle for resources. The pie is somewhat divided for approval of the reform. It went ahead with the recognition of the staff being part of the Secretariat. While we very much appreciate that this added something important to the pockets of our staff, the hardship question puts us in a very difficult situation where there are gaps between our staff. We find some defensive programmes are very important. But what is more difficult is that we are not able to capture people coming from the defensive programmes to work in peacekeeping missions. This is particularly difficult when you have integrated missions that need to address the questions that some of the people in defensive programs have the skills and experience to address. So that is one overall issue that we are going to tackle again. The Secretary-General will send a new report asking for a review of this aspect next year.

In general, we also have a problem with process. Our internal process is difficult and cumbersome. The fact that staff in the field are now equal to staff at Headquarters has made the process even more cumbersome, because we need to be complying with the process as established in the Secretariat. Our plan is to have people on rosters and to have people cleared beforehand to help us move faster and better, and that is what we are going to address in the strategy. In the meantime, we are trying to short-circuit some of the recently adopted processes and find ways to move forward, because now we find ourselves with a bottleneck trying to apply the new reform. It is creating a delay in the deployment of field staff. So all in all,
staffing and leadership are two soft issues that we need to push and keep working on.”

The facilitator, Mr. Normandin, asked how Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace and security was factored into all these considerations.

Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, Director of Policy, Evaluation and Training in DPKO, pointed out that peacekeeping operations had indeed come a long way since the adoption of resolution 1325. “All the multidimensional peacekeeping operations today have a designated gender unit which looks over all dimensions related to gender mainstreaming, gender protection, etc. That is one definitely important achievement. Gender perspectives in peacekeeping operations have been integrated into pre-deployment training packages. The thinking has already made its way, cascading down, to the troop- and police-contributing countries’ training as well. What we are now doing is to review those materials, including the gender guidance, but also the training standards, to incorporate the new resolutions, including resolution 1820 that was adopted earlier this year and, most recently, resolution 1888 concerning sexual violence in conflict. Since this is a very important development, we are now looking into how to increase our training aspects to make sure that peacekeepers really understand how to protect women from those extreme circumstances, and also to prepare clear guidance as to how they might in fact react in those conditions. This is clearly very closely linked to the overall protection of civilians issues. The main issue in 1820 is that rape and other sexual violence is being used as tactics of war, and it establishes how peacekeepers should react to serious violence committed in areas where they are deployed. So we are already taking action. Our gender team in New York has recently conducted visits to field missions, including to Sudan, Chad and other operations. We are now trying to incorporate its findings into the new guidance materials that we will be preparing. We have been working very closely with the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM). We will also work very closely with the new SRSG’s office to be established in the near future. The Secretary-General will be appointing a new Special Representative on sexual violence and conflict, and this will be a person and an office with which DPKO and DFS will obviously be working very closely to address this very important issue.”

Mr. Le Roy added that there was quite a debate about whether the SRSG should be a man or a woman. “We also appeal to attract more female police officers in order to protect women in the field. I shall relate that to the previous question on Darfur. We are trying to protect both civilian men and women through our presence, especially in the camps. When we are present 24/7, as we are in Kalma and other camps, it increases the overall perspective on the protection of civilians,
both for men and women. This has been achieved through the deployment of
formed police units in the camps. Out of nineteen planned units for these camps,
twelve–thirteen are already on ground.”

Mr. Normandin pointed out that there were many building-blocks and a number
of actions that had been taken with regard to resolution 1325. “But there is one
area of 1325 where there has been next to nil progress. It is the participation of
women in peace processes and peace negotiations; the number is abysmally low.
The international community, including the UN Secretariat, and all those involved
in peace processes, have to take this issue much more seriously.”

A representative from a leading troop contributing country agreed with
previous statements that, regardless of the number of deployed troops or police,
peacekeepers would not be able to protect all civilians. “Because, according to my
modest understanding, the notion or concept of physically protecting civilians is
basically and inherently flawed. It is rather self-defeating. First, it requires more
forces, and second, it requires reactionary forces. We might as well be providing a
very lucrative target to the rebels. One possibility or strategy is the establishment
of village defence committees. Along with the provision of cellular phones, if we
could also give some weapons for self defence to the elders of the village that
could help them hold up against any rebels’ attack for the short time that it takes
a peacekeeping force to arrive there. In addition, there is the question of whether
we can consider an indirect approach of protecting civilians and what that could
be? That is, by seeking out and diluting threats that mean essentially to go into
an offensive mode and which might be beyond the mandates that we generally
are provided with. But that is probably the way forward; becoming offensive and
attacking and liquidating the threat right in the strongholds of the perpetrators in
order to protect civilians.”

A retired general and former senior UN peacekeeping official asked Ms. Malcorra
about the importance of mobility. “First, how far has the DFS developed its
procedures on not using civilian rules and regulations for military aircraft,
in particular helicopters, but to use the rules and regulations of the troop-
contributors themselves? In 2005, we received a waiver to use military aircraft
according to national rules and regulations, and we provided the procedures to
DPKO a few years ago. Where are we now? Because that is such an important
factor when we talk about vast areas and various threats. Second, the concept of
hard-wall accommodation for the troops is something of the past. It not only eats
an enormous amount of engineering capacity, but it also hampers the ability to
move troops quickly from the castles that develop over the years in the places they
are located. What are the plans in this regard?”
A participant raised the issue of deployment deficits. “In the case of MINURCAT, for example, the deployment deficit is 39 per cent, but for MONUC it is only ten per cent. What measures are being taken by DPKO in order to face this growing disparity? The second issue is related to intelligence capacity and it is addressed to Ms. Malcorra. It was rightly mentioned that we are facing difficulties in gathering intelligence. Any ideas on that specific issue? The final question concerns the modular approach which is intended to address the need to change our mode of operating, in order to deploy logistics efficiently. Having said that, I recognize the importance of developing a system of field support for meeting the logistical challenges of peacekeeping.”

A participant underlined how important it was for Member States to be informed of the vision that was evolving with regard to the way ahead, so that their own efforts could be aligned with those that the New Horizon process was trying to accomplish. A question was also raised with regard to the protection of civilians. “You mentioned specifically that you are struggling to find competent, qualified formed police units and the need to provide additional training so we can bring them up to UN standards. How can we get the regional organization or the training centre that has been created for that purpose – the Centre of Excellence for Stability Police Units – to more effectively fit into the mix to help you train and prepare units for deployment?”

Mr. Le Roy returned to the question of the protection of civilians to remind the Forum that during the two World Wars there were millions of civilians killed in the conflicts. “We were unable to protect them, we all know that. Also, I always quote the case of Kosovo in 1999, when I was there as part of the interim administration mission, UNMIK. There were 45,000 NATO troops deployed on a territory 200 times smaller than the DRC, and still civilians were killed every day. Thus, it is very clear, even with the highest density of troops, we cannot protect all civilians. That is why it is a very important point for us to show the limitation of what we can do, and to limit the expectations. This is one of the major issues. It is easy to include the one sentence in the mandates. It is more difficult to fully implement it.

It was said that one of the options would be to have a direct offensive approach to destroy the spoilers and the threats. Of course, we would all like that, although that may well mean peace enforcement. But UN peacekeeping would never be suitable for peace enforcement. We could go in for robust peacekeeping, having harsh positions to harsh processes toward violent spoilers. In DRC today, FARDC, with our support and sometimes with our attack helicopters, attack FDLR. However, they are something like 5,000 to 6,000. Some surrender, some are killed, but some go into the bush. To ensure that all of the hundreds of threats are neutralized is
impossible. In addition to what the troops do on the ground, what we do on the
civilian and diplomatic side is very important.

Linked to that is the question of qualified formed police units (FPU) for the
protection of civilians. It is a relatively new concept in peacekeeping. The first FPU
was deployed to Kosovo in 1999. Since then, there has been considerable progress.
As we speak, we are developing a doctrine to standardize the training needs, in
order to ensure that the required capacities are available in the field, based on a
long internal study on the capacity of the available resources. The doctrine will
form part of pre-deployment training that will be very useful. Maybe Ann-Marie
Orler can comment on this.

On the deployment issue and the 39 per cent deficit in the case of MINURCAT, as
Susana stated, we received the MINURCAT mandate on the 16 or 17 January for
deployment on 15 March. We might have known for a year that we would have to
take over the operation, but we had the legal mandate only less than two months
before envisaged deployment. As Susana can explain to you much better than I
can, in order to deploy we need a full proclamation for the signing of contracts.
We need a resolution and a mandate; otherwise, there are many processes that we
cannot undertake. For the EU, it took at least six months to deploy.

For us, it evidently took a little longer and that is why we have included in our
New Horizon recommendations that we need to ensure that, in case we are to take
over from a previous mission, e.g. EU or AU, we have the mandate at least six
months in advance to avoid a deployment deficit.

Concerning MONUC, we are ten per cent short, but the forces are arriving now.
I was there when the Egyptian troops arrived. By the end of the year or maybe by
mid-January, we will be there with 100 per cent of the force.

On the issue of intelligence capacities, there is currently a debate in the C-34, where
some countries are saying that we shall not develop too much intelligence capacity
because it might give us a problem when we approach a sovereign country. But we
keep insisting, because we think it is very important in order to protect our troops.
If we want to have troops in peacekeeping, we need to have better protection. To
this end, we need intelligence, in some cases unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
Therefore, we keep insisting on these intelligence capacities.”

Ms. Malcorra briefly commented on the issue of deployment, pointing out that it
always had at least two ingredients; one was logistics and the other, availability
of troops.
“In the case of Chad, we had to go far beyond what EUFOR had achieved in terms of logistic deployment. We had to open new places and, as Alain stated, we are catching up. There are still some delays on the availability of troops. Thus, there are two sides to the coin, and we are pushing to finalize the deployment in Chad in the first quarter of the coming year.

With regard to the questions related to mobility, we need a change of mind-set. I agree that hard-wall accommodations are a key element of the debate. We need to sit with the TCCs and the PCCs and agree on the way forward. Agreements have not yet been made, and that is part of the engagement we need with Member States on a very specific question. As tents today are different from 20 years ago, you can have tents that are equivalent in comfort to a bad hard wall accommodation, but you deploy and install them much faster.

I believe that, during 2010 and 2011, we are going to have a lot of work to do with regard to those issues as well as Contingent Owned Equipment (COE), which is another thing I believe is pending. How to create the necessary incentives for the type of COE that we require? How to make sure that the commitments made to provide COE are met, and how to make sure that the quality of the COE is adequate? We in the Secretariat are not doing this very well, and we need to work more with the Member States on this.

The question about military standards is part of a review that I have been tasked to do on logistics, including how we can show people that we can better address the needs, as well as how we can be more flexible so that we are given more space. The review will be finalized shortly, but I also believe the COE question is relevant in this regard, because we have lists and military capabilities that include helicopters. The way we reimburse the contributors, and how we approach COE will help us get there. In other words, it is work in progress.

Finally, with regard to the question about the modularity, we are aiming to set up standard models for camps and for headquarters. Standard models could include deployment with a certain capacity of tents for the military or the police. This is what we are aiming to do, so that we can have pre-procured sets or standby agreements with companies, and standardized ways to construct or build on the ground which will hopefully allow us to comply with a very old wish that was included in the Brahimi Report, namely, the 30- to 90-day deployment. We do not have much to invent here, and I can honestly say that many of the things that the support strategy contains have been said in the past. My aim is to get it done, and I believe it is the main drive that we have before us. We not only have to ensure that we have the commitment and hopefully the approval of Member States, but to really deliver and change the things we need to change will require a certain mind-set.
Sometimes we are satisfied because we received approval for our objectives. That is only the start of our journey. We need to really switch into the mode of being urged by the needs on the ground, being urged by the demands that our people on the ground face every single day. That is why shifting things more to service centres and a bit away from the New York-centric perspective is very important, in my view. No matter how agile you are, no matter how focused you are in New York, somehow the New York atmosphere traps you. You get trapped in the committees. You get trapped in the discussions. And all of a sudden, papers become more important than actual delivery on the ground. That is what we have to change.”

Mr. Normandin concluded the discussion by repeating the phrase ‘to get it done’ as an appropriate way of wrapping up the session. “I think we are off to a good start. We have been provided with the big picture and the background for many of the other issues that we will be tackling in the next two days. On behalf of us all, I would like to say thank you, Ms. Malcorra, Mr. Le Roy, for your presence and contributions this morning.”
Multidimensional Peace Operations – Early Peacebuilding and the Need for New Strategies and Partners

Focus: What are some of the most critical challenges for modern multidimensional peace operations? How can we meet the requirements? How do we prioritize and sequence our efforts?

Facilitator: Lt.Gen. Satish Nambiar, Senior Adviser, Challenges Forum / Former Head of Mission and Force Commander UNPROFOR, India

Good afternoon, everyone. We start Session II and it is my privilege to be the Facilitator. My name is Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar and we have a very distinguished panel in front of us.

In my introduction, I will highlight a few of the issues that probably need to be addressed. Mr. Dmitry Titov, the Assistant Secretary-General in the Office of the Rule of Law and Security Institutions will deliver a keynote. Then we have four other members on the panel: Ms. Ann-Marie Orler, the Acting Police Adviser; Ambassador Zhenmin Liu, the Deputy Permanent Representative of the People’s Republic of China; Gen Carlos dos Santos Cruz, former Force Commander in the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH); and James Cockayne from the International Peace Institute.

Let me kick off by making some provocative points or statements. We are today at a very crucial stage for the international system, at a point where, in my view, the United Nations is being increasingly marginalized. There are issues, and that is the sad part of it, particularly for those who have been flag-wavers for the UN for many years. My arms are getting a bit tired of waving, as major decisions are taken outside the UN system. Even UN peacekeeping has been affected. Over the last decade or so, the developed world has distanced itself from this very visible form of UN activity, except when it comes to positions at senior levels and those dominating the decision-making apparatus. That is the provocative part.

The theme for the session is: what are the most critical challenges for modern multidimensional peace operations? How can we meet the requirements? How do we prioritize and sequence our efforts?
The first challenge is the use of force in peacekeeping operations and the need for clarity about the circumstances that call for the use of force. Now that we are talking increasingly about the protection of civilians together with the question of using force and the proportionality of the use of force, the lawyers have to think about the applicability of international humanitarian law to peacekeeping. The fact that impartiality will be compromised has to be acknowledged, as well as the consequent dangers to unarmed UN personnel, including the military observers and civilian staff. We have to ask whether these operations are for blue-helmeted military, given the fact that the UN does not really have an enemy as such? Or should these be handled by regional arrangements?

I was quite struck by Ben Tortolani’s presentation and the inclusion of ISAF’s facts and figures in the broad study of peace operations. This makes me very uncomfortable, because in my view the operations of ISAF are combat operations that cannot not be grouped with peace operations. This could be a subject of discussion.

The permanent members in the Security Council have to play the role envisaged. Will they do so? That has not always been the case. The other thing which needs some attention, and which Dmitry touches on in his paper, is the absence, or inadequacy, of exit strategies in many of these missions. As things stand, many of our UN missions carry on and tend to become somewhat static. There are vested interests at play at various levels that will need attention. The leadership of the parties in the conflict are themselves part of the problem at times, so one has to think of that too.

Training standards is another critical challenge. I do not think anyone, particularly those of us who have had the privilege of commanding and heading missions, are unaware of the large variation in training. Whether this aspect is to be totally handled by DPKO is an important question, because there is a large deal of expertise available within the international community. There are regional training centres that can be tapped into for assistance. The increasing global need for police is another critical challenge and something which will be addressed, not least, by the Acting Police Adviser.

The last point, but James Cockayne is going to talk about the role of peace operations in fighting organized crime. I will reserve my comments until I hear what he has to say and what the comments are. Now I am pleased to hand over to Dmitry for his remarks.
Mr. Dmitry Titov, Assistant Secretary-General for Rule of Law and Security Institutions, United Nations

Thank you very much, General, thank you Colleagues, and thank you the Permanent Missions of Sweden and Pakistan. We are grateful for the continuation of this dialogue and for the opportunity to speak from our perspective of the issues.

We have come quite a long way from where we started, and I would like to pay tribute not only to Member States who supported the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI), but first and foremost to the visionary attitude of Jean-Marie Guéhenno. Together with Mark Kroeker, he was the mastermind behind the creation of the OROLSI in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

I took my responsibility with some trepidation, as I came with a different background. However, now, I do see the tremendous value of the Office and its purposes. OROLSI was formed only two years ago and incorporates police, justice, corrections, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), mine action and security sector reform issues, which are the latest and youngest additions, but which hold great value for peacekeeping. We are creating space for our humanitarian colleagues, for security, for service linkage development, and for the creation of lasting foundations for exit strategies.

One can address exclusively security issues in peacekeeping operations, and sometimes the debates do exactly that. However, the value of creating rule of law institutions in post-conflict settings, or in immediate peacebuilding situations, is demonstrated quite vividly and strongly by the experience of the international community, both within the UN and outside the UN. This involves everything from human security to humanitarian security, from development to access to justice. Without lasting foundations, or even basic foundations of such a system, it is very difficult to imagine that we can deliver anything real in Darfur. Can we, for example, ensure peace and security in the troubled region of Sudan exclusively through boots on the ground and through military means? Perhaps not. Or, alternatively, could we do much less than what we are currently doing in Liberia or in Haiti? I think we all have to do more.

This Forum represents an important opportunity for us to launch a project which we are trying to advocate and which the Challenges Partners are assisting us to define more sharply in a focused, consistent, and maybe even modular way. Questions include: what do immediate peacekeeping, stabilization, or early peacekeeping entail? What are the priorities? Are we rushing through the small door of opportunity, altogether, UN agencies, bilateral donors and yes, sometimes...
private businesses, in one go? Or are there priorities which could be clearly defined, clearly sequenced, clearly linked to implementation partners?

It is in this aspect that the theme of partnerships is so important for us, because we, in our young and relatively small office compared to the rest of the peacekeeping establishment, will never be able to do this alone. We may have almost 14,000 police officers operating in four continents, in nineteen operations, but we have only six DDR officers today, dealing with half a million ex-combatants in the field, and supervising over 400 DDR field officers. We have only four corrections officers at this stage, dealing with 200 corrections field operators in twelve peacekeeping operations. Equally, we have only five justice specialists in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and the list goes on, with the only exception being a quite well-established and robust mine action service.

The Mine Action Service, with 23 professionals in New York, operates a considerable number of coordinated activities through all UN agencies, admirably with a light footprint. It represents an activity that is quite a unique opportunity for peacekeeping and for peacebuilding as a trust fund. Last year, almost $90 million was raised, but this was a unique chance which will most probably not be replicated this or next year. However, this also tells us that we can deploy a considerable amount of people, especially on the police side. We have an opportunity to develop a quick and robust training module, or establish a police academy, buy boots and belts and procure weapon systems. For Haiti alone, we are very grateful to our French colleagues. After years of discussing with various donors, we finally obtained ammunition for the Haitian police this week. The same applies to justice, to corrections, and the need to jumpstart DDR.

DDR perhaps could be a model for addressing the financial stream, since after fifteen years of advocacy in the General Assembly, we have received money in the budgets of peacekeeping operations to handle disarmament and demilitarization for the first two years, and that helps. Having said that, we also have to look ahead. We have to understand that beyond our regular activities, beyond our partnerships, we have to build a reliable and quickly deployable system of police, justice, corrections and other officers, who could be on the ground tomorrow. The way it was done, with the support of Mr. Guéhenno and Mr. Le Roy in the case of the standing police capacity, is the way to go. After eighteen years of being a bureaucrat here at the UN, I was astonished with the agility of that mechanism. It deployed quickly and robustly to Chad and allowed many to create their own rapidly deployable functions nationally. If the Department of Peacekeeping Operations could have such an opportunity within the UN system, and could link up with national entities doing the same, we could have a tremendous pool for very robust initial deployments.
From my perspective, this is the way forward. Altogether, as a new system, we are trying to create an entity which will be united by one philosophy, by one methodology, as we come from different backgrounds, professional cultures, and ways of doing things. Part of the system comes from lessons learned, and there is nothing wrong with that. But we are trying to orient all of us as staff to being providers first and foremost for field purposes. The intention is to make both a centre of excellence within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations through methodology, and joint training for UN staff and recipient nations. Ultimately, however, a very field-oriented organization is required that could work and provide extra value for all of us.

Having said that, the initial setup is somewhat questionable, and are we actually addressing the new threats? The future conflict environment will be extremely fluid, extremely dynamic and volatile, as the case of Somalia shows. Will we be able to address the challenges of information technology? Include in that maritime security, organized crime, and trans-border crime. There are some studies which indicate that, currently, organized crime is already controlling 15 per cent of the world’s global economic activity. In some states, that number is reaching levels of 60 to 70 per cent. It is a big global issue. That is why one of our projects – and we are grateful for Interpol and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) initiatives in this regard – is to link peacekeeping with law enforcement functions. Without that we will never succeed, especially not in failed states. We will not be able to bring lasting security foundations.

The report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding identifies several key areas which are absolutely essential for immediate peacekeeping, early recovery and early peacebuilding. The report states that basic safety and security, DDR, strengthening rule of law, security management, mine action, political processes, provision of basic services, economic revitalization are all essential. From my perspective, the dilemma whether to do it or not does not exist. Without addressing those issues, peacekeepers, either within the UN context or outside of it, will not be able to succeed. The Secretary-General keeps orienting us towards creating comprehensive and integrated rule of law systems. Recently, US Ambassador Susan Rice made the excellent statement that we need to strengthen the security sector and the rule of law so that peacekeepers can return home with the pride that their missions are finally accomplished. This is the sense and the purpose of what we are trying to achieve. It is a difficult enterprise. It is a considerably challenging road, but we are confident that the future lies there.

We have confidence in you and your support. We do know it is a growth business. But we are also acutely aware of our limitations, as we in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations are trying to create new horizons and new operational
space in those areas. We will never be able to encompass everything without your support. Again, for us, it is important to know who does what beyond the sequence. Who has comparative advantage in our areas? UN, non-UN entities, or our programmes and agencies? Who can deliver in a predictable manner? Where will the money be coming from?

These are the future questions we will all have to address, and we do count on your support. Thank you. Finally, I have to pay tribute to General Nambiar. He headed one of the largest, most complex, and most challenging operations. And he made one of the most difficult choices in his career as a peacekeeper. So our admiration to you, Sir.

Ms. Ann-Marie Orler, Acting Police Adviser, Police Division, Office of the Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

First of all, let me thank you for inviting me to this Forum and to be part of this panel. The panel reflects the current multidimensional character of peacekeeping. The growing complexity has been especially felt in the range of mandated tasks that the United Nations Police has been assigned. As Mr. Titov pointed out, we are met with very high expectations, and we can only deliver by working together. I would like to focus on the question of partnerships that United Nations Police needs to engage in, in order to successfully contribute to security, and work towards building sustainable and effective police capacity around the world. There are a number of partners, ranging from our colleagues in host state police services, to other components of the peacekeeping missions, UN agencies, and other international organizations.

Let us start with local ownership and what it means for the United Nations Police. Throughout all of our efforts to reform, restructure, and build capacity, we have to keep in mind that it is ultimately the host state police that will have to ensure law and order without international assistance. Whatever we build, we have to build with buy-in from our host state colleagues and authorities. Whatever we build has to be sustainable and workable in local conditions and within local budgets. We need to contribute to police institutions and services that make sense to the people in a given conflict area. This is also a practical necessity, as these institutions will not be sustainable unless they are fully supported by the society they serve. When arriving in a mission area, it is often difficult to identify who the most suitable partners are, and, too often, the partners that we have to work with, do not necessarily live up to the international policing standards. They are sometimes corrupt or involved
in criminal activity and, therefore, have very little interest in reform and in a functioning police and justice system.

Moving to military and police cooperation on UN peacekeeping. Overall, we have arrived at a sound division of labour and cooperation between the military and police. Typically, that has meant that police have been responsible for law enforcement, mostly in support of host state police, and military peacekeepers have dealt with threats of a military nature. We are currently looking into questions of robust peacekeeping, stabilization, and protection of civilians. The UN Police role here is primarily focused on the long-term, on building local capacity to deliver effective and fair policing. We do also contribute to security and protection paths, mainly with our formed police units. As guidance in these areas develops, we will look further into how United Nations Police best can contribute and cooperate with military and other police components.

Mr. Titov indicated how important cooperation across the sectors of security, justice, and corrections is. Any effort to build capacity in the police has to take place within an integrated rule of law approach. UN Police capacity-building has to be tied to well-related efforts of reforming justice and corrections systems. Without functioning courts and/or prisons, it does not matter how many perpetrators the police arrest. Any confidence in the rule of law that the police may be able to engender in the population will quickly be lost if criminals return to the street in a matter of days, or if there are suspects, who may or may not be innocent, are detained for months and years without trial. In addition to the wider rule of law, the success of our work depends on a stable political context that is supportive of reform.

Reforming police is a highly sensitive issue, as the police is at the heart of a state’s ability to govern. Unless the police is embedded in a context of democratic governance, we are simply providing governments with more effective tools to suppress its people. For any improvements in the area of governance and public administration, we are again dependent on partners in multidimensional peacekeeping operations.

A further example of partnerships in peacekeeping is related to organized crime, which is a complex phenomenon that not only requires cooperation across all components of a peacekeeping mission, but also cooperation with other partners. As James Cockayne’s background paper explains so well, widespread organized crime threatens to undermine the rule of law and progress of the peace processes in many conflict areas. In these situations, UN Police works with host state police to build capacity and improve their ability to combat serious and organized crime. That might involve developing investigative capacity,
information and evidence-gathering, building criminal intelligence databases, assisting in complex and lengthy investigations, creating dedicated investigation teams and so on. We do this in individual nations, but are also strengthening regional cooperation and building capacity at the regional level, quite simply because we have realized that organized crime is a transnational phenomenon that rarely stops at national borders. Interpol and UNODC are close partners in these efforts.

Before concluding, allow me to highlight a few issues. Given the dramatic and rapid growth in UN police work, the development of doctrine and guidance for UN Police has not kept pace with developments in the field. The Police Division recently launched an initiative to develop a strategic framework for international police peacekeeping, which will identify core functions of UN policing. This will give us a more sophisticated understanding of our tasks. It will allow us, in partnership with Member States, to better prepare police men and women for deployment in an international mission, and to select the most suitable and most highly qualified personnel. This is necessary because we have realized that international policing differs fundamentally from the job police officers do in their home countries. The issue of capabilities was also highlighted in the New Horizon non-paper as a key challenge for the future. If we are to be successful, we need to recruit more specialized police personnel for multidimensional peacekeeping operations. This is especially true in the light of increasing sexual- and gender-based violence in conflict and post-conflict situations. We are actively working to recruit more women for police deployment abroad in order to be better able to tackle these challenges. Thank you.

H.E. Mr. Zhenmin Liu, Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations

Good morning. It is really a great honour and privilege for me to join this panel and this Forum. Both the Security Council and the General Assembly are considering the issue of reforms of peacekeeping operations, and the Secretariat initiated a report on New Horizon. All these pending issues will not be solved here. They are also discussed within the Council and the General Assembly. But let me share with you a few issues that we have in mind.

The first issue is the size and unlimited extension of operations and their sustainability. From a strategic point of view, this is a big issue. There are seventeen operations with over 120,000 personnel all over the world. Then there are other issues like the delay in reimbursement to TCCs, the pressure to recruit competent and qualified troops, pressure to mobilize the equipment and to deploy
missions in a very short time. We are still relying on a few countries for UN peacekeeping. There is no exit strategy. For some operations you know that, even for the normal maintenance of the social order, we rely on UN police. There are issues of sustainability of peacekeeping. How and to what extent can we sustain big operations?

The second issue I want to share with you is the gap between peacekeeping and peacemaking and the need to ensure that there is a peace to keep. Mr. Guéhenno, with all his experience, has also expressed this view. We have seen it happen in at least two cases. In the case of Darfur, the Security Council decided to deploy UNAMID, but in the initial months, the question was raised whether there was a peace to keep. Then, in Somalia, very urgent requests have been made by the host country and by the African Union to deploy a UN peacekeeping force. But there are differences among the Council members about whether there is a peace to keep. These are big issues.

The third issue is the gap between the mandates and the resources. To be very frank, I have served in the Council for three years and four months. What I have found is that most of the current operations have very broad mandates. People are joking that mandates have become Christmas tree mandates. MONUC has around 40 tasks in its mandate. The SRSGs and the Force Commanders never formally complained before the Council, but privately there are complaints. Because with broad mandates and too limited resources, even the commanders do not know how to implement every task in detail. The limited resources are different from their service unit or national army.

The fourth issue is coordination between the Security Council, the Secretariat, and the contributing countries. This is always an issue, because this coordination has been taken as one of the strategic issues in the current reform discussions, addressing how we should improve the coordination from the initial stage of any operation. Coordination should not be very formal.

The fifth issue is more strategic in nature; namely, the challenge to uphold the three guiding principles of peacekeeping. The three principles are the consent of the major parties, impartiality, and the non-use of force, except in self-defence. In a situation of robust peacekeeping and the protection of civilians, it is important to know how to uphold these principles. This issue has been discussed in the Council for the past 50 years, since the early 1960s, and there are still great differences. How to uphold these principles while ensuring the safety and security of our peacekeepers? Reversely, how to ensure that in robust peacekeeping operations UN troops are not involved in internal fighting?
So these are our new challenges. They are all very strategic issues. Therefore, I believe that we should start the reform from the Security Council and the question of how to develop and formulate the most appropriate mandates for the missions. Mandates should be focused, prioritized and closely confined to peacekeeping. Some operations may be doing something else, which could be for other agencies. They might have encroached on the prerogative of other agencies. Second, to improve the planning of the deployment on mandates, this should fully take into account the specific needs of the country considered. What do they really need? Consultation is required. Also, there is a need to take into account the resources needed, personnel, equipment, budget, and also a need to talk about the exit strategy. Third, there is a need to enhance coordination between the Security Council and the Secretariat, especially on information sharing and more frequent dialogue. Fourth, there is a need to improve coordination with the TCCs to avoid that they are informed only after the decisions have been taken and they are requested to deploy their forces. They must be given time to prepare.

We need to encourage more countries to contribute to UN peacekeeping, because currently it is mostly developing countries that do so. We need more troops from other Member States. Then we need to have training of potential peacekeeping troops. In addition to the efforts of DPKO, we need to encourage developed countries that have the capability to provide training to developing countries and potential contributing countries. We also need to continue to uphold the three traditional peacekeeping principles, not least in order to maintain the reputation of the UN’s operations. Of course any specific requirement of robust peacekeeping should be decided on a case by case basis because it is difficult to formulate a one-size-fits-all criteria.

Last, we need to enhance the partnership with regional organizations. The enhanced regional cooperation with the African Union has proven to be very effective and important. We should continue to enhance that. We should also find a way to support some African Union peacekeeping operations. Thank you.

Lt.Gen. Carlos dos Santos Cruz, Former Force Commander, MINUSTAH

Good morning. It is a pleasure and an honour to be here with such a distinguished gathering. The question is: what are some of the most critical challenges for peace operations? The question is not for the military to answer. Because the most critical challenge for peace operations is the question of challenge for what, for success?

I will focus on two points. I believe the objective of the United Nations is to reduce violence, misery, promote justice, protection, peace and security. The
second point is that I am not a ‘New Yorker’ and, therefore, I will provide the perspective of the field. The perception we have when we walk in the streets every day, in the poor neighbourhoods, when we face the bad guys, the groups, the perception develops from the field, not from New York. It is natural that we have different visions. The objective is to achieve a better life for the people on the ground.

In the military, we do not have many challenges in the field. The challenges originate in New York. New York needs to have more contributing countries. They need to have more trucks, more helicopters, and more money. In the field, we transform the challenges and obligations. Soldiers in the field need to fight. They need to work with the means they have. Obviously, we have some limitations, but we need to work night and day. Very young people – not me, but the soldiers – stay on for six months to work. Thus, for us it is not a challenge. The challenge for us is motivation. We need to use military force all the time. The challenge is for New York. The military transforms the obligations. Sometimes, we do not have the means, but we do what is possible. The success of peace operations depends on situations beyond the limits of the mission.

My personal conclusion is that the main challenges are in the political arena, and with regard to financial supervision and accountability. We need to know that it is very clear, apparent and not merely a technical assessment. The social-economic achievement is not compatible with the amount of international aid resources being spent. It is easy to see on the streets, six months, one year, two years, and three years. I went back to the field three weeks ago. It is still the same. The poor people, the misery. And the misery is a source of violence. The source of violence is not only religion and ethnic problems. Misery, and when it is clear that nothing has improved for the people for a very long time. Therefore, we need more clarity in financial supervision and accountability.

Another point is political accountability. We talk about the protection of civilians, but we do not talk about political accountability. I am not referring to the military, because for us it is very easy. We do not have many challenges. We need to receive the means possible and we need to work. We have very clear accountability. We have a chain of command. Our accountability is very clear. But we do not have political accountability. Yet, everybody knows that the challenge we face now must be overcome politically. This should not however, prevent the international community from considering to what extent the political behaviour, governments, authorities, national and international organizations, are responsible for the lack of results and effective use of international aid, and even the deterioration in some situations. It is easy to talk with the people on the streets during riots, during demonstrations. They ask
exactly that, how are you there to help? They say, “we do not receive anything and you are responsible.”

That is the mind-set of the people in the streets. Therefore, the moment when we talk about robust operations, we need to talk about more robust political action as well. Thank you very much.

Mr. James Cockayne, Senior Associate, International Peace Institute

Thank you very much for the opportunity to be part of such an esteemed panel. You might think it is a little ironic that someone with the surname Cockayne has been asked to write the paper on organized crime.

Based on my paper, my focus is on two points. First, is there really a role for peacekeepers and for peace operations on this specific point of tackling organized crime? I argue that peace operations, already thinly stretched, should not become the primary vehicle for tackling organized crime or for developing state capacity to do so. To continue the Ambassador’s analogy, this might be one decoration too far, one decoration that ultimately makes the Christmas tree topple over.

We have to recognize that there is an appetite for peace operations to become the primary vehicle for tackling organized crime, as organized crime is a major problem in many conflict situations. And in some cases, it is very clear that peace operations are finding that they have to tackle organized crime, since it is becoming a significant peace spoiler. Left unchecked, organized crime groups can undermine post-conflict states’ institutional or territorial cohesion, as in Afghanistan and parts of the Balkans. Or even pose force protection issues, as in Haiti.

The best approach may be to consider peace operations as one of many partners that must cooperate to develop an effective response to organized crime in these and other situations. During conflict, or immediately after it ends, peace operations might have a role as providers of some services such as policing, investigations, and analysis, as mentioned by Ms. Orler. But as countries transition away from conflict, peace operations may need to serve less as sole source providers and more what I describe as, platforms for other actors to provide coordinated programming and capacity. Peace operations, after all, have very time-limited and geographically limited mandates. They struggle to muster the necessary specialist policing, judicial assistance, and other relevant skills, and to gain the knowledge of the local context that is so crucial to tackling organized crime. They are not set up to undertake the kinds of complex cross-border investigations and prosecutions that may be needed to deal with this kind of phenomenon.
At the same time we also need to think beyond policing and investigations. Effective responses to organized crime, as we know from many contracts and contexts, cannot depend only on military and law enforcement responses, although these are important. They also have to involve social and economic responses, providing alternative economic opportunities to move communities away from the illicit activity towards the more licit economy. They have to involve governance responses to protect state territory and institutions. This is a crucial point that has already been mentioned a number of times this morning. The responses have to involve political strategy because many of the individuals that we rely on to provide consent for peace operations activities may also, at times, be implicated in some of these activities. There is a real political choice there for peace operations, whether to treat these individuals as partners for peace or as targets for law enforcement. Therefore, this question of whether peace operations have a role here actually helps us to think about some of the broader issues the panel is addressing. We may need to think about peace operations, not only as potential providers of services but as potential platforms through which other actors can coordinate their own provision of services.

Finally, there are six specific steps that I suggest the international community think about in order to tackle the problem of organized crime in some of these situations. First, there is a need to mainstream organized crime in conflict assessment, political analysis, mission design and planning. Second, we might find ways to improve operational analytical capacity through improved information sharing between states, particularly between TCCs and PCCs and peace operations. We might even think about developing joint analysis and analytical capacities, whether it is Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMACs) in the field, or through some kind of capacity or protocols based in headquarters. Third, we clearly need to think beyond policing. As we have heard from both Mr. Titov and Ms. Orler, we have to think about what kind of platforms we need to deliver anti-corruption, witness protection, detention and correction services, border control, customs capacity, even financial sector oversight, and this may well require a platform that goes well beyond peace operations. The point is not that peace operations need to provide all of these things, but perhaps they are a useful platform for getting us on the right track into effective peacebuilding. Fourth, we may need to think about creating rapid response or standby policing arrangements, specifically to deal with organized crime. Fifth, we need to think about how hard it truly is to build local capacity to deal with these types of issues. We have a lot of experience from the EU police mission in Bosnia, from UNMIK, and other missions in Haiti, about how hard this is. Perhaps it is time for a lessons learned process around these kinds of experiences. Finally, if we are going to start thinking about issues such as organized crime, we have to take the political nature of organized crime, and the political nature of responses to it, and other forms of peacebuilding, very
seriously. Otherwise, our efforts to build peace may run squarely into our efforts to secure the state and enforce the law. Thank you.

Discussion

Mr. Dmitry Titov opened the discussion commenting on the issue raised by Ambassador Liu about mandates. “There is a problem with the proliferation and sustainability of the peacekeeping mandates and there is therefore already a tendency within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to try to group things together. For example, in MONUC there are 41 tasks listed in resolution 1856, three-quarters of which are surprisingly dedicated only to the rule of law, with very little means attached. It may be appropriate to group these mandates and focus on ten to twelve priorities, maximum, that are sustainable at every stage. Second, regarding national ownership, OROLSI is trying to create awareness about the need to mainstream national capacity-building from the very beginning of the planning stages of our operations. If we start thinking about training judges or vetting police officers only when we arrive on the ground, it will already be too late.

We will not be building systems and institutions, at least not in the most rudimentary manner possible. The basic systems that we are trying to create include immediate training of street police and establishing two or three courthouses. As we have experienced these problems several times, we have learned to emphasize responsibility over law and order, responsibility primarily by the receiving government and nation. Initially, they may not be able to deliver, but we have to transfer responsibility as early as possible. Peacekeeping soldiers are in most cases not capable of doing so, and that is quite amply shown in a paper produced by USIP. That is why you have to bring things forward much quicker than we are doing. This is the main challenge; national capacity-building in all of these areas from the outset. How to identify the ‘new’ people? How to start training them? How to push a new police officer onto the street? How to decriminalize the justice system as early as possible? Those are the challenges.

As for platforms, indeed the question is: what platforms? Peacekeeping operations are not yet prepared to assume all these responsibilities. They are not configured for this purpose. But we have to be smarter in giving that opportunity to other actors, forming partnerships that more clearly set out who is achieving what. We are pioneering some of those projects already in West Africa. We will for sure be working on organized crime together with Interpol. We will also be working under bilateral arrangements with the help of many of your contributions in Haiti, for example. In addition, we recently acquired quite an interesting new partner,
the Colombian government, which is sharing its experience of tackling organized crime, from kidnapping to drug control, in Haiti. Thus far, the feedback has been very complimentary. The regional perspectives are also very important in this case. But we definitely have to determine at some stage where the peacekeeping phase, in terms of police, justice, and corrections, ends? Is it after six months, one year, 24 months? Or should there be an organized, predictable transition into yet another phase, which involves our development partners, the bilateral partners as well as the many others, for which they have to be prepared well in advance? We cannot continue to create a situation in which we catch them by surprise regarding the need to assume that responsibility.

These are a few issues that I wanted to emphasize. But once again, early stages in peacekeeping or peacebuilding is a fantastic opportunity, if we are well-prepared and well-trained. With our minimal resources we can jumpstart the processes if we think issues through beforehand. When we fail to do so, we face tremendous dangers, and we risk derailing the very good efforts by our military colleagues and perpetrating the misery and suffering of the population.”

Ms. Orler pointed out that all seem to agree on the problems that had been identified. “But can we agree on the solutions? If we are able to establish the rule of law and the police in a very professional and good way, then we have our exit strategy that will allow us to gracefully terminate a mission. Finally, as Mr. Titov stated, in order to solve the conflict, it is key to get involved early. I would like to go before the outbreak of conflict, or even before the state has fallen, to address problems with regard to the rule of law and police. If we could get involved that early to support and make sure that there is a justice system in place, we could maybe prevent some of the conflicts from erupting in the first place.”

Lt.Gen. Santos Cruz made a remark on the issue of drugs, suggesting this was a very dangerous challenge. “The UN should analyze very accurately how to deal with the problem of drugs, because if the UN goes openly against drug traffickers in the field, these people may cause a lot of damage to the UN or to the civilians. Drug traffickers have very complicated minds. Maybe worse than the groups that we have been facing up until now. It is a very complicated challenge for the UN.”

A former UN Military Adviser raised some concern with regard to the idea of a UN standby arrangement system for police. He commented that as Military Adviser, he had tried to work with a military UN standby system that never worked, despite memorandums of understanding, agreements of levels, and so on. Therefore the UN should not spend a lot of time pursuing a standby arrangement system for the police. The political process was what had to be improved. “What is needed is commitments from countries that they will
actually come.” Mr. Dmitry Titov, underlined that he had talked about standing, not standby police capabilities.

A participant from a developed country expressed his support for the implementation of all of Mr. Cockayne’s recommendations, but pointed out that the challenge at hand was even more dire than how the issue had been framed in the paper and throughout the discussions. He suggested that there was a difference between organized crime as a consequence of conflict and organized crime as one of the primary causes. “And so, to endorse James’ first point about the assessment, we really need to take into account the extent to which criminalization of the legal system, as Mr. Titov just mentioned, is one of the challenges that we are going to have to confront. In Kosovo, one of the great successes of the Mission was to stop the civil war that was going on between Mr. Rugova’s supporters and the Kosovo Liberal Army (KLA) members, primarily by detaining an organized criminal, Remy Mustafa. However, Mr. Mustafa was put in jail by an international judge, not by local judges. It was suggested that the problem could be assessed through the various examples of Bosnia and the Third Entity Movement, the problems of blood diamonds and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the looting of natural resources in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the drug problem in Afghanistan. It is an inherent problem that we have to confront. When organized crime is one of the drivers of conflict, they are insinuated in the structures of power, both the opposition and the government. How do we deal with that?

It was also suggested that if there is no functioning court system, problems will not be addressed. So what is the task for peacekeeping with regards to stabilization, the rule of law and organized crime? It is to take the criminals out of power, even if it will not be possible to eliminate organized crime. Organized crime will remain, but the criminals cannot be left running the country. Hence when the UN does the assessment, if the outcome is that there is a problem with organized crime in the structures of power, should the international community give itself the authority to set up a special, central court to deal with the use of political violence, and maybe even drug traffickers who may be part of the government. Should the mandates give the international community the authority to deal with the problem rather than trying to retro-fit the mandate one or two or three years later?”

An academic representative pointed out that while there was agreement that fairly credible, effective state institutions were needed to handle the types of challenges that organized crime poses for conflict-affected states, thinking more broadly about the rule of law may also cause problems of over-reliance on state institutions. “If the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) is to be believed, approximately 80 per cent of the population in conflict-affected and weak states rely on non-state or traditional structures for their security and justice
provision. That is a very difficult issue for the UN as an organization of Member States. How can the UN contribute to the rule of law institutions and provision by working with non-state actors?”

A senior military officer from a leading TCC raised the issue of the potential political nature of organized crimes. “If organized crime is of a political nature, it means it is no longer organized crime, because organized crime is essentially related to the economic dimension, and if it is of a political nature then it means it is embedded in the very structure of the conflict itself, which would make perhaps a conflict even more complicated. If this is the case, then organized crime should be approached right from the beginning of the conflict resolution efforts. The UN has to deploy instruments and experts on the ground to deal with the very important element of conflict and the political economy.”

A diplomat asked what the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institution was doing in relation to the nexus between security and development, as well as with regard to its role in peacebuilding and early action plans. “In the context of overall peacekeeping strategies and sequencing, what is the correlation between early action plans, as mentioned in the Secretary-General's report on peacebuilding and the early stabilization plans mentioned in the New Horizon report?”

Mr. Titov responded that there was already a standing system for the police, with 27 police professionals that were already in place. “They will most probably be 50 or so next year. The idea is to jumpstart a police component in peace operations or address the pressing needs of already existing missions. The military should have the same system. We would like to add to the police capacity a very small number of justice and corrections officers. If we want to be operational, the future lies in this kind of operational tool within the Secretariat, ready to be dispatched tomorrow rather than having to first be recruited, generated and discussed. People have to be linked to the national capacities that exist in some of the Member States. In Australia, for example, we have seen a very robust overseas police tool of 200 plus people that has a very interesting job in the Pacific. These types of arrangements are also very important.

Regarding the need to address formal and informal elements of justice; according to a report by the OECD, 70 or 80 per cent of justice in developed countries is obtained through known formal streams. It underlines the importance of our experts investing in and interacting with civil society, with professionals, with political parties, with parliaments, in order to build rule of law institutions and systems. It is not only a formal act of creating a certain number of courts or institutions. It is a broader task where there is definitely scope for traditional justice, such as tribal or religious justice systems which we are already using very
actively in Africa. It is not yet a very formalized way of UN activity, but it is an indispensable element. You cannot do without the traditional justice systems in certain situations. You can only apply certain principles to how these operate before steering them towards more formal types of justice.

Organized crime has to be included in the planning process as a factor, together with security sector reform. However, this we are not doing yet for some strange reason, even after many years. It should be part of planning, through the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) or strategic frameworks linked to longer-term development. Regarding the question about ensuring the correlation between our planning process and this action plan, this is work in progress. I liked some of the observations about the preventative element which is attached to our police, justice and other capacities. We should use those elements before a crisis breaks out. This is where the added value of the standing elements lies. As soon as there is a mandate or a request (because whatever we do, we have to do it at the request of the Member States), people could deploy even before there is a peacekeeping operation. But imposing security sector management or legal system reform has never succeeded in recent years. The nexus between international and national has to be better understood.”

Mr. Cockayne commented on the issues that were raised regarding how organized crime relates to conflict, and whether to use prosecution or other coercive mechanisms to deal with the links between organized criminal activity and political power in situations of conflict. “I am very careful with the term organized crime. Many of us think of it as an entity but increasingly, we should think of it as an activity that anybody can engage in. The reality is that in a globalized economy, conflict-affected states have a comparative advantage in that kind of activity, and so do people with power in those states. This is the reality of conflict that we have to continue to confront, and it is precisely a question of peacemaking I would argue. It is not, however, a question of peacekeeping in terms of the tools to use. Whether we use political, military or law enforcement mechanisms to address organized crime, we will necessarily be dealing with realities of power. Therefore, I am extremely pleased to hear Mr. Titov’s comments regarding the need to incorporate organized crime into IMPP processes and other strategic frameworks. But there is still a question beyond that: how do we address this challenge at the strategic level? How is it addressed in the Security Council, for example?

On the question of how local justice relates to the state and whether we rely too heavily on criminalized state institutions, etc., again I welcome Mr. Titov’s comments with regard to the need to interface with local and traditional forms of justice. There is much work that can be done in this area, such as thinking about how to connect the World Bank’s community-driven development strategies to the
provision of local security and justice solutions. We need to go beyond thinking about justice in terms of very Western-oriented court type processes, and think about it in terms of dispute resolution. Often, organized crime power is brought to an area because it resolves disputes. This gives them enough legitimacy to get on with their criminal activity. Hence, the two processes often go hand-in-hand. It is really terrific to hear about this kind of innovative thinking.”

Mr. Liu underlined that “it is key that we consider what role peacekeeping should have in fighting organized crime, because peacekeeping operations are always deployed in situations of conflict to try to keep and maintain peace. But organized crime may take place in both conflict situations and in peacetime. It occurs in most countries, and is a very generic problem. This is a clear distinction that has to be made.

Second, I agree with General Cruz that, actually, for peacekeepers it is very risky to get involved in fighting organized crime because it requires special skills and special training. Not every police officer can do it. It requires a specialized as opposed to an ordinary police force. In addition, it certainly also affects our principles and whether we should empower our soldiers to shoot or not. If you are fighting organized crime, you should also have the right to shoot at any time. That is the prerogative. That is why it would be very risky and also not very feasible to have peacekeepers fighting organized crime. It may also lead people to argue for a role for peacekeepers in fighting terrorism. This is why we need very clear mandates for peacekeeping.

Third, strengthening cooperation between the UN and contributing countries is a very important issue for ensuring and improving the preparedness for deployment. There is the possibility of contributing countries having a mechanism prepared for police operations. This also emphasizes the need for training and the potential role of PCCs.”

Lt.Gen. Nambiar made a point of clarification with regard to the idea of having standing police forces. “An earlier speaker mentioned the capacity as envisioned at national level. This means that they will not necessarily be deployed when the Security Council or the UN asks them to. It is up to the individual governments to take the final decision about whether or not to get involved. Thus, by the time a decision has been taken, the situation on the ground is likely to have changed. That is why there is a need for standing capacities in police, in the military and even in human rights.”

A participant raised the issue regarding the gap between the rhetoric of the Security Council and the reality on the ground, or the overambitious mandates and the
inability of the missions to implement them. “The question is: what mechanisms could we implement to try and stop this gap from occurring and to formulate more realistic mandates? How can we educate the Security Council about what is actually required on the ground, while keeping it up to date? How do we make sure that SRSGs, force commanders, police commissioners and human rights people on the ground are able to deliver their messages clearly to the Security Council? Where does this leave the Secretariat? In the middle? What mechanisms can we actually improve?”

Mr. Titov pointed out that what was needed was first and foremost honest and transparent assessments of the situations, in which various stakeholders have a say. “OROLSI does not advocate the presence of all major UN partners, but also of all participating UN sister agencies and, increasingly, also bilateral and multilateral donors. The more they know about the situation, the more they understand the dynamics, the more realistic they are. But, in the case of the Security Council, since it is a political organization, there will always be a political element in their demands. One has to tell the Council, very realistically and honestly, what is feasible and what is not. Unfortunately, the Secretariat is also a political organization and therefore it can sometimes be very diplomatic when it informs the Security Council. The more honest we are in terms of resources required, timelines, and the scope of the issues, the more informed we will be. There is room for mitigating the political factor on both sides of the equation.”

Lt.Gen. dos Santos Cruz added that some standards needed reviewing in order for them to be realistic. “It is very easy to see fantastic projects. Things that we do not even have in our countries we plan to build in weak states. This is not realistic. We therefore need to be more realistic in our planning for weak states.”

Ms. Orler emphasized that it was important that all of this was based on accurate assessments, including risk assessments, and certainty that the mandate actually came with a commitment of resources. “We need a purer commitment from Member States to actually involve and engage.”

Mr. Cockayne highlighted that it was always going to be difficult to expect Security Council members to integrate their own political decision-making processes and timelines with the more logistical planning processes. But there was an interesting potential relationship between modular planning and the design of Council mandates, an issue which the forthcoming Secretary-General’s report would address.

Mr. Liu stressed the need to have more informal and frank dialogue between the Secretariat and the Security Council. The Council was perceived to be very
diplomatic, but the Secretariat did not sufficiently raise issues related to difficulties in implementing the mandates. “If they want to please each and every member, there will be a problem. Council members have to realize what the reality of things are. As such, I encourage a process whereby mandates, from the beginning, are developed based on informal dialogue and frequent exchanges that can establish exactly what is feasible, what is required, as well as what should be prioritized. This is a realistic aim, but it requires courage.”

A Military Adviser shared his experience about having to act also as a Police Adviser in connection with the discussion on standing police forces and the idea about standing military forces. “In my experience, a standing police force of a small scale, such as 27 to 50 people, is not contentious, and therefore probably fairly easy for governments to agree on. However, to try and have a standing military force that is armed and going to different countries with different environments, in a very military sort of a way, is a completely different concept. It requires governments to make weighty decisions about whether they want to get involved, and to what extent they want to get involved, and what capability. Whilst it might work for the police, it will not necessarily work for the military because of the complications related to obtaining the agreement of governments.”
Mandate-Making and Mandate-Implementation

Focus: How can mandate-making and mandate-implementation evolve to meet the challenges of multidimensional peace operations? How do we address the peacekeeping – peacebuilding interface?

Facilitator: Mr. Edmond Mulet, Assistant Secretary-General for Operations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

Good afternoon. First, I would like to thank the organizers of this event for bringing us together. Challenges is always a very important Forum for strengthening partnerships, discussing critical challenges, and finding solutions.

Ten years ago, the Brahimi report famously highlighted the importance of clear, credible and achievable mandates. Yet, as Alain Le Roy mentioned in his opening remarks, we are still grappling with some of the issues that led Brahimi to make this recommendation. The tendency of the mandates in the recent past is to add more detailed tasks to our responsibilities. While this has brought more clarity, it has also created problems in terms of identifying priorities, sequencing, coordination, delivery, and not least, of finding the right capabilities to deliver.

MONUC in the Congo is mandated to carry out more than 41 different tasks. As the background paper mentions, contrary to the classical peacekeeping mandates, the mandates given today often reach far into the areas of peacebuilding, recovery and institution-building. But in reality, peacebuilding roles and capacity are disbursed across a broad range of actors. UN peacekeeping and political missions as well as development and humanitarian agencies are all involved in peacebuilding. More discussion is needed to clarify the roles of the peacekeepers within this broader effort. Given our limited role in programming, there should also be a stock-taking of the limits of peacekeeping operations in ensuring the delivery of the peace dividends that are essential for lasting peace.

As part of the New Horizon process, we are trying to reorient the mandates to focus more on the end state. What are the objectives that we seek to achieve? We also need clearer priorities from the Security Council on the basis of which, planners can outline the tasks and their sequencing in detail, and various partners
can assume their specific responsibilities. The IMPP process is helping us to put practical procedures in place for collaboration among UN actors. Most recently, the elaboration of the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) is helping us to set common priorities for peace consolidation among UN actors on the ground, and delineate roles and responsibilities to improve accountability.

However, we know this is not enough. We need to keep stressing that mandates should be prioritized. They should be reasonable, and regularly reviewed by the Council, and if necessary, tasks should be eliminated to ensure their achievability. We not only need political processes to support each mandate, but also adequate resources – personnel and financial – to back-up the implementation. Finally, for a mandate to be credible, there should be a peace to keep.

To this end, the main questions that we are going to address are: how can mandate-making and mandate-implementation evolve to meet the challenges of multidimensional peace operations; and how do we address the peacekeeping – peacebuilding interface? This means looking at how can Member States improve their collaboration with each other at the levels of the Security Council, the General Assembly, the TCCs and so on, to ensure that mandates are clear, achievable, and properly resourced. In addition, where does the responsibility for the different tasks of the Security Council and that of the other bodies – the General Assembly, the Peacebuilding Commission – end and where does it begin? On the side of the Secretariat, what can it do to facilitate the work of Member States with regard to the planning and drafting of mandates? How do we achieve more clarity with regards to responsibilities and tasks during the mandate planning stage without encouraging micromanagement in the field?

Mr. Jake Sherman, Associate Director, Centre on International Cooperation, New York University, United States

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, over the past decade the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping has been predicated on a broad coalition of support among key groups at the UN: the Member States in the Security Council, the major TCCs and PCCs and the leading financial contributors. Shared political vision among the members of the Security Council enables it to authorize ambitious, multi-dimensional, and recently also robust operations. TCCs and PCCs have been largely willing to deploy the troops and police necessary to implement these increasingly complex and high-risk mandates, and financial contributors have with few exceptions been willing to pay the rising costs necessary to sustain these operations.
However, this broad coalition of support is deteriorating, which threatens both individual operations in the field, and the system of UN peacekeeping generally which we rely on for the maintenance of international peace and security. A principle cause of this breakdown is the tendency of the Security Council to increasingly mandate peacekeeping operations without there being accepted peace agreements in place, and to carry out robust tasks such as the protection of civilians and supporting government forces. In a new partnerships agenda, DPKO and DFS call for revitalizing the reforms and re-emphasizing the principles that were first laid out in the Brahimi Report in 2000, as well as for a long-term effort to build a new coalition of support between Member States and the Secretariat, to ensure the success of future missions. In fact these initiatives go far back past 2000. As early as 1996, there were presidential statements to this effect, which Fatemeh Ziai’s background paper covers quite thoroughly.

Considerable and necessary attention has been placed on achieving greater clarity and consensus on robust peacekeeping, both conceptually and operationally. But there is another dimension of contemporary multidimensional mandates where further consensus in institutional alignment is needed, namely peacebuilding and state-building activities. Both are increasingly frequent and central elements of the mission’s tasks. While the UN struggles to deliver in high profile peacekeeping environments like Darfur and the DRC, it is also encountering pressure to ensure the transition from heavy and costly security-oriented peacekeeping operations to lighter peacebuilding missions, in countries where stability has already been established, as in Haiti and Liberia. For many Member States, peacebuilding and state-building activities, particularly security and justice sector reform, are controversial. Moreover, the expansion of peacekeeping into these areas has de facto extended the authority of the Security Council with implications that have yet to be fully addressed.

Of the 50 UN peace operations deployed since 1990, the overwhelming majority have followed internal conflicts. Most of these conflicts have occurred in weak states without credible or effective state institutions. Whereas traditional missions were impartial observers and occasional enforcers, multidimensional peacekeeping missions are frequently mandated to perform in state-building roles, helping to create legitimate functioning state structures in the aftermath of violent conflict. In some instances, missions function as state surrogates to extend the authority of fragile states that are challenged by peace spoilers. They carry out both civilian functions to support the states’ administrative authority, and political and military functions to assist in establishing, or perhaps re-establishing a state monopoly on force.

Although there are parallels between the civilian and military police operations to extend state authority, there is a clear difference between the two. The use
of force implies a different level and form of international commitment. At present, the concept is being stretched to its limits, as the UN is asked to face increasingly daunting operations, often with insufficient means. Recent experience has demonstrated that effective operations to extend state authority cannot be undertaken without substantial advance capabilities. The militaries of Western countries disproportionally possess the requisite force multipliers and enablers relative to the majority of UN military and police contributors. But while Western militaries participate in UN-authorized peace operations, notably in Afghanistan, they have been largely absent from UN-led missions outside of Europe and the Middle East.

The necessary advanced capabilities are not sufficient. Force must be used in support of a viable political framework. In cases where there is no adhered peace agreement, UN peacekeepers are increasingly subject to violence from peace spoilers, including from the assisted state itself. This trend gives pause to existing TCCs and PCCs alike, as well as to Western militaries, concerned that UN command and control arrangements are insufficient for the task at hand. One factor in the willingness of Member States to support mandates for the extension of state authority is whether the state in need of support is perceived as legitimate and viable. The Security Council will not authorize such mandates for a state without sufficient international legitimacy. This is also important for TCCs and PCCs who are unlikely to commit forces to undertake such an operation if the dangers of the operation outweigh the support that the state enjoys, or if the viability of that state is in fact in doubt.

State-building, and more so extending state authority, requires a degree of alignment with the state in question and its government. Having too close a relationship may compromise perceptions of the UN’s impartiality, with implications both for the security of its staff and the integrity of its mission, particularly if the legitimacy of the state wanes over time – a situation that arguably NATO now faces in Afghanistan. Engaging with non-state actors may help weak states to become more inclusive and more legitimate. But it may also pose dilemmas concerning the UN’s relationship with that government. In addition, in several contexts the nature of non-state actors such as the Taliban may also have international implications. How the balance is struck and how it is managed over time is a case-specific question.

Several UN missions are deployed in contexts where the government does not have the capacity to protect its authority across the whole of its territory and therefore, lacks the capacity to ensure the rule of law and protect civilians across the entire country. In such contexts, military operations can play important roles in extending state authority, although setbacks on the
ground demonstrate the difficulties that the UN faces in this task. In the longer term however, rebuilding and reforming national institutions responsible for upholding the rule of law and other functions, is necessary for consolidating peace, and for enabling the drawdown of both the UN military and police forces and its civilian personnel.

These tasks are more complex and more challenging to successfully implement than the bulk of multidimensional tasks added during the 1990s. They are also overwhelmingly political in nature. If too often addressed technically, they nonetheless directly touch on delicate issues of state sovereignty and the maintenance of power. Moreover, the time required for many of these tasks such as reintegration of ex-combatants, security and justice sector reform, rebuilding administrative institutions, and transitional justice, exceeds that of security-oriented peacekeeping operations, and the competencies necessitate additional expertise that is mostly civilian and often in short supply.

By authorizing peacekeeping missions to undertake peacebuilding and peacekeeping tasks, the Security Council has expanded peacekeeping responsibilities into the realm of immediate post-conflict peacebuilding. In doing so, the authority and competence of the Council has been de facto extended beyond the traditional boundaries of peace and security. The creation of the OROLSI has enabled DPKO to develop policy and provide mission guidance on the security side of the rule of law. The Security Council itself has begun authorizing smaller, longer-term peacebuilding missions to situations where a large security-oriented peacekeeping force is no longer needed such as in Sierra Leone; or to contexts where a large peacekeeping force may be unwarranted as in Guinea-Bissau. This transition marks a significant change in the means by which the UN supports the consolidation of political processes, from the strategic use of security to the strategic use of development and institution-building. But although authorizing UN operations to undertake general peacebuilding tasks has become a widely accepted practice, it nonetheless has political, financial, institutional, and bureaucratic implications that have yet to be addressed.

Politically, the language of the UN Charter provides the Security Council with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. At present, there is no consensus among Member States as to what tasks fall under peace and security as opposed to development or humanitarian tasks. Humanitarian and human rights tasks may arguably be a bit clearer, but the nexus between security and development much less so. Consequently, many Member States have expressed reservations with respect to state-building and security and justice sector reform.
Financially, the budget of a peacekeeping operation is no longer determined solely by the size of the force on the ground. Discussions in the Ad hoc Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) and in the Fifth Committee have acquired significant policy impact. Financing mechanisms is another issue linking the policy debate to the financial debate. For example, how much disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration activities, or security and justice sector reform, or institution-building, should in fact be funded through the assessed budget of the UN, rather than through voluntary contributions? One approach could be to say that critical mission tasks should come out of the assessed funds, and non-critical tasks should come out of the voluntary funds. But to make that distinction, one first would need to actually define what issues are critical for the mission.

This suggests that institutionally, there is a disconnect between the policy discussion in the Security Council, and the financial discussion in the General Assembly, not to mention the UN and non-UN sources of funding, be they bilateral donors or the World Bank and other International Funding Institutions (IFI), that may be critical for the success, not just of the mission but of the broader goal of consolidating peace on the ground. There is also a gap between the evolution of UN policies and that of its institutions. The establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and the Peacebuilding Support Office för (PBSO) was intended to explicitly address the linkages between security and development. There is however, still a need for greater discussion, clarification, and agreement on the relationship between the PBC and the PBSO on the one hand, and the Security Council and by extension, DPKO and DPA on the other.

Once a mission is mandated, how does the Security Council know when the political and security situation has stabilized sufficiently for it to begin handing over responsibility to the PBC? Conversely, how does the PBC know when its engagement would, in fact, be productive? PBSO has been explicitly mandated to measure progress towards meeting short- and medium term recovery goals. In this regard some progress has been made but considerable challenges remain. How to identify the critically relevant measures for the emergence of a viable national political process is an especially difficult item to grasp and measure.

Finally, bureaucratically, multidimensional mandates are predicated on integration of efforts, both in the field and at UN headquarters. But the extent of actual integration within the UN, and of the IFI’s and lead donors within the UN, is still insufficient. No UN entity has sufficient bureaucratic leverage or control of financial resources to coherently orchestrate the various actors within the UN and beyond. This is a problem without a ready solution and one that significantly weakens the leverage of the international community in post-conflict situations.
In conclusion, multidimensional missions, especially those that extend state authority or are explicitly mandated to protect civilians, have raised fundamental questions about the purpose and limits of peacekeeping, as well as the appropriate use of international resources. In both cases, a collaborative mandating process appears to be the most promising way to ensure that the political consensus that supports UN peacekeeping operations is maintained. Nevertheless, strengthening the existing mandate-making process will require a distinct change in attitude on all sides and an overall commitment to making peacekeeping function up to its stated aims.

H.E. Mr. Maged A. Abdelaziz, Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations

Thank you for inviting me to be part of this panel. Addressing the issue of the quality of mandates is vital for ensuring the success of any peacekeeping mission. Some mandates might be clear, but still unachievable due to inadequate resources. This is the case of UNAMID. Other mandates might be achievable but not perceived as credible by the parties or the host country. The implementation of Security Council Resolution 1706 suggests that a clearly defined mandate supported by the consent of the parties facilitates the implementation on the ground, particularly when it comes to new peacekeeping tasks.

The current practice in the Security Council is to increasingly mandate multidimensional peacekeeping operations when there is no accepted peace agreement, or when robust tasks such as the protection of civilians and supporting government forces are central to the mission. Examples include MONUC, UNAMID, MINURCAT, and UNAMIL. This is clearly having implications on the effectiveness and perception of peacekeeping as a tool for maintaining international peace and security. The Security Council therefore has to consider creating mandates that reflect clearly achievable objectives, and to specify the activities for which the missions are responsible. Clear mandates and cohesive political and military planning is necessary for new mandates that are still under consultations in the Security Council. For example, we have been discussing the protection of civilians during the past few days, particularly in the Security Council, but there is still no consensus on this among the Member States. Similarly, the peacekeeping mandates are formulated without much coordination with the TCCs and the PCCs. The Security Council should be more closely associated with the TCCs to discuss the mandates, particularly during the start-up phase.

Cooperation between the Security Council, the TCCs, and the Secretariat needs to be more meaningful. The Security Council has taken some steps in the right
direction during the latter half of 2009, strengthening its consultations with TCCs, and at the Summit that was called during the ministerial week at the beginning of this session. But more substantive cooperation is still needed with TCCs.

Concerning mandate implementation, it is imperative to draw from lessons learned and to achieve greater consensus on robust peacekeeping, both conceptually and operationally, as well as on what the troops are asked to do. We need to listen more to those who are implementing the mandates on the ground. Questions such as when a given mandate can be implemented, when it is not being implemented, and if so, why that is the case, all need to be addressed, particularly in high-risk environments such as Darfur and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Meanwhile the implementation of new mandated tasks, like the protection of civilians requires integration of efforts at all levels. I would like to underline the importance of a comprehensive approach to this issue, which encompasses the provision of timely and adequate resources, capabilities, logistical support and training, as well as political support and well-defined mandates. TCCs will not be able to implement mandates to protect civilians without such requirements. In addition, we need to agree on the role of the host country, as we always reaffirm that the protection of civilians is one of the host country’s primary responsibilities and obligations as a state.

The role of the United Nations peacekeeping operations should not substitute the role of the national authorities in the longer term. Implementing peacebuilding activities and developing national institutions responsible for upholding the rule of law is necessary for consolidating peace. But these tasks should be implemented within a well-defined exit strategy based on promoting national capabilities and achieving development. None of the current missions have a clear exit strategy that enables a drawdown of the UN presence. This is one of the questions that is raising alarms. Some still view the integration of both peacekeeping and peacebuilding as long-term tasks.

Authorizing UN peacekeeping operations to implement peacebuilding is generally and increasingly being accepted. But there is no consensus among Member States on the long-term tasks that this implies and what their numerous implications are. UN peacekeeping mandates should not be made to expand the authority of the Security Council or to undertake activities that fall within the national competence of the host country.

It is also important to take into consideration that there is a third pillar of multi-dimensional peacekeeping, which is the pillar of development. Peacekeeping and peacebuilding alone are not going to be sufficient in dealing with the situation
on the ground. Moreover, the implementation of new peacekeeping mandated tasks requires substantive coordination and coherence between the relevant UN entities. No sufficient coordination exists between DPKO, PBSO, PBC, and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) on the issues that relate to peacebuilding activities in multidimensional peacekeeping. A discussion of these issues should therefore be added to the New Horizon process, which presents us with an opportunity to assess the current situation and deliberate on the ways in which to establish a collective mandating process.

Another essential factor that defines the Security Council’s ability to integrate more of the peacebuilding activities, to enhance its effectiveness, and to implement the resolution that established the PBC, is the extent to which the mandates lay down the foundations for sustainable peace and development. These can be defined by certain preconditions that have to exist. First, the existence of a peace accord, or a peace agreement, is something which I have already mentioned, and which has also been mentioned in the SG’s Reports on the work of the organization. Second, ensuring the national ownership of peacebuilding activities and separating these activities from the activities of peacekeeping, and the role of the Security Council in that regard, is key.

Third, the importance of ensuring the presence of the developmental aspect, particularly the development of national robust forces that are capable of maintaining law and order and defending the country concerned. Fourth, the capabilities of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the General Assembly to deal with the peacebuilding and development activities have to be fully utilized. Because whereas the Security Council only deals with these activities within an integrated approach that combines the three central orders or pillars of multidimensional peacekeeping, peacebuilding and development are at the centre of the work of these two fora. Thank you.

_H.E. Ms. Sylvie-Agnès Bermann, Director, United Nations and International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of France_

Our current debate is very important. It represents a cultural revolution for peacekeeping. In the past, there was always a peace to maintain. The situation was very clear, peacekeeping troops were deployed to monitor ceasefires. It was very simple. This is not the case anymore. Even if the question of having a peace to keep is mentioned, what is actually meant by peace? Is there peace in the DRC? Is there peace in Sudan? What is peace? The reality of the situation is that most of the time there is a civil war, or hostile rebels fighting a state. This is why we are talking about robust peacekeeping. It has become a completely different endeavour, the
reality of which we now have to face. We have to not only identify a new concept, but also the measures, for its implementation.

First, with regard to the concepts, everybody is referring to the Brahimi Report. It was important at the time of its publication because there was a crisis in peacekeeping. We are currently in a similar situation. Although some of the peacekeeping operations are very successful, they are also in a situation of crisis. The situation in the Congo and in Guinea-Bissau are case in points, which needs to be discussed further.

The two most significant things that DPKO has done recently which merit appreciation are the Capstone Doctrine and the New Horizon. Initiatives have also been taken by some of the members of the Security Council, namely the French-British Initiative to improve the ways in which peacekeeping is conceptualized and implemented. What we need is more precision. The debate which took place yesterday on the protection of civilians has been referred to several times. I believe our resolution is a very good and precise resolution on what should be done, and what kind of cooperation we should have with the TCCs and all other stakeholders. But as stated earlier, more operational clarity is also needed to understand what is meant by the protection of civilians? The question of what peacekeepers should do in different situations, and clear rules that they can follow on the ground are very important.

Drafting mandates most of the time comes down to a political compromise between political or permanent representatives. But it needs to be remembered that these mandates have to be implemented on the ground. This is why we have all emphasized the need for more discussions with the TCCs on what is achievable. But we also need to understand that security intervention alone is not enough. Elections alone are not a guarantee for a democratic country or the successful implementation of a multidimensional peacekeeping mandate. That is why these operations are more complex, more difficult, and more integrated. This has to be taken into consideration. For example, when the question of the protection of civilians is mentioned, the issue of natural resources may also have to be discussed, as was precisely the case in the DRC, or the question of environment as in Darfur. This is crucial.

Equally important is the linkage between the ground, UN HQ and the Security Council. This is why the French and the British took the initiative to address multidimensional peacekeeping in the Security Council. In our experience from the crisis in the Kivu, the UN HQ and the Security Council did not have the necessary information of what was happening on the ground to take decisions about the reconfiguration of the operation. The planning documents had not been adjusted
or updated since 2005. Thus there has to be a closer cooperation with what is done on the ground and it has to be possible for both DPKO and those who are deciding in the Security Council to gain a strategic overview of the situation. While there has already been some improvement, including the important statement of August 5th, there is still room for improvement.

When France has the Presidency of the Security Council in February, we intend to dedicate it to the question of peacekeeping. We will carry out a general survey rather than a discussion on each operation in turn. We will also discuss the problems faced by the Secretariat in the area of peacekeeping, with all the members of the Security Council. It will not be a question of addressing the specific details of the operations on the ground or of micro-management. But it will be about the information-sharing with all components of peacekeeping that is necessary to ensure an informed mandate and decision-making process.

There is another question that we intend to raise during our Presidency, namely the relation and implication of organized crime and drug trafficking. These issues are important for peace and security, but also important for our operations. This is clear in Afghanistan, but also in Haiti. They should be taken into closer consideration.

Finally it is also necessary to keep discussing the question of robust peacekeeping. We are ready to organize a seminar with the Challenges Forum on this challenge while C-34 is in session to help continue the work in that field. Thank you very much.

Amb. Jacques Paul Klein, Former Special Representative of the Secret General, UNTAES and UNMIL

Excellencies, Colleagues, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is refreshing to participate in a panel discussion on such a relevant and topical issue. I have been fortunate enough to have led three successful peacekeeping missions in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in Liberia. Needless to say, each conflict on the Security Council’s agenda has its own causes, unique personalities, and geopolitical variables. Therefore there is no single formula or definitive operations manual that can be instantly applied to all situations. On the ground, we need to maintain flexibility to achieve fixed goals. At the headquarters level, we need to be sure of strong political support from the capitals and adequate and timely resources. But above all, we need to base our interventions on a clear understanding of the nature of the problem that we are addressing, and the capacity of the society in which we are intervening to sustain the solutions that we are proposing. Taken together,
these factors will determine whether we simply maintain the status quo, or vastly improve it for the better.

In the over ten years that I have been engaged in UN and non-UN peacekeeping operations in the Balkans and Africa, I have come to recognize five principle prerequisites for success that apply once the decision to engage has been made. They are: mandate; organization; planning and prioritization, including resource allocation, leadership and personnel; political support; and finally, an exit strategy leading to the closure of the mission.

Everything starts with the mandate. A clear, credible and achievable mandate sets the pace for all that follows. The appropriate force size and composition of the rules of engagement, and the resource intensity that promises ultimately an avalanche of activities. It stands to reason that a confusing mandate will only lead to confusion on the ground. UNPROFOR included some 70 Security Council Resolutions and dozens of Presidential Statements. Political negotiation authority was split between the UN, the EU, and the Contact Group. The biggest challenge for any peacekeeper was to understand what he or she was supposed to do before actually doing it. As such the challenge is twofold. First, if you start out without knowing where you are going, you are going to wind up somewhere else. Second, although the mandate is the floor but not the ceiling for everything the mission does, if the mandate is vague and the Security Council is unable to agree on a political end state, dysfunction will plague the lifespan of the mission.

This brings me to the second prerequisite for success: clear organizational structure. Here, let me be rather controversial about the relationship between the military and civilian components of the mission. The failure of the dual key system in UNPROFOR does not justify the division of a mission into separate and parallel military and civilian chains of command. There is unity of command, and without unity of command, you are only asking for major problems. The other point I would make about organizational structure is the question of the effectiveness of multiple organizations working in a pillar structure. The UNTAES mission was fully integrated. We sequentially brought in specialist organizations – the European Community, the Council of Europe, OSCE, the UN Volunteers, bilateral donors – for specific tasks according to our overall plan and timetable. In contrast, you recall the Dayton Accords mandated an unprecedented number of organizations to work under the weak, overall coordinating authority of the High Representative. By ignoring that tenet for unity of command, each of the five principle organizations had their own mandate, budget, and governing body. The result was niche mandate implementation, duplication, lack of focus, and a lack of real strategic planning.
My third prerequisite for success is strategic planning and prioritization, including resource allocation. We need to ask ourselves why Bosnia and Herzegovina, which until now, has received more per capita assistance than Western Europe under the Marshall Plan – some $14 billion – still remains weak, and unstable, requiring several more years of intensive international attention? One reason is that we failed to prioritize, particularly with respect to the rule of law. Law is, after all, the oil that lubricates civilization. Mortgages, banks, trusts, marriage, divorce; ultimately governance is the rule of law. I have no doubt that the rule of law must be placed as the centrepiece of practically every peacekeeping mission. Without it, a credible exit strategy is inconceivable. International military forces cannot leave, the economy cannot recover, democracy remains a façade and corruption and criminalization become entrenched.

On the issue of personnel, my key point is the recognition of our civilian staff which is the continuity and driving force in any mission. Our people indeed were, and are, our greatest asset. But our treatment of civilian staff is often shameful and one of our weakest links. As we came to closure in our mission, we had over 200 international mission appointees that had no duty station to return to, and had not received an onward assignment. They deserved better. The prospect of unemployment weighed heavily on the mission’s morale at the time, when efficiency was needed most. Surely we could have done, and must do, more for our people. We are in their debt. We owe them thanks and appreciation for what they do.

Finally, a few words about a mission’s closure and departure. I have always maintained that the success of a mission is judged not only by what it achieves but also how it leaves. Following the completion of UNTAES, long-term monitoring was undertaken by the OECD to ensure local compliance with iron-clad guarantees. Successes have been sustained by the EU police mission once transition occurred, and to quote my colleague, the Former High Representative, Paddy Ashdown, “Europe can begin its new role in Bosnia and Herzegovina as the UN has done its job.”

In conclusion, the one thing I do know is that there is no single answer on how to ensure successful peacekeeping. But I believe that a decade of peacekeeping in the Balkans and Africa has identified some fundamentals. A mission stands or fails on the basis of its mandate, its organization, its strategic planning and prioritization, its leadership, personnel, political support, and how it leaves. While there can be no definitive operations manual, there are core lessons and best practices to be considered. Get them right, and an operation has a real chance of success. Get them wrong, and the mission will collapse, or at best flounder indefinitely, trapping us into a long-term, expensive, seemingly endless engagement that degrades over time as political fatigue, donor fatigue, and compassion fatigue set in. Many of
the issues I have raised were identified in the Brahimi Report, and to the credit of our colleague, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, many were institutionalized into DPKO to be applied to new situations of even greater complexity.

In closing I would also like to recognize the thousands of UN peacekeepers, civilians, police, and military, for their dedication and determination in the service of peace, a service in which many of them have made the ultimate sacrifice. For over half a century now they have lived up to the Biblical admonition: when the question was asked in the Bible, “Whom shall we send? Who will go in our name?” they stepped forward. They said, “Send us. We will go.” So we owe them all a debt of gratitude.

Lt.Gen. (Retd.) V.K. Jetley, Former Force Commander UNAMSIL / United Service Institution of India

I am extremely delighted to be invited to this Forum and will focus on two issues in which I have had substantive experience during peacekeeping operations. First, two decades ago I served in Iran on an observer mission. Second, in Sierra Leone a decade ago, despite working on what was basically a Chapter VI mission with windows of Chapter VII, we went into an almost war-like situation. I will focus my lessons learned from those missions on mandate-making and mandate-implementation.

Most of the mandates given by the UN Security Council are given also by the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council. It is essential that input be given to whomsoever is making the mandate, so that they can derive a mandate which is credible and achievable. One of the means of doing this is to send technical assistance missions (TAMs) out to gather information for making the mandates. The composition of this TAM is very important. It is essential to include a representative from a major troop contributing country so that they can make a realistic assessment as ultimately they will be the ones on the ground. Further assistance can be provided through the Military Staff Committee. This organization has not been functioning for a long while. However, as it was envisaged in 1948, it consists of military members from the permanent members of the Security Council. This set-up is not relevant today. There should be members from all permanent as well as non-permanent members of the Security Council on the Committee. For difficult missions, members from the major TCCs and PCCs for that particular mission should be co-opted.

There was a discussion in the morning regarding the inability to protect civilians. As a former Force Commander, I feel that if we go into a UN or any other peace
operation, our prime responsibility should always be to take care of the civilians. We cannot say “Sorry, I do not have the capability”. In that case, we should not be there in the first place. Nothing is more embarrassing and more callous than to get to a place and just protect yourself! You wear big helmets, white vehicles, go around well-equipped, and you protect yourself! That is not what the country or the troubled spot is expecting out of you, and therefore it is essential for the mandate to factor this in. It should be a primary factor. Although I do agree, that it is not possible to protect the complete nation, no matter how small it is, but there are ways and means of doing things. A lot of good suggestions were made earlier today by the USG DPKO, the USG DFS and Brigadier Muhammed Feyyaz. Mobility, good communication, helicopters, vehicles and we could also be more proactive. We should not be sitting on our hands and wait for something to happen. We could be proactive enough to go and fight with them. You can put the fear of God in them, which is what we did in Sierra Leone and we prevented something from happening. So therefore I feel that protection of the civilians must be an essential part of the mandate. Adequate resources must be provided for that.

Having said that, I will be stating the obvious by saying mandates should be clear, should be implementable and achievable. But having received a mandate, we all know that resources are never sufficient. So how do we implement it? Essentially, every component of a mission should analyze the mandate from its point of view. The military, the police, and the civilians – everybody should be looking at it from their point of view and then convert their assessment into achievable tasks. Insofar as the military is concerned, we convert their aspects of the mandate into operational plans and orders, and logistics orders. These are all very implementable. The police and other components must also be operating in a similar way.

It is important to coordinate all these plans into one actionable whole, which is the responsibility of the Head of the Mission. The Head of the Mission should first, meet all the mission senior leaders individually, then collectively and finally make sure that all the plans mesh into each other and to make one fine-tuned plan for that particular mission. Despite such efforts, all things can and will go wrong, as in Sierra Leone. Therefore, the mandate has to change dynamically with the changing situation. One helicopter attack by the Government of Sierra Leone went to an area where they thought rebels were hiding, bombed and threw some leaflets. It resulted in a massive IDP problem. We were not equipped for it and did not have the resources. We could have said, “Sorry, we cannot do anything about it, because it is not in my mandate.” That is not the way missions are managed. The mandates should not be frozen; they should be dynamic and should change with the situation.
Second, mandates should be worded to include peacebuilding activities. Peacebuilding should not, and does not, follow sequentially. Peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacebuilding – they all mesh into each other and some of them precede one another. The missions on the ground do not really do peacebuilding, but they do parts of it. Peacekeeping missions can undertake quick impact projects, like constructing roads, bridges, building a hospital, giving food and shelter, making a water point and giving some medicines. These are all small little things which are not given in the mandate, but which mesh into an all-round plan.

Further, it is impossible to achieve a mandate by following the national chain of command. It is very unnerving for a person on the ground, who is supposed to be in authority, to not have any authority. It is an adverse situation on the ground, when the Commander needs to move troops or resources around, and orders someone to move, but he is told, “Sorry, let me check back home and then I will come back to you, whether I can do it or not.” This sort of command and control arrangement which has existed in many places, I believe is currently being rectified. Things need to improve, because unless they do, we will have a major problem.

It is vital to have a competent senior mission leadership team. Your Head of Mission should be capable of performing the duties which are expected of the Head of Mission. The Head of Mission should be able to read what is visible as well as what is between the lines and be able to say, “Yes we are going to do this, not this”, or “This may have a political implication, so, lets not get into that.” Similarly if a Force Commander or a Police Commissioner is incapable of controlling the troops or the resources under his command, he does not have the right to be there. The senior mission leadership appointments are so sensitive, that there is no scope of distributing these appointments to settle political scores.

My last point concerns the caveats posed by many countries on operations. These need to go. Once you have committed your troops, once you have committed your resources, then please leave it to the people on the ground to be able to control them in the best possible manner.

Mr. Ihab Moustafa, Senior Officer, Peacebuilding Support Office, United Nations

Thank you for this opportunity to be amongst these very distinguished panelists. I thought I would bring some sort of conceptual clarity to the linkage between peacekeeping and peacebuilding mandates, especially as undertaken by peacekeepers. But the previous panelists have already done the job and I learned a lot. Having said that, I will try to conclude the discussion with some very
important conceptual elements. Because, there are still some issues here regarding who does peacebuilding, when and how? These questions are still being asked, both amongst Member States, and within the UN system itself. The very notion of multidimensional peacekeeping as presented by Brahimi some ten years ago was actually an attempt to answer that question. How and what does it take to make peace sustainable and durable? How can the UN protect its huge investment in peacekeeping operations? Of course, ten years ago, we did not have UNMIS, UNAMID or even the new MONUC. Still, peacekeeping was seen as a huge investment that needs to be protected for the future. This is exactly where the notion of multidimensional peacekeeping sets in and it is what we continue to struggle with in trying to answer these two very important questions.

The creation of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture in 2005 by the 2005 World Summit was another attempt by Member States and by the international community to provide answers to these two questions. The answer this time was in the creation of a dedicated institutional mechanism to complement and to support the original notion of multidimensional peacekeeping operations and beyond, including the notion of a sustainable post-conflict development. That is why the dedicated institutional mechanism that was put in place was an inter-governmental advisory organ. It was conceived in a unique and ingenious way, bringing together all possible actors that need to provide answers to these questions. It is a funding mechanism via the Peacebuilding Fund, which is not intended to fund peacebuilding generally, or all the peacebuilding tasks, but only to provide catalytic funding for short-, medium- and longer-term peacebuilding during the life of peacekeeping operations.

Third, the small Peacebuilding Support Office, which I am pleased to represent, was not envisaged as an operational office with an operational mandate, but rather as a support to this new structure.

Finally, a lot of Member States and actors in the international community believe that we actually do have a responsibility for peacebuilding during the life of a peacekeeping mission, somehow. When there is a peacekeeping mandate authorized by the Security Council, the leadership is with the peacekeeping mission and with the Head of that Mission. But the very fact that there is an integrated and multidimensional peacekeeping mission means that other actors including the development and humanitarian groups, all are under this umbrella. So, what is the problem? Why are we not functioning coherently? Is it the UN that needs to function coherently? What other actors on the ground need to come onboard to avoid duplication, and make maximum and optimum use of the very minimal resources that are available to the international community for all of these needs in post-conflict situations? That continues to be the struggle. That continues to be
the challenge, and I believe that for this particular Forum, this continues to be a challenge on its own. How and when will the international community – UN plus – be able to work coherently and optimize the available resources?

Recently, the SG was asked by the Security Council yet again to try to provide answers to these challenges. This time, the SG was asked to address the creation of the peacebuilding architecture. Member States still found that there are funding gaps and strategy gaps in achieving a coherent common shared vision for post-conflict, immediate post-conflict, peacebuilding. There is also a capacity gap, which is the key to resolving most problems. We can have a common strategy and have good intentions of working together within the UN and with other non-UN actors outside. However, at the end of the day, we would not succeed if we did not identify the right capacities, whether local, national, regional, or international. The recent Report of the SG was an attempt to try to see how these gaps could be bridged.

The SG Report and the process of drafting it was a consultative process within the system. The Member States have come to the conclusion that we should not get bogged down in the question of who does peacebuilding and when. In reality a peacebuilding perspective needs to be there right from the onset of UN interventions in post-conflict situations. Five recurring areas were presented by the SG to illustrate that there would never be a single actor doing peacebuilding. It will have to be a collective effort by the international community, although under one leadership. The five recurring priorities areas are as follows. First, the provision of basic safety and security, which is one of the primary areas of peacekeeping mandates. Second, support to political processes, which during the life of a peacekeeping mission, the SRSG and his/her staff have the mandate to support. Third, the provision of basic services and this is where it starts to get a little bit trickier. Fourth, the restoration of core government functions, which also goes beyond the security sector institutions, security sector reform and the rule of law. There are other core government functions that have to do with the institution-building aspect that goes beyond peace and security and the rule of law towards the development aspect or the capacity of the state to deliver. Finally, the support to economic revitalization, which is straightforward and requires development actors to come onboard.

The complexity of thinking about a mandate that has a peacebuilding perspective is not what needs to be done over a ten years period, because that will defeat our purpose here today. Peacebuilding is a medium-term and a long-term endeavour, but it needs to start when peacekeeping sets in.

I would like to conclude by saying that the PBC, in the context of the drafting of the SG’s Report, has been nominated to play an important role in advising
the Security Council on peacebuilding mandates that will be required for implementation early on. Some of these possible areas for the PBC’s contribution may be the identification and building of knowledge and best practices, as Mr. Klein just mentioned, on critical early peacebuilding tasks as well as to provide consistent, relevant, and timely advice to UN peacekeeping operations on undertaking mandated peacebuilding activities. Thus, what are the PBC’s core peacebuilding priorities and sequencing for country-specific situations? First, by providing advice. Second, by doing it so that the Commission can help mobilize resources including through top donors, the World Bank, IMF, and other actors. Third, to promote partnerships for peacekeeping and peacebuilding, which is another way of mobilizing resources. Fourth, to contribute to assisting peacekeeping operations in addressing immediate peacebuilding issues and to provide exit strategies. The PBC may be able to provide that perspective. I thank you for listening.

Discussion

Gen. Anis Bajwa commented: “Ambassador Jacques Klein gave a very good analogy of the mandates that made me think as he said, ‘A mandate is not the ceiling, it is the floor.’ But that is a wonderful mandate. Should we not very strictly be bound by that mandate? Stepping upwards and stepping sideways is something we need to be mindful of, because if a mandate is the floor and not the ceiling, then it is important for the mandate also to have the four walls beyond which those who are implementing the mandate cannot, and should not go. Based on past experience, peacekeepers have sometimes gone beyond the limits of the mandate, and began acting as if they were peace enforcers not just wanting to do robust peacekeeping, but also peace enforcement getting into the mindset of the enemy. Peacekeepers must never get into that mindset of the enemy. There is no enemy in peacekeeping only the parties to the conflict that you contend with. There are spoilers that you have to use robust peacekeeping against. But there is no enemy, that is why the mandate does need to provide four walls in addition to the floor if it is not to provide a ceiling. If there are activities that are not mandated at all, we need to be mindful not to get into those activities. If the mandate does not provide authority nor resources to act against organized crime, then our mission would be ill-advised to begin to operate against organized crime without getting the mandate and without getting the resources because by doing that, we could be jeopardizing the security of the whole mission.”

A participant asked whether peacebuilding can also be an activity that does not necessarily only need to happen because a conflict has taken place? Is peacebuilding
only a post-conflict activity? In “West Africa and in the particular instance of Guinea-Bissau, the UN is already engaged in peace-building. Guinea-Bissau has not technically gone the way that Liberia or Sierra Leone did. Perhaps the international community needs to expand the concept of peacebuilding and look at it also as a tool for the provision of necessities. Guinea-Bissau had been going through difficult situations for a long time. It was a country that could qualify as a state that existed only in name, with the drug issues and so on. Should members of the Security Council or the UN in such cases sit and wait to see how terrible the situation degenerates before they send a peacekeeping mission.

We are currently faced with a situation in Niger. If pressure is put on the regime in Niger early, we may be able to avoid the situation degenerating into armed violence between opposing groups that needs peacekeeping. This is only one example that one can cite from Africa. With proper conflict analysis, and clear early indicators, the UN ought to be in a position to use means of conflict prevention, but I like to call it peacebuilding. Thank you.”

One senior diplomat suggested that we should not forget that peacebuilding activities are based on the principle of national ownership. “We are talking about post-conflict peacebuilding. We cannot, except in certain exceptional cases, force countries to accept peacebuilding activities in their territories, they must ask for it. They must agree with what is on their territories and they must have the right to terminate it at the very end. If you look at the cases of Guinea-Bissau and of Sierra Leone: the reason why they turned to peacebuilding is because the advisory groups on these two countries in ECOSOC were not supporting enough. They tried to find another way of linking with the donor countries through peacebuilding activities and through a wider network that include the Peacebuilding Fund and the PBC in order to retrieve some of the funds that they had lost through the advisory group of ECOSOC. This is where the complementarities between the activities in the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the ECOSOC on this particular issue, are very important.

Another example is Haiti, a state that refuses to come to peacebuilding as it has a very good standing relationship with the advisory committee in ECOSOC, which is doing well in development. There are UN troops in Haiti, but at the same time, they have solid development activities that are supporting their economy, supporting the country, capacity-building, establishing viable defence forces, and establishing other infrastructure. As such they do not want to come to peacebuilding and they have the right to say so. There is also a perception among the developing countries that peacebuilding, as mentioned by Jake Sherman in his paper, is building a surrogate state, that is under the influence of a group or other states. This is not easy to accept in certain cases, where you need funding, but you
are not ready to let go of sovereignty or nationality. That is the dilemma that some countries feel, when they deal with this issue."

Amb. Jacques Paul Klein responded by saying that his point about the mandate being the floor, not the ceiling, was a little bit misunderstood. “The mandate is understood, but then you have practical situations. You come to Liberia and you realize you have no engineers and no hospital. The people who have engineers and a hospital are the Chinese. The Chinese say to me, ‘Liberia recognizes Taiwan, which pays them $5 million. If you can sort out that relationship, we will be delighted to help you.’ So then you fly in a Chinese delegation from Sierra Leone in the middle of the night. You negotiate. You say to the local acting president, ‘There is only one People’s Republic. You and the Taiwan chaps can do business, but there is only one People’s Republic.’ Sierra Leone drops the recognition of Taiwan, they recognize the People’s Republic, and we get an engineering battalion and a hospital. That is not in the mandate. The mandate also said nothing about treating 210,000 Liberian citizens for various maladies of one kind or another. Now why are we not supposed to treat locals? They might sue you? In a country that has no judicial system and no infrastructure!

In any case, I used to tell my Force Commander to be careful with medicines and treating people. You have to be careful if you deal with money. But in terms of treating populations, treat them for weapons, whatever you need to do! Those are practical things, but these are not in the mandate. ONUCI in Cote d’Ivoire was our next door neighbour. There is a long border between Cote d’Ivoire and Liberia. I went to the French Commander there and suggested to him that we divide the entire length of that border between the two missions taking almost 500 kilometers each. It was done to maximize our resources to secure the border to prevent cross-border migration. When we first got to Liberia, we had to fly a Nigerian battalion from Sierra Leone to Liberia. Believe me or not, it was not in the mandate! You cannot use funding for one mission for another mission. Well, we financed it. You have to be practical and realistic. If you are the Head of a Mission, you are dealing with what? You are dealing with thugs, criminals, psychopaths, serious spoilers, and you are doing what – compromising, negotiating, turning the other cheek. And they all think you are daft! At some point all of that has to stop and you have to do what we call surgery. The surgeon, if he cuts cleanly, quickly, and well, does minimum nerve tissue or muscle damage, the patient heals. Now if you are starting to argue, who is the surgeon? Who has got to do this, or when are we going to do the surgery? Whose surgical instruments are you going to use? What medication? Where is the recovery going to take place? The patient lingers, the patient ails, and the patient may finally die on you. And so there comes a time for action when you may not think it is really required, but if you want the mission to be a success – you will have to do it. But then you do not do this alone. You
ask your staff. And make them sign a statement that they fully support you in this stupid action!”

A participant inquired about a French proposal to focus on robust peacekeeping in the coming year. “Would the emphasis be on robust peacekeeping at the tactical and operational levels, or would it be broadened to a discussion at the strategic level? The process of consultation on the Capstone Doctrine document suggests that Member States did endorse the principle that robust peacekeeping and the use of force should be looked at from the operational and tactical level, leaving aside the strategic level, given the political considerations on the issue. It might be a controversial discussion on where peacekeeping starts, where it ends and where peace enforcement will start from. There are some fears of blurring the lines between peacekeeping, which bring credibility and legitimacy, and robust peacekeeping at its strategic level, which can be seen as peace enforcement. It would be helpful to know the focus of the French Presidency of the Security Council.”

Amb. Sylvie-Agnès Bermann commented first on Amb. Klein’s presentation and called for action. “This is the case in peacekeeping operations today. When you face a particularly unacceptable and outrageous situation, the peacekeepers have to act. It is the case in the DRC with the mass-rape of women. In this case the peacekeepers should react, as was the case in Rwanda, years ago. That is the reason why we talk about robust peacekeeping. The seminar has not yet been prepared, but each aspect should be addressed. The problem is not the definition but the problem of how you should react on the ground and sometimes the reaction is to do nothing and to stay in the barracks. It depends on the SRSG and the Force Commander’s ability to react. What is robust peacekeeping and the use of force when we have soldiers on the ground? They are also soldiers even if they are peace soldiers, they are soldiers and they are there to protect the population”.

Another question was raised by a participant about the need for collaborative mandate-making, where there was a clear need for distinct changes in attitudes. “Is the problem the Security Council’s structure or as it rather the process?”

Mr. Jake Sherman suggested his paper had focused on the current configuration of the membership and how to strengthen the working relationship between the main TCCs, PCCs, the current Council members and its present configuration and the Secretariat. I will leave that question to the diplomats”.

A former Military Advisor asked about early peacebuilding. “When exactly and how does one know that early peacebuilding is finished and the peacekeeping mission should be withdrawn and the country team and the other organizations
including the PBC can continue the job? That seems to be the problem. When do we actually pull out the peacekeeping mission and go to the other processes?”

Amb. Sylvie-Agnès Bermann responded that there should be benchmarks to help us know if the goals are attained or not. “But the decision about when is the right time to leave should be based on reflections done by all stake-holders. However, regarding East Timor, the former UNSG, Kofi Annan had suggested that ‘Maybe we left too early.’ It is important not to leave too early. This is what happened also in Haiti. Fourteen or fifteen years later we had to intervene again in an even more degraded and deteriorated situation. There should be real discussions with all stakeholders concerning the time to leave.”

Gen. V.K. Jetley mentioned that peacekeeping missions should pull out once the institutions of that particular country are built up, including the police and an army, which is capable of defending itself. Otherwise the whole situation will crumble again.

Amb. Jacques Paul Klein responded that it was a very tricky question. Regarding Liberia 106,000 people were disarmed, 14,000 of whom were women and 1,000 child soldiers. “My first criterion was, who has the weapons now? We did. The level of criminality in Liberia was lower than the city of Washington D.C. in terms of murder rate. The other sign was the functioning of the police. Are the police working? Is the state border service, customs, and immigration functioning? Is there some kind of penal system, because we cleaned up the penal system. There was one poor old man in the prison, who had been a murderer. He was not a political Taylor-type, but he killed someone because he did not like him. Given that the man had already served much time, he was allowed to be freed. As he responded “I am not going out there. It is much too dangerous”, then you know you have a problem. There are criteria that you have to set up, such as the crime rate. There will never be a perfect police force in a country. You do not just leave overnight. You draw down gradually and keep as much muscle as you can. Let the light stuff disappear and keep your muscle until the end. But that is a judgment call that you have to make with your staff, studying the country and analyzing the situation on the ground.”

A participant inquired who makes that call? The exit team or the Security Council? Amb. Jacques Paul Klein suggested that there is a problem with many studies and commissions. As an analogy, he recalled attending a year at Princeton teaching international and public affairs. Academics are bright people, and Amb. Klein asked a man who seemed to have written the definitive history of surgery and the evolution of every surgical technique, about when he last operated on anyone? The attending responded that academics do not operate! They research! They
critique! This is arguably the difference between the academic theorists and people who have been in the field and had to do it. It is the difference between writing about surgery and actually slicing someone open and taking the spleen out. That is the difference. And most of you here are people who have taken the spleen out, which allows for a total different mental approach to all of this.”

Mr. Ihab Moustafa suggested that the overarching answer had been provided, which is benchmarking. But how to develop the benchmarks, what should they be, and how does one measure progress against those benchmarks? The Security Council had tried a similar approach during the drawdown of UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone. The Security Council had been employing the same approach against a number of targeted sanctions in Liberia. “The key question here though is on institution-building. In 2004 and 2005 during the discussion on the creation of the new peacebuilding architecture, one recurring theme was always, that this architecture needs to refocus on building the institutions in the country concerned, emerging from conflict. This ranges from security institutions and rule of law aspects to financial institutions and banking systems which are extremely important, especially when donor money starts to come in tons like in Afghanistan or in other countries that emerge from conflict. How do you manage that? Will it still be the international community that manages this money for Afghanistan or do you need to build certain capacities in that country to manage that money and to channel it to critical areas that can sustain or build peace. These are the questions but the knowhow of measuring the progress towards achieving certain benchmarks as such, the international community is still trying to get better at.”

A participant raised a question concerning Security Council Resolution 1325. She was pleased that the issue of organized crime was addressed. Human trafficking in women for prostitution is one of the major issues and France made an important contribution as the driving force in getting Security Council Resolution 1820 adopted last year. “How do you see that as part of the process since peace operations unfortunately in themselves also contribute to human trafficking for prostitution purposes?”

Amb. Sylvie-Agnès Bermann responded that to address organized crime and prostitution as part of peacekeeping is important. But there is no linkage between what is done in New York, and what is done by the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) in Vienna and since it is a question of international peace and security, it needs to be addressed.

Amb. Maged A. Abdelaziz suggested that on the issue of human trafficking, a Resolution has been adopted today in the Third Committee starting the process of drafting an action plan on human trafficking under the auspices of the President of
the General Assembly. The resolution was initiated by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), of which Egypt is the chair, based on a decision at the NAM Summit last July in Sharm-el-Sheikh. That action plan is supposed to be a composition of various actions besides the EU and the AU. There is an action plan of ECOWAS, and many other action plans out there and there is of course the 2000 convention which has only 130 ratifications. It is lacking about 60 ratifications from mostly developed countries. The General Assembly is working on the formation of a joint, global action plan, to be adopted on human trafficking before the end of the 64th Session of the General Assembly. Needless to say whatever is going to be done in the Security Council would also be strengthening the drive in the direction of combating this abhorrent crime.

A participant referred to the issue of Kimia II in the Eastern part of the DRC and linked it to remarks made by Amb. Klein as well as by Gen. Jetley. The question concerned the issue of the rule of law as one of the prerequisites for successful peacekeeping and the inherent tasks of a peacekeeping mission to protect civilians. The whole concept of the UN supporting an army, the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC), was the biggest infringement on the public and the population in the DRC as well as the hosting of criminals that are sought after by the ICC. “How are we going to get around that? How are we going to ensure that that mission succeeds? It seems as if the mission is just moving around and around. It was good to hear what Amb. Klein said, that they demobilized 160,000 combatants in Liberia. Since 2003, we have been trying to demobilize 88,000 combatants in the Congo, but only 44,000 have been demobilized so far. How can this be changed in this mission?”

Mr. Edmond Mulet suggested that the dilemma the mission is facing in the DRC right now regarding Kimia II is because we have a clear mandate from the Security Council to work with, and support, FARDC to combat all those illegal groups and non-groups in eastern part of DRC. There was also a political agreement at the highest level between the two Heads of State of the DRC and Rwanda. “They decided to go against the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR) and integrate the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNFP) into the FARDC. Kimia II is going along with, or without, the UN or MONUC’s participation or support. What we are doing now is trying to minimize the impact against the civilian population there. For example, we are feeding FARDC troops who are involved in Kimia II. If we do not feed them right now, they will feed themselves out of the population. They will go and get the food, set up illegal checkpoints to get money from the population, and go into the villages and steal and rob and rape. We are providing food rations every day to minimize the impact on the civilian population. Now there is an uproar against MONUC and Kimia II because of the impact on the civilian population, which is indeed of enormous
concern. This is one of the dilemmas a Force Commander and an SRSG have to face on the ground every day. What do we do in situations like this? Do I stop my operations and the support that I am providing to Kimia II, knowing that the Kimia II operation will continue anyhow, and the consequences are going to be even worse for the civilian population? These are issues we have to balance every day on the ground. We have now suspended the support to one brigade that clearly was involved in some awful situations. The whole operation in support of Kimia II is under revision and the message that has been transmitted to the authorities right now is that we will be following this very closely. Any other unit, brigade, or even platoon of the FARDC involved in these kinds of actions will not be included in the support plan anymore. The operation will continue for the next few weeks but I do not think it will be sustainable any longer than beyond the end of the year. They will have to revise the whole concept and the way in which they are dealing with this situation, balancing the consequences and the effectiveness of the operation.

It is not easy to be on the ground making these difficult decisions every day, which many of you have made and know. It is very difficult indeed. The General mentioned the importance to have the right leadership in missions, the people who really have the experience, can assume responsibilities, and at the end of the day can make the best call when they have a dilemma in front of them.”

A former senior UN peacekeeping official suggested that “without going into the nitty gritty of operations, even if the UN is mandated to support the FARDC, the UN is not obliged to do so on their terms. You are authorized to do it, but you do it on your terms, on the UN terms. It makes a hell of a difference.”

A participant raised the issues mentioned by Amb. Abdelaziz about the need to coordinate between the PBC, the ECOSOC, and whatever other institutions that may be relevant for issues related to peacebuilding. The need for coherence in the vision of the UN in its peacebuilding activities and operations was also stressed. There was also a need to involve the TCCs not only in the implementation, on the operational side, but also in the mandate making. “What would be the best concrete mechanism, that could both achieve this coherent vision and ensure this effective contribution in the mandate-making?”

Amb. Maged A. Abdelaziz responded by saying that there is no “one size fits all” approach. Each peacekeeping operation will have its own composite support requirements because in some peacekeeping operations, there is a peace agreement. It is quiet on the ground. The mission is there to maintain peace and to make sure that peacebuilding is done, making a quick start of the development activity. In other peacekeeping missions, there is no peace agreement, but fighting parties,
and the peacekeeping mission is caught in the middle. In the first instance, a peacebuilding presence should be more extensive, more supportive of the role of the peacekeeping. The second type of mission should start gradually, symbolically, and try to synthesize the parties in order to reach agreement in order to be able to jump-start the economy and go into peacebuilding activities. “There are parameters that could be applicable for all peacekeeping missions in addressing peacebuilding measures and that peacebuilding could be pursued without the peacekeeping. It is not a prerequisite that peacebuilding activities should be attached to peacekeeping operations. There are requests from different countries to the PBC asking for urgent support for projects to support peacebuilding operations in those countries where peacekeeping operations have already finished. These countries are granted finances by the Secretary-General from the Peacebuilding Fund.”

Mr. Ihab Moustafa added that of course there are two levels of coherence that are essential for the peacebuilding activities to go on, whether there is a peacekeeping mission or a special political mission, or no mission at all. That was the idea behind the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission with that particular composition, drawing from the Security Council, the ECOSOC, the General Assembly, the top donors, and the top TCCs. The philosophy in the conceptualization of the idea is that you bring together the collective political will of the most relevant actors for peacebuilding activities. It is either about mandate, which is why the Security Council is there or about a longer term socio-economic development vision, which is why the ECOSOC is there; or about the experience that the TCCs have gained in a specific country situation.

“Some of the military-civilian activities undertaken by certain troops on the ground are peacebuilding, quick impact projects – building bridges and digging wells in certain areas and as Amb. Klein mentioned, treating populations in villages. There is also a wealth of experience made by certain TCCs. The donors and resources are essential. I do not need to dwell on that. The broader ownership of the international community is represented by the General Assembly. The whole idea here of coherence is imbedded in how the PBC was configured.

The challenge remains how this Commission, this intergovernmental body with this kind of composition, can collectively bring some operational relevance to the advice and to the work. How does it connect with the field? How does it connect with the SRSG on the ground if there is a peacekeeping mission or the equivalent if it is a political mission? That is still lacking. One of the key issues here has to do with the whole of government approach concept that is being discussed in various capitals, with the OECD and so on. Those players themselves – whether TCCs, donors or even members of Security Council – are not coherent within their own governments. So to bring about some coherent policy approach to this very tricky
and very complex situation on the ground and these multitasks that cut across
security, humanitarian, and development is not easily achieved. There are different
ministries and different agencies linked with it in each and every government. So
it is a complex situation, but the PBC has been put in place in order to provide
answers to that.”

Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno suggested it was a very interesting discussion, but
offered to stir things up a little by proposing that the session was basically about
how the Council could adopt better mandates. “Do you think that – and this is a
question addressed to every member of the panel who feels he/she has a part of the
answer, do you feel it is because it lacks enough military or political information
on the situation, or because it does not have enough agreement on how much
resources it is prepared to put in the effort? It cuts a deal and puts 15,000 troops
in Liberia, which is a fraction of Congo where it puts barely more troops, in fact
less troops initially. What are the drivers of the decisions of the Council and what
should be done to change that? Is it lack of military information, lack of political
information, lack of interaction between the two? What and where is the problem
in the view of the panel?”

Amb. Jacques Paul Klein responded by raising the example of UNTAES. “UNTAES
was supposed to be a Russian-American operation – 20,000 or so. But suddenly
Bosnia occurred, and NATO went to Bosnia, and there was no one left for Croatia
and UNTAES. So someone made the decision, as they always do, ‘Let us give it to
the UN. We may not necessarily give them the resources, financing, or personnel.
But let us give it to the UN,’ and Boutros-Ghali was very direct saying that ‘You
have played this game with me before. We have no support, it fails and then you
blame us – I am tired of failures.’ In the meantime, Boutros-Ghali asked Klein ‘Go
out there and do a little assessment. Can it be done?’ Amb. Klein’s assessment
resulted in an estimate that there was no need for 20,000 there, but about 9,000 to
10,000, some airlift support, a little bit of firepower, and a few tanks. Not that the
UN were going to defeat anyone, but it would make enough noise to get people’s
attention. The proposal was 10,000 and one of the Security Council members
said, ‘Five.’ Amb. Klein asked what happened to the 20? ‘Well that was then. This
is now. Five is all we are paying for.’

That is the dynamic of how this thing really works in terms of decision making.
Then there was no lead country so they called everybody trying to get help! Well
NATO is in Bosnia. Who is not in Bosnia? Belgium. Ah! Go to Brussels! So Amb.
Klein flew to Brussels and talked to the Prime Minister and said, Look, this is a
Croatian problem, you know it is ethnic, it is language, it is this and that. to which
the Prime Minister responded What do you think I have here in Belgium? But also
Okay. We will be glad to help you. So the Belgians became the lead country. We
needed one NATO country as the lead country. It just happens, you do things, you hope it works and we managed to get 5,000 people in there in about two and a half, three months. I moved them faster than NATO by using Ukrainian and Russian airlift. So I do not know what the answer is because a lot of these things are crafted in rooms that you were never a part of. “Regarding the mandate Amb. Klein was asked ‘What, shall we call you? Excellency?’ to which he recalled responding ‘That is nice. But, no, we need something else.’ ‘Governor? Resident General?’ was then suggested, after which Amb. Klein asked ‘Well, what are we calling the mission?’ ‘Well, it is going to be the Transitional Administration of Eastern Slovenia.’ Amb. Klein then suggested ‘Why not just call the person the Transitional Administrator? What Chapter are we here for, are we five, are we seven, are we…?’ ‘No, you are not, seven. You are not even six. You may be five and a half.” So that means only traditional weapons, bows, arrows and spears. You know nothing and that is the kind of mandate we talked about, and we never defined what it was, whether we were doing Chapter five, six, six and a half, or seven. Certainly it was not seven. May have been closer, we edged up to seven, because my thesis is, when someone shoots at you, he is probably trying to kill you, and you should return the favour. So you have to factor that in!”

Amb. Sylvie-Agnès Bermann proposed that some of the countries are more or less interested in particular peacekeeping operations and afterwards there is a compromise which is purely political, never based on the real situation on the ground, and never based on the necessary military means on the ground. “Hence if you are asked for 10,000, you end up with 5,000 or the contrary. This is the problem and it should be more based on the real situation on the ground and on the necessary military means. Someone referred to the Military Staff Committee which might be of help in assessing the requirements. Clearly it cannot be the five permanent members of the Security Council. I do not know if it is this Military Staff Committee or another informal group, but there are more and more meetings with political counselors and defence attachés of the missions to discuss the needs for the mission. We should follow this trend, but these political uncertainties will remain.”

Amb. Jacques Paul Klein added that in terms of data flow, when the UN went to Liberia, we were told there were 35,000 plus thugs running around with weapons from three different factions. Suddenly it increased to 80,000, 90,000, and even beyond 100,000. Now what you had were three factions, all psychopaths and killers, and we had to negotiate with them. Asked about ‘Where are your people, so we can think about disarmament, demilitarization?’ ‘I am not telling you, because if I tell you, the others will know.’ Then you go to the next one and he will give you the same story. So you are dealing with three sets of thugs, who do not want to cooperate. Finally you force them into cooperating. ‘You actually tell
Another situation faced us in relation to the NGOs. We offered to fly them saying that we can get you to anywhere in the country. We will get the medication, everything. The reply was, “We cannot fly in your helicopter because it is painted black. You are aware of that; it says ‘black, UN black’. We do not do black. We only do blue.” So the mission asked if one helicopter could be done in blue?” “Well the General Assembly says you cannot do that.” It is as if you can imagine a scenario where you are lying on the scaffold – let us say you are Michelangelo and you are painting the Sistine Chapel. You are on your back, in great pain, you have been doing this for several months and down below you, 140 feet, you hear a voice, looking up, saying, “Excuse me, do you know you are dripping paint here on the floor? And are you really a member of the painters’ union?”

Amb. Maged A. Abdelaziz suggested that the issue is the lack of coordination and lack of political agreement among members of the Council at some point. But the permanent members of the Council counts differently from the rest of the Council. If you take the example of Darfur, Resolution 1669 or 1668 was pushed hastily to the vote establishing the force. The Sudanese Government was not in agreement with the Resolution, so the force was not established for about a year and three months. We had to plead with the Sudanese to accept a new Resolution and Resolution 1706 came out. We had to push it even if the Sudanese were not going to accept and said, ‘You put one soldier on my soil, I will kill him.’ So it is as simple as that. We established the mission in Darfur with Resolution 1706 in a situation where there was a preliminary peace agreement; there were only four or five rebel movements and we were entrusted to negotiate. After two years and a half they said ‘Well, we cannot negotiate’. Now the rebels are mushrooming with 20 odd groups all over the country. We have Bassolé in Darfur, the rebel movements are about 34, and the peacekeeping mission is still the same. With no helicopters and with no capabilities to move anybody who gets sick on the ground. Finally, how much do we pay to UNAMID – 2.6 billion per year? How much do we pay in development aid to Sudan?” Mr. Ihab Moustafa informed five hundred million.

Amb. Maged A. Abdelaziz commented “so, 2.6 billion dollars to sustain a robust force of 27,000 troops on the ground. At the same time, you are not doing anything on the development side, not even digging wells. They have very limited resources to dig wells in Darfur for people to get safe drinking water on the ground. But development here is the connection and the nexus between development and peacekeeping, development and peace itself, not peacekeeping.
This is the kind of situation where the Security Council looks only into selected issues, how to protect the civilians. I have to take care of the people that are dying on the ground, so I am pushing the draft resolution and I would try to save them. We have to think about dealing with such a situation in a comprehensive way that will encompass peacekeeping, peacemaking and at the same time development in a manner that would ensure that the situations is going to improve in that region.”

A participant from the floor returned to the question about how do we know when we should transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. “Really the answer is we do not know. We can only establish benchmarks. Thus the critical issue is really not exit strategies. It is transition strategies. How do we set up the people who are doing the peacebuilding for success? What kind of authorities should they have in their mandate? To me these are the big threats that can take us back to conflict, as in Haiti and East Timor, where there is politicization of the security forces or the police, and criminalization. What authority should we be giving to the peacebuilders for them to serve as a check, some kind of accountability and transparency, in order for them to be able to blow the whistle, when things start to deteriorate again, if they do.”

Mr. Edmond Mulet commented on Jean-Marie Guéhenno’s question about the possible lack of interaction and information. Essentially, “what is really the problem? Is it a political one? Is it a military one? Why does the Security Council sometimes make these kind of decisions that sometimes are not reflecting the reality on the ground? Amb. Brahimi mentioned in his Report in 2000 that the Security Council before taking final decisions should really take them in two steps. First, consult with TCCs if the troops would be available to go on the ground. Sometimes or rather all the time, the Security Council is not doing that. The Security Council just mandates missions – “there it goes”, and without really knowing if there will be enough forces or resources in order to implement sometimes very complicated mandates. During the previous US Administrations still at the beginning of this year, there was a lot of pressure to send a UN peacekeeping mission to Somalia, pressure from Washington D.C. We did negotiate with the Security Council in order for them to have, before deciding on that, a presentation of what that meant. The Secretariat sent people to the ground, including to Mogadishu, Baidoa, Nairobi, Jibouti and all the surroundings. Based on what the experts found out, the Secretariat made a presentation to the Security Council about what a mission would mean on the ground in Mogadishu. Just after that presentation, the Secretariat sent 60 Notes verbal to 60 Member States asking them if they would be interested, in the future, if maybe there was a UN peacekeeping mission to participate in. Of those 60 Notes verbal, 15 wrote back – 15 countries wrote back! Of those 15, all of them said ‘Thank you, but no
thank you.’ So to this day, we have zero commitments from troop contributing
countries to have a UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia. If we had done that
in some other countries and missions, I wonder if we would have been present
in many places. This is related also to the political will of Member States. For
example, regarding UNIFIL in Lebanon, we have a list of countries, who want
to go to Lebanon. They want to be part of UNIFIL and we cannot receive them
all. When we ask them ‘Okay fine, thank you very much for your kind offer, but
instead of going to UNIFIL, because you are 27th on the list, could you send
your assets, your engineer units, your transportation units, your communication
units, your troops to Darfur, or to Chad, or to DRC?’ They say, ‘No, that we
cannot do. We cannot go there, because our constituencies, our parliament, our
media, public opinion, would not allow that.’ So there is a mixture of political
will, of military capabilities, of all sorts of things, and of course as we all know,
every single mission is completely different from the other. Mandates are all
different. Every single one has to be adapted to different political, historical, and
sociological circumstances.”

Amb. Jacques Paul Klein shared an experience from Liberia regarding the issue
of money and funding. “You suddenly realize, as an SRSG, you do not have
any walking-around money, which you desperately need. A little bit of road
construction, a little bit of bridge building, a little bit of this and that, and it
is not there! So you do pledging campaigns. Expectations are rising in Liberia
especially after a pledging conference. Coming back to Liberia, the people is
asking ‘Where is the money?’ when one has to tell them ‘No, the UN did not
get that money. That is bilateral donor money used by national agencies and so
on. When one goes back to countrie that pledged money and ask about what
happened to their 480,000? The answer is often ‘The potato crop failed. The
greenhouse caved in, the tomatoes did not ripen.’ There is always an excuse
about why it did not happen. A lot of countries, I found pledged without ever
having any intention of paying. For Liberia we should have done two things.
We should have had the peacekeeping mission. And then parallel to that, we
should have been planning the development mission and you cannot do the
development stuff until you have people disarmed. People do not understand
that. There has to be a safe and secure environment so you can move and then
plan the development program.”

Amb. Sylvie-Agnès Bermann proposed that for a fourth generation peace operation
it is easier, when it is what Madeleine Albright used to call CNN wars, such as
the one in Lebanon. Everybody was seeing the war on screens and was ready to
go. However, one year before, when we said there is a dangerous situation, the
situation is very fragile, nobody was interested in Lebanon. This is the reality.
Mr. Edmond Mulet concluded the panel discussion by thanking the distinguished members of the panel for their participation, and the participants for their questions and comments, as well as the organizers. “The Challenges Forum is always such a productive event and we learn so much from what is going on here. Thank you.”

Concluding Remarks of Day 1

Ms. Annika Hilding Norberg, International Coordinator, Challenges Forum

First of all I would like to thank our excellent facilitators, keynote speakers, the panelists and the participants for a very rich and fruitful discussion. Earlier we heard our Senior Advisor General Nambiar facilitating the second session. Now I have the privilege and pleasure to introduce Major General Robert Gordon, who is also our Senior Adviser. We have asked General Gordon to share some concluding remarks and reflections on the discussions today.

Maj.Gen. Robert Gordon, Senior Adviser, Challenges Forum / Former Force Commander UNMEE

How do we pull the threads from today’s discussion together? The trouble in trying to conclude a day like today is that it is a very subjective process – subjective because one tends to note down the issues that interests oneself, which may not necessarily interest others. What I am therefore going to try and do is to offer some reflections upon what we have heard today for the benefit of the Challenges Partnership, as they are the ones we want to be able to take away some of these lessons. Of course, we will get all the papers and subsequent transcripts of the presentations, so I will not try to summarize them.

The entire day has been a modular process. It has been a process of excellent papers that we have read, followed by some outstandingly good presentations, and then your questions. We have had many speakers and if words digested were protein, we would all need some surgery because we would be very tubby indeed!

We have covered much good ground starting from the context set by the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations, which focused on the increased liability for peace operations and the problems of maintaining their quality. We heard that these two issues are not necessarily working in close conjunction. Most significantly, we discussed the challenges of the increase in rule of law mandates and finally the theme, that has been constant throughout the whole day, that all challenges are political.
Session I built on the New Horizon work and issues which were discussed in Ms. Fatemeh Ziai’s background study. I do just want to highlight the four priorities laid out by Mr. Le Roy: the policy development that is going on in DPKO with all the work that is needed on those issues, such as robust peacekeeping and protection of civilians; the capability development line of activity; the field support strategy that Ms. Malcorra spoke about so forcibly; and the concept of the improved mechanisms of dialogue with TCCs, especially between the Secretariat and TCCs.

Those four priorities are absolutely the business of the Challenges Partnership. What we need to do as Partners is identify how we can help that process. Ms. Ziai’s paper has already given us some indications on this. The most immediate time we can help is when the Secretary-General’s Report goes to the UN Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations in February. Let us try and support that process to achieve the collective goal of the Secretariat in dealing with the challenges we are all facing in this difficult environment of complex peacekeeping in the contemporary world.

Secondly, we have heard much on the physical components of peacekeeping in the first session, but we have heard perhaps too little on the moral component of peacekeeping. All practitioners in peacekeeping would agree with me that these issues of leadership, of personnel management and staffing, and the moral issues that they throw up are absolutely fundamental. I do not really have a comfortable feeling today that these issues are being fully addressed. If they are, we did not get much insight into how, and I think as Partners we need to keep our attention on these issues of good leadership and good personnel management in our missions because people are fundamental. The human resource dimension is absolutely central for our success. The political will to look after our people, which is part of the moral component, is a constant theme without which all the physical components that we have discussed today will be of no use whatsoever.

In Session II, the early peacebuilding session, it is probably worth noting the core functions of peace operations as articulated in the Capstone Doctrine. The discussion today was very much enshrined in what is clearly articulated in the Capstone Doctrine. The Capstone Doctrine was the Secretariat’s attempt to try and capture some of these issues and provide that coherent and coordinated framework for all in-country activity. If we could keep those core functions in mind, I think that will help us get through some of this quite difficult terrain.

In this Session II, we also spoke about the burgeoning need and liability for rule of law mechanisms, a liability that we do not fully meet either as Member States or within the Secretariat. Currently the Secretariat seems under-resourced in dealing with these issues and the emerging concepts of rule of law. Partners therefore
could help in articulating concepts and looking at all those issues which come under the concept of the rule of law. This is an issue that we Partners have been discussing in our meetings during the last three days, about how we can support this process including the issues like supporting a rapidly deployable rule of law capability. We have built up a deployable police capability, but clearly there is an outstanding liability here for a civilian-based capability in terms of justice and corrections, which we can, as Partners, help articulate and meet.

The whole issue of partnering the host nation with quality police, and the dynamics between quality and quantity was particularly well-addressed. How can we help the host nation tackle those law and order questions which lie at the heart of issues of good governance, which in turn are at the heart of peacekeeping? We had a very good session on organized crime. Organized crime has the danger and potential of becoming yet another task in a mandate as has been suggested by several participants from the floor. But when we think of that staggering figure of 15 percent of the global economy being involved in organized crime, the question arises; how will we manage that, how will we plan for it in missions, and how will we integrate the requirements for that within missions? That will be a challenge for all those having to deal with these issues under a rule of law mandate. It is something that the Partners may which to consider for their future work.

Session III focused on mandate making and implementation of mandates. Sometimes we are up in the stratosphere on issues that are difficult for Partners to deal with, except by lobbying through their own Member States. Basically, at the heart of it, is this paradigm shift from inter- to intrastate conflict and how we, in the international community, actually deal with this paradigm shift, and the Security Council’s response to it. Increasing concerns from the Security Council are not just about immediate security issues, but about those long-term state-building issues which ultimately affect security.

In my view, this is quite right, because unless the Security Council starts looking at the issues which lie at the heart of conflict, the causes of conflict, we will continue to deal with the mere symptoms of conflict. Looking at how you deal with the root causes of conflict inevitably brings us back to issues which might be called state-building, they might be called governance, or rule of law, but actually together are the centerpiece of our peacekeeping missions.

I think we all feel that we did not have consensus amongst speakers on this. All that means is that there needs to be a deeper conversation on these issues, because there is clearly not a consensus that peacekeeping should be involved in the foundations of peacebuilding, foundations which will in due course be taken on by other organizations after a transitional period. We discussed some of the issues
of how you benchmark transitions, when is peacekeeping done, and when does peacebuilding begin, how much peacebuilding should we be doing, how much state-building should we be doing? I think it helps just to think that anything we are doing is designed to try to get at the root causes of conflict acknowledging that traditional peacekeeping initiatives alone cannot get at these root causes.

It is rough and complex terrain out there and guidance is clearly needed. The Capstone Doctrine guidance is helpful in some of this and in the articulation of those fundamental peacekeeping principles and how they have changed alongside those additional factors such as legitimacy, credibility and national and local ownership which together contribute to success. We heard, time and time again, the principle of national ownership. We heard time and again, the principles of legitimacy and credibility. All is very helpful for getting us through this difficult terrain. If we could take to heart what Jacques Klein said about those five prerequisites, we would be able to cover some distance.

Concluding and to pick up on what one speaker said, peacekeeping is a huge investment. And as Mr. Guéhenno put it, peace is fragile. We cannot afford to let that fragile peace and that huge investment be spoiled by insufficient attention on this developing but critical nexus between peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

Lastly, in terms of the conceptualization of the considerations for mission leaders in UN peacekeeping operations which the Partners are currently working on, after today’s session we should all be clear that this conceptualization of what needs to be undertaken in terms of the nexus between peacekeeping and peacebuilding has become better focused and much more evident. This will help our work. Meanwhile I would like to thank all the speakers and the panelists for a really smashing session today where we have covered a lot of ground and we look forward to more of that ground being covered tomorrow. Thank you.

Ms. Annika Hilding Norberg, International Coordinator, Challenges Forum

Thank you very much, General, for those concluding remarks on a very rich day. Before closing, I would also like to welcome General Anis Bajwa, who has just joined us. Given your very long expertise in the peacekeeping field, we look forward to your active contribution to our proceedings over the next few days. Thank you.
Chapter 6

Enhancing and Facilitating the Partnerships with TCCs and PCCs

Focus: How can member states’ military and police perspectives be better integrated into the mandate-making and planning process? How can the sense of partnership in and ownership of UN peacekeeping be enhanced?

Facilitator: Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, Director, Policy, Evaluation and Training, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

This year we have been making very thorough and considerable efforts to improve the functioning of the partnerships between the UN and TCCs and PCCs. In a way, we have managed to generate a momentum for a renewed global partnership. Some of the efforts include the French-UK initiative in the Security Council, and the Security Council open debates under the French, Turkish and UK presidencies. The Security Council Working Group under the chairmanship of Japan, as well as the Canadian Seminar Series have also contributed, as has President Obama’s recent meetings with top TCCs. These are all examples of renewed efforts to revitalize the peacekeeping global partnership.

The central theme of this session is how to further strengthen consultation and cooperation between the Security Council and those who contribute to peacekeeping operations, in particular TCCs and PCCs. This is not a new challenge. Security Council Resolution 1353 has already set out elements to enhance the consultation amongst those actors. What is needed for this special global partnership to tackle the ever more complex peacekeeping challenges, is for all of us involved to look closer at our collective commitments to security and peace. To this end, the Secretariat on our part started the New Horizon process and in October, the two USGs, Peacekeeping Operations together with Field Support, issued a directive to all staff, both in the headquarters and in the field, to address some of the key issues related to improving our consultations and cooperation with the TCCs and PCCs, especially in the context of the mandate renewals of UNIFIL, UNMIL, and MINUSTAH, and the implementation of the new practices of the New Horizon process. The forthcoming mandate renewal of MONUC in December is a very important milestone in that process.
Finally, supporting and assisting some of the new and emerging TCCs and PCCs is a very important priority identified in the New Horizon process. I will therefore welcome your views on how the international community can jointly improve its efforts in developing peacekeeping capabilities for today, and also for the future, with a view to broadening the base of peacekeeping contributions.

Ms. Fatemeh Ziai, Research Adviser, Challenges Forum / On leave from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

Good morning. It is a pleasure to be here this morning and a privilege to have worked with the Challenges Forum over the last few months to prepare the two papers that I will be presenting this morning.

The papers were intended to pick up on some of the important themes of the New Horizon non-paper, and they were based on interviews conducted primarily in New York in August and September. The first paper is on the issue of consultations among troop contributors, the Security Council, and the Secretariat. This issue goes back to the 1990s and possibly even further back to a time when there were no formal consultation structures in place. It was a time of proliferation for large peacekeeping operations, when troop contributing countries were being asked to do all kinds of very difficult things. The T/PCCs began to object, drawing attention to the fact that: ‘There is something not quite right here and we really need to have closer consultations with the Security Council which is making decisions that then have an enormous impact on us.’ As a result, a number of initiatives, discussions, and debates took shape and several Resolutions and Presidential Statements were issued which gradually established formal mechanisms for consultation. The results of which can be seen today when the Security Council regularly has public and private meetings with troop contributing countries, as well as with the Secretariat and the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations.

Going through all of the documents related to the development of these mechanisms, the reform efforts, on paper, appear to be very successful. All the key issues are covered. But the feeling among troop contributing countries was that these partnership mechanisms have never really been implemented. Moving into this year, a feeling has been building up that Security Council mandates are increasingly unclear, and unachievable. Contrary to what the Brahimi Report called for, the mandates have become a case of laundry lists of various tasks that are just appended to each other. This is particularly true when it comes to robust mandates, and the protection of civilians mandates. T/PCCs felt that there was not enough awareness on the part of the Security Council of the operating environment on the ground, and the limited resources available to carry out the
ambitious mandates. Or at least, these aspects were not taken adequately into consideration. In sum, what was said was that: ‘We are the ones who are on the ground and we see the conditions. We are aware of the risks and we are the ones who are in harm’s way and yet, we are not being consulted. What is really needed before mandates are adopted, before mandates are extended, and when there are new developments that require change in a mandate, is a dialogue so that some sort of consensus can be achieved on the major components of the mandate to the extent that they are going to impact our actions on the ground’.

Another thing that was pointed out by several T/PCCs was that there may well be times when the Security Council does not have any, or many, T/PCCs on it. Hence some sort of a reality check is needed from those who are actually going to be carrying out this work on the ground. The series of events in Congo last year, particularly bring to the fore some of the bitterness that this situation has created amongst at least some T/PCCs. In this particular case, the problem was that while the contingents on the ground were informed about the changes that the Council made in MONUC’s rules of engagement, these changes were not communicated to the governments of the countries which provided troops until after the changes had been authorized.

What is clear in all of this, is that there is no one unified position on any of these issues on either side, neither on the UN nor the T/PCCs side. Generally, most T/PCCs feel that more consultation would be a good thing but they are more or less preoccupied by the issue, and the motivations and goals behind pushing it forward are different from case to case. This is something that is important to keep in mind. This being said, the overall message from the T/PCCs was, ‘Do not assume we are just going to automatically send troops if you continue not to consult us.’ There was also a concern about the fact that although consultations are now regularly taking place, the meetings tend to be just a formality, which take place very late in the day. In other words, the Council meets to adopt a Resolution, and only very shortly before doing so are the T/PCCs invited for discussions. Clearly the message that T/PCCs take from this is, ‘You are not really consulting us. You are briefing us on what you are about to do in 30 minutes, and you are not really looking for our feedback. You are not looking for our concerns to feed into your decisions.’ This has left many of the T/PCCs with the feeling that there really is no point in participating actively in those consultations.

The T/PCCs also directed a fair amount of criticism against the Secretariat. While everybody consulted said that they understand that the Secretariat is overstretched and does not have the resources, they nevertheless felt that the Secretariat did not consult them with a view to dialogue but rather out of obligation. When these briefings and meetings with T/PCCs take place the focus is not adequately clear
in advance. The T/PCCs are not informed of whether political issues are going to be discussed, or whether they are going to be briefed on something, or whether they are going to be asked for input for which they will have to to consult their capitals in advance. Thus the T/PCCs found that there was a need for a shift in the institutional culture and quite frankly, I believe that there was a feeling of disrespect.

On the other hand, the Security Council, the organ with the primary responsibility for international peace and security, and particularly its permanent members, are understandably wary of having different actors, be they T/PCCs or anybody else, encroach on what they consider their decision-making prerogative. Moreover, the permanent members of the Council shared the feelings of the T/PCCs with regards to the challenge of an inclusive decision-making process. However, their understanding of the problem was that it is the T/PCCs that are not making adequate use of the existing mechanisms. It is not good enough to address the ineffective participation mechanisms by simply refraining from participating. The problem must therefore be elsewhere. In other words, there is reason to ask why do they not participate or why do they not come well-prepared? Why do they not ask more questions about the issues raised during the consultations, and why are the questions that are asked often of a more technical grass-root nature than addressing some of the more strategic or important operational concerns? Are T/PCCs regularly consulting adequately with their capitals throughout the lifecycle of the missions, or are they limiting their participation to meetings on the issues that are of particular importance to their specific country? Are the T/PCCs receiving enough information from their contingents in the field, as to what the important issues are and which concerns should be raised with the Council?

Another issue that also came up in the discussions with the Security Council is that the permanent members seem somewhat less hesitant about consulting T/PCCs prior to the adoption of mandates and the deployment of troops. The reason being that the discussions provide them with an important opportunity to appreciate, which countries might be interested in contributing and funding the operation. But the matter becomes more complex after the mandate has been adopted and the troops have been deployed, when the T/PCCs are asking for not only a say in how the mandate should be implemented, but also in the details of the mandate renewal and potentially also its termination. The Council thus finds itself having to balance authority with effectiveness, because having the T/PCCs on the ground refusing to implement mandates, or significantly deviating from them, seriously undermines the credibility of the Council. Underlying all of this is the awareness that the demand for troops is far larger than the supply. Hence, there are crucial discussions here that have to be held, and key compromises that have to be made.
Important changes have taken place this year. Concerns have not only been raised but they have also been addressed. In addition, as previously mentioned by Izumi, there has been an increased focus on peacekeeping. With thematic debates, the UK/France initiative, Turkey’s hosting of a Security Council debate, the Canadian series of discussions, as well as the revitalization of the Working Group on Peacekeeping, the stakeholders agreed that the discussions and the dialogues have qualitatively improved, and become more interactive. Thus there was a general consensus among the T/PCCs, that their voices are finally being heard and that the Council has grown quite serious about addressing their concerns. This trend began in August under the UK Presidency, when a number of important changes were made in the way in which the consultations were held, including the establishment of early briefings with T/PCCs. The initiative was picked up by the US Presidency in September and since then, several consultations have been held on different missions. In some cases the outcome has been high quality dialogue, and in others, it has been more a case of people getting used to the new system, which will probably be subject to more changes with the MONUC discussion, and hopefully beyond.

The New Horizon paper puts forward a number of very important recommendations that get to the core of some of the issues that need to be addressed for T/PCCs, the Security Council and the Secretariat, to operate together. Since the non-paper was released, a number of steps have been taken in terms of how briefings and consultations are carried out. There is a clear commitment among the Member States to the discussions about some of the underlying issues of these problems, and the Secretariat is very serious about moving the New Horizon process forward.

What all the parties involved seem to agree on is that there is not a need for new mechanisms. Rather all the mechanisms for consultation, collaboration and streamlining that already exist have to be used more effectively. To this end there are a couple of issues that need to be worked on in the coming period. The events in the Congo in late 2008 were a wake-up call for all peacekeeping parties and actors. The Security Council demanded more oversight over peacekeeping operations and a better sense of the Secretariat’s activities; in other words, for a closer involvement in the mission planning. But at the same time, T/PCCs were also increasingly demanding to be more involved. Hence all in all, the events in Congo made it clear that mission planning has to become more inclusive.

The New Horizon report makes a quite clear recommendation for DPKO and DFS to review and strengthen the mechanisms for inclusive planning for robust operations, ensuring that T/PCCs are not only consulted, but also that they understand their tasks and the rules of engagement. As such, the challenge for the Secretariat is how to balance this clear need for inclusiveness, with the need for the Secretariat to remain impartial and act with efficiency, while preserving a unified
command and control of the UN. These are very important considerations which the Challenges Partnerships can help the Secretariat, the Security Council and T/PCCs make by providing them with a dialogue on some of these issues.

Another item of the New Horizon report, which has also received support from all peacekeeping parties and actors concerns the ad hoc groups, the informal coalitions or groups of friends that exist for certain missions. Haiti and Timor-Leste are repeatedly referred to as two effective ones which made the missions more inclusive of especially the T/PCCs. The two groups have been involved in drafting and even defending Resolutions, and their opinions have influenced Council decisions in a positive way. The support of the T/PCCs for the Resolutions has made them stronger. But there are still key missions, such as Sudan and the DRC, which do not benefit from these informal coalitions. This is something which the Security Council, the Secretariat and the Member States need to address, possibly together with the Working Group on Peacekeeping under the chairmanship of Japan to reinforce the process. There are also cases like Darfur where there is a group of friends, but T/PCCs are not included in it, because it originated from a different focus. Thus the discussions about the ad hoc groups should also identify the key missions that might benefit from having the opportunity for T/PCC involvement beyond informal consultations.

Furthermore, there is the question about how the quality of dialogue with T/PCCs can be improved? Throughout the peacekeeping community, it was emphasized that the TCC/PCC representatives who attend the consultations either have to be adequately senior or really on top of the dossier in order to be effective advocates for their concerns. There was concern that often when a military person attended the meetings, they were not sufficiently briefed on the political aspects and vice versa. As such, it is key that the representatives, who attend the consultations, have an integrated understanding of the issues at stake, but more importantly, they have a clear channel of communication with their capitals on an ongoing as supposed to a reactionary basis. Thus the quality of the dialogue greatly improves if the permanent missions receive regular feeding from their capitals, as well as from their commanders in the field, to ensure that all concerns are covered.

Thus far, the Working Group on Peacekeeping has received wide appreciation from the peacekeeping community. It has been of great assistance. But perhaps it could, in the coming period, develop a more focused agenda around a few issues, concentrating on a set of concrete, achievable objectives rather than addressing the whole gamut of challenges. One of these issues could be informal coalitions.

To conclude on the subject of more inclusive mandate making, it is very important to note that there has been significant progress this year in terms of an environment
of consensus. It is clear that participation of T/PCCs in one way or another is crucial and that it will make peacekeeping better. There is clearly a commitment to keeping this progress in motion, both on the part of the Council, the Secretariat and T/PCCs, building on what has been achieved so far this year.

Turning briefly to the second paper and an issue that is also quite prominent in the New Horizon, let us consider a bit more closely, the need for expanding the base of contributors to UN peacekeeping. There is no doubt that there is a demand for peacekeeping and that it is likely to continue to grow. At the same time however, the peacekeeping supply, the capabilities and resources, are shrinking. Many are trying to share the same amount of limited resources, and in addition many of the specific capabilities that are required are simply not available at all, or at least not in large numbers. Thus the UN is struggling to generate the capabilities to operate peacekeeping operations of the scale that it is mandated and expected to do. In late August, early September approximately 60 percent of the 116 T/PCC came from only 10 countries which are all developing countries. In other words, rather than a global representation indicative of a true international effort, there is a remarkable reliance on a small number of countries to provide the majority of peacekeeping capabilities and they are all developing countries.

Hence, the UN clearly needs to be able to identify more resources. Some countries that are already providing troops but on a small scale may be further tapped into for more resources. It might also be possible for the UN to find ways in which to provide incentives to bring the countries that have left peacekeeping back on board.

The paper identifies six challenges for the expansion of the troop contribution base. One of these is a very proactive and targeted outreach to Member States, whereby strategies are tailored for the different kinds of contribution bases that are involved. What is key across all types of contributions is for the outreach to be of a political nature. At the moment, these matters are treated as somewhat of a technical exercise at the UN. It is not enough for the UN to have occasional consultations with political actors. Providing troops and police is, for Member States, a highly political matter and this has to be directly addressed. As there is already a lot of thinking and work dedicated to this issue there is no need for new propositions. All that is needed is to stress the issue, and to underline that it has to be addressed with a strategic and integrated focus.

Second, the general understanding among TCCs is that the force generation service and the police division are doing quite a lot. They truly are there to serve, but procedures nevertheless, need to streamline what is currently predominantly achieved through informal communication. There is a mass of information out
there that can sometimes overwhelm Member States. What is needed are materials that clearly target new TCCs who are not familiar with the system, or countries that need more information about how they go about expanding their contributions. Basic information should be available for the Member States to obtain at any given time, which can then be followed by targeted briefings. Another mechanism that was continuously referred to both by T/PCCs and the Secretariat, was assessment visits to current and potential contributors, to evaluate their current capabilities. Since these issues are very technical there is a need to go beyond discussions in New York. In order to have a meaningful discussion the UN has to get out there to see what the actual capabilities are. But these visits cost money and at the moment, they are not budgeted as a priority. Hence both Member States and the Secretariat need to think about how to make these visits a more prominent part of the process.

A large part of the support to UN peacekeeping comes from bilateral and regional partnerships, whereby countries that may not themselves provide troops or police, are supporting other countries that are. At the moment, these arrangements are made in a very ad hoc manner. The countries with the resources are not necessarily training or providing capacity building support to the people who deploy to peacekeeping operations. As such there is a need to bring together the vast amounts of money and the large efforts that many countries are investing in training. The question is however, is this possible and is it actually a good idea to set-up a coordination mechanism under the UN? If so, this requires resources because it will not be possible under the existing staffing situation. Or are there existing mechanisms, such as the G8 plus or others, which could be expanded to cover also this area? Would such arrangements be more likely to provide more structured cooperation as opposed to a general information-sharing platform, that could render the bilateral and regional partnerships efforts much more targeted and effective?

Finally, when it comes to mission planning there are several issues that need to be addressed such as: command and control in robust operations, operational standards for personnel in peacekeeping operations and several others that were mentioned in the New Horizon non-paper. Moreover, issues linked with contingent-owned equipment, standards, and possible changes or modifications need dialogue. Thus, there are a number of issues that straddle the two topics that I have mentioned, and where serious dialogue between Member States and the Secretariat, and in the case of the former also the Security Council, would really help to make progress. Again, this is an area which the Challenges Partnership is in a particular good position to help the Secretariat and Member States address. Thank you.

Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu thanked Ms. Fatemeh Ziai for an extremely thorough and comprehensive presentation. She said that she had raised a lot of very important
issues and she was particularly pleased that Ms. Ziai had hit on some of the issues that they were now grappling with in the DPKO, while developing their internal thinking. There was a very clear distinction between the legislative functions and the executive functions, where the Secretariat would retain the executive functions, (which was very different from some of the other peace support operations run by, for example NATO or the European Union.) The question was how can the current setup retain its very unique and important executive functions but at the same time involve the contributing countries to satisfy their needs for certain kinds of information necessary for them to perform well on the ground as TCCs and PCCs. So there was a challenge in terms of finding the right balance in those different kinds of requirements in UN peacekeeping.

Ms Nakamitsu also raised the issue of informal coalitions and said it was very good to know that in some countries – Haiti and Timor – the coalition framework worked very well. When drafting the New Horizon non-paper, she said that they were fully aware that the term “coalition” might be taken as a controversial word, but was put there because it was felt that this was perhaps one of the ways that a stronger partnership with the TCCs and Security Council could be found. These were the issues on which the Secretariat was trying to develop its internal thinking and in that process, the views and the concerns – the Forum’s input – would be very important, very helpful, for the developmental work as well.

She then introduced the next speaker as His Excellency, Ambassador Takasu from Japan, who was currently chairing the Working Group of the Peacekeeping Operations of the Security Council. The Working Group had been meeting very intensely and there were three more meetings before the end of the year.

H.E. Mr. Yukio Takasu, Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations and Chairman of the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations

Thank you very much. Following the Security Council’s reactivation of its Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, three meetings were held with major stakeholders, including T/PCCs, during the first six months of this year to listen to their main preoccupations and concerns, as well as their expectations from the Security Council. In the process, we involved the Secretariat very closely.

Before going into the specifics of the results so far and plans for the future of the Security Council Working Group, I would like to say something more general based on my observation of the history of UN peacekeeping operations compared with some other operations in other parts of the world. In other words, I will be
talking about the responsibility of the Secretary-General, and the responsibility of the Member States and theSecurity Council. I will reflect on my experience while I was in the Secretariat in the early 1990s, when the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations was created, and I was closely involved in that process. It was an extremely difficult period after the end of the Cold War. People just jumped into peacekeeping – “Now is the time for UN peacekeeping operations”! It was also encouraging to see US involvement in peacekeeping at the early time of the Clinton Administration.

Then Somalia and Rwanda happened, while I was in the Secretariat. I remember TCCs wanted to stay there and asked for more troops, but the Security Council did not agree, and I think we know why. 1993–1994 were crucial years in the UN history, and 1995 was particularly difficult.

The Brahimi Report was released at a turning point for UN peacekeeping. In my opinion, 2009 is again, another turning point. It is a challenge, but not a crisis like the one in the 1990s. We have learned great lessons, and we know that T/PCCs need the political support of key countries. Today, more than 100 countries are participating in UN peacekeeping. Our partnerships with TCCs are extremely important, but at the same time it has to be properly managed. Because it is not only troops, equipment, assets, and financial resources that are important, but what is equally essential is the political support for a mission and its contributors.

To build confidence there are operational difficulties that have to be overcome. To this end, some initiatives are already underway namely: the New Horizon non-paper, the study on the protection of civilians, and the Security Council’s efforts to bridge a few gaps to improve the overall situation of UN peacekeeping. Based on my experience in UN peacekeeping since the early 1990s, these efforts need to focus on tackling two main issues.

The first issue is the failure of the UN to respond properly and effectively to protect civilians in the DRC and Darfur. We need to think about a better way to do things. The second issue is the expansion of missions, particularly of mandates, to include very complex and demanding tasks notably, the protection of civilians. When the Brahimi Report was first prepared, this was not an issue but much has changed since then. Eight out of fifteen peacekeeping operations are currently mandated to protect civilians. Translating these mandates, and making this concept operational is very complicated. In the DRC it caused changes in the rules of engagement without having consulted the TCCs on the ground, which is clearly not acceptable. The current troop requirements are also different from traditional peacekeeping. They demand new partners and partnerships as well as the strengthening of the present ones, and capacities such as utility helicopters and logistic units have to be
mobilized. This is the major operational problem that we have to do something about.

To address these challenges, the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, based on a series of meetings with TCCs and other stakeholders, has identified a number of specific issues and areas on which to focus during the next few months. In addition, an interim report was produced before the summer on how to strengthen partnerships with TCCs, PCCs, and other stakeholders. Last week, the Group met again to decide on how to organize its work program. It was agreed that another three sessions will be held this year, and that in the first two sessions, a wide group of experts will be invited, including from regional organizations and some of the host countries. Many raised an interest in joining the Working Group, particularly five non-permanent members who raised their interest in being involved in the formulation of recommendations after they are set to leave the Security Council.

The Working Group agreed that its efforts will focus on three issues. The first issue is the mechanism of consultation which has already been addressed by the Security Council, the Secretariat, and more specifically by the New Horizon process consciously making efforts to involve T/PCCs.

The second issue on the agenda is the implementation stage of the mandate. The aim is to explore ways in which to improve gaps in mandate and implementation by involving the TCCs and the countries in a better way, especially with regards to the protection of civilians. The third issue is the provision of support to T/PCCs to broaden their capacities with especially pre-deployment training, but also through capacity-building and the mobilization of critical assets in response to, for example, acute shortages of utility helicopters.

There are already wide ranges of mechanisms available. While some improvements have been made more needs to be done. However, this does not mean reinventing new wheels, but to make use of the existing mechanisms, and to ensure that the T/PCCs and other partners are involved before the formulation of mandates. Informal and more interactive consultation are a necessity between the T/PCCs, the Secretariat and the key members of the Security Council. It is totally unjustified to have a pro forma meeting with T/PCCs only to provide them with information, and then proceed to business as planned. The problem is not addressed in a way that the T/PCCs have been hoping for. The responsibility or prerogative of each player has to be recognized, whether it is the Security Council or the TCCs. The issue has to be addressed as a necessity, rather than how to please certain actors in the process.

Further, we need to look at how to establish informal channels and mechanisms of consultations. In Timor-Leste, I was personally involved in the creation of a
core group of countries in support. When countries are deeply involved in some regional issues, sitting in the Security Council as a non-permanent member or as a permanent member, the linkage between Security Council, the TCCs or the regional countries is basically respected. But when that deep involvement does not exist, or is not enough, there needs to be a group of countries to support the decision-making process in the Security Council and also give guidance to the Secretariat. Thus, I made a proposal to create a core group of countries and the key members of Security Council to Timor-Leste, when Japan was leading the Security Council. It was extremely useful. Every time there was a need to review the mandate, this core group met and prepared recommendations for the Council, which were always very helpful and the mechanism proved very productive. The case of Haiti, and the Friends of Haiti Group is a very similar group. The Working Group is going to discuss these models in detail to address the issue of consultations. However, it is important to remember that one mechanism may not be equally effective in all missions and in different situations, such as the very large missions for example in Sudan and Darfur. But discussions can lead to suitable solutions.

Lastly, on the issue of supporting T/PCCs, this involves a partnership between the Security Council and the General Assembly, namely the UN Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations (C-34). As this partnership will need substantial input, key members of the C-34 will be invited to the Working Group’s next meeting.

Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu thanked and commented on Ambassador Takasu’s presentation agreeing that the informal and interactive nature of the consultation and dialogue was a very important one. She also commented on the referral to the link with the C-34. She said that one of the most encouraging things in recent weeks was when she briefed the C-34 on the progress on New Horizon implementation. There were several delegations that took the floor and also mentioned that importance of the informal and interactive nature of a dialogue. Some of the countries said that between now and the formal opening of the C-34 next February, let us intensify and deepen our substantive discussions and dialogues so that the differences will be resolved before the formal session starts. The same spirit was also now within the C-34, which is an extremely encouraging development in recent weeks.

The next speaker introduced was Brigadier-General Muhammed Feyyaz from the National Defence University of Pakistan. “Pakistan is one of the most important countries for us, an important TCC. Not just because Pakistan contributes so many people in peacekeeping, but because of your large expertise, experience, and knowledge in peacekeeping. I was recently very impressed by the inputs, and insights of Pakistani field commanders, participating in capability development in UN peacekeeping recently”.

198
Very good morning, Ladies and Gentlemen. Integration of military and policy perspectives into the mandate-making and planning process is an important imperative for successful conduct of peacekeeping operations. I have predicated my brief discourse on three questions. Why is integration essential? Where are we? And what are the very barriers towards optimal integration, and how can we remove these barriers and enhance integration?

To answer the question of why integration is essential, we first of all, have to understand what integration is. In the military perspective, there are generally two notions of integration; jointness and integration. Jointness is essentially a function whereby synergy of outputs is achieved to secure the objectives. But the notion of integration goes much deeper into the realm of psychological spheres, which means it is developed on the basis of mutual respect and understanding of feature restraints, limitations, and so on. Thus integration is more essential, specifically, in an environment which is fraught with many challenges, fluidities, and where the lives of people and their properties are at stake.

Then robust mandates, as these are becoming increasingly frequent, require the troop contributing countries’ political will to participate. Why? Because, they will also need to operate robustly. This is why this particular dimension of integration becomes that much more relevant. The political or mandate-making level is essential. The mandates essentially imply, at times, the extension of the host state’s authority. Especially in the instances where the protection of civilians is required as this is not merely a function of security. It has a very strong political flavor. Consequently integration is required. Likewise, TCCs can enhance readiness to deploy if they are part of the discussion from the very outset and throughout the UN Security Council’s and Secretariat’s process for authorizing a mission. Any engagement of TCCs will accordingly facilitate planning and force generation at their respective ends. More importantly, continued consultation with TCCs can help avoid duplication of resources and will result in an economy of effort and timeliness in lining up the force structure required for the execution of contemplated missions.

With regard to the barriers, a lot of ground has been covered in the last ten years. Nevertheless, there is always room and space for improvement. Thus I shall briefly touch upon a few of the barriers in terms of notional or structural barriers, that I and a number of colleagues, here and elsewhere, have identified.

There are countries in the Security Council, particularly the permanent five members, who have greater political clout than the TCCs. This leaves the troop-contributing
countries without much space for their voices to be heard in the mandate-making. This has obvious ramifications for the execution of the missions. Similarly, the UN Security Council consults TCCs as warranted by a situation or whenever they deem it appropriate. Since this mechanism fluctuates on an ad hoc-basis according to the will of the Security Council, it is not institutionalized as it currently stands.

There is a lack of understanding, most especially, among the staff and even the political hierarchies of the United Nations, including among people in the Secretariat. This might not be visible to them, but it is to the troops or to the commanders, who are actually deployed on the ground. Likewise there is now regrettably a gradual increase in the tainted image of the United Nations. One rarely hears about the violence inflicted by terrorists or militants on United Nations offices or installations. Only recently, there were two visible examples, even though the violence which occurred in Kabul and in Islamabad has not received much attention at UN headquarters. This has led people around the world to gradually become suspect of the very credibility and legitimacy of the United Nations. Obviously, this has a lot of ramifications and implications for United Nations' missions. The decision-making in the UN Security Council is generally viewed or perceived as based on political reasons rather than on the dictates of the ground. Here it is worth noting what Amb. Klein mentioned while describing how the force structure promised to him decreased from an initial 20,000 troops to 10,000, to eventually 5,000, because those who were making the decisions were divorced from the ground realities.

The decision-making is also very discreet without involvement of even UN organs such as UN military committees. In addition, there are very mundane issues that create friction. Someone wants to use this TCC, while someone else wants to use that PCC. Those are frictions that become barriers which can easily be removed by simply developing a consensus whereby we are in a position to develop a mutual understanding. Then there is a lack of concern with regard to the protection of civilians. My guarded assessment is that a section of countries around the world are suspecting a device or an instrument of machination whereby certain countries are creating a pretext for intervention in developing countries to address security situations that are created due to the turmoil of interested parties elsewhere. Why has this suspicion arisen when we are all working together and we always talk so much about the collective good to achieve or establish peace around the world? These are also concerns and barriers that have created friction and that can be removed if there is no real politics actually in play. In other words, we have to move beyond national interest.

How can integration be enhanced both in the formal and informal spheres? In the informal spheres, a lot of work is under way judging from the discourse. The
Security Council and Secretariat’s meetings with potential TCCs for particular missions are an informal forum, as is the TCCs’ engagement at the political and technical levels with the Office of Operations, the military advisors, the Security Council, the Secretariat and military committees. Thus while the UN should be dealing with senior hierarchies present in the permanent missions primarily represented by the military advisors, interaction should also be undertaken at the political level to bring the national capitals into the loop of understanding the dynamics behind the particular mandate-making processes. Frequent visits by senior DPKO officials to national capitals should not be an exception. Rather, it should become a rule in order to bridge several misunderstandings or gaps in communication. Information-sharing with the TCCs about likely missions, the environment, challenges and so on is also a possible means in the informal realm that can enhance integration.

When it comes to formal instruments, a military committee and the Security Council’s Working Group do exist for consultation but they need to be institutionalized as formal forums for discussions. Likewise consultations should go beyond planning to also include the permanent representative of the TCCs’ during the mandate-making. Without the consent of TCCs, it will be very difficult to translate mandates into actionable tasks. Countries do not want to expose their soldiers to harm if their concerns are not addressed. Real integration is required, especially in the area of robust peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions right from the analysis stage. TCCs may accompany technical assessment teams. Since the hierarchies within the United Nations will make it difficult at the planning stage to decide which particular country shall subsequently be selected to participate, a mechanism can be explored whereby participation takes place on a rotational basis.

What dividend will the TCCs’ participation provide? The assessment will become more objective and it will include dictates and dynamics which will reveal the facts and figures of the ground situation. It has often been said that at times the assessments provided by DPKO are what the Security Council members want to hear rather than what is essential. Hence if you incorporate the TCCs in the assessment missions, it is likely to become more realistic and objective and as such, it will facilitate the Security Council’s mandate-making.

Another area that needs institutionalization is the signing of memoranda of understandings. At times the force commander in the field asks a particular contingent to protect a specific area and the answer he receives is: “No, this is not included in the memorandum of understanding.” This also complicates integration or jointness at the field level considerable.
Finally, the vacancies in DPKO should be filled with people who have experience from the field. Thank you.

Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, thanked Brig. Feyyaz, saying that the Secretariat “has to become better, continuing to improve our capacities for assessment on the ground, and being more realistic, and also more objective”. This was one of the aspects that were being addressed internally in the context of the New Horizon process. It was very important to have those important obligations pointed out and that they would be pursued from the Secretariat side.

The next speaker was introduced as the Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations, His Excellency Mr. Philip John Parham. The 5th of August Security Council Presidential Statement, adopted under the leadership of the UK Presidency, was a very important milestone in the collective efforts to strengthen peacekeeping. It has revitalized the issue of partnerships, and because of that Presidential Statement, the Secretariat felt that the peacekeeping partnerships were now, on a new footing, revitalized and renewed.

H.E. Mr. Philip John Parham, Deputy Permanent Representative of United Kingdom to the United Nations

Thank you, Izumi. Let me start also by thanking Ms. Fatemeh Ziai for her papers which are extremely thought-provoking and a really valuable stocktaking of Member States views at the moment, of the progress that has been made, and the recognition of that progress, but also of the progress, which we still need to be making. The UK attaches great importance to the issue of improving engagement with the TCCs and the PCCs; not just the frequency but also the depth of that engagement, and its timing well in advance of Security Council consultations. The views of TCCs and PCCs have to be genuinely taken into account, at all points where the mission mandate is being considered.

Consultations with the T/PCCs provide indispensable insights into the situation on the ground, what the obstacles are, and how those obstacles can be overcome. That is why engagement with TCCs and PCCs was a key part of the initiative which has been underway in the Security Council since the beginning of the year. We believe that some progress has been made, as has also been recognized recently with regards to UNIFIL, UNMIL and MINUSTAH. Following the meeting with troop and police contributors on UNIFIL, the participants were filled with enthusiasm for how interactive and valuable the meeting had been. Thus while the somewhat dry nature of the actual consultations is a measure of the base from which we are
working, it is also a measure of the fact that we are moving in the right direction and making progress.

The Secretariat is also making progress, by ensuring that the technical assistance missions are more useful to the UN membership, and that missions have clearer guidance on more informative reporting, including the development and use of benchmarks. As we develop these things, it is important that we ensure consistency, bringing them into standard practice for the upcoming renewal of MONUC and other mandates.

But having the right structures and the right processes in place is only part of the issue. We also have to try to ensure that the participants really make full use of them once they are in place.

Against this background, I will outline a number of the questions that are in our own minds at the moment as a stimulus for further discussions on this issue. First, if we improve the frequency and the depth of the consultations with T/PCCs, how do we encourage the Security Council members to actually draw upon what was said in those consultations when they themselves contribute to the Security Council consultations?

Second, how do we encourage the troop and police contributors themselves to invigorate their own internal networks so that when they come to the consultations on mission mandates, they come with relevant information which can effectively contribute to those consultations?

Third, should we look more at augmenting the Secretariat planning teams with planners from troop and police contributors on a temporary basis to ensure that there is a more direct reality check with the situation on the ground? And if so, how do we get around the political and financial obstacles to doing that?

Fourth, if groups of friends and coalitions do indeed provide very valuable additional engagement and political support for peacekeeping missions, how do we develop their use and spread it to other missions without provoking pushback from those who are concerned about the prerogatives of the Council?

Fifth and finally, how can we make more use of the force commanders themselves in the consultations, both in the consultations between the council and T/PCC and in the consultations of the Council itself? How do we make more use of the fact, or the times, when the Force Commanders are in New York? Can we try to ensure that they are in New York for the consultations in the same way in which the SG’s Special Representatives often are? Can we make use of video links to have their
contribution or military input from the ground feed directly into discussions about the mandate? Thank you.

Discussion

Amb. Jacques Paul Klein posed the first question with regard to the contribution base for peackeeping and more specifically, the question of certain countries’ diminishing interest in UN peacekeeping operations. He raised the example of Canada, which had a modest 56 Canadians left in peacekeeping. Mr. Klein emphasized that it is necessary to ask: “What happened here? Or put it in another way: what prevents someone from the Secretariat from visiting Ottawa and sitting down and saying, ‘What has happened here? How do we get you back in the system?’ and mounting a public campaign in Canada itself? Because many Canadians I know are very much supportive of this. So what does it take to motivate the government to become more active?”

Amb. Klein also raised the question of what is preventing us from reaching out to the new members of the UN such as Croatia, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic, asking them to contribute with for example a helicopter squadron, engineering or hospitals designated for UN service in exchange for an international cachet as a credible member of the international community. “In other words, why cannot we go to some of these countries and say, ‘We do not want an infantry division. I can get that from Pakistan or India. What I need from you is a communications company, a helicopter squadron, an engineering battalion,’ small enough that they can actually support it. But the key thing is that it makes them credible partners in the game that we are all playing here.”

A participant pointed out that the discussions about the contribution base are often held as if there were two types of countries in the world: one that provide troops and police, and one that do not provide troops and police, when in fact there are only 10 countries that provide troops and police. “This is a very sad commentary for the international community to say that, alright, you ten are the TCCs, PCCs, and the rest of us, we are going to tell you what to do and how to do it.” The divide of the world which this represents does not reflect the international community that the United Nations should be representing, and this issue needs to be addressed. More often than not, the countries of the more developed world have the means, the capabilities, the training and the logistics to truly make an impact if they actually went to the field. Instead it is people, who lack all of that who go there and contribute.

The participant also asked: “what type of training are we talking about? If it is a matter of training police and military then all the training they need is their
initial training combined with a certain knowledge of the nuances of operating in an international peacekeeping environment. In other words, the basic training of police and military officers remains the same, the only thing that is needed is clear instructions on what is required in a particular situation. This type of training is better done by the nations contributing the police and troops themselves rather than by anybody else.

If some T/PCC make special requirements for the deployment of their troops, what one mission is provided with, all missions should be provided with. More specifically, as mentioned in Fatemeh’s paper, the case of the deployment of European troops to UNIFIL, where a requirement was projected to the DPKO that there should be a strategic military cell set up at the DPKO, so that it could advise the UNIFIL on military matters. Do I take it that all other missions work without any strategic military sense at all? Or is that a particular example where you need strategic military sense to be put into the commanders and people in the field? This is a very one-sided thing, only because particular people from a particular nationality or group want to go to a particular place, they need to have special things put into place. I do not think that is correct. If, a strategic military cell is required, then I think it is required for all missions across the board.

Regarding the contracts for UN missions, I would imagine most of expenditure in a mission goes towards sustaining the mission; creating infrastructure for the mission and so on. I do not find any of these large contracts going to any of the developing countries who are actually participating over there, even if they have the capability and all the technologies with them”.

Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno took the floor to address the challenges related to the need for an intensified dialogue between the Secretariat, the Security Council and the troop contributors. “There are some real issues that need to be addressed head on. Having a candid conversation with the troop contributors, with the Security Council, on a mission is different when it is a static mission such as say Cyprus, to when it is MONUC or one of the tougher one such as Sudan, Darfur. In the tougher cases, which are what preoccupies us today, having a candid conversation may mean discussing the weaknesses of the mission, for example information or intelligence about a Member State, or that other Member States may be playing a spoiling role and how you want to address that. You do not want this information to be known publically.

This is where the problem lies because the UN definition of a troop contributor is a very broad one. Whether you have one brigade or one military observer, you are a troop contributor but you are not going to have the same conversation with a
troop contributor who has no real stake in the mission, as you will with one who has a major stake in the mission.

To this add the problems within the Security Council, where their stakes in the mission are, whether they have troops or whether they have a political interest or no political interest, whether they are more with one party or another. The lack of genuine unity of purpose in the Council does also impede the candour of the necessary conversations. Thus the second problem with the Security Council is one that is above me to address. The only answer that I can give is that with regard to the troop contributors I agree with Ambassador Takasu that informality is the way forward, informal arrangements with groups that are small enough to hold candid conversations. I doubt that you will be able to distinguish between troop contributors through formal arrangements. Troop contributors are not likely to address this issue, let alone to accept it.”

Amb. Philip Parham, responded that with regard to the problem of countries decreased contributions to UN peacekeeping, “the Secretariat and DPKO actually work quite hard to revitalize their interests. Only recently, Alain Le Roy made a very strong pitch to the UK Foreign Affairs Committee from the House of Commons in London about the lack of UK contributions to UN peacekeeping missions. But the problem first of all relates to the fact that there are quite a lot of countries now that have heavy overseas military commitments in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and so on in UN-mandated, UN-authorized, although not blue-helmeted operations. Second, for developed countries to make a contribution to UN peacekeeping operation is to incur a significant cost, whereas for many developing countries, the opposite is the case.

Third, this point which was raised in connection with UNIFIL that there are currently expectations among some militaries concerning adequate command and control and strategic leadership arrangements, which they feel cannot be met in the normal UN peacekeeping structures. This is a serious issue that has to be acknowledged.

So these things are obstacles. With regard to training, only having those who are currently providing troops to a particular UN peacekeeping operation train the police and troop, would be an unnecessary constraint. There are clearly militaries, and I would include the British military in that, who have relevant expertise and capacity to provide that training. Why deny us that? Why deny the international community that use of resource? Finally, I agree with the point that informal arrangements have to be the solution to many of these questions, including to those that I have raised. But the handling of them is always going to be sensitive”.
Amb. Yukio Takasu commented that when it comes to the need for broadening the base of troops and other resources, the growing demand on peacekeepers indicated that something has to be done. “Having ten countries provide 85 percent of peacekeepers is not representative of a good international peacekeeping community. Japan is one of many countries contributing to this situation, by contributing troops only to the Golan Height and a few other places. There is currently a big debate in Japan about the possibility of putting more emphasis on UN and peacekeeping operations. The new government is very anxious to do more. But because of a constitutional requirement, and other things, we only have a standby arrangement of 3,000 people specialized in logistics and communication. Therefore Japan continues to explore the issue in conformity with our law and other things.

To encourage deployment, we should focus on the countries which have the potential to provide troops such as Indonesia. In addition, although traditionally the permanent five have not really provided troops for peacekeeping operations, as the world has changed, a country like China for instance, is due to renew its role in UN peacekeeping. But to encourage a development in this direction, requires a considerable amount of political understanding and support as the New Horizon Report points out.

When it comes to the issue of training, the military often has to be trained to perform policing tasks in order to protect civilians. People who have been sent to the field have first and top priority to be trained and by their own people, perhaps. But for a mandate like the protection of civilians, which is done by police in most of the countries, the military is not adequately trained for such tasks. In peacekeeping operations in Congo, Darfur, and elsewhere, it is the military doing this task. Obviously, they have to be trained for this. Therefore, training is not only necessary pre-deployment, but there are also many things that they have to catch up on, once they are deployed. The troops have to be prepared in a large number of areas that requires regional or international cooperation beyond the national training. In Africa and Asia there are several regional training centers which can provide important support for future operations.

Finally, I regret to hear the skepticism that has been voiced about mandate for the protection of civilians. There is a need for clarification here as I do not believe that anybody in the UN or in the Security Council is trying to interfere in the working of the host countries by introducing these mandates. The concept of the protection of civilians is genuinely based on humanitarian concerns for the ordinary people who are the largest victims of conflict.”

Ms. Fatemeh Ziai commented on bringing back TCCs into the fold. “The approach that DPKO is pursuing is at a strategic level. But there is really a need to not only
look at this problem over the medium- and long-term within the overall strategic approach. One of the findings of the study was that more awareness is definitely required in those countries that have left peacekeeping. Outreach to them is key to address the concerns which are causing their reservations such as ambiguous command and control, exclusive mission planning and so on. The UN has to explain to them how peacekeeping has changed and improved, because some of them are stuck back in the 1990s when they last contributed in any significant way. One of the proposals in our study is that perhaps one of the weaknesses that DPKO and DFS have at the moment is that all the outreach is being done through individual visits, or originated from New York, and really what might help is to have regional bases. At the moment, DPKO has no presence outside of New York or in peacekeeping operations set up for that. Therefore, regional bases with experts who can liaise with capitals and do some of that outreach that could make a difference. As Amb. Klein mentioned, the public opinion is important. Another problem that came up in the study was that there is not one department or person within the DPKO to which the Member States can address their questions with regard to contributions. As such, having regional bases that can answer such questions, or pull together whatever is needed, could make it considerably easier for potential TCCs.

Finally, on training, when I was in the Integrated Training Service, we did a large-scale training needs assessment. It confirmed that the training must be done by Member States. Nobody has suggested otherwise. It would not even be practically beneficial. The question is however, when we talk about the need to hold consultations with TCCs: who should be consulted? I mean, who will sit at the table? Do you really need to consult every single TCC in a mission, or is it based on how many troops they have, or the sensitivity of their active role that they play in a mission, or the sensitivity of that particular mission? It is not the case that all T/PCCs are coming en masse asking to be consulted saying, ‘Consult us, and do it every day.’ But there are certain countries that clearly need to be consulted informally in specific situations, in order to alleviate some of the overall peacekeeping concerns’.

Brig.Gen. Muhammed Feyyaz suggested that peacekeeping is a mindset with a global perspective that goes much into the realm of social sciences. As such, a peacekeeper has several virtues that perhaps are not expected of a soldier, likely to be fighting in an intrastate or maybe in an interstate conflict. There are several facets of the attributes that one needs to learn with regard to the need for training in a formal national environment.

Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, responded to the question about the contracts involved in the setting up of a peacekeeping mission: “Most of the contracts might be going
to developed countries rather than the developing countries but this is one of the intended outcomes of the regional center concept within the new support strategy. The strategy is to push some of those contracts closer to those countries that are around the regional centers. The pilot location for this regional support center concept will probably be in Entebbe, subject to the approval and endorsement from the Member States. But the idea is to make contracts more available for the developing countries as well.”

A participant commented on the question of why certain countries that used to be big contributors to UN peacekeeping, have withdrawn their support. “Sweden in that sense is much in the same position as Canada. There are a number of reasons for this. The situation is not entirely black and white though. Sweden for example, did take part in UNMIL/Liberia a few years ago. So it does happen still. Further, the contribution in troops is not the only way to contribute to peacekeeping, there is also funding. The EU for example, contributes around 40 percent of the UN peacekeeping budget. Notwithstanding that however, there is a problem that certain countries in the West who used to contribute, do not do so anymore. One of the reasons is that we only have one limited set of forces and those are now quite busy in other UN-mandated operations in Afghanistan and so on. Then, the command and control issue that has been mentioned is relevant to the military aspects of peacekeeping in particular. If this problem could be resolved, I think that would encourage Western countries to contribute to UN peacekeeping.

Then there are also exceptional cases where we are not welcome. In the case of Sweden, we put together an engineering unit at a very high cost together with the Norwegians to contribute to UNAMID in Sudan, but in the end we were not welcome there. Needless to say, if you have invested a lot of money in preparing and planning for an operation, and then you cannot carry out that operation, the next time you will be more careful to act. Thus there is a problem here that needs to be addressed. But it is not only a matter of informing or talking to contributing countries and so on, we have to try and answer all of these questions as opposed to only one of them.”

Lt.Gen. Satish Nambiar, commented on UNIFIL as an example to demonstrate that the Secretariat and the headquarters are becoming more engaged with contributors and suggested that this could be misleading given that it represents an exceptional case with several developed countries among the contributing countries. “It is an inappropriate example because UNIFIL as constituted today is because there are powerful countries like France, Germany, and Italy involved, so the compulsion for consultation would be greater. I am not too sure whether that would have taken place if it was in 2005 or something like that when only the Indians, the
Ghanaians and some others were there. Thus drawing upon an example such as MONUC or UNAMIS will probably be more effective.

With regard to the participation of Western countries in UN peacekeeping, there is no doubt that the developed world currently has other commitments that consequently impacts the sort of capability that it provides the UN with. But this is not the point. I would like to illustrate with a small example how people in the developing countries who contribute troops to missions feel. While I was doing some work for DPKO in MONUC about six years back, I found to my horror that there were contributions from the developed world, from Europe, from the UK, from Norway, France, and so on. They acted as military observers or staff officers, but they were actually deployed as liaison officers in either the neighbouring capital, or the headquarters staff. This makes us out in the field, the Indians, the Pakistanis, the Algerians, the Tunisians, the Moroccans, the Uruguayans and so on, feel the lack of participation by the other guys who are going to be in the decision-making corridors of power in the years to come to talk about the contributions that our countries would make. This is an issue that somewhere has to be addressed. If there is participation, then the share of the burden in the field must be accepted by those who are deputed to those missions. Moreover, when it comes to the consultation for better performance in the field, the troop contributors, at least from the developing world, simply want to be part of the decision-making process and have an ownership of the decisions that are taken to ensure their effective performance in the field, where they are making sacrifices!

Maj.Gen. (Retd.) Patrick Cammaert thanked Ms. Ziai for her two outstanding papers and shared his experience on consultations with the T/PCCs before and during the deployment of a peacekeeping operation. “I would like to come a bit to the rescue of the Secretariat because I feel a little loss of institutionalized memory here. I had the privilege to be Military Advisor from 2002 to 2005 under the leadership of Mr. Guéhenno as USG. During that period, we started three new missions, extended two big ones, and closed one.

There were extensive consultations with Member States, extensive consultations with troop contributors and police contributors and technical assessment missions. Draft concepts of operations were discussed weekly, with potential and existing troop contributors. Everybody knew exactly when the Bukavu crisis and the Bunia crisis took place, and the reinforcement mandated by the Council of 6,000 troops was approved. The risk analysis and threat assessments were clear to all parties involved, so there was no doubt about what the contributing countries and the UN were signing up for. The rules of engagement were openly discussed, and everybody was aware of them. It was clear that it was a Chapter VII operation where all necessary means could be used to implement the mandate. As a result,
for a number of years, troop contributors did an outstanding job protecting civilians under imminent threat where they were deployed and within capabilities. The boiling point however, when the whole thing came to the surface, was in November 2008 when troops, blue helmets were standing idle when the atrocities happened.

Thus the focus on the fact that the troop contributors were not consulted I believe is wrong. The focus should be on the pre-deployment training and how to ensure that the soldiers coming from the highlands of the Himalayas or the lowlands of the Netherlands know that when they are deployed to a country like the Congo, they might encounter an 11 year-old girl being gang-raped by four FARDC soldiers. What are they going to do to protect her and what are they going to do to protect the village that is threatened by whatever spoilers? That is the issue. Thus I fully agree that the existing mechanisms, formal and informal, should be fully used. The military advisors’ community should discuss all the issues, and all the strategies, and so on. Force commanders and the division commander have been briefing the Council for some time now. I have personally briefed the Council three times, as Division Commander, on the progress as well as the weaknesses and problems in the Congo. In other words, it is not new mechanisms that are needed, we only have to dust them off a little bit and do better where possible. I wanted to bring out these issues before we start with the command and control discussion in the next session. Thank you”

Ms. Fatemeh Ziai suggested that the UNIFIL example was brought out to demonstrate how TCCs often perceive this mission as a proof of the double standards involved in UN peacekeeping. Nevertheless, there were elements in this mission which allowed Member States to be involved in mission planning, and in ongoing guidance, and these arrangements could be looked at as a possible model for the future. Furthermore as highlighted by General Cammaert and Mr. Guéhenno, the issue of consultations with troop contributors needs to be put into perspective and context. The Secretariat did not make those points, but many agreed that they could do better, “we could be doing more”.

Amb. Philip Parham proposed that regarding the overall deployment, key must presumably be that people are deployed where they are going to be most valuable, whatever their nationality. Second, regarding consultations, there are already a lot of structures and processes in place and one of the challenges is actually just to make better use of the existing ones.

Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu concluded the session by saying that it had been a very rich and substantive discussion. The results would be fed into DPKO’s own internal developmental work. “We have all identified the need for increased
effort in peacekeeping training. DPKO is currently moving into a new phase of training, and it is to this end, in need of highly strengthened training partnerships. The training resources within the peacekeeping operations are very limited. In headquarters, the Integrated Training Service (ITS) consists of approximately 35 staff. With such a limited amount of resources, it is not possible to address the entire needs of peacekeeping training. Thus we need to approach you, and some of those peacekeeping training centers that could be training people on the behalf of DPKO. Our role should become much more strategic in this area. We need to develop stronger standards for peacekeeping training, and we also need to pull together different partnerships at the strategic level of different kinds of trainings. In addition we have to go much more into mission-specific and scenario-based training. Finally, better use of e-learning mechanisms also has to be explored. All of these relatively new issues will have to be addressed, but we cannot do it alone. I would like to identify these issues with a view to coming up with some concrete ideas for advancing the partnerships agenda in peacekeeping training.”
Chapter 7

United Nations Effective Mission Control and Command

Focus: How can robust command and control arrangements contribute to the success of multidimensional peace operations?

Facilitator: Maj.Gen. (Retd.) Patrick Cammaert, Former Division Commander, MONUC / Former Military Adviser, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations / Former Force Commander, UNMEE

Any peace process suffers from spoilers, trying to derail the ambition of the peacekeeping mandates and the, at times, inexperienced senior UN leaders. I have had the privilege to work under the overall authority of two excellent Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSG), as Force Commander and Division Commander. Under the strategic guidance of the Under-Secretary-General we worked together hand in glove, knowing and respecting each other’s role and responsibilities.

I would like to highlight a few issues that hopefully will be discussed during this session. Command and control – that starts at the United Nations headquarters level. The first word that comes into mind is leadership, which starts at the top, notably at the United Nations headquarters level. There is a Dutch expression saying, “The fish starts smelling at the head.” In the context of the UN, leadership is about the selection and preparation for first and foremost three roles: the SRSG, the Force Commander, and the Director of Mission Support. An important consideration for the selection process is what is more important, competence, or the right political sauce over the choice? Lastly, evaluation of performance and accountability should also come into play.

The second point at the United Nations headquarters level is that you have to have your house internally in order. How are the procedures functioning with integrated operational teams (IOTs), with the Office of Military Affairs (OMA), and other functional parts at headquarters? How does it work? Does everybody know their responsibilities and the various procedures and coordinating lines? Who is doing what? At times, it would seem as if everybody and their dog is doing force generation, while those who are actually designated to do so are not doing any force generation. As for the relations with troop contributors and police contributors I leave this out since it has already been thoroughly discussed.
The second level is the field headquarters and the delegation of authority between the SRSG and the Force Commander for political matters and military issues respectively. I hope that the balance between the grip of UN Headquarters and the delegation of authority will be subject to discussion, as well as the fact that the field often is under the impression of being micromanaged by Headquarters. There is also the problem where missions might paint too rosy a picture of the situation in the field to Headquarters, which leads to a widening of the gap between the latter’s perception of the former.

Also at the field level, there is the issue of the distribution of responsibilities between the roles of the SRSG, the Force Commander, and the Director of Mission Support. One has the overall responsibility for the mission, but is not in command of the troops. The Force Commander is the one who is responsible for the command of the troops. He is the only one who moves the battalions – nobody else. While TCCs sometimes refer to the Memorandum of Understandings (MOUs) as the base for decisions about what is going where, “Ah but I cannot do this because it is not in my MOU”. There is nothing in the MOU. The MOU is an administrative arrangement. It does not say anything about going where or doing what.

Another issue is the relations between contingents and their capitals. Every contingent will clearly have a line to their capital for reporting and for information, but the capital should not give direction to a contingent because that should go via UN headquarters.

Last point is that the command and control is crucial, because it has an immediate effect on several troop contributors, particularly on the participation again of western troop contributors as Amb. Jacques Paul Klein said, in the arena of UN-led operations. If the command and control is not properly organized, and if troop contributors have no confidence in the leadership, countries are reluctant to provide troops under the UN flag.

I think we have an extremely good paper written by Mr. Guéhenno and Mr. Jake Sherman, and I am very happy to give Mr. Guéhenno the floor.

Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Patron, Challenges Forum / Former Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

I will start where the last session ended, namely with the question: why is command and control such an important issue? It is essentially so for two reasons. First, the command and control arrangements in the UN are important because they are often mentioned as exhibit number one by developed countries, by NATO
countries, for not participating in UN operations. My views on this topic are well-known.

It is a very damaging situation for UN peacekeeping and for the UN in general not to have enough participation from developed countries, not just because of the limits that it puts on capabilities and the broadening of the pool of countries contributing, but also because of the political signal that it sends out. At the end of the day, it runs the risk of marginalizing, to use General Nambiar’s expression, the United Nations. Hence this is a very strategic issue which needs to be resolved in a way that makes every troop contributor comfortable. If better command and control arrangements do not resolve the issue, then there is a deeper problem of the UN simply not being the priority of a number of countries. But that is an issue which is beyond today’s discussion.

While this might be reason enough for discussing command and control, there is also another substantive reason with regard to the complexity of command and control. The starting point of any discussion on command and control has to be the recognition of the fact that no organization really gets it right. The discussions on Afghanistan and NATO today are a clear case in point, and so are the discussions in the UN. There are serious problems involved, which can be put into three categories. First, how do you run a multinational operation, which was already alluded to in the previous session? Second, how do you position the use of force in support of a political process? How do you consider it? How do you manage the use of force in a peace operation that is not static? Third, there is the issue of multidimensionality, the issue of orchestration of the various efforts. These are specific issues that are not part of traditional peacekeeping, nor of traditional non-peacekeeping military operations, but which have to be addressed if one is to be effective in a peace operation. This is not just an issue which the UN has to give more thought to, but which NATO and the EU also have to address.

I do not pretend to have the answers to that. Much hard work needs to be done on those issues. But let me give a few hints of the kinds of issues that we should look at on these three points. First, regarding multidimensionality, we have to recognize that there is a basic trade-off that needs to be managed. On the one hand, you want sufficient ownership of all troop contributing countries in a mission, and on the other hand, just like war cannot be managed by committees, neither can peacekeeping, especially not in difficult environments. That is a recipe for trouble. There has to be real executive direction and so one has to recognize that the more you go towards one direction, the less you may have in the other direction. So you have to balance the two concentrations – the ownership of troop contributing countries and the need for real executive direction.
In NATO, there are problems of multiple caveats and at times bloated headquarters which might allow all parties to feel included but runs against effectiveness. In the UN, there are different issues. You have MOUs that serve as caveats. You have unexpressed caveats. That is definitely not good. But there are ways to address this issue, both at headquarters and in the field of multidimensionality.

Regarding the strategic military cell. This was an expedient response to the urgent need to bring quick reinforcement to UNIFIL in the crisis of 2006. The great strategic merit of the military cell was indeed to make sure that the headquarters level would not be a black box for troop contributors. At the same time, and again, we are in the tradeoff issue: you do not want a UN peace operation to be just a coalition of the willing that does not benefit from the cross experience of other missions. Thus probably the right answer and I think DPKO is moving in that direction, is the reinforcement of the Office of Military Affairs; to reinforce headquarters with officers from key contributing countries in a particular mission so that there is enough visibility at headquarters level. However, at the same time we need to keep a core of officers who are not linked to this or that mission, so that it does not become a juxtaposition of the Multinational Force (MNF). I think that is something that can be envisaged and it is again a question of maintaining balance.

Police units raise different issues. They raise issues that, in a way, are more complicated in terms of multidimensionality than military units. While there are different ways of training military units, there is still some basic commonality that is shared across battalions around the world. When it comes to law and order, the gradation of force varies and the way that it is managed varies considerably from one country to another. Thus it is very important to develop UN standards in this area to ensure that there is compatibility and interoperability between the units.

Let me now address what I think is the most complicated issue, the most difficult one, where none of us really gets it right. It is the fact that military force in a robust peace operation is in support of a political process. That raises issues for the military that are very different from a traditional military operation. The military are used to having an enemy. That is what military force is used for, to deal with an enemy, to suppress it, to defeat it. But in a peace operation, it is much more complex. You do not have enemies. You have threats, and you have evolving threats. Sometimes you have a lot of decisions to make, which are of a political nature. Is the force there to deter potential spoilers? Is it to support a government in its fight against spoilers at the risk of losing its impartiality, and thus a capability to mediate? When confronted with threats, how to choose between military deterrents, military suppression, or political negotiation? These are issues that have a military dimension, because you have to assess the gravity of the threat in operational terms and that is more of a military judgment to be made. This is
also a political issue because you have to assess politically whether you could deal with that threat through political means rather than military engagement, which has implications for command and control.

The first implication, which is evident in NATO as well as in the UN, is that all politics is local, as an American politician once said. This is certainly true for peace operations. You have to have your ear very close to the ground. There are lots of decisions of a political military nature that cannot be made from thousands of miles away. So the theatre level has to be really empowered. You are not going to address those very complex choices from a distance. Sometimes the complexity of that kind of peacekeeping is that tactical decisions may have strategic implications. The way a patrol addresses a roadblock – it is a tactical judgment that may have a whole series of consequences of a strategic nature. So you need a hefty amount of decentralization. A lot of interaction between the military element of the mission and the political leadership of the mission is needed. The advantage of the UN is to recognize that. The weakness of the UN is to rely a bit too much on personalities. I could not agree more with what was said by Patrick Cammaert that leadership is probably the most essential element in the success or failure of a mission. But it is dangerous to have to count only on personalities getting along with each other, and having the right dialogue. You need greater clarity in the arrangements that link the military command of the mission and the SRSG. You do not want the SRSG to become a little general. You do not want the general to think that he can make all the political calls. That would not be good either. So how do you manage that balance? How you manage it at the theatre level is a tricky issue.

The other tricky issue is the balance between theatre and UN Headquarters. Because you have to decentralize so much, you run the risk of losing the grip on the mission, on having initiatives that gradually change the fundamental strategy of the mission without the Headquarters really fully understanding that. The dangers there are amplified by the way our Security Council resolutions are drafted, that micro-management replaces strategic thinking. It would be better to have greater clarity on the strategic goals of the mission, and less details on all the tactical actions that need to be taken to implement that goal. This should be the nature of the dialogue between Headquarters and the field.

Third, the fact that a multidimensional peace operation is essentially about orchestrating and leveraging a range of tools – the military, the police, the economic, the political – in support of a fragile political process. That notion of orchestration is essential. It is hard enough for foreigners to support a political process if they do not get their act together. The discussion on Afghanistan has been an illustration of that problem. If they do not get their act together in aligning the various levers they have in support of a unified vision, then they are going to lose the game. How
you do it? Frankly, I think the UN notion of an empowered SRSG is a good one. But the implementation is deficient. Because SRSGs are not necessarily trained in the job, and I think the kind of exercise that Patrick Cammaert was alluding to, should be developed for the interaction between the SRSG and the military, so that they understand on all sides what the interaction should be and for the interaction between the SRSG and all the components of the mission. In theory, the SRSG in the integrated mission has authority over all the components of the UN system. But it very much depends on persons and expertise, because to exercise authority, you have to have the expertise to do it, otherwise you are not taken seriously. There are some SRSGs who have that expertise. Some do not and they meet with resistance and so the integration of the effort is less than adequate. This is very important. Patrick conducted very effective operations in the east. If they are not supported by a well thought-through DDR development strategy, these efforts eventually will slide back and will be lost. So that orchestration is really essential. It is not always there.

At Headquarters, it is even less. There are different centres of power. There are the agencies, funds and programmes. There is the Peacebuilding Support Office with very able personnel. There is DPKO. It is a variety of arrangements. Of course one can say the Secretary General, on top of it can orchestrate the whole effort, but he has many other duties. So in reality, the position of the top is very weak for orchestration. The Security Council itself, because it has an uneasy relationship with PBSO and the PBC is also fairly weak in the way it looks at orchestration. This raises all sorts of other issues, because it is the balance between what is the responsibility of the Security Council and what is the responsibility of the General Assembly, that is questioned. There are all sorts of institutional issues that can weaken this so important unity of vision.

If we do not address those three issues: multinationality, role of force in support of political process, multidimensionality – we are not addressing the real issues. Is it possible to solve them? There are different circles. There is a circle of the relationship between politics and the military, which is the most pressing one in a robust peace operation. Then there is the broader circle of the integration of the whole effort. On the first issue, considering that all organizations are presently recognizing that they have some problems, it would be good to bring together military with different cultures, different backgrounds to discuss that, but also to bring with them civilians. It is not just the military issue as I stressed. It is also the interaction between the military and the civilians that is essential. Considering that today, everybody recognizes that peace operations have a problem with the use of force, with the balance between the use of force and the role of politics. I would not characterize Afghanistan as a peacekeeping operation but nevertheless, it has that problem of the balance, and that is where there is a commonality with our
own issues. It has that problem of balancing use of force with a political strategy. The time is ripe now to look at where are the gaps? Where are the trade-offs to be made? And to come up with practical solutions that would allow us to instill more confidence among troop and police contributors in peace operations; to broaden the pool so that the UN becomes, again, a real, truly universal organization when it does peacekeeping; and to be more effective. And that would benefit not just the UN, but also other organizations which are grappling with similar issues. Thank you.

Gen. Patrick Cammaert thanked Mr. Guéhenno for his very informative presentation, which painted very clearly the picture of how complex and how difficult peacekeeping operations in 2009 are; and how important is the balance between the political and the military, and the interaction between military and civilian components. He was then happy to give the floor to Maj.Gen. (Retd.) Anis Bajwa, Former Director of Change Management, Policy, and Evaluation and Training in DPKO.

Maj.Gen. (Retd.) Anis Bajwa, Former Director of Change Management, Policy, Evaluation and Training, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations / Pakistan

Thank you. It is a privilege for me to be part of this panel on command and control arrangements and its problems and weaknesses in the UN. Mr. Guéhenno has discussed various difficulties that we have with command and control, both at Headquarters and in the field, and the relationship between the SRSG and the Force Commanders, and the relationship between Headquarters and the field. I want to take you to a different dimension of command and control, which is probably the more fundamental and basic problem of command and control within the UN. And that relates to the very notion of what is command and what is control in the military understanding of command and control? In the military understanding of command and control, command means your ability to configure forces, to move forces, to deploy them from one place to another, to be able to attach and detach troops from one component to another. And control means your ability to be able, (to have the authority not just ability) to employ those forces, to make use of those forces, to ensure utility of force. That is control. My soldiering friends here from the artillery, know that we say, “Command rests with the Gun Position Officer, and control rests with the Forward Observer.” The Gun Position Officer has the responsibility to deploy and move his guns, and the Observer who sits somewhere forward has the ability, and the authority, to call for fire and make effective use of that fire. So that is the fundamental thing.
What happens in the case of UN operations is that while the member states, troop contributors and police contributors have ceded a very small part of their command and control authority to the UN, they have not ceded enough of that authority for the UN to make effective use of force when required. And why effective use of force is now necessary is because we are into multidimensional operations in broken states. We are no more sitting between two forces, or observing ceasefires.

We are doing multidimensional peacekeeping. In multidimensional peacekeeping, there are threats that Mr. Guéhenno and Gen. Cammaert spoke of. There are threats. There will always be threats and there will be spoilers. There will even be parties to the conflict who want to go back on part of their consent that they gave for deployment of those missions. When that happens, there is a need to either use force or display the threat to use force to overcome those situations. Therefore, in those circumstances, a greater authority to use those forces is required.

If we are going to have only that little part of operational control, we will not be able to make best use of them. Patrick Cammaert very rightly said that when a contingent is there, then it is supposed to take orders from the chain of command that exists in the UN, and not refer back to its own capital. That is how, ideally, it must be and I would agree with him 100 percent. But unfortunately that is not how it is, and may I even say that this not only relates to the amount of national command and control authority that has been ceded to the UN, but also relates to the professional culture of the force of the contingent that you are dealing with. Unfortunately, all militaries of the world do not have the same level of professional training. They do not have the similar professional cultures and they do not have the same standards of discipline. Therefore you will find varying responses to operational requirements by different contingents, particularly when they are under dangerous conditions and asked to engage in dangerous operations.

There is definitely a need to address this issue. But merely by enhancing our ability, to be able to provide greater strategic direction to the missions, by enhancing our ability to plan better, and by strengthening the Office of Military Affairs, we will really not address the lack of political will of the Member States to give enough of their command and control authority to the UN. That is the important issue at stake here which has to be increasingly discussed with member-states in order to obtain the level of authority that the UN and its commanders in the field need. By commanders, I am not only referring to the force commanders, but also to the SRSGs who have the overall political authority to command and for whom the Force Commander works.
The issue of the relationship of the SRSG with the Force Commander is also a fundamental issue that has to be addressed together with the Member States through principally the Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations and the Fourth Committee. This way we can all collectively come to a conclusion, that if we want peacekeeping to be more effective, well, then the Member States have to agree to part with some more of their authority. Thank you.

Gen. Martin Agwai, Former Force Commander, UNAMID / Former Chief of Defence, Nigeria / Former Deputy Military Adviser, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

Let me thank the organizers for inviting me to be here. I am happy to be here with my former boss and leader, Mr. Guéhenno and I appreciate the foundation that he has set for this discussion. I will outline a complex diagram to illustrate the issue of command and control and ask the question: for what purpose do we need command and control?

First, there are the mandated tasks, which forms the base, followed by the concept of operations, which sets out what is needed to implement the mandate. The most crucial element for the implementation of the mandate is leadership, and the question of how can leaders function? What makes the leaders important is decision-making, and more specifically, taking the right decision at the right time. To take the right type of decision requires the availability of the right information, or is it intelligence? Whichever name you call it, they need right information, the right intelligence, at the right time, to take the right type of decision. Do we have those things?

The decisions taken by the leaders of the missions, create the other pillar that supports the forces in the implementation of the mandate, which in turn requires support. In other words, the issue of decision and command and control does not stop at the headquarters level of the mission. It trickles down. Whatever the constant, and whatever the issues of command and control that affect the military, they will also affect the other parts of the mission. Hence it is key that they all work in synergy to support these three pillars.

To this add the complexities that we have on the ground. Robust peacekeeping requires robust equipment, as well as a robust understanding of the overall aim. But when peace missions are deployed with the major task of the protection of civilians to places where there is not yet a peace agreement in place, the operations will suffer from the same weaknesses as we did. Like what happened in my last mission, in Darfur. The DPA was not signed by all the parties to the
conflict, and yet the mission was deployed with the major task of protection of civilians.

Thus, in the model or ideal line of command and authority, the mission headquarters works together with the sector headquarters and with the country team, as well as with the host government. However, in reality, there are many other factors involved.

First, the host government and the UN country team, have to be in contact with HQ in New York, who in turn have to be in contact with the Security Council. To this add the numerous non-UN actors involved, such as the NGOs. At times, the mission headquarters themselves are unsure about everybody involved. However, it does not end there, as we found out in Darfur, for the troop contributing countries always remain in contact with their own troops in the mission as well. They might even pass on information to their capital, which has not been communicated to the mission headquarters.

Another layer is added in the case of hybrid operations, such as UNAMID, where the complexity on the ground of communication and decision-making is even deeper. In these missions, it is not uncommon that some of the crucial, most encompassing decisions are taken out of the mission without the knowledge of the Force Commander. The SRSG in particular does not even know of this, and some decisions have already been taken based on information that is not known to the mission. The mission will be asked certain questions for which they do not have the information, and they will be expected to do certain things of which they are not in control. These are some of the challenges that I saw in my two experiences in the field: one as a Deputy Force Commander in Sierra Leone, and one as the Force Commander in Darfur.

But the main issue is that for command and control to work properly, we need the right equipment. This is especially important to remember when developing countries are involved who are, for the first time, deployed to peacekeeping. How is their equipment to be compatible and operational? This is another operational challenge on the ground. To this add that there might also be a need for more personnel.

Moreover, there are some challenges involved which might not be at the top of priorities, but which are nevertheless key. There are occasions when there is a competition in play between the SRSG or the head of mission, and the head of the military component. Sometimes, heads of mission try not only to tell you, the Force Commander, what to do, but they even want to tell you how to do it. And that creates conflict and friction within the mission.
There is a need to clearly identify who controls the enabler units, the engineers, the mobility assets, either air or ground mobility, but especially the helicopters - who controls them? Who needs them most? Who needs flexibility? Who needs to move them quickly to do things? I remember a personal example (that I do not always want to remember) when I wanted to visit the troops on the ground. I had requested the people on the support side a week in advance when I wanted to go. At the end of the day, they tied my movement to a group of technicians, that were to repair something in the other locations. In the end, I could not achieve what I went out to do. These issues of priority, how do we open a discussion on that? We have talked about contributions by the TCCs and their caveats. In my view, there is a lot of hiding under the rules of engagement, and sometimes, when things go wrong, there are so many people on the ground. In the headquarters, other international bodies, other military centres, bombarding you with phone calls to tell you why did you do this or that. You are the Commander on the ground. You have got to be trusted to have your own initiative and to do what you want to do.

Regarding the issue of guidance, I really love that we need guidance from the HQ. But sometime, let it not lead to micro-management and to telling people what to do every day, for you make the Force Commander, the Sector Commander, feel that he has been guided by people who do not allow him to use his initiative. When something goes wrong, big volumes of papers have been published and sent to you. Is the Force Commander supposed to be a lawyer? Would he have time to read all these books, or do you want him to have room to manoeuver and to do the right thing that you want him to do on the ground? These are the challenges that I think we have to look at.

Yes, MOUs have an effect on deployment! When you give the rules of engagement, sometime we allow these rules of engagement to go to the extent that the soldier on the ground is not given the initiative to do anything because he has to start reading, what did it say? As Mr. Guéhenno pointed out, these soldiers have been trained to fight an enemy but they now find themselves in front of ten to twenty pages of instructions about the use of force and the protection of civilians: when you are going to fire, you should do this, you should do that. Sometimes it kills the zeal of a soldier to do the basic job of the soldiery. Our seminars are wonderful. Our seminars are good. But how many seminars, and how much are we giving that soldier who is always on the ground in immediate touch with the people?

Finally, what are the solutions to these problems of command and control? First, the chain of command should be maintained so that there is enough guidance but without micro-management. But the mission itself also faces challenges in terms of providing directives to help the lower level people in the mission perform as required. Knowing how to react to a situation in crisis is very important.
Therefore the missions have to ensure that the soldiers are really prepared and that everybody in the mission works in an integrated fashion, well-informed of their respective roles and how to support each other in a crisis? Instead of major seminars, we should concentrate on scenario training for particularly the lower leadership, because in peacekeeping, this is where it happens and at times a tactical mistake may lead to a strategic issue that can be highly embarrassing.

Scenario training, even at the lowest level, should be what we concentrate upon. Another possibility is to improve the dialogue between TCCs and the international organization, on the issue of mandate formation, how do we do force generation, and the rules of engagement, which should be flexible to allow people on the ground to use their initiative, not to kill initiative in over-prescribing issues of what people should do. But above all, equipment and resources are needed that allow the people on the ground to implement their mandate.

Finally, ultimately the staff has to be able to do their job; they have to be trained properly. In the past I have come to work with staff officers who did not even understand the language of the mission and with people in charge of communications who themselves could not understand the language of the mission. These are the challenges that need to be addressed if we want to make the command and control of UN operations more effective. Thank you.

Brig.Gen. Jean Baillaud, Chief of Staff, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

Good afternoon, from the point of view of the Office of Military Affairs (OMA), the military structure within DPKO, the role of UN Headquarters in New York depends on the situation and the stage of a mission. The role of the UN Headquarters will be more dominant in the start-up phases, than in the midst of the lifecycle of a mission. Moreover, strong and clear arrangements are of particular importance in crisis situations. Depending on the nature of the crisis, specific officers from UN HQ, including OMA, will have key roles to play.

Looking at the whole chain of command, one of the UN strengths is that we have specifically tailored settings for missions. As officers coming from different cultures and experience, or organizations, we do not necessarily apply in the UN system our own way of doing business, but what is important is what is suited for UN operations? “One size fits all” does not apply to the UN. However, this does not mean that there are no commonalities across peacekeeping operations. Therefore, developing more robust command and control arrangements should not restrict mission design. They must effectively take into account the nature of the mandate,
its environment in terms of the size of the country and the security issues, the structure and size of the force itself, and the complexity of military operations.

Current command and control arrangements already take into account the multidimensional nature of most UN operations. I think that in terms of integration, the UN is really advanced compared to many organizations in the way we do business. Further developments are required to address effectively the capabilities required during the start-up of a mission and during crisis situations.

Finally, this is also the case for joint operations including within dimensions such as maritime or airspace control. Would those operations be conducted with or without the support of regional arrangements?

In addition, from a UN and more specifically a UN HQ perspective, strategic operational and tactical levels which overlap must be seen also as a continuum. Decisions taken at the tactical level can impact the higher level. This is true in other organizations but it is especially true in UN operations. That is why the OMA is currently together with the missions developing guidelines for the coordination on a variety of issues. This effort will certainly support decision-making at field level.

In a multidimensional environment, it is also worth mentioning that key military documents have a direct impact on the ability to effectively implement the mandate. These documents map out the concept of operations, the rules of engagement and the force requirement for the force commander’s directive. Most of them are permanently revised by our office. These are essential documents when we communicate with TCCs. We have mentioned prior to my intervention the use of MOUs as an excuse to do something or not. There is no link to operations in the MOU, but everything is directly driven from the mandate in the CONOPS, in the force requirement, and this should be the basis to interact with the troop contributors, to effect what we want to achieve on the ground.

To summarize, I have quickly touched upon the major challenges that we face and this list here is not comprehensive in developing a more robust command and control. We still have a long way to go, but we are looking forward to your views and recommendations during the discussion. Thank you.

Mr. Henrik Stiernblad, Former Police Commissioner, UNMIL / Special Adviser, Ministry of Justice, Sweden

Thank you. I will speak on the basis of my recent experience as Police Commissioner in Liberia, a mission that is not under the same stress as many other missions; a
mission that is nevertheless facing its own challenges and does not benefit or suffer from the CNN effect, which is good at times, but which creates its own problems in other instances.

Policing is a very different animal from military affairs or soldiering. It contains its own objectives which may coincide with military objectives but which for a large part do not. Other standards apply, and there is often a greater need for interaction with the local population. We need to be good at communication and dialogue with our counterparts, especially as regards our police advisers or, as I would prefer to call them, police reformers. These advisers are a different breed of peacekeepers that need a lot of focus, support and guidance.

I will start with the issue of command and control. When I was first asked to come and speak on this, I thought of it as a very military concept. However, translating it to police language, I realized that it does apply equally to the police, but possibly in a different way. Of course, we have formed police units, the role of which may sometimes be described as paramilitary. They come with equipment that sometimes is quite similar or equal to military equipment, and occasionally their tasks resemble military tasks. We have also discovered that we need to develop command and control arrangements that make it possible for formed police units to interact and operate together with military units.

We have an important case where we need to develop very good command and control arrangements to make this happen. There is an excellent policy issued by DPKO – authority, command and control policy – which contains a lot of good guidance. It does not make your life easier, because it is a very complex matter. It was issued already in February of 2008, and then we did not hear much more about it. It was assumed that it would somehow happen in the missions, just because it was issued. It was a brilliant piece of policy, which contained a lot of good guidance, but there was very little follow-up. I am not sure to what extent missions were held accountable to actually implement this policy.

One paragraph in the policy says that the SRSG, the Force Commander and the Police Commissioner are accountable to DPKO to implement this policy. But does that happen? Are we held accountable? I must tell you a story of how we came to think twice about this policy. It was when the Military and Police Advisers’ Committee came to visit Liberia and they reminded us about the importance of the policy and the need to implement it. After that, the Force Commander and I sat down, and we actually started to talk and said: “Okay, let us do something about it.” We developed a mission-level standard operating procedure, which took the policy paper and translated it into a paper more relevant for the mission, considering the contextual issues we needed to keep in mind, and also doing it in
such a way that we could actually conduct command exercises and train people on these various issues. Tricky issues, like putting formed police units under military command or military units under police leadership, in case you have a situation that is not characterized as a military threat situation. I would like to suggest that DPKO be more engaged in providing support to missions in order to translate these policies into reality.

With regard to the balance between command and control between missions and Headquarters, I have no complaints, at least when it comes to police. I never felt micro-managed when it came to operational decisions. However, when it came to the informal dialogue, more effort is needed from DPKO. What exactly is expected from DPKO when it comes to supportive dialogue, helping to interpret how we can actually address a given situation? As a new Police Commissioner in a peacekeeping mission you probably arrive with high expectations about the level of expertise that you will meet in the mission. But you will be surprised, because people are often quite bewildered about the task they have in front of them.

I cannot help but to quote William Bratton, who used to be Police Commissioner here in New York and more recently in Los Angeles. He is the Police Commissioner behind the transformation of New York’s Police and he brought in a lot of modern management ideas. One of the things he says is that the only way you can control a police department from headquarters is if your aim is to prevent police from doing anything, rather than enabling it to function effectively. I do not think there is any disagreement on this point. Everything that we have heard, and everything that is expressed, very much reflects that quote.

This is the only reasonable approach to command and control. We have to make the assumption that an effective organization needs to consist of a sufficient number of educated and trained leaders, as well as managers that delegate authority, to manage these issues effectively. We talk about it, but what is the real situation? We have already answered that – it is not the real situation. We do not have a sufficient number of educated, trained and experienced leaders out there. But we also have to assume that the organization’s purpose and principle has been clearly understood, articulated, and commonly shared with those that are expected to deliver the results. Here we come to the real issue. The problem is about the skills needed for the job, the skills needed for our leaders, and I am not talking about the SRSGs, force commanders, and police commissioners. I am talking about commanders, managers at lower levels. How do we ensure that they have the right skills for the job? I am not talking about policing, as national policing is one thing and international policing is something completely different. Police peacekeeping is, again, a different ballgame. We can have excellent police officers from any
given country, well-trained, well-experienced, a very good person in every respect, but put that person in the peacekeeping context, and he or she may be clueless about what needs to be done.

Much standardized thinking has gone into training police units, and yet, many complexities remain requiring considerable attention. In addition, there is statebuilding, which is the other half of police peacekeeping. This is an extremely complex task. And if we are honest, do we allow regular police officers to engage in our own countries to reform the police? I do not think that is the case. We bring in specialists. We bring in civilians. We bring in management experts. We bring in financial management experts. We bring in lawyers who develop accountability systems and models. But we are still not there in police peacekeeping. How do we achieve this? I think we need to rethink the issue. We need to stop thinking about numbers: “Oh, we did not deliver the right amount of police to this mission, so it is a big failure.” But the big failure is that we are not delivering the right experts, with the right skills, to do the job, because how do we succeed? How do we succeed in Liberia? By building the state. That is, where we build a police force, a rule of law sector that can deliver security and justice to the people of Liberia. That is when we succeed. Then we will see other effects take place. I will not get into the debate about what comes first: economic, social development or security and so on. But it is all linked.

I will be a little provocative by saying that I could have done ten times as much with ten times less police, if I had had the right experts and the right resources. As regards command and control, it is not that bad for the police. There is good work in progress. The new FPU policy will soon be out, and that will address a number of issues that need to be addressed. We also need to see how we translate this into real activities and effects on the ground. But the real and very serious issue – where we have a lot more to do – is how we get the right police experts into the mission. And I want to flag that we do not normally need police officers, we need police experts. They can be civilians or they can be police officers. I do not care what background they have, as long as they deliver the skills and the results that we need on the ground.

Discussion

Gen. Patrick Cammaert, thanked Henrik Stiernblad for his rich intervention. “It is slightly disappointing that we have been discussing command and control arrangements for formed police units since 2005. Four years of talking and former police commissioners are still struggling with this issue. The comments with regard to changing the mind-set from numbers to focusing on getting the right people in
the job were especially enlightening. The issue is directly linked with the military, as similar arguments are made in this area in terms of lacking troops. Also in this context, is it important to keep in mind that with the right people, you can do so much more.”

Gen. Nambiar asked Mr. Guéhenno and Gen. Cammaert about the relationship between the senior mission leadership and UN HQ in response to interventions. “The last couple of years, I have had occasion to share experiences with some of my friends and colleagues at various seminars, and there are at least a couple of missions in the field where the members of the senior leadership are not even on talking terms.” Gen. Nambiar continued: “The issue has to be raised as the missions are moving into robust peacekeeping, as now we are talking about the lives of people being at stake. Are there mechanisms to deal with this phenomenon? If yes, what are they, and have they been applied? If no, what do you think needs to be put in place to deal with this phenomenon?”

Gen. Gordon noted that, while there had been a paradigm shift from traditional to robust peacekeeping operations, the UN command and control arrangements have not changed since 1948. The UN is aware of the peacekeeping environment and the risks which have been described. “We know from Fatemeh’s paper that many troop contributing countries are nervous about getting involved in this environment, because they have no confidence in the command and control arrangements of the United Nations. And yet we stick with command and control arrangements which are based in 1948. We have not changed the structure a bit. I just wonder whether we are getting this right. Someone senior in the Secretariat once described this using the metaphor of a watch.

We have the hour hand ticking around in New York which is exquisitely slow, based on consensus and diplomacy, and all the organs of the UN trying to agree on the grand strategy at that level. And then there is nothing between that and what we have in the field, which is the second hand going around frantically at very high tempo. What we are missing is the minute hand, that gearing, between the hour hand and the second hand. And yet, we continue to reinforce the hour hand, hoping that will deliver what the second hand wants. And it seems to me it is really high time we started looking at our structures saying, ‘Do we need operational levels of command in order to meet this complex environment which we are now facing in UN peacekeeping?’

Member states which are into expeditionary operations do not consider commanding their operations in the field from their ministerial headquarters. Yet, this is how the United Nations leads its peacekeeping operations. Even organizations such as the EU put operational levels of command into the field
in order to command these operations in ways that allow them to function with confidence, knowing that all the aspects that they might need in the field from a military perspective are covered at the operational level. Again, this is not the case in UN operations. This is an issue that needs to be addressed more carefully, and that the Partners should perhaps commission a paper on.”

Mr. Guéhenno intervened by saying: “Regarding the senior leadership question, the first thing is to get the selection right at the start. The panels were systematically put in place to have an objective process of selection. A lot of member states do not realize how challenging operations are, and I have seen time and again that, for difficult missions, there are not that many top level candidates available for the kind of difficult job on hand, whether you are talking about the civilian or the military leadership. There are SRSG candidates who have no clue about the job. You have some military candidates who do not have enough operational experience from that kind of mission. I do not want to throw it back at the Member States, but I think part of the problem is the lack of qualified candidates. I do not know what General Cammaert will say because he was part of those panels.

Once the leadership has been appointed, it is not so much a question of procedure but rather of the political will and management within Member States. Removing a senior official from a position is very unpleasant and therefore it is a situation that has to be managed. I do not know of many instances in which it has happened. I do not think the contract should be too long, especially at the outset, so that people can be tested. If they are tested, then they stay. But we should not get stuck with the wrong person.

I am a little surprised by what Gen Gordon said, because what I have often heard is that the UN is too decentralized, that essentially the SRSG and the Force Commander are little kings with little strategic oversight. So, I would characterize the problem a bit differently. What is missing is the right level of dialogue between the mission and headquarters; for a number of reasons. To be honest, UN Headquarters, even after all the reinforcement, remains incredibly small and fragile for the range of issues that need to be addressed. As a result, it lacks capacity to really focus on and address the strategic issues. Especially on the political side, that aspect needs to be considerably reinforced. How do you deal with Congo? What is the right approach with the government of the DRC? These are not easy issues.

Now, there is more knowledge in the mission than at Headquarters. So the dialogue shifts to sort of practicalities that annoy the mission, because they see that as micro-management by people who know less than they do. While there is a need for HQ to ask the right strategic questions, quality and quantity remains important. When people are overworked they do not have the time to think, but
if you have more people without the quality, you are just going to have more micro-management. You need to formalize the dialogue a bit. There has been an effort in the form of mission directives, etc. Another possibility is to develop the mission implementation plan in the mission but in dialogue with HQ. We have to raise our game to really move the discussion to another level. Empowering the SRSGs, empowering the Force Commander with the right people. In a way, the two questions are very much linked. The objective should be to have a dialogue that does not focus on the nitty gritty, which should be delegated to the mission, but on the big questions. It has to be a revolving plan that is continuously evolving, and that every year undergoes a real review. This requires quality and expertise at Headquarters that is not always there.”

Gen. Anis Bajwa suggested: “To translate the hour hand and the second hand into the practical aspect of peacekeeping means that we have the strategic level at HQ and the tactical level of operational capabilities in the field. In the middle, perhaps, the UN does not have an operational level capacity by which it should be able to carry out operational control of the forces or the resources that are deployed in the field. If that is to indicate that we need something in the nature of the Strategic Military Cell (SMC), thinking that it would provide an operational tier, then that is something that one would find very difficult to agree with. But if it is to assert the necessity of that level of operational control, it could be discussed. It raises a few questions, like how much control will rest with the field and how much with HQ, and in that case, what reinforcement is required of the capacities at HQ and in the field.”

Mr. Guéhenno added: “There is an ambiguity there, whether we need three levels of command or not. Personally, I would be very much against it, and I know that many SRSGs and Force Commanders are actually very happy with this relatively flat command structure. There is a theatre level, which has to be the operational level, and then there is a strategic level. So, we need two levels, not three. But an organized dialogue between those two levels, much more structured than what presently exists, is required.”

Gen. Gordon entirely agreed with the virtues of flat structures, with its two levels and speed of reaction. “But it is not working. It is a construct that the Member States clearly have no confidence in, and we hear that a lot. I am not advocating an SMC. But in many ways DFS is going down the route and showing us the way saying: ‘We need regional bases and the operational level control of logistics and we are going to operate those regional bases to supply a number of missions.’ I am just thinking slightly outside the box here. Is there scope for saying: ‘Right, there is an operational level requirement to manage the military regionally in, say, East Africa or West Africa, alongside the DFS regional hubs being created there’? I do
not know the answer but nobody seems to be looking at the question. Maybe this is something that the Challenges Partnership might consider?”

Gen. V.K. Jetley intervened by saying: “Based on my experience as Force Commander in UNAMSIL, I can say, first, that clearly the SRSG is the head of a mission, and that the other senior persons are the Deputy SRSGs and the Force Commander. It is key that as few as possible of these senior appointments come from the area in which the conflict is taking place, mainly to avoid that they come under pressure from their home countries. So, it would be better to get officials from somewhere else.”

Having said that, I would like to say that the relationship between the Force Commander and the SRSG is very sensitive, and it has to be respected by both. The SRSG is more often than not an older person, a person with much more experience, and a political person who understands the political implications of what is going to happen. However, the SRSG does not necessarily understand the military implications of a particular military action. Therefore, the SRSG has to work in conjunction with the Force Commander, taking rather than giving military advice.

Third, more specifically with regard to command and control, there is a fourth level of command that can be added to those outlined by Gen. Agwai and that is, the command of a contingent in the mission, which in many aspects has direct control over the force. As a soldier, I do not understand why there should be so many chains of command. It would be preferable to cut the Gordian knot and concentrate on one chain of command. It is a simple solution which means removing all of the caveats that have been imposed. First, the UN has to impose its chain of command on anybody volunteering to contribute troops. That chain of command is no different from any other army’s chain of command: no company commander or soldier gives orders to a general. It is the other way around. In other words, as long as the chain of command is clearly laid down and followed in letter and spirit, and there is a force headquarters, a sector headquarters, battalion headquarters, company headquarters, and so on, there should be no problems.

The distinction that Gen. Bajwa made between control and command is fundamental. It is essential for a force commander to have command of his troops because in an adverse situation, every force commander has to create a reserve to tackle the situation. If the commander cannot move the troops because they are to be deployed only to a particular sector, or if the commander is not allowed to move the troops at all, then the commander cannot command. Therefore, the Force Commander has to have the authority and the backing of the UN to perform the duties that the force is deployed to carry out under the most adverse circumstances.
Finally, a small point on DDR – and I agree that DDR falls under peacekeeping; however, with the reservation that reintegration falls outside the realms of the capability of the peacekeeping force. More often than not, reintegration requires more funds and, therefore, the IMF, the World Bank, and other international financial institutions should also be part of DDR. The situation in the field is such that, while many are involved in demobilization and participate in DDR camps, it rarely means that they are reintegrated into the mainstream. Thus, the UN still has to give a lot of thought to this particular aspect.”

A participant from the floor raised three questions regarding the future of command and control, more precisely about the process, police, and cross-cutting issues of command and control. “First, on process the UN has invested quite a lot of time and effort in the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP). But what implications does the IMPP have for command and control from the strategic through to the operational and tactical level? Moreover, what implication does it have for the way in which the UN will do business in the future, given the throughlife system that is being developed?

Second, the emphasis that Mr. Stiernblad put upon de-emphasizing the FPU and emphasizing the need to really work on establishing the foundations for effective rule of law in the context of police reform is very promising. On this note, has DPKO yet identified the specific skill sets that a police commissioner would require to carry out rule of law work in post-conflict societies? This is an absolutely critical and fundamental requirement for success, and, unfortunately, current practice indicates that we have not achieved much progress since Sérgio Vieira de Mello raised concerns about the inability of the police deployed to Timor-Leste to work on rule of law issues. Moreover, is the UN command and control relationship of policing set out clearly, i.e. who the Police Commissioner reports to and works with, as well as his/her relationship with the SRSG? In some missions in the past, the Police Commissioner has been relegated to a lesser standing than the Force Commander, when in many respects the lawlessness of the situation requires peacekeeping to be as much about the police, if not more, than about the military. Finally, the main crosscutting issue concerning command and control is about the protection of civilians. Who is responsible for the protection of civilians, which impacts on all the elements in a police mission? Is it the SRSG or somebody else? Moreover, how can we ensure that all the efforts that go into the protection of civilians are coordinated to make sure that the Security Council’s mandates can be implemented more effectively than they have been in the past?”

Gen. Martin Agwai responded: “An area which I found very interesting in my last mission in Darfur, but one in which I have little expertise, is the formed police
units. There is a lot of theory with regard to policing in peacekeeping, but on the ground much remains to be done. Mr. Guéhenno touched upon some of these issues in his previous comments. There is no uniformity in the usage of police, and there is a need for more coordination and training. Some FPUs that were deployed to Darfur were virtually another wing of the military, and as such, brought an element of competition instead of complementarity. Why are both the military and police sent out to patrol? Does this not amount to a duplication of effort? I was under the impression that the concept for the protection of civilians and IDPs implies that police walk the streets and protect the IDP camps while the military provides an umbrella of security. But when all of us are competing for the umbrella of security and nobody is doing the real protection of the IDP camp, then there is a problem.

Another issue is that people come into the FPU without really understanding what role they play and how it fits into the overall equation? Thus, there is indeed a need for the Police Commissioner and the Force Commander to work together to smooth this relationship, and to work on a standard operating procedure (SOP) that covers everything. Currently, all compete to be seen, to be more influential, more powerful, and most relevant. This is not the aim of a mission. I am not claiming that the military has monopoly or seniority, but simply that somebody must take the lead. In a mission where no disarmament has taken place, where civilians are armed, does the political or the civil affair officer have the lead, or does the chief of civil affairs? When it comes to DDR, is the military in the lead? These are fundamental questions that we need to ask ourselves. There is nothing wrong with the SRSG being the head of mission and with the Police Commissioner reporting to the SRSG. It is not a problem for the military or any other person, as long as all components work in harmony, knowing where they overlap and where they work with each other. There has to be a common understanding between the components, between the police, military and the civilians.”

Gen Agwai continued: “While I agree with most of the points that Gen. Jetley raised, I would like to point out that my colleague did not apply a one-size-fits-all model, and that in some situations it can be a blessing to have the leadership of the mission coming from the region of the conflict. But if the leadership is not honest and does not act impartially and starts taking sides, then you have a problem. From my personal experience, the fact that I happen to be a West African who understands some Krio, helped me in Sierra Leone when people thought that disarmament in Kono meant fighting. Being able to understand the people of the region, we were able to disarm Kono without violence. People even began to call me ‘Pa’, and gradually we started understanding that the teeth and the tongue belonged to the same body, but sometime by accident the teeth will bite
the tongue. This being said, I totally accept the point that if we are not careful, instead of solving the problem we will become part of it.”

Brig.Gen. Jean Baillaud suggested: “With regard to the comment on the question about the link between the IMPP and command and control, I would say that it might have an important impact. The impact is obvious because the IMPP is also implemented at the mission level through the mission mandate and therefore will give rise to better guidance, better sequencing of action, better ways to identify how actions can be mutually supportive, all of which will certainly have an impact on the capacity of the mission. It will help to better integrate different actors and implement the mandate. It is not a substitute for other plans or the concept of operations; these still have to be developed in parallel in order to complement the comprehensive plan. Thus, I would like to stress that there is a limit to integration. Everything does not necessarily have to be integrated. There is still a need, especially in the mission in the field, to have a chief of component who is fully able to carry out his or her responsibilities.”

Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno commented: “When it comes to the question of Gen. Jetley on SRSGs, I fully agree with Gen. Agwai that, since it is difficult enough to get the right person, our hands should not be tied by nationalities as well. In the case of force commanders, what is needed is simply the right person for the right job, and someone who is loyal to the UN. In some cases, a personal regional attachment is a plus, in others it is a minus. We just have to be very pragmatic about it. As for the need for one chain of command, I could not agree more. The reality of the matter is that, when things get rough, everyone, including the developed and developing countries, every troop contributor, starts to reassert their national chain of command. It is simply a fact of life that can only be addressed in transitions to IMPP and to ConOps. We have to ensure that the troop contributors have been sufficiently and thoroughly involved in the development of the key elements of the ConOps, and the rules of engagement, and that they are prepared for what might happen once deployed. The contract has to be clear. Nonetheless, we have to keep in mind that, in multi-national operations, there is that national dimension. The less, the better, but it is a fact of life.

On the issue of IMPP, I very much agree with Gen. Baillaud. The difficulty lies in the articulation between the specific plans, or various components, and the broader IMPP process. Because when the specific issue of the use of force in peace operation is discussed, it has to be discussed as an iterative process. Often we look at it in the wrong way. We try to explain the problems encountered by missions in terms of a flawed military plan. But the problem is that the military plan is only as good as the political questions and answers that are raised by the political side.
In other words, we do not ask the right questions, and are therefore also unable to give the right answers.

We shy away from the hard questions, the ‘what if?’ Questions such as: ‘If you are given this task, what do you really need in order to implement it and what would the implications be?’ We do not engage in such an interactive process in a thorough manner. The protection of civilians is perhaps the best example. When the Security Council includes a sentence on the protection of civilians in the peacekeeping mandates, in one way it simply states the obvious. For troops in the field not to protect civilians, who are getting hurt, if they have the capacity to do so, would be unconscionable. It should not have to be ordered by the Security Council. It is ethical, it is very basic. The UN Charter begins with ‘we the peoples’, hence if the whole idea of a peace operation is not to protect the people, to ensure their basic security, then what is the point of a UN operation? We should just pack up and leave. So in that sense, it is all redundant, this protection of civilian business.

However, if the Security Council mandates an operation to make sure that no civilians get hurt in the country where the mission is deployed, it is nonsense. That is where the discussion on the protection of civilians and the discussion on IMPP, mission plans, and ConOps are linked. Because the ratio of forces that would be needed to ensure basic protection of civilians – and you know counter-insurgency theories, they are all based on the notion that the force, instead of fighting an enemy, protects civilians. And they come up with ratios like 20-25 soldiers per 1,000 civilians. So apply that ratio to the Kivus in DRC – 10 million, and you would need 250,000 troops. We do not have the necessary dialogue with the Security Council when we discuss protection of civilians. So in that sense, it is nonsense.

The reality is that the troops can be part of a political strategy that eventually would lead to a Congolese state where the army is not a threat to the population; where the state is the protector of the population, rather than a threat. That may require some military action, picking a fight that you choose carefully. But the fad of protection of civilians is very misleading, in my view. In conclusion, the SRSG is indeed the ultimate responsible for the protection of civilians, because it is the SRSG who has the come up with a plan for the mission that eventually allows for a government to be a source of reassurance for the population. Part of that plan will include the use of the military, and part of it will include the use of police units. All of them must have the trust of the population, will have to be professional, reassure rather than threaten, and be part of the political process of building trust between the population and the state. In other words, it is the SRSG who is responsible for the overall mission plan, which includes a
wide variety of tasks that have to be implemented through a variety of tools and actors.”

Gen. Patrick Cammaert added some comments regarding the military being only one component of the protection of civilians concept. “Any military measures should be discussed with the SRSG and the senior management team in order to avoid potential fallout for the humanitarian efforts. It does not mean that they have the prerogative to say no to protection of civilians, but it underlines that one has to discuss these issues, especially their consequences, and that it is the SRSG who has the overall and ultimate responsibility.

But then you see the political consequences that military action might have in relation to protection of civilians. For example, in November 2006, we were heavily involved in the operations against Mr. Nkunda. At the time, I discussed my plans with the SRSG and told him: ‘I have a number of plans in place, which may have very serious political consequences. Because come the crunch and Mr. Nkunda is doing all sorts of bad things threatening Goma, we will not have another Bukavu on our watch. That will not happen, and I have a number of measures in place to avoid it. However, some of them may have serious political consequences. So if it reaches that point, we will discuss over the phone or radio or I can even fly and meet you, so that we can discuss this very serious matter.’ Just to say that there is a continuous discussion. Returning to the issue of an extra layer of operational headquarters, I would argue against it because, first, try to get the right senior leadership who can deal with a delegation of political and military powers and could do a better job. When I was in the Congo running the divisional headquarters, I also saw the European force operating with their operational headquarters in Potsdam. I was extremely glad that we had a very flat layer of command, which allowed us to immediately jump to the strategic HQ here. On that note, a regional logistical headquarters might not be a better way of providing the logistic support in situations requiring rapid deployment. In my experience, mobile operating bases present many logistical problems. Two days here, seven days there, one day here, is a nightmare for the logisticians. However, it is often necessary and yields results. Having said that, I was fortunate to have all the necessary helicopter support, while Gen. Agwai had none. So, he was in a much more difficult position.”

Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno added: “On the issue of operational and intermediate headquarters in multi-national operations, where it is so important to have a close interaction with troop contributors, it would be a nightmare for the troop contributors. They would need to have military advisers or attachés at the strategic as well as at the operational level. And part of the responsibility at the strategic level is to make sure that we are on the same page with key troop contributors so
that both ends of the chain of command work. So I totally agree with Gen. Patrick Cammaert to have only two levels of command.”

Mr. Henrik Stiernblad suggested: “While the skill-sets for policing have been developed, many of them are now out-dated and should be revised, e.g. on internal affairs, accountability and police organization. A possibility would be for the Police Division to consider the work of the EU and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in this area, because they have developed a lot of job descriptions for the Kosovo mission.

The police commissioners’ reporting line is very complicated. In Liberia, I had three separate lines: to the SRSG, the Deputy SRSG for Rule of Law, and a technical reporting line to the Police Division in DPKO. However, it was not much of a problem, because if an issue was about political or security-related operational matters, I always turned to the SRSG. And I turned to the Deputy SRSG when the issue was of a developmental, rule of law, capacity-building character, rather than burning minute-by-minute decision-making issues. Thus all in all, there was no major problem in any area. The authority, command and control policy was flexible enough to be adjusted to overcome any problem encountered in the process. However, this assumes that the leaders are flexible and result-oriented in their thinking.

Protection of civilians is a task that lies close to the heart of any policing activity. This is not to say that it is an easy task, especially not in a conflict or post-conflict situation. But again, an executive mandate simplifies the matter. With a mandate like the one we had in Liberia, protecting civilians was very complicated for the police component because it amounted to assisting the maintenance of law and order. This meant working through the government to ensure that there was a functional police that responded in the way it should, a population willing to share information about gangs that were harassing, robbing, and killing people or raping women. The tools that can facilitate policing in these contexts relate to the basic notions of good information, criminal intelligence, and developing the whole range of police thinking and experience. But it is not easy to translate concepts into action in these situations, and hence much work needs to be done in terms of managing and translating them into results on the ground.”

A participant made two comments, one regarding caveats and one on protection of civilians: “First, based on the experience I have had in MONUC and in UNAMID, it is still difficult for peacekeepers in the field to understand what the caveats of the operation are. If the caveats are there to enhance the effectiveness of the operation, so be it. But often caveats are very problematic, and we need to investigate if they are actually enhancing the effectiveness of the operations or not? If not, then
they should be eliminated. Second, military officers, commanders, and troops are doing something about the protection of civilians, and the only question is if they are doing it right? Are we doing what the politicians want us to do? The military should not operate according to expectations but according to political instructions given by the Security Council and UN resolutions. If we equate the matter to the national level, the directives that are issued have to be clear, not feasible. This is the key here, clear practical benchmarks as opposed to feasibility studies. Commanders have to be able to brief their troops and derive objectives from clear mandates.”

A participant asked where civilians fit into the discussions on command and control in multidimensional peace operations. “While the troop contributing countries and police contributing countries are often mentioned, there is no reference made to civilian contributing countries. Is it that because civilians are not deployed as units into mission areas? Or is it a function of the numbers that would determine whether you have problems of command and control? What about the NGOs that are operating in the mission area? I was just wondering how I could relate this discussion to the work that civilians are expected to do in the field.”

Another participant noted that the critical need for situational awareness, information or intelligence that Gen. Agwai had mentioned was not only related to force protection. “It is also relevant to the protection of civilians and certainly with the challenge of robust peacekeeping, including how to deal with the networks of spoilers and the violence that are undermining peace processes. Does the UN have the capacity to provide the situational awareness, information or intelligence that is required in that context? Did you derive your intelligence from the JMAC? Is the JMAC competent? Does it consist of an existing team that was deployed to the mission, or does the UN need to invest in professionalizing this function? And if you do not have intelligence and your mission is simply responding and reacting to violent situations without proactively addressing the threat, then do we need to invest in professionalizing the JMAC function? The second question is: assuming we have the intelligence, do we have the ability and means to act on it? Gen. Dallaire had intelligence that there was a genocide in the making, but the political will to act did not exist. But if he had been given the green light, do we have the planning capability to mount a multidimensional military-police response required to address these kinds of threats?”

Mr. Guéhenno responded: “When the Security Council gives the directive for the protection of civilians, it transfers a huge responsibility to the UN Secretariat in terms of the strategic decision on how you get there. Hence, in a way, it just pushes the responsibility away from the Council, refusing to make strategic choices and leaving it to the Secretariat to prioritize. As for the civilians that are employed by
the UN in the missions, there is a difference between the civilians and the military who continue to be paid by their respective states. So, command and control is a military expression but in terms of authority, there is no doubt that the SRSGs have the authority over the mission staff employed by the UN agencies, funds and programmes, that is, the civil servants of peacekeeping. But this is a very different situation. The authority of the SRSG over civilians working for NGOs, however, is non-existent. They are independent and that works well. While there can be a dialogue to ensure that we all work in the same direction, it is important to distinguish between various categories of civilians.

With regard to the issue of intelligence and JMAC, there is a considerable amount of resistance to making JMACs effective, in my experience. UN missions should have enormous situational awareness and the JMAC should be able to provide them with that. In reality, this is not the case, and the issue therefore needs to be pushed continuously. In addition, there is the issue of mobilizing information or intelligence at the HQ level. For many years, the UN was reluctant to address this issue, but recently there is some progress as the OMA is looking into the matter. But it remains that the UN suffers a big disadvantage in this respect compared to other organizations like NATO and the EU. Rather than borrowing intelligence from those two organizations, it is important that the UN develop a stronger intelligence capacity of its own at the strategic level.”

Brig.Gen. Baillaud added: “The current intelligence capacity is very limited, but a step in the right direction has really been taken. If I look at it from the perspective of nations who place conditions for the commitment of their own contingents, as in the case of the SMC (which will be terminated in a few months). Our impression in the UN peacekeeping system of the SMC is that a very strong headquarters has been established from that cooperation. So if there is no restriction from the administrative side in terms of budget, we could have the capacity to develop something with a mission where we have a lot of latitude. We can take the example of MONUC, for instance, where a divisional headquarters was established. In case of the OMA, we have been enhanced by 60 per cent, but it still does not make us a big staff. However, the output is already justifying the current augmentation, but the HQ in New York has much less flexibility to develop capacities for command and control structures compared to the missions.”

Gen. Martin Agwai commented: “The problem of raising situational awareness and the fact that there is a shying away from the word intelligence has serious implications for the missions in the field. I will give you one example. Across the border from Darfur, in Chad, we had another peacekeeping force [i.e. EUFOR]. At times, we had to get information about the situation in Darfur from across the border, because they had facilities that we did not. They had things that we in the
UN did not have in Darfur. As a Force Commander, it is so important to have all available information to plan your operations. But we were just there, blind people in the mission. That is why I have talked about capacity and resources. If you give somebody a task, you must give him corresponding resources to achieve that task.”

Mr. Henrik Stiernblad: “Regarding the JMAC function, it is very important from a policing perspective. To understand the context you are operating in is always crucial, whether it is about reforming the police or building the state. If you do not understand the politics that surround the police, especially in a reform situation, you are actually a threat to the established and vested interests and agendas. If you do not understand those, then you do not know what you are doing. From an operational point of view, we need to become much better at identifying and understanding the threats that we are facing when we bring out the FPUs to deal with, for example, a demonstration. This is not currently the case. In many regards, we are blind. Even though UNMIL has been around for so many years, we have had to guess about the threats we are facing and the type of force required to address them. It cannot continue like this. It is a credibility issue relating to the earlier discussion about attracting additional police contributing countries. How can we re-attract the ones that we may have lost? Without an intelligence capacity we will not be able to do so. It is a decision-making tool, and we need such tools in order to be credible.”

Gen. Anis Bajwa commented on the question of situational awareness and a UN intelligence capacity: “After all, there are JMACs; only they are not functioning as well and as effectively as they should. The reasons are many. One weakness is that the policies, like the command and control policy, are simply sent out from HQ New York without any follow-up to ensure that they are followed up in the missions. In other words, their implementation is simply assumed or it is expected that missions will automatically ensure that they are followed in letter and spirit. However, in reality, it does not happen because there is not enough follow-up. A similar thing happened with the JMAC policy. In fact, some time ago Jean-Marie Guéhenno sent me to go and look at the JMACs in some of the missions, and we discovered that most JMACs were not functioning as intended. But that is just one point. Intelligence does not merely come out of a system that enables information analysis. JMAC is an analysis tool. But the most basic thing is collection. Where do you collect information?

United Nations operations are exceedingly poor, weak and ill-resourced, and in fact not resourced at all, for collection of information. So JMAC can at best collect whatever is available in the open sources, conduct some analysis of that information and provide its findings to the rest of the mission. But what the UN needs, if it serious about successfully making use of force, through effective
command and control, is to start thinking about convincing the member states that the operations also need resources for collecting information.

It was refreshing to hear our South African colleague talk like a true soldier. Okay, the military is given a task and then it just goes and does it. In that case, we need to know from the politicians what they want and expect us to do. There should be no caveats at all. Yes, we would love it if it was like that! Both missions and Headquarters would be very happy! But we need to be clear. It is the member states who place caveats, because they do not want to part with all the authority over their troops. And there is good reason for not parting with all the command authority. Just imagine if a member state said: ‘All right, we give all the command authority over our contingent to the UN,’ and then tomorrow the Member State wants the contingent back, and the UN responds: ‘Sorry, we are not sending it back yet, because we have the command authority to move this.’ So there are good reasons for limitations of command and control authority given to the UN. But I am not suggesting that what is given to the UN is good enough. No, it is highly inadequate.”
Chapter 8

United Nations and Regional Arrangements
Effective Mission Command and Control
– Issues of Relevance for Cooperation
with Partners in Action

Focus: How can command and control arrangements contribute to the success of multidimensional peace operations? How can enhanced interoperability strengthen their effectiveness?

Mr. David Harland, Director, Europe and Latin America Division, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

Good afternoon. We now have a great panel: Gen. Chikadibia Obiakor, UN DPKO; Mr. Stefano Tomat, European Union (EU) Delegation to the UN; Gen. James Soligan, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); and Mr. Sevyuile Bam, African Union (AU). We will talk about how command and control arrangements can contribute to the success of multidimensional peace operations, and how enhanced interoperability can strengthen their effectiveness.

I will not pre-empt the panel in any way, but only say that there are two dimensions to all of this. There are the arrangements within the UN and there are the arrangements between the UN and its partner organizations. We had a good session on the arrangements within the UN earlier. The challenge is that the command and control arrangements are relatively weak compared to a modern national structure, and what is weak becomes weaker in two contexts. First, it becomes weaker as the UN agenda diverges from the national agenda of the mission leadership of the troop and police contributing countries, and of the partner organizations.

One of the most dramatic experiences of my career was just last year when the Secretary-General, after much deliberation and hair-pulling came to a position on how to manage the crisis in Kosovo. It was really a very delicate issue, trying to hand over to the EU and introducing an interim administration, while promoting forces of moderation in Serbia. It turned out that this approach diverged slightly from the national positions of the SRSG and the Deputy SRSG. I have never had such a professional shock in my life as waking up in the middle of one
night and discovering that, precisely contrary to written instructions from the Secretary-General, they had chosen to launch an armed attack on a particular installation. Lives were lost. It was really a very dramatic lesson for me about the limits of command and control in certain contexts, and it speaks enormously to a partnership agenda. Make sure you know, when the going gets rough, who is on your side and how long they are going to be on your side.

The other intra-UN issue of command and control that we could explore is the weakening of command and control as the agenda between the UN peacekeeping mission and that of the Country Team and other partners diverges. I had a recent experience in Haiti where a certain approach has been taken involving the former President of the United States as a Special Envoy, and I was amazed to discover the Secretary-General’s Humanitarian Resident Coordinator taking an absolutely independent view, and not to say a view quite out of line with that of the Secretary-General. So we have a whole series of issues which broadly I think are well addressed within the New Horizons paper, and which could be very well teased out. Even more central then is how we deal with the partner organizations. Command and control is of course not really the term that applies, strictly speaking, because all authority relations with our external partners are almost, by definition, entirely ad hoc. If we are smart, we can shape these authority relations in ways that can contribute to international peace and security, in ways that we could not do alone, and which our partners could not do alone. For me, that was ultimately the great lesson of Kosovo. With the EU, we could create a stable environment that we could not create without them, and they clearly could not create it without us. But it is necessarily very ad hoc. It requires flexibility; it requires tolerance, tolerance for ambiguity, the great enemy of command and control. It requires imagination, the great enemy of large bureaucracies. So it is full of challenges. And here, first to unpack a quota of them, we have General Obiakor, and then we will turn straight to our panel.

Lt.Gen. Chikadibia Isaac Obiakor, Military Adviser, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

Good afternoon, distinguished ladies and gentlemen. I start by thanking the Challenge Forum for giving me this opportunity. Now as the Military Adviser and as former Force Commander in Liberia, I am privileged to share my views and experiences on the issue of command and control, as well as on interoperability. Certainly, these are very important issues among the challenges of today’s peace operations. This discussion is indeed timely and some of the points that I will make are solely mine. As such, they will not necessarily represent those that are held in the departments of peacekeeping or the UN Secretariat. Since the two
interrelated concepts, that is command and control and interoperability, are historically military, I also relied especially on the theories and material of experts on military issues, which recognize the cycles and precedence of authorities, and of course on the Capstone Doctrine.

Firstly, command and control is a vital issue whose requirements cannot be overstated. Secondly, command and control in multinational environments is best achieved through a working partnership with clear current coordination lines and decision-making parameters. And thirdly, command and control, to be more effective, requires ample resources and knowledge sharing, given that it must evolve with technology.

Having said that, and covering what scope I am going to deal with in articulating my discussion, I want to state that it is obvious that in the last ten years we have seen changes in peacekeeping, from when it was about 16,000 peacekeepers to now that you have more than 100,000 deployed. If given the chance, we shall be hitting the roof of 140,000. That is civilians, military, and police, and these men and women are spread all over the world as we speak today. I think they are in almost all time zones in the world.

Peacekeepers of today have also been made to operate in hostile and inhospitable environments, or environments that require multidimensionality as well as forces in full spectrum capabilities. This unprecedented development in peacekeeping has ushered in new requirements in a number of functions, with command and control being one of the most crucial, if not the most important. The issue that begs the question is, how do command and control arrangements contribute to the success of multidimensional peace operations? To answer this question, allow me a little bit of elementary theory. I want to state that command and control, in essence, is the exercise of authority and direction by a duly designated commander over assigned and attached forces for the accomplishment of a mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities and force multipliers employed by the commander in planning, coordinating and controlling forces and operations for the accomplishment of a mission. Command and control, in other words, refers to both the process and to the system by which the commander decides what must be done, and then sees that the decisions are carried out properly. Command and control works to avoid uncertainty and ensure operational tempo.

Now what is the rationale for command and control? Command and control is not unique from other military functions. Through effective command and control, commanders are able to do collaborative planning and synchronized operations, ensuring mission effectiveness. Effective command and control, and command
and control arrangements, enable commanders to use available forces at the right place and time to optimize the attributes of global vigilance that empower, thereby allowing decision superiority over adversaries. Good horizontal and vertical information flow, which is at the core of command and control, enables optimal decision-making. This allows a centralized control, which centralizes execution to provide an effective command of forces. And this is the basis for mission command as a style and as a strategy for commanding men and women. A robust command and control system provides commanders the ability to effectively employ their forces.

In his background paper, Mr. Guéhenno, argued that command and control arrangements in the UN are inadequate. This problem, coupled by overstretch and insufficient military capacities, is partly the source of the crisis facing the UN. I want to state here that I could not agree more with you. Indeed, there is merit in the observation that command and control arrangements are well structured in UN peacekeeping, while still leaving much to be desired. UN peacekeeping forces operating under varying national cultures defy the very basic military principle of means of command. The presence of permanent chains of command in missions, which link field contingents to their national headquarters, has been an impediment to current activities. Compounding this problem is the matter of the Security Council mandates.

There are ample examples of officers categorically refusing to carry out legitimate orders in crisis situations, pending clearance from their respective national authorities. That, in each case, was a challenging issue, and those challenges still exist today. The assertion that there is too much political control over the conduct of military operations in UN peacekeeping also needs to be examined. After-action and end-of-assignment reports received in the last couple of years are replete with examples giving credence to the observation made by Mr. Guéhenno. Of course, we will all have heard how the oversight function of mission leadership has interfered in the deployment of troops; especially in conditions and environments that require prompt action and a professional touch.

What are the trends impacting on command and control structures? Effective command and control is paramount in today’s peace operations. If you remove that, the potential for mission failure is greater, particularly in an architecture that has dramatically evolved and expanded into an integrated system of many elements. Apart from having the military, the police, the civilians, you now have other components in the system. This is coupled with complex tasks as exemplified in the mandate. A glaring example is that of MONUC where there are 41 tasks contained in the mandate. These mandates are expected to be operationalized within very tight budgets.
In the time ahead, UN peacekeeping may, and will likely, bear footprints of two priority issues – protection of civilians and robust peacekeeping. Given the predilection of the Security Council for such mandates, including the hybrid missions, which are missions with military, police, and/or civilian personnel from two or more entities under a single structure, they are one of the many trends that will definitely require us to improve command and control in the UN.

Now I will take a look at a few of those partnerships we have had with other organizations, such as MONUC, UNAMID, UNOCI, and MINURCAT.

Regarding MONUC, among the salient features of the collaborative engagement with the EU was a deployment of the initial operational capability in Kinshasa – I assume some of us were actors in this – with the bulk of forces stationed in Europe, and operational headquarters in Potsdam. In the summer of 2006, when DPKO and the EU conducted an exercise to test the readiness of a dedicated buffer force to react to a scenario, the required authorization from Brussels was only obtained after 12 hours. On a number of occasions, the consequence of a powerless command and control was felt. This problem was corrected at the end, as may be gleaned from the prompt support provided by EUFOR to MONUC troops in engaging the rebels.

Regarding UNAMID, the first Force Commander was jointly appointed by the AU and the UN. From that level downwards, there could be unity of command. The problem is that in crisis situations, the SRSG finds it difficult to perform, because he has to report to both the UN and the AU. Should there be a discrepancy or disagreement, I do not know which headquarters he would be turning to. So that is the issue of hybrid AU/United Nations.

Regarding Licorne in Côte d’Ivoire, a French battalion group made up of infantry, cavalry, transport, logistics, health service, joint civil-military action groups, etc. – was mandated to assist UNOCI in addition to ensuring the security of French and other foreign nationals. This is a model in which one country is in partnership with the UN. This worked. It worked throughout the period within the MOU because an MOU agreement was reached and signed, and people functioned within that MOU.

Finally, on MINURCAT, which is the latest of the partnerships we have developed as the UN took over from EUFOR in March this year. This relationship was one that gave EUFOR all that it required to function. It gave it a direction and it gave it authority when to disengage. The March 15 date was sacrosanct for EUFOR, and it was kept. However, there was no jointness in this relationship. Security Council resolution 1778 duly gave EUFOR a clear picture of when and how it was going
to leave. So the EU had no problem. However, the mandate for the UN mission never came until three months after the UN had taken over from EUFOR. That in itself imposed strain on the generation of forces, and it is an issue of command and control.

Now what are the ways forward? We have identified some of the problems, so what can we do to improve the arrangements? At the strategic level, we could do a number of things. First, we need further to enhance the sharing of information between TCCs, the Security Council, and the Secretariat; sharing of, in the early stages, operational ConOps, force requirements, and rules of engagement with the TCCs, in particular. Because we believe that if there is buy-in time for the TCCs, then you reduce the risk that they will impose caveats. Parallel command and control lines from contingents to their countries will be minimized.

An important lesson from peacekeeping is that the UN chain of command must be respected by TCCs and PCCs and other partners in order for operations to succeed. If national or organizational directives make it necessary for a contingent commander to divert from this principle, his superior in the UN chain of command should be informed immediately. Conversely, the UN should keep TCCs, PCCs and other partners totally and promptly informed about the situation in the mission. This can be achieved by making existing command and control structures credible. This is critical if there is going to be a change. If there is not going to be an acceptance of orders, then let the Force Commander or the mission leadership know.

Further, it is necessary to establish the responsibilities at all levels in the command structure, define communications and other logistics support procedures compatible with the needs of the mission. Command and control arrangements should also provide means for communicating with liaison teams and the selection of headquarters elements with which liaison is required.

I support that police and military elements of the operation must be fully coordinated and that their command and control tasks must be responsive and flexible, with authority delegated to the most appropriate command level. Leaders must have the right background and aptitude. We used to have problems in the transition between the police to the military, or military to the police. This must be defined and cleared so that we do not have problems in moments of crisis.

Deployment of homogeneous brigades, such as those in MONUC, also offer more effective and cohesive command structures. Perhaps we need to look at this paradigm more critically. Such involvement, or deployment, will not only address coordination issues flowing from language and cultural differences, but also problems relating to interoperability, which I will discuss later. This is not to
say, however, that we are endorsing a departure from the multiple deployments that we envision, different contingents coming together under one command. This is not a case of one size fitting all. If it becomes necessary to use homogeneous brigades, let us apply it. If we cannot go homogeneous, let us apply the other method of having combined contingents.

In some cases, there is a great need for a technical agreement between military components and missions, as well as forces of the UN and partner organizations. If adopted as an option, this has to be discussed at the appropriate level, agreements signed when possible, even before cooperation starts. Among other issues, the technical agreement should discuss what can and cannot be done, which in turn should generate a better interface mechanism.

What are the implications of what I have proposed? Enhancing command and control arrangements has its price, including budgetary implications related to establishing a liaison network, as well as additional training and training designs. These arrangements may require procurement of relevant technologies and infrastructure, and that is where the cost in itself comes in.

Interoperability is a crucial aspect of command and control. Interoperability is the ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to, and assist services from, other systems, units or forces, and to use the services in a way that enables them to operate effectively. Or simply put, interoperability is the ability of diverse systems and organizations to work together.

What is the rationale for interoperability? The need for interoperability in any operation cannot be overemphasized. Interoperability allows people, procedures, and equipment to operate together effectively and efficiently. For us in the military, interoperability is a vital enabler for effectiveness. In the aspects of communications, interoperability is one facet that assists in the seamless and uninterrupted flow of information. In the past, problems related to interoperability have hindered an integrated UN response at critical moments.

What is the linkage between the two concepts; command and control and interoperability? Interoperability is one of the three subjects, the other being sustainability and survivability of an interrelated command and control system. These three characteristics are critical to ensuring that forces or units have the operational flexibility, sustained combat support, and full dimensional protection. Flexibility, a key feature of interoperability, allows amassing or combining command and control systems in order to satisfy command and control requirements. Command and control systems should work in a complementary and synergistic fashion to avoid unnecessary duplication of functions.
What are the political dimensions of interoperability? To achieve interoperability we must devise some means of ensuring institutionalization. If we are to have interoperability, we should have the means to standardize and apply procedures which will also enhance command and control in the system. I wish to emphasize that extensive partnering and resource-sharing will be needed in order to get to this stage. Thank you.

Mr. David Harland thanked the General for his presentation and invited Mr. Bam from the African Union to speak, saying: “Several operations in Africa or with the African Union have been mentioned, and it would now be interesting to learn whether the convergence of command and control will help us, and if so, how it can be done.”

Mr. Seyyuile Bam, Head, Peace Support Division, African Union

Thank you. The African Union is a donor-dependent institution. We are entirely dependent on donors to participate in our missions. Our latest mission, for example, the AU Mission in Somalia is over 90 per cent dependent on donors. As a result, our leverage on our own mission is very suspect and extremely poor, because it depends on whether we have the available means to ensure that we are able to carry out what we want to do. To give you a recent example, the AU received a terms of reference from a donor which stated: ‘I shall supply you with equipment, provided that I, as the donor, retain the right of usage.’ We are still trying to find out what is ‘the right of usage.’

Second, donors inform us that they intend to provide equipment to the mission. They are neither providing it to the TCCs nor to the AU. They are providing it to the mission. These are some of the challenges we have in terms of how we exercise command and control. Invariably, then what happens in the mission area is that because there is such poor support from AU Headquarters in terms of mission directives and what needs to be done, the Force Commander, contingent commanders, and everybody else resort to their capitals for the needs that they have.

To mention an example, when a soldier gets injured in the mission area, we do not have the means to do medevac, so the troop contributing country steps in and does the medevac. This increasingly means that mission commanders invariably refer and report to their capitals. This is becoming a serious problem for the AU and it is an issue that we are trying to address.

In the future and in relation to the African Standby Force, we are trying to ensure that there is proper training that is going to be integrated. The African Standby
Force is a regional standby force that is ready to be deployed by the AU Peace and Security Council at a time of crisis. In order to overcome the process of command and control at that level, one of the first things that was done was to develop a common doctrine and a common training programme for the African Standby Force. These are some of the issues and approaches that we are dealing with in order to move forward and ensure that command and control is actually dealt with.

The second problem concerns the need to create and turn the command and control system into operability. There needs to be a strategic engagement between the policy decision-making bodies of the Peace and Security Council in the AU and our counterparts and partners inside and outside of Africa. We need to ensure that there is a common understanding at that level.

We are happy to hear that there is actually a realization within DPKO that we need to communicate and interact on this matter. One of the proposals which we are working on aims to ensure that there are interactive desk-to-desk sessions between the AU PSO Division and UNDPKO, which should help to advance those processes.

Finally, the issue of command and control has been reflected in the AU in the types of missions in which we have been engaged with our partners. First, the hybrid mission; while still struggling to define how we engage with the UN on this, a Joint Security Coordinating Mechanism (JSCM) has been established. Unfortunately, at this stage, the AU side of the JSCM is not yet functional. However, one of the objectives of the Mechanism is to actually deal with the very same problems and issues that Gen. Obiakor raised. The second issue concerns support missions. The UN is supporting the AU in UNISOM. The UN is providing a large-scale package of over $300 million. It has an impact on our command and control. Who does the Commander turn to when he needs something? Does he come to Addis, or does he go directly to the UN and say: ‘I need this for my troops’? These are some of the issues that need to be addressed and resolved. Thank you.

Lt.Gen. USAF (Retd.) James Soligan, Deputy Chief of Staff, Transformation for Allied Command Transformation, North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Thank you. Mindful of the specific task which was to discuss regional arrangements and issues of relevance for cooperation with partners in action, I will perhaps try to focus my remarks on how NATO and the UN can build on some of the discussions that we have had over the past day and a half. Thank you for including NATO in this discussion.
I will start out with several caveats. First, I am not an expert on internal UN command and control arrangements. So I will not comment on the internal pieces of command and control but rather look at it from an external perspective; how NATO and the UN can work together in some areas, particularly when there is a UN mandate and external organizations may expect to work together with the SRSG. In those areas where we overlap – like in ISAF, or cooperation with the AU, or in Kosovo – there are some expectations as those raised yesterday by Mr. Cockayne, Gen. Jetley, and others. The focus is here on where we overlap.

I will talk about three specific issues; first, some of the common challenges and common debates. We could have taken the charts that we saw over the last two days and changed UN for NATO, and I think you would find many of the same discussions and debates about command and control, about logistics support, about expeditionary or deployable capabilities, rapid response, integrated planning, information sharing, and intelligence sharing. All the organizations that are out there have the same sets of dialogues and discussions. I believe there could be some areas where we can leverage each other’s expertise and experience, both in the preparation phase and in the execution phase.

Second, certainly from an academic perspective there is a desire to separate peacemaking from peacekeeping from peacebuilding, and then organized crime from armed factions and spoilers. For the conceptual aspect of thinking through problems, thinking about them in discrete ways, is useful. However, when you go to execution, they all happen at the same time and they overlap, and therefore the strengths of the different organizations that we bring together in the same space need to be complementary and they need to be dealing with all of those issues at the same time. It does not mean any one issue deals with all of those factors, but in fact, you cannot separate organized crime from some of the spoilers or some of the armed people trying to prevent the implementation of a peace agreement.

The separation of the missions often overlaps and is simultaneous, and the separation of the threats is an artificial challenge, which in many cases forces us to sub-optimize the agreements. Only by working together, only by partnering on security, rule of law, economic development, can we achieve our mandates. NATO is having the same discussions that the UN is having, so the question is how do we benefit from each other’s work and avoid duplication? There is only one set of nations, we only have one set of forces. There are lots of competing priorities and responsibilities as we go through this process.

Third, some areas of opportunities that we might be able to partner more effectively in order to leverage some of the experience or scar tissue gained from leading these
kinds of operations. There are areas of comparative advantage for each one of the organizations, from peacemaking, to peacekeeping to peacebuilding. Certainly inside NATO, with a new Secretary General, a new Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation from France, and a new strategic concept, this is a great time for the UN and NATO to discuss how we can work together more effectively. NATO uses a term called the ‘comprehensive approach’, focusing on the military support to a comprehensive approach. In Afghanistan, for example, there are many actors in the same place. With that common vision, common purpose, who is out there coordinating, aligning, synchronizing, not necessarily commanding, but who is the coordinating function for all of these different actors that are all working in the same space? It has been broadly agreed that most organizations, certainly NGOs, international organizations, the EU and others, do not want to have NATO as the lead in a comprehensive approach. Having said that, NATO is contributing to a comprehensive approach and is a partner in the process.

Which is then the right organization to lead that comprehensive approach? Many people look to the SRSG to call meetings, in which all actors can participate, align, and work in a common way. Referring to the command and control UN SG’s report on peacebuilding discusses the coordinating role of the UN. However, this is not functioning, or in many cases we do not find that the SRSG is taking responsibility for that coordinating function. Hence, other organizations without the moral authority or mandate to bring everybody together are looking for a leader. Again, it is not a command relationship. It is a coordination responsibility, and one way of possibly improving the effectiveness of the UN is for the UN to recognize that it does not have to do all the 41 tasks discussed when there are other partners. The UN just has to coordinate those responsibilities.

Lastly, much is really about the informal and formal opportunities for engagement, cooperation, and leveraging best practices. Over the last several days, I have noted down areas where the UN can really benefit organizations like NATO through joint protection teams and the Integrated Mission Planning Process. This is a look at very internal UN integrated planning processes. Would you want to include other actors in the theatre? The AU missions, Kosovo, and Afghanistan are all good examples of that. Sharing databases of leaders and subject matter or regional/cultural experts could really help the organizations that contribute. In terms of training, whether it is police or military training, there are lots of synergies between what NATO is currently doing and the UN. Some of the distributed learning, modeling and simulation capabilities could be made available to the UN. Certainly, DPKO and NATO could strengthen their partnership in a number of areas, e.g. outreach. In conclusion, I believe there is much we can learn from each other. NATO can bring a lot to the discussion with regard to lessons learned,
intelligence and information sharing. We have a very strong capacity in planning that could help training and preparation, and the kinds of standards that could be used by many nations. I have probably opened a few boxes for further dialogue. Thank you.

Mr. Stefano Tomat, First Secretary, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union to the United Nations, European Union

Given the level of the audience, I will not go into detail on the European Security Defence Policy and how it works. We have deployed 24 operations, of which twelve are still deployed, and we are working together with the UN, NATO and the African Union. We are the ‘new kid on the block’, which is both a good and a bad thing. The positive aspect is that we are learning a lot from others, while the negative aspect is that we still have much to learn.

Taking into account the paper by Mr. Guéhenno and earlier discussions, I will discuss the EU chain of command before considering some elements of partnerships. The main characteristic of the EU chain of command is that the political and strategic control is still carried by EU member states, the Council, the Political and Security Committee (PSC), and other subcommittees that follow the military and civilian aspects of every operation. The PSC is helped by a committee of experts, but this does not mean that the operation can be run solely through committees, which is why there are specific chains of command: one for the military and one for the civilians.

As Mr. Guéhenno’s paper indicated, there are probably two main differences between the UN and the EU. First, the role of the operational headquarters, and second, the role of the senior political player of the EU, the EUSR, which is different from the role of the UN SRSG. The EUSR is the top official in a particular theatre, but he/she is not in the chain of command. This implies that he/she can fit in the chain of command by contributing to overall coordination. However, if complicated issues are raised in the theatre, we have created a crisis management board, which meets in Brussels under the auspices of the Secretary General and brings together all the different players trying to find how to overcome the differences, or how to define strategies. It is quite complex and takes some time, but that is how it works.

Regarding coordination with other partners, and as Gen. Obiakor indicated referring to the Congo, the EU chain of command had a parallel chain of command, meaning that the EU forces remained under the EU chain of command. I personally think it worked very well. The EU deployed within the UN framework,
and we were just there to implement a specific task. It could have been better. Gen. Obiakor also gave the example of the transfer of authority from one chain of command to another, such as EUFOR to MINURCAT in Chad and to MONUC in the DRC, which are our latest undertakings. We started with the International Police Task Force (IPTF) and European Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia in 2003, which were a bit complex. We learned a lot of lessons, so good mechanisms have been developed for these recent deployments. First, we started interaction between the two Secretariats quite early in order to assess jointly the situation on the ground and have a political understanding of what was going on. We did joint analysis. Contacts at headquarters level and in theatre between planners, with visits between New York and Brussels and to the theatre. Overall, it went quite well. Lessons learned in template form should be applied in the future, templates that can be used off the shelf in case of a similar situation. Regarding partnership, the EU maritime operation is an interesting example of how to work with others. The EU is working together with NATO, but also with single Member States operating in the area, as well as organizations like the International Maritime Organization (IMO)). The operation is still going on, and how it has been created should be used in the future in order to understand how we can work better in these kinds of situations.

On the way forward, I will focus on EU-UN cooperation, since we have been working together quite extensively. First, a template ready-to-use should be developed; i.e. documents that can be used off the shelf in case we have to work together, if there is a re-hatting or something similar. This would help us avoid making the same mistakes. Second, I would like to propose virtual task forces. The EU has created task forces since 2003, that is groups of officials with different expertise, such as military or rule of law. They get together and work as a team in the planning phase, as well as during the conduct of the operation. The UN has developed something similar in the form of the Integrated Operational Teams (IOTs). Can we imagine some regular virtual meetings by VTC or similar between the IOTs and our task forces to look at the same problem from different perspectives?

Finally, I will mention the creation of the External Action Service under the High Representative. This implies that the political part of the house and the operational side are going to get together. It is a new instrument, a new institution that the EU is acquiring, and we all hope that it will help the organization to be even more capable of conducting all the different aspects of crisis management, from conflict prevention to development at the other end of the spectrum.

Second, there is the creation of the Crisis Management Planning Directorate, the CMPD. Until now, the European Union has kept a clear division between civilian
and military operations. Now, with the creation of the CMPD, we are bringing together civilian and military efforts in the early planning of operations. Crises are more complex than just military or rule of law; more so in an operation that goes from pure military to peace-building in its different phases. In the early planning of every deployment, we will work with military and civilian planners together under a single structure, under a single chief, and this will probably be helpful for the EU to provide an integrated response to today’s peacekeeping.

Discussion

A participant asked Gen. Obiakor about two points, which he had considered fundamental to success: homogeneous teams and interoperability. “What are the political challenges to achieving a homogeneous and interoperable UN force, given that interoperability often means technological and cultural parity? Second, regarding hybrid operations and the difficulty of making them function. You mentioned the AU and the UN being two heads of the same operation, requiring them to consult. Why not give operational command to the AU through a directive from the full command authority of the UN, with normal accountability back to the UN?”

Gen. V.K. Jetley enquired: “If the environment is extraordinary and if the current command and control structure is complex and not working, what should be our response? We need to come up with something different or consistent with the requirement that can facilitate our job. For example, one could have the command models, such as a uni-force command model, bi-force command model, tri-force command model, and a multi-force command model. By uni-force, or single force command model, within the perspective of a benign peacekeeping mission, the entire force comes from one country, and hence it will also facilitate the deployment of a force commander. I am mainly focusing on the military component, not the police, because we have heard our esteemed colleague, Mr. Henrik Stiernblad say that, as such, police do not face acute command control related problems.

If we have forces from two countries deployed in a regular peacekeeping mission, the Force Commander should come from the larger contributor. If we have tri-forces, three forces from three countries, and the deployment was a robust peacekeeping mission, command could rotate. In the fourth scenario, a multi-force command model employed in a peace enforcement scenario, the command could be under a joint authority. If command is not vested in a single person, it can be a consensus-based command structure. If the command structure is improved, so shall the communication.”
Lt. Gen. Obiakor responded by recalling the Under-Secretary-General (USG) answering a question about selection of a force commander. “The USG discussed mathematics used by the TCCs to equate their contributions to the number of force commanders they should have in the field. The USG said: ‘yes, your approach, your argument is there, but we have 120 TCCs. If the first one takes five, the second one takes three, the other one two, then the first five TCCs will take all the Force commanders, and that is not the spirit of the United Nations.’”

The proposal of joint command would be difficult, because all contingents would go back to their countries to get directions resulting in confusion. Regarding interoperability and a homogeneous type of command as we have in MONUC, you have the various contingents standing up like the Indians and the Pakistanis. Like we used to have in Liberia, with the Nigerians, Bangladeshis, Pakistanis, having brigade size formations – that sometime works. But where you cannot have that level of force coming from one country, then of course there is a need to combine contingents to create appropriate formations.”

Mr. David Harland added that the UN’s diversity is its strength. “Our most successful missions include Liberia and Haiti. In Liberia, we had Swedes and Nigerians co-deployed. In Haiti, we had Senegalese and Brazilians co-deployed. And each of them brings something and the strength of the UN is being able to use each part in its most effective way.”

Amb. Jacques Paul Klein: “You have all had to deal with logistics problems. In other words, who is responsible at HQ for giving me a communications system that is actually interoperable, so I do not have to send runners, use smoke signals, or beat drums to communicate with my contingents? Who is going to give me the weapons systems so that I do not have South African, Namibian and Russian vehicles, Pakistan with Chinese and American equipment that gives my logisticians nervous breakdowns because of tyre problems, and why can we not get gasoline in West Africa, even though Nigeria exports oil? The Americans generously provide Pakistan with M113 personnel carriers, and then the wonderful Pakistani Brigadier says: ‘Sir, we have a fuel filter problem.’ I said: ‘Let us talk to our American colleagues.’ ‘I am sorry, Pakistan is under sanctions!’ I said: ‘Oh, really? Let me understand this. You voted for this mandate. You supplied them the damn equipment, and now you are telling me you cannot do spare parts? Welcome to the UN!’ So you send someone to Munich on a plane to buy these fuel filters to put in the M113s. Those are the kind of practical problems I think that we need also to think about.”

Lt. Gen. Obiakor: “That does happen in the UN. The UN is not too sophisticated in the way it does this. That is the uniqueness of the UN. In the first instance, there
are various types of contracts that units get into, or TCCs get into, which means that if you deploy with all the equipment you need, you have the responsibility to maintain it.”

Amb. Klein: “What if they call you from the port and say: ‘We are here with the vehicles. Unfortunately we cannot unload them. They have no tyres.’?”

Lt.Gen. Obiakor: “UN rules stipulate that, if you bring in equipment and it does not function, you do not get reimbursed, and the TCCs know that. Technology has advanced to the extent that most communications systems are interoperable. With digital technology, most of the computer systems are interoperable, and besides the UN itself has its own contingent and it has its own equipment. The UN establishes its communication systems, which will function even if one unit’s systems are not functioning. In missions, you can have three layers of communications system. You have a satellite system, a microwave system, and a military communications system. No contingent deploys without full complements of equipment. We have tried it once, by shutting off the UN system for a whole day. We worked with the systems of the units and it all functioned. The process of getting units inducted into the mission area takes care of some of these problems. If you do not meet the requirements, then you are not inducted, and if you are inducted and you cannot sustain it, you do not get your funding.”

Mr. David Harland asked General Cammaert about his experience with the EU. “My impression of the Congo is that we can work with separate chains of command. The question is whether or not there is unity of effort or a coherent final goal. I think we all had some doubts about EUFOR, but perhaps Gen. Cammaert can enlighten us.”

Gen. Cammaert responded that there was some good and some bad news. “The good news relates to Op Artemis by which EUFOR supported the UN for three months, although it was very much confined to the village of Bunia. So Bunia was for the EU Force. EUFOR in Kinshasa was to help the mission in case something went wrong during the presidential elections, which was a different ballgame. When problems arose in Kinshasa, UN forces rushed to the scene, EUFOR forces rushed to the scene, and then you had a three-star and a two-star general dealing with a company problem, sorting out command and control. They did not hit each other, they were friends and spoke French together. But it was certainly not ideal. So when you say everything went well, there is still a lot of room for improvement. Unless you very clearly define which is your area, my area, and so on, it is a recipe for disaster. On top of that, I was with my Division Headquarters at Kisangani. The majority of the problems were in the east. The caveats of EUFOR were such that if I had a problem with its presence or actions in the east, EUFOR was not
going to help me out there. And then there were the caveats related to the C-130 aircraft; I think there were six, and none of them could fly at the same time, because each had its own caveats – one in the morning, one in the afternoon, one at teatime, one in the evening, etc. For the Force Commander of EUFOR it was a nightmare. During a debriefing in Brussels, I got into a collision with some of the EU member states, because they said it had stopped, which I was not too sure about. So there is room for improvement.”

Lt.Gen. Obiakor agreed. “There is a way forward, and I think I showed it. If we really want working partnerships, they have to be based on agreements and procedures enabling implementation of the tasks or obligations we have to discharge. If we are ready to partner, then we must work out the rules of the game well ahead of time, and, if need be, practice them before the real situation occurs. The way it is today, we are not getting it right, because there is no unity of command. A group of people make decisions, which is fine. But there should be a flow. Because time is of the essence, particularly when we are talking about protection of civilians, and at a time when resources are limited. We must plan, have the structures, have the procedures, and then, very important, credible leadership. That is where the robustness comes from; robust thinking, robust application.”

Mr. Stefano Tomat: “A lot depends on how you look at the operation. Maybe I am too positive and optimistic, but for me, first of all, what was the scope of all this to have directions? Second, I agree there were problems, small problems, but at the end of the day, the commanders were there to solve the problem. From the EU side, and this is internal EU, we had this idea of over-the-horizon, which was sort of implemented. Then, obviously I agree completely with you on everything. Was it perfect? No. The EU was deployed with very limited territorial coverage and a series of caveats. But I have to say, even in that situation, on the ground, both sides, both chains of command, worked very well. You say because of partnership; maybe, but also because both the UN and the EU were committed to the goal, which was to reach the election in an orderly fashion. So at the end, probably it was not perfect, it was not by the book, but I would say it was a positive conclusion.”

A participant asked Mr. Bam about cooperation and interoperability. “What are the key lessons we learned from the only on-going hybrid operation, i.e. UNAMID? And I hope you will be as candid as you were in your initial intervention.” Second, a question for Mr. Tomat: “With the establishment of the Crisis Management Planning Directorate, which is a very positive development, Brussels-level capabilities will now be integrated. But when it comes to actual integrated operations in the field, how is the EU progressing?”
Mr. Bam responded: “The African Union has not undertaken any lessons learned exercise with respect to UNAMID on the two issues of interoperability. However, we conducted exercises at the level of regional standby forces, which also dealt with this issue. We are currently conducting a regional exercise for East Africa, after which we shall look at lessons regarding interoperability. As regards SADC, it has one of the most heterogeneous systems. Three countries are using old Soviet weapons systems, while other countries are using western systems. There is a need to ensure that there is proper understanding of what needs to be done. Just to give an example, perhaps one that people in the navy will understand better. When a helicopter has to land on the deck of a ship in the Soviet system, it comes directly from the back. In the western system, it comes from the side in from the right. In short, no lessons from UNAMID at this stage, but with the Africa Standby Force we are learning lessons, which we shall be sharing. We are going to have a command post exercise in June/July 2010, where some of these issues will be covered.

Regarding cooperation, a joint security coordinating mechanism was set up between the UN and the AU precisely to facilitate interaction. Unfortunately, on the AU side, this body has not yet been fully functioning. But this is where the issues of cooperation will be managed. Adding to what the General was saying; yes, in theory we are supposed to appoint the Force Commander, but I am the head of the Peace Operations Division of the AU, and he does not report to me. He reports to UN. That is the reality we are having at this stage.”

Mr. David Harland directed a question to Gen. Agwai: “With regard to the hybrid mission, would we do it again if we could turn back the clock? Would we do it again, but in a different way, or would we avoid such a construct in the future? Please, tell us.”

Gen. Martin Agwai: “Well, would we do it again? I would say yes. There are challenges. But the challenges match the objectives. When I deployed to Darfur in July 2007, when the force was still AMIS, I found challenges that were unique to the AU. But as we metamorphosed into UNAMID, we expected that the UN component would solve every challenge. But it became more problematic. It is just like Gen. Cammaert said; there is the positive side and the negative side. The positive is that the UN has been in the peacekeeping business for over half a century. The AU is just starting. There is no military setup at AU Headquarters. As a Force Commander, I would never get any military guidance from the AU. I think there can never be two captains on one ship, so there can never be two organizations that are equally representing each other, in an organization. But each of the organizations has its strong points, and those should be capitalized upon. For example, without the AU, UNAMID would never have taken place,
because the UN got into Sudan and Darfur on the back of the AU. Politically, the AU has helped that mission to survive. Without the AU, the events of March this year would have spelt the end for UNAMID. But because of the AU, UNAMID is still on the ground. So yes, politically, I would do it again, because the alternative would be not to do it at all. As regards the operation itself, there was virtually no guidance of that from the AU. I do not blame them, because they do not have the knowledge. How do you run an operation without anybody at HQ knowing anything about the military? In contrast, the UN Office of Military Affairs has, I think, over 100 officers, and they are still in short supply, and we are asking for more. At the AU, you do not even have one officer to run it. And where you have an office with military officers, they are tied to a particular operation. So you cannot get those who are working on AMISOM to support those who are in UNAMID, because there is no coordination.

The other aspect I want us to really realize is: who are the imagined peacekeepers? Who are the imagined troop contributors? I would say that the Asians and the Africans will continue to be the imagined ones. How do you give them the capacity, especially when we are talking about five stand-by brigades in Africa? UNAMID has exposed some of the Africans to UN peacekeeping through its hybrid nature. Today I think I can stand tall and say I have gained a lot of experience that can help other Africans who may be facing similar challenges, and so can others. So I see a hybrid mission as a grooming stage, as a capacity-building mechanism, for the Africans who will be at the forefront of maintaining peace in Africa. I am not saying that African problems are only for Africans. But I am saying that Africans will be at the forefront to address African problems. What we can do is to provide them the capacity and the capability to do it. And I think hybrid is a step in the right direction. But the problems relating to the rest of world has to be solved globally.”

Mr. David Harland: “Great, thank you very much, Gen. Agwai, for your thoughts on the hybrid concept. I have to say, within DPKO, I opposed UNAMID, so that is interesting for me to hear. Now, Stefano, a question for you on how the Lisbon structures will work?”

Mr. Stefano Tomat: “The Civil-Military Planning Directorate (CMPD) will certainly help in the planning of civil-military operations, in the sense that the planning of the EU is similar to the schemes presented this morning. We will have a fact-finding mission, then there will be a first document called a crisis management concept, which will be done under the CMPD structure. It will address the crisis as a whole. The rest of the planning documents: Conops, military strategic options or police strategic options, will follow from these crisis management concepts (CMC). The future will see more and more civil/military coordination in the planning phase
and consequently, we hope, on the ground. Up to now, the EU has tried, (and the most-oft quoted example is FYROM, where we moved from a military to a civilian intervention), to Commission actions aimed at future development for FYROM within the EU. It is an example that is often used and sometimes a bit abused, but okay, we can say it is a good example. Obviously, it does not always work so well. For example, if you look at the field, we have two operations in DRC; one doing police and one doing SSR. They report to different structures in Brussels, which might look a bit confusing. When these two operations were launched in Brussels, the structures were different. This situation has remained until today, but with the creation of CMPD, the structures should be merged.”

A participant asked about ambiguity and imagination, especially as regards the nexus between diplomacy and peacekeeping. “Many issues we have spoken about relate to measures that can help us achieve greater clarity when it comes to command and control. The political context in which a mission takes place is of course essential to achieve that clarity. This brings us to diplomacy, which is to a large extent concerned with managing ambiguity. Mr. Harland, it would be interesting to hear about your experiences from the Kosovo transition that you talked about earlier. Are there some practical lessons, not just when we talk about the broader political context, but some actual practical lessons that we can use from the interaction between the EU and the UN in managing this type of transition?”

Mr. Harland: “The key partnership is precisely the political and diplomatic one. You can survive Operation Artemis in Congo, a very bizarre operation parachuted into a much wider operation with its own chain of command. There was a situation slipping into what could easily have been genocide. Mr. Guéhenno got in direct contact with the national government, which would respond immediately within a limited context, provided it got everything it wanted. This was one big achievement of Mr. Guéhenno’s tenure. Another one was Lebanon, which in a way, was the same. Again, a group of western countries saying, yes, we will play, but play by completely different and idiosyncratic set of command and control rules. You can make the mission work with separate command and control. What you cannot make it work without is a certain sense of a common political objective, which the UN can provide.

Kosovo was made for failure and explosion. The EU was massively divided between those who recognized Kosovo and those who did not. The UN Security Council was massively undecided. Every major player was gridlocked. The Serbs had a radical government supported by violent nationalists who were funneling in weapons. The Kosovo Albanians were funneling large amounts of weapons. They were all getting ready to fight. Yet, there was a commonality of vision, and
frankly, what mattered in the end was a minimal degree of trust, not even between the politicians, but between the topmost diplomats – again I am looking at Mr. Guéhenno, but many comparable ones like Serrano on the EU side. And a common strategic goal to manage down the crisis; a willingness to swallow your position on recognition or non-recognition; and to figure out how to ease a transition from UN to EU to take the sting out of the Kosovar anger; and how to create a framework with which Serbia could deal to create political circumstances in which moderates who would not funnel weapons would emerge. And for me, the moral to that story is that, for these partnerships to work, they are going to have to work at the diplomatic and political level. We can deal with separate commands and control. We will have mad issues, such as those raised by Amb. Klein regarding runners, car tyres and so on. But without the trust at that level, we are not going to get anywhere. And I think one of the great roles for this Challenges Forum, in fact, can be to do what Lt.Gen. Obiakor has called the ‘deep preparation’ for that.”

Mr. Tomat completely agreed with Mr. Harland “What made a difference on a politically instigated issue like Kosovo was the trust between the two organizations. There was trust between the UN and the EU structures to work together on the issue and find a solution. The objective was to present Member States with a package that was acceptable to everybody. The work was done diplomatically by the players on both sides, and it ended up pretty well in this case.”

Lt.Gen. Obiakor commented on the notion that sometimes there is no peace to keep, and that partnerships are required to deal with such situations, which will also require transition to peacekeeping. “As long as we do not have a partnership with that kind of capability, we will never get to peacekeeping and peacebuilding. A glaring example is the Horn of Africa. We cannot go in because there is no peace to keep. But is it to say that mayhem is not being committed? I told the story of writing 60 notes verbales to 60 nations for them to indicate if they would participate in a mission in Somalia. For four months there was no sound. It was dead silence. Up to this moment, it is only a few countries that have indicated that, should there be an operation, they would like to participate.”

A participant from the UN Refugee Agency asked a question about the link between to the issue of protection of civilians and command and control issues. “UNHCR is one of the few agencies that has protection as part of its mandate, so we spend considerable time elaborating what it means and what the priorities are from a humanitarian perspective. But in terms of interpreting it in the UN context; what is possible and what are the priorities for UN military? If the regional organizations could give some sort of advice on factors, including command and control structures, that you consider to be important for ensuring consistent interpretation of protection of civilians on the ground. And perhaps
also the implications, perhaps, from the AU of their recently finalized convention on IDPs.”

Mr. Bam: “The AU is organizing a workshop with the assistance of the Australian government on the protection of civilians, during which we will draft a policy for the approval of our principals so that it gets integrated into our processes. The whole issue of protection of civilians is fundamental to peace operations. That is why operations get deployed in populated areas. Otherwise, we would be sending them to sea. They are there to protect civilians. It is an underlying assumption that one of the core virtues of an operation is to protect civilians. That is why, even in the case of AMISOM, when we were reviewing the mandate, it is included there as well. We are not talking about buildings. We are talking about persons. This is what we understand. So yes, it is an assumption that it is always there, but we have realized it is always underplayed. It is never actually interrogated; what are the implications?”

A participant intervened proclamation: “It will all be revealed at the next Challenges Forum! I have seen protection wrestled with, from both a military perspective, in the field and also from the humanitarian perspective. All Member States have a huge responsibility to make sure that if their soldiers, police, and civil agencies are working under a mandate that includes protection of civilians, we have to do more than we are doing at the moment. Even out of sight of the UN, in places like Afghanistan, where there are no UN troops. Gen. McCrystal talks about population protection. This is a huge international issue, with great respect for Jean-Marie [Guéhenno] with whom I agree 99 per cent of the time. It is more, it is not a fad. It is a real situation and certainly Australia is really welcoming the opportunity to work closely with the AU on this, because Australia needs to learn a lot more. I was in Timor in 2006, when a small international security force came in. It was not a protection of civilians mandate, but protection of civilian was what it was all about. Military, police and humanitarians on the ground did not really understand what to do at all. So there is a lot to be done.”

Mr. David Harland: “Great, a sobering message. I will ask Jacques Klein, because in a way, the most integrated operation ever conceived by the international community, that I can think of, was UNTAES. And yet, the least integrated international enterprise I have ever seen was the system in Bosnia and Herzegovina led by the Office of the High Rep. Jacques Klein was at the point end of both of those. So, I wonder if you have a final reflection for us, Jacques, on the partnership issues?”

Amb. Klein: “First of all, I think we need to compliment everyone in this room when we think about what we have talked about now; the lack of unity of command,
the dysfunctional equipment, the linguistic problems, the financing issues. That we have actually done as well in these UN missions as we have is remarkable!

We did not talk about the other UN family where you, as the SRSG, are given a mandate by the Secretary-General that you are to go out there and create an integrated mission out of all the other UN agencies, whom you then invite into a room and find that there are many more than you thought; some, you do not even know what they do. But they are there! And then you say to them: ‘The Secretary-General has asked me to tell you that we are all going to work on the mandate together. Here is the mandate. And each of you, I hope, will play your respective role.’ These actors are probably much more comfortable with Charles Taylor than they are with the new mission! That is a serious issue.

Have we ever really resolved that the UN agencies also realize that it is not only the military component that has to be part of this unity of command and working the mandate together, but they as well? On Bosnia, you are quite right. Between the OSCE, UN, SFOR and all the other agencies, it was a very weak structure with a head who had very limited command and control over everyone else. And then I found one thing kind of disappointing; it is not only that each of these agencies had a mandate, but also each of the personalities heading these respective agencies had a mandate. That is at times rather hard to overcome when you are trying to work in a collegial fashion. So, there is no perfect model. If I ever do get another mission, looking around this room, I have identified maybe fifteen people who I would love to have with me, and I think we could actually do something useful and constructive.”

Mr. Harland: “Great, thank you. I will not attempt to summarize, but it showed us there are still lots of challenges left out there. However, it seemed to me if there was a theme, we have been filling up a basket with ways in which, as the General says, we can develop a deep partnership, one starting with convergence of doctrine, one with the development of common systems, one with exchanges of desk-to-desk contacts and so on. And we will spell them all out for you in our follow-up paper.”
Chapter 9

Concluding Session of the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations 2009

Invitation to the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations 2010

H.E. Mr. Gary Quinlan, Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations

Thank you very much. It is very nice to be here, and I would like to welcome fellow excellencies, Challenges Forum Partners, and ladies and gentlemen. On behalf of the Australian Prime Minister, Prime Minister Rudd, it is a great pleasure for me to be able to invite you to the 3rd Challenges Forum next year, which will be held in a town called Queanbeyan in Australia from 26 to 28 April. It is a small city that was founded, for those who know Australian history, by a former convict and pub owner in 1838. The name Queanbeyan is derived from the Aboriginal word ‘quinbean’, which means clear waters. It is established on a river.

I would also like to extend a preliminary welcome to next year’s Challenges on behalf of the Honourable Dr. Mike Kelly, who is our Parliamentary Secretary for Defence Support. Unfortunately, Mike was not able to be here this week, but he certainly will be an ever-present person at next year’s Forum. He has had a long association with Challenges and is very much looking forward to hosting next year’s event. His own town, of course, is Queanbeyan, which is the capital of his electorate. I should point out that this is purely coincidental, of course.

You can expect to find the official invitation for Challenges to arrive in February, but since many of you here today will hopefully be making the journey to Australia, I want you to mark the dates 26 to 28 April in your diaries now, and obviously I would like to encourage you to spend a bit of time looking around Australia generally.

As one of the early Partners of the Challenges project, Australia, is much honoured to be hosting the Challenges Forum next year. Clearly, we do value the way in which the partnership brings comparative advantages and experiences from this diverse membership to improve best practices in peace operations. The partnership
may have no formal authority, but it has another, probably more important, organic authority, and its composition and nature enable it to influence and assist. Australia remains a strong advocate of this, and we want to continue supporting this in the future.

The actual programme for next year has yet to be finalized with partners and through the Challenges Coordinators and Secretariat at the Folke Bernadotte Academy. However, I understand there is general agreement that the theme will focus on protection of civilians which seems a particularly relevant and timely theme. Along with many other countries, Australia has actively promoted the need to enhance protection regimes in peace operations, and we are very keen to see this important issue extended to the critical area of conflict prevention.

Ahead of the Challenges Forum next year, from 3 to 5 March, Australia and the African Union will be convening a symposium in Addis Ababa on the protection of civilians, and subject to the agreement of the African Union, we are hopeful that the outcome of that symposium can be shared with Challenges Partners in April. You may know that we are doing some work with the African Union in terms of development of doctrine on protection of civilians.

Australia is also keen to consider the protection of civilians in association with progress being made to enhance the rule of law in peace operations, and of particular importance to Australia has been the importance of the central role of policing in peace operations. As part of Challenges 2010, we are looking to facilitate a visit to the Australian Federal Police Facility in Canberra which is the home of the International Deployment Group which comprises 1,200 police on permanent readiness for deployment to peace operations. This is the only international deployment group of its type.

Challenges 2010 will be hosted by Australia’s newly established Asia-Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence. The Centre’s founding Executive Director, who has been present this week, is retired Maj.Gen. Mike Smith, who was selected to head the Centre specifically because of his UN experience, his leadership of Australia’s largest humanitarian NGO, and his association with a number of universities and think tanks. Since our Prime Minster opened the Centre last November, and this has been a very innovative, interagency initiative for Australia – I was the Prime Minister’s National Security Adviser and Foreign Policy Adviser at the time we opened it – it has already established its presence in the field of conflict and disaster management. I am particularly pleased that a key focus of the Centre is directed towards enhancing the UN’s effectiveness in peace operations, and I am very hopeful that Mike and his team will be frequent visitors here in New York, as well as to UN field missions.
I would also like to acknowledge the presence here of retired Maj.Gen. Tim Ford. He is a former UN Military Adviser and Chief of Staff of UNTSO. Gen. Ford remains actively engaged in improving UN training, and I am delighted that he is assisting the Centre and that he will be an important part of Challenges next year. I also understand that Andy Hughes, who is Australia’s Deputy Police Commissioner, and who, very recently, stepped down as UN Police Adviser will also be contribute.

Just prior to Challenges, on 25 April, there are ceremonies nationally throughout Australia, in fact in over 3,000 towns in Australia and New Zealand to commemorate Anzac Day, the Australia-New Zealand Army Corps. This day commemorates the landing at Gallipoli on the Dardanelles Peninsula on 25 April 1915, together with British, Indian and French troops, Ghurkas, and indeed, the first Jewish brigade to take to the field since the war against the Romans in AD 70, for those interested in history. The landing ended in retreat, withdrawal, extraction, evacuation, but it has become an important part of the founding of the nations of Australia and New Zealand. Almost 3,000 Australians and New Zealanders were casualties on that first day of landing, and since then we have commemorated the loss of all Australians and New Zealanders in wars, including in peace operations overseas, on that day. It is a more important day to Australians and New Zealanders in terms of its overall significance than 11 November, although 11 November of course is also important.

To conclude, I would like to offer my congratulations to all those who have been involved and responsible for making this a very successful week, and we intend to give you an equally successful week when we see you all next year. Thank you very much.

Concluding Remarks

Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Challenges Forum Patron / Former Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations / France

I certainly would not want to summarize this whole Forum, which has been extremely rich and achieved exactly what the Challenges programme is all about. That is, creating a partnership between countries who may be very different in their outlook, but who are all committed to peacekeeping, and who are prepared to discuss it not superficially, but to go to the heart of real issues. I think the discussion we have had in these two days definitely illustrated that.

I just want to extract maybe a few points rather than summarize. In a way, what struck me was one of the first presentations by the Center on International
Cooperation about the volume of operations. I would say deployment of military forces is used to support a political process. I use that careful sentence to make the point that certainly I see the difference between what is going on in Afghanistan, which is not peacekeeping, and what is going on in peacekeeping operations. Nevertheless, there is a commonality in the sense that in the two situations, as different as they may be, there is a sense that force is not used in a traditional sense to overwhelm an enemy. There is a realization that politics will be a very important part of victory, whatever way you define it.

What strikes me is that most armed forces in the world have not trained for that situation, and right now we have more than a quarter of a million troops that are doing precisely that. We are discovering that this exercise in mixing force and politics is infinitely more complex than people usually realize. The variation between forces and politics can be ten to 90 per cent. It has all shades of grey in that, but it is infinitely more complex and, frankly, listening to the discussion, in a pessimistic moment I had a feeling that the international community is way ahead of itself. That it is undertaking something that is infinitely more ambitious than the degree of coherence, cohesiveness, unity of purpose that presently exist. There is some danger in that situation. The gap is great between a very complex ambition and an international community that frankly is more fractured than what would be needed for success. I would want to illustrate that with three examples.

The basic principles of peacekeeping are consent, self defence and impartiality. Today, we experience that these principles raise new questions.

Regarding consent, yes, we do agree that you are not going to force yourself into a given situation, but consent can be manipulated, it can be pushed. The force can be a way to help consolidate consent. Consent can also be withdrawn. Consent is evolving. We see all shades of grey now, when it comes to consent. From those who consent as we launch the mission, to those who withdraw their consent, to those who never consented, but are on the margins so they can be ignored. We do not have any clarity on the issue.

Regarding self defence, is it wise in situations where there are spoilers to wait until they shoot at you before you respond? That is a purely reactive posture. Any military would tell you that what is wise is to have the initiative. This is a tricky situation.

Regarding impartiality, what does it mean when we are addressing intra-state conflicts?
The United Nations is an organization of states, with a natural bias to support the sovereignty and authority of states. When we are mediating between a fragile state, whose legitimacy is questionable and whose modus operandi may be questionable, and various rebel groups, do we have to be the auxiliary force of that state, or do we need to keep the capacity to mediate? There is no easy answer to that. Yesterday, Alain Le Roy noted MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is experiencing difficulties with regard to all three basic bedrock principles of peacekeeping, and we know that there is more than what meets the eye.

The second basic principle that is under question, and we discussed it, is the very parameter of peacekeeping. We discussed Security Sector Reform, DDR, peacebuilding activities that may be integral to the success of the mission. How should the peacekeeping mission relate to them? Are they an afterthought or are they a critical element of the process? We are not clear on that. We need to build consensus.

Lastly, on protection of civilians I would agree with Gen. Smith that I went a bit far. Of course we all should believe that civilians are the centre of our effort. If we are not there to help people who have no weapons, who are the victims, what are we there for? At the same time, and that is where my annoyance surfaces, is that protection of civilians as such does not give you a strategic direction, because the gap between the resources and what would be needed to ensure full protection of civilians is just too big to fill. So it leaves open the whole discussion on how you get there and that is why it would be very useful to go deeper into the issue at the next Challenges Forum.

Confronted with all these tough issues, what needs to be done? I think this is a good start, since we need to have deeper discussions on command and control arrangements. We need these discussions, because peacekeeping succeeds or fails depending on the capacity of the Security Council, while the troop contributors and the Secretariat need to be on the same page. If there are gaps, it will not work. The command and control arrangements, the balance between the executive role and the ownership by the various actors of a strategy, are essential. Otherwise, we have caveats, restrictions, second thoughts, ambiguities; all of which will make us fail. Beyond the discussion we have had today, the whole question of the use of force needs to be thought through much more than it has so far. In the previous meeting, I mentioned Gen. Rupert Smith, who has written on the utility of force. We are grappling with the issue and do not have the full answer today - we need to do more.

Third, and linked to the previous point, the importance of the issue of intelligence and situational awareness to understand the potential of spoilers need to be further
There is a military dimension to that question, and there is a political one. How much damage can they make? That is the military question. Are they susceptible to negotiation? That is the political question. We need much more of that. We discussed it, but we need to go much deeper into how we organize ourselves to understand the situation we are thrown into.

Fourth, there was an interesting discussion on police, launched by the former Police Commissioner of UNMIL, that needs to be further pursued. We have to realize, as was said, that there is a big difference between policing in one’s own country and transferring knowledge to another country, and we are just in the infancy of that. This is a new frontier for peace operations where we need to go much deeper, emphasizing quality as opposed to quantity.

Fifth point on what could be done, the Security Council sits at the top of the chain of command. We say, and I will continue to say, that we need to have much more clarity from the Security Council on what the strategy is. I have my doubts about the possibility of having full clarity. In those complex peace operations, as was said by David Harland at the beginning of this session, a measure of ambiguity unfortunately may be necessary. Now, the danger is if those who launch the operation do not participate in the ambiguity, so to speak. Apart from all the reasons mentioned for the participation of the decision-makers in the implementation of decisions, it is important that they take part in the ‘sausage making’. That they are part and parcel, with their feet in the mud, of a peace operation, because it is too complex, too fluid, too ambiguous to be managed without direct participation.

Sixth, on partnership and what we discussed this afternoon, I was very interested in what General Soligan from NATO said regarding the demand for the United Nations to play a coordinating role. This is a very interesting and very constructive point and we need to examine how it can be operationalized. When I look at the situation in Kosovo, the relationship between the SRSG and the KFOR Commander has worked reasonably well on an informal basis most of the time. I think there is an avenue there that needs to be pursued.

One caveat, though, as we bring more organizations together, we should only do it because we think that the whole will be bigger than the sum of the parts. Frankly, the danger, as seen in a hybrid mission, is that, instead of making the whole bigger than the sum of its parts, it may just dilute accountability and responsibility. There is always a risk for the UN that the member states will call on the UN in order to dilute their own responsibilities. When they call on two organizations it may be a double dip, so to speak, in terms of dilution. That is a mortal danger for peace operations. It has to be built on trust, responsibility, and a sense of ownership. I am all for partnership, provided that each organization really feels responsible
for its commitment, and that the member states of that organization do not feel that they have just pushed the issue to the organization, but are drawn into the operation by the engagement of their organization.

The last point may be the most critical. When I was in charge of peacekeeping, the most critical decisions were probably the leadership decisions. A mission stands or falls with the quality of its leadership. In a way, that was the point that David Harland was making. It is all about trust. When you have people reporting to you in whom you trust, and who have the trust of the partners and of the people they negotiate with, it can make a huge difference. If they do not have that quality, you can refine the command and control arrangements, and you can do a lot of things, and it will still not work. In this area, frankly, we can do much better. Gen. Nambiar raised the question of whether we are in a position to fire incompetent SRSGs or force commanders or other senior leaders. Obviously, there is a major political issue there, but it needs to be raised with member states. Because at the end of the day, the issue is whether the member states, when they entrust the UN or any organization with an operation, whether they just push it to the organization or whether they feel it is still their operation. If they feel it is their operation, then they have to be serious about the leadership of those operations. They need to offer the best leaders, and then if they do not measure up to the task, the member states need to support the organization when it tells them that they should pack up and leave. That is difficult, but in a way it goes to the heart of the relationship between member states and organizations. Do we use the UN because we think we will be more effective working together? Or do we use the UN because we do not know what to do, so we push it to this beautiful organization, but which comes from the planet Mars, and that creates a safe distance between national responsibility and the tough realities on the ground?

These are the points I wanted to raise. I will leave it there, and look forward to the gracious invitation by the Australian Ambassador. I would also like to thank the Government of Pakistan, the Government of Sweden, and the Folke Bernadotte Academy for this very successful meeting. I think this commitment from countries with different perspectives, but which have the same passion for peacekeeping, is what really makes it possible, because normally we should fail much more often than we do, and if we do not, it is because of the commitment of people who see the importance of peacekeeping. Thank you.
Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Amb. Hussain Haroon, the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations, is in Pakistan and the President of the National Defence University, could not come because of commitments at home. So I have the privilege to represent Pakistan for these concluding remarks. After Mr. Guéhenno’s excellent and eloquent summary of the proceedings, there is not much for me to say, except to thank everybody who has come to take part in this event. First of all, I would like to thank the Government of Sweden, the Permanent Mission of Sweden here in New York, and of course the Folke Bernadotte Academy for the partnership with Pakistan in arranging this event. This Forum did meet the goals set out. Very valuable contributions have been made by the panellists and by others in the house, who have been part of this event. Thank you very much to all of you for having taken the time to come and be here on this occasion.

It is amazing the range of issues that we have covered; partnership with regional organizations, partnership between the member states and the United Nations, command and control, accountability, etc. Most of these issues are not new. They have been the subject of discussions here in the United Nations, between the Secretariat and the member states, among the member states, in international settings, and even in national settings. However, the extraordinary thing is that, despite all the difficulties and problems, United Nations peacekeeping has emerged over the past decade as a fairly successful venture and as a method of addressing conflicts, which is acceptable to a growing majority of member states. So that brings me to the conclusion; perhaps we are overly self-critical when we are discussing what is not right or perfect about peacekeeping. At the same time, it is good to be overly critical, because only then will we keep on making progress towards finding solutions.

Amb. Quinlan has invited us to the April event in Australia, and he was able to reassure us against the dangers of snakes and spiders. Following the event in Australia, hopefully the next event will take place in Pakistan, in October next year. I am not as confident about announcing that event, however, because the snakes and spiders in Pakistan are far more venomous. Unfortunately, the security situation in my country is not very good at present. The Government and people of Pakistan are trying very hard to overcome the insurgency by the Taliban and the on-going spate of terrorism. We hope that the situation will improve, and we will all be pleased to welcome you to Pakistan. So thank you very much, once again, ladies and gentlemen and thank you, Folke Bernadotte Academy and the Government of Sweden.
Closing Remarks and Looking Ahead

Ms. Annika Hilding Norberg, International Coordinator, Challenges Forum, Sweden

Thank you. I would like to start by speaking to our Partners in Pakistan and regarding what Maj.Gen. Bajwa just mentioned. We are, indeed, very much in great debt to the efforts of Pakistan in addressing the challenges that you have in and on the border of your country.

Based on a joint decision, we were sad to postpone the Challenges Forum 2009 in July. We are, however, also optimistic – just like you – and therefore we look forward to revisiting the issue of hosting the Challenges Forum in Islamabad. It is just a matter of time. And when the circumstances are ready, we will be ready. So we are very much looking forward to that.

Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, partners and friends, it is my privilege to bring this 2nd International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations to a close. Over the past two days, we have reflected on, sought to tackle, and, I would argue, developed our thoughts on our chosen theme: A New Horizon for Peace Operations Partnerships – What are the Next Steps?

We have had a wide-ranging dialogue on some of the key challenges facing peacekeeping today. Or as our Challenges Forum Patron, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, has put it, how do we most effectively orchestrate our efforts? We have explored the peacekeeping/peacebuilding interface, looking at the challenges posed by the gap between mandates and mandate implementation, as well as lessons learned regarding support to the rule of law and security sectors in the early peacebuilding phase. Further thought needs to be given to how key activities in these sectors are prioritized, sequenced, and delivered in the immediate aftermath of conflict, and we hope that the Challenges Partnership can contribute some further research and analysis to this effort. Our discussion on command and control highlighted the strong impact that these arrangements can have on the success of peacekeeping, and the important proposals made in the background paper regarding modification of planning processes.

We also reviewed progress made this year with regard to the quality of consultations among the Security Council, the Secretariat, and the troop and police contributing countries, and examined how the base for contributions to peacekeeping can be expanded. That session highlighted the need for further dialogue on how to make mission planning more inclusive, as well as changes to a number of other policies and practices. For example, Brig. Muhammed Feyyaz addressed the partnership
perspective from the point of view of the need for a more integrated approach between military and policy, between the developed and developing world. So it was indeed rewarding to learn that there was united support from our diplomatic, research, and practitioners’ panel of United Nations, Japanese, Pakistani, and British speakers of the need for, and proposals for, more integrated assessment mechanisms.

We are pleased that our French partners have proposed to hold a meeting in France next year to discuss the issue of robust peacekeeping operations and mission planning. Further, we are delighted that the newest Challenges Partner, Egypt, will both be hosting the Challenges Forum in 2011, as well as the third annual meeting of the G8 Global Peacekeeping Operations Capacity Building Clearinghouse in Cairo in December. This meeting will focus on the New Horizon and will address several of the challenges and recommendations highlighted in our sessions over the last two days.

As you are aware, the UN Secretariat has undertaken, in the New Horizon process, to engage member states in dialogue on a number of issues, many of which were also the subject of recommendations made in the background papers and studies for this conference. It is our hope that Challenges Partners, together or individually, as well as others, will step forward in the coming months and offer to host or fund some of the proposed discussions and studies, in order to move forward the United Nations Secretariat’s efforts as clearly outline by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr. Alain Le Roy, and the Under-Secretary-General for Field Support, Ms. Susana Malcorra, in the opening session.

Earlier today, Mr. Guéhenno reminded us that not only is all politics local, so is peacekeeping. If I may add, that also applies to the Challenges Forum. We bring our local and regional experiences to our common global table. Today, we may not have an instant global impact, but step by step, and through all of our investments into the Challenges effort with different expertise and various perspectives, I would argue that we are making real progress. The Challenges Forum 2009, thanks to your engagement, contributions and interventions, has taken our cooperation to the next level.

I would like to say a word about our concepts and doctrine development work, which we are carrying out in response to a DPKO request for assistance from Challenges, and which is being coordinated by Maj.Gen. Robert Gordon. A paper prepared by Maj.Gen. Gordon outlines the background and status of our concept development work. As you are aware, Challenges will not be developing any actual guidance; that is of course the responsibility of the DPKO. Rather, the project aims to distil key considerations that senior mission leadership must take
into account in their decision-making. The concepts development working group has already met three times since January and has produced preliminary drafts. These will be further refined in the coming months and we expect to meet twice, one of which will be kindly hosted by our partners in South Africa, the Institute for Security Studies, before presenting our work at the next Forum meeting in April in 2010 for comments and considerations by the broader international community.

As Senior Adviser Lt.Gen. Nambiar said, we need to do what we can to prevent the marginalization of UN peacekeeping, as an effort and as an option. It will also assist the UN to be a credible and effective partner for the people in need, as well as to international partner organizations in the field, as represented by our distinguished panellists this afternoon.

Excellencies, dear colleagues, we are very much looking forward to gathering again in April 2010 for the next Challenges Forum in Queanbeyan. Australia is a longstanding partner of Challenges, and an engaged, proactive contributor to peace operations. The focus of the 2010 Forum on the protection of civilians is a subject that both Australia and not least Maj.Gen. Michael Smith, the Executive Director of the host organization, have prioritized for a long time. So I am sure the Forum will be rich and productive.

We are also looking forward to both keeping the dialogue with our partners in Pakistan on the future Forum in Pakistan, as well as the Challenges Forum in April 2011 to be hosted by our partners in Egypt, the Cairo Regional Centre for Training for Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa. We hope the Challenges Partnership will continue to expand, bringing in new perspectives and experiences. This will allow us to continue to raise, and tackle, key challenges of peace operations. New ideas are needed; but, as both the Permanent Representative of Japan and Fatemeh Ziai suggested, often we do not need new mechanisms, but rather to enhance and make better use of the ones we have.

In conclusion, I would like to express my appreciation, once again, to our partners in Pakistan for co-hosting this event and making it such a great success. I would like to express our thanks to the Permanent Representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Haroon, for his effective and resolute decision to support and co-host this event in New York. As Maj.Gen. Bajwa mentioned, Amb. Haroon had to return to Pakistan, but we have, as you all know, been generously hosted by the Acting Permanent Representative, Amb. Sial. Three days of our work in the beginning of this week was held at the Permanent Mission of Pakistan. I would also like to thank Maj.Gen. Anis Bajwa, Brig. Feyyaz, our new Challenges point of contact at the National Defence University in Islamabad, and Col. Dogar at the Mission
here in New York, as well as all their colleagues for their invaluable contribution to this effort.

Second, I would like to express our appreciation to our Challenges Partners, without their perspectives and expertise there would be neither the dialogue nor Challenges outcomes. We are also greatly indebted to the distinguished representatives of the United Nations, in particular, Mr. Alain Le Roy, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, and Ms. Susana Malcorra, Under-Secretary-General for Field Support, as well as their staff and colleagues, the facilitators, the panellists, presenters and, not least, excellent expert authors of the background studies and papers. All of you greatly enriched our discussions. I would also like to thank you all for responding to our invitation to make this an interactive discussion, and for your thoughtful questions to and dialogue with the speakers.

We are delighted and most grateful for the unique and active contribution to our efforts by the Challenges Forum Patron, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, who kindly spent much time advising us on the programme and the substantive issues of this meeting. Senior Advisers Gen. Satish Nambiar and Gen. Robert Gordon, and Research Advisor Fatemeh Ziai, have also been invaluable to our effort. Our thanks also go to the Swedish Ambassador and the Permanent Mission of Sweden here in New York, and to my Challenges colleagues at the Folke Bernadotte Academy, first and foremost, Challenges Project Officer, Anna-Linn Persson. I would also like to express our thanks to our important Associate Coordinators in Sweden, who contributes to the Coordination effort with their valuable diplomatic, military, police, and prison and probation service expertise and resources.

Dialogue is critical if we hope to have a shared understanding of the areas of peace operations that need review, strengthening, and modification. We hope that Challenges will remain at the forefront of these efforts, and look forward to your participation in future Forums. Thank you again for your participation and invaluable contributions to the Challenges Forum 2009 and see you soon in Australia! Thank you.
ANNEX 1

Gender Analysis

Dr. Louise Olsson, Researcher and Project Leader, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden

Introduction

Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the primary responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security (UNSCR 1325)

The Challenges Forum in New York addressed the on-going reform of multidimensional peace operations in direct relation to the UN’s continuous efforts to develop its operations. As part of the UN efforts, the Organization has taken it upon itself to strengthen the integration of a gender perspective in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009) and 1889 (2009) on ‘Women, Peace and Security’.\(^{39}\) Starting under former USG Jean-Marie Guéhenno’s leadership and supported by the Gender Unit of the Best Practices Section, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations has continuously developed aims and procedures to improve gender balance and enable the mainstreaming of a gender perspective throughout peace operations. As pointed out by USG Guéhenno in 2005, however, there are several challenges, and progress on UNSCR 1325 depends on many more actors than just the DPKO.\(^{40}\) That the challenges to fully integrate the resolutions remain was also evident at the Forum. Although discussions centred on the reform of UN operations, UNSCR 1325 was not an integrated part of those discussions. This paper will therefore reflect on the importance of UNSCR 1325 for the Challenges Forum. This is further developed by exemplifying the relevance of three of the central themes at the Challenges Forum: a) troop and police contributions, b) mandate implementation, and c) protection of civilians.

\(^{39}\) When referring to UNSCR 1325 in this paper, it includes the follow-up resolutions of 1820, 1888 and 1889 which further develop certain aspects of the original resolution on ‘Women, Peace and Security’.

The importance of UNSCR 1325

As pointed out by Amb. Amjad Hussain B. Sial at the Forum, “[w]e also have to be mindful to check any factors that compromise a mission’s operational effectiveness or focus with respect to basic task of peacekeeping.” This underlines the centrality of implementation being fine-tuned enough to fully consider what factors affect operational effectiveness. The fact that both the affected population and the armed parties will consist of both men and women who play different social, political and economic roles is one such important factor, which UNSCR 1325 brings to the fore.

In general, two main misunderstandings of UN Security Council resolutions on ‘Women, Peace and Security’ exist. First, UNSCR 1325 is often assumed to present a completely separate “issue” or new assignment area. At a time when assignment after assignment is added to already stretched and underfunded UN peace operation mandates, the apparent addition to an already too long list of tasks naturally meets with resistance. Second, UNSCR 1325 is assumed to deal only with the importance of increasing international female personnel. While improving the gender balance is a key component, UNSCR 1325 should be seen as pointing to the need to better adapt operations to the factual situation on the ground. In effect, situational differences between local men and women mean that a peace operation is going to affect them both and affect them differently. Importantly, effects occur whether an operation applies a conscious gender perspective or not. If a conscious gender perspective is utilized, the operation has the ability to reach the intended effect rather than ending up with an unintended one. To address this factual situation, UNSCR 1325 underlines the need to gender mainstream operations:

“...the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programs, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programs in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality.”

The mainstreaming policy is based on the formulation of the UN Charter, which states that the UN cannot discriminate between men and women and that equality between men and women is a central end-state for which the UN should work.

41 Originally adopted by the Economic and Social Council in 1997.
This does not mean, however, that a UN operation should set out to create “instant equality.” Rather, an operation is obligated to ensure that it does not discriminate or unintentionally make a situation worse for men or women. The goal should be for the operation to improve the situation for both men and women. Thus, UNSCR 1325 is in line with the general peace operation notion to “do no harm.”

The relevance of UNSCR 1325 for peace operations exists from the operational headquarters down to day-to-day implementation in the field. To get an overview of how implementation is affected by UNSCR 1325, this paper categorizes UNSCR 1325 (and the following UNSC resolutions) based on “content” and “level.” There are two central dimensions of “content”: 1) the participation of both male and female personnel; that is, the degree of representation of men and women (what we sometimes refer to as gender balance); and 2) the integration of gender-specific aspects into the daily work of an operation (i.e. gender mainstreaming).

Representation and integration operate on two “levels”: 1) the internal (organizational) which means how the UN peace operation organizes its work to realize UNSCR 1325; and 2) the external (how to reach the objective in the host society), which relates to the manner in which an operation addresses practical situations in the field in order to reach its objectives of peace and security. There are, thus, several components to implement UNSCR 1325. Outlined, UNSCR 1325 affects the work of an operation in these areas:

### Framework: UN Peace Operations areas affected by UNSCR 1325

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Representation</th>
<th>Integration</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal</strong> (i.e. internal organization of the Mission/Operation)</td>
<td><strong>Work Structure of Missions/Operations:</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Recruitment and Equal Opportunities:** | • Training  
• Analysis  
• Planning  
• Reporting  
• Evaluation and policy development |
| • Recruitment of male and female personnel – all functions and levels  
• Work environment  
• Access to resources and material |
This paper will reflect on the three themes of troop and police contributions, mandate implementation, and protection of civilians. If we observe these themes through the above framework, we can better understand how they relate to UNSCR 1325. The questions of *troop and police contributions* can be considered in relation to *internal representation*, that is, the participation of both male and female personnel. We know from research that representation relates to how an operation can interact with the host population and the importance of gender mixed units for addressing the protection of all civilians. *Mandate implementation* relates to *external integration*, that is, how the operation addresses the area in which it operates in order to achieve its mandate. Gender mainstreaming is central to consider in this respect. Last, but not least, the paper will conclude with reflections on a practical example of what the resolutions state on *protection of civilians*. Protection of civilians is a specific part of how tasks are executed in *external integration* to ensure a gender-aware approach. Given the adoption of the follow-up resolutions 1820 (2008) and 1888 (2009) and the appointment of the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Sexual Violence, this last area is central to UN peace operations.

**Troop Contributions, Mandate Implementation and Protection of Civilians**

**Troop Contributions**

The Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr. Alain Le Roy, stated: “We also appeal of course to attract more and more female police officers because that helps to protect the women in the field. I shall relate that to the
previous question on Darfur. One of the things we are doing also to protect civilian of course both men and women, is again our presence. We have increased our presence in the camps. And what makes a difference when we are present 24/7 as we do in the Kalma camp and other camps, is that it increases the overall perspective on Protection of Civilians both for men and women.”

Representation, more specifically increasing the number of female personnel in field-based peace operations and at all decision-making levels of an operation, has been on the agenda since the 1990s. This is captured in UNSCR 1325. For example, it states that the Security Council:

Further urges the Secretary-General to seek to expand the role and contribution of women in United Nations field-based operations, and especially among military observers, civilian police, human rights and humanitarian personnel (UNSCR 1325).

The UN has set the goal to reach 20 per cent female personnel in its military and police components. In August 2010, the rate was just over 3 per cent. With the exception of a few contributing countries, such as South Africa and Ghana, which send female military personnel, there is more progress for the police than the military. By September 2010, the number of female police has just increased to 8.7 per cent, with Bangladesh, Gambia, Ghana, Namibia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Pakistan, India and Rwanda providing female police officers to several UN operations. There have also been attempts to increase the number of women police by deploying female police units. For example, India deployed an all-female unit to the UN operation in Liberia. As identified by the UN Police Adviser, Ann-Marie Orler, there are several reasons for increasing the number of female police personnel: “Increasing the number of women is not just about tackling sexual and gender-based violence. …More generally, the presence of female police officers provides trust and confidence in the police. Female police officers play an important role as security providers, mediators, investigators and trainers in reconstructing police services around the world. … They have a major impact as role models for the populations whom they serve.”

While there is progress, the question of improving representation has been on the UN agenda since the mid-1990s and, thus far, the number of women in the military and police components sent to peace operations has only marginally increased. The complication is two-fold. First, as discussed at the Challenges Forum, there are but a few states that provide troop and police personnel which strain their resources. Secondly, even if the number of troop and police contributing countries could be increased, the total number of active women in the military and police forces around the world is still limited. This relates to the general male domination
of these professions. While this domination is slowly changing, the problem underlines the dependence of the UN on national developments.

In relation to representation, it is also central to recall that it is directly related to local representation. As stated by H.E. Mr. Henri-Paul Normandin, “If I just may add my own editorial comment on 1325, which goes a little beyond peacekeeping. … Yes, there are many building blocks and, and a number of actions that have been taken on 1325. But there is one area of 1325 where there has been next to nil progress, I would say. And it is the participation of women in peace processes and peace negotiations. When you look at the numbers, the number of women participating is abysmally low. And I think that the international community, including the UN Secretariat, all those involved in peace processes have to take this issue much more seriously. End of the editorial.”

The question of who gets a voice – and thereby gets to influence the direction of implementation – is thereby also related to the next focus area of this paper on multidimensional mandate implementation. This important point was raised by Mr. Ihab Moustafa: “Who else during the UN presence on the ground needs to come on board because we need to avoid duplication, and we need to make maximum and optimum use of the very minimal resources for all of these needs in post-conflict situations that are available to the international community. That continues to be the struggle.”

UNSCR 1325 underlines the importance of considering women’s organizations in that category.

Mandate implementation

Mr. Edmond Mulet, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, DPKO, has suggested: ”As you know, our mission MONUC in Congo has more than 41 mandated different tasks, and that is quite an ordeal. Also, as the background paper mentions, contrary to the classical peacekeeping mandates, mandates given today often reach far into the areas of peacebuilding, recovery and institution-building.”

The Forum discussed the importance of mandates under which it is possible to prioritize, sequence, coordinate and deliver. This is central also to UNSCR 1325, since how a mandate is implemented relates to how to best fine-tune implementation to the situation, risks and roles of both men and women. For example, how do you implement a mandate on protection to ensure the safety of men and women, when we know that they are the targets of different forms of violence occurring under different forms of circumstances? The UNSCR 1325 framework outlines
three central questions which need to be asked when beginning to ensure that mandate implementation considers gender:

a) How the main assignments are selected and prioritized (that is, the content of what an operation does);

b) Execution of selected and prioritized assignments (that is, the procedure in which tasks are implemented);

c) Adaption to local developments in the field (that is, interaction between tasks and how new developments affect the implementation).

The first question on how assignments are selected and prioritized is central, as a security situation affects men and women differently and their access to resources for survival vary. Prioritizing one task higher than another is therefore central, since women can be more at risk from one form of violence than men are, and vice versa. How vulnerable men and women are and how urgent their situation is therefore varies. Often, there are also on-going political developments driven by local women’s organizations that need to be picked up early in an implementation process in order not to undermine their efforts. The argument that “gender” is an “issue” that only comes into play “later” is therefore detrimental to positive on-going changes. The inclusion of knowledge from local women’s organizations in the planning of an operation is often pointed out as a remedy for this problem.

The procedures used to implement prioritized tasks are also central. In addition, the lack of a gender perspective in one prioritized area can affect other prioritized areas. For example, it is essential to have a gender perspective in a DDR process in order for it not to end up with a serious safety problem for women stemming for demobilized male soldiers. Such problems will, for example, affect women’s ability to participate in economic reconstruction, thereby hampering development, etc. The second question, i.e. relating to the procedures for implementation to ensure the inclusion of the need of both local men and women, therefore affects standard operating procedures and tactical procedures as well as broader programmes. There are several concrete issues mentioned in UNSCR 1325. For example, the resolution emphasizes “…the need for all parties to ensure that mine clearance and mine awareness programmes take into account the special needs of women and girls.” This emphasis comes from the fact that women and men, due to their different labour and social roles have different patterns of movement in a society. Where mines are cleared will thus affect if men and women are equally protected from injury.

The last question relating to adaptation to local developments remains under-researched. As discussed at the Forum, operations are often longer than originally planned, and their mandates evolve during the implementation phase. For example,
what does it mean for women’s and men’s security that current missions often move from peacekeeping to peace enforcement mandates? What we do have is anecdotal evidence indicating that it brings with it gender-specific effects, such as women’s security being overlooked. The on-going work of the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section at DPKO to develop guidelines for military personnel is thus a crucial step.

Protection of Civilians

Lt.Gen. (Retd.) V.K. Jetley shared with the Forum participants the following: “As a Force Commander, I feel that if we go into a United Nations or any other peace operation, our prime responsibility should always be to take care of the civilians. We cannot say that we do not have the capability. In that case, we should not be there. Nothing is more embarrassing and more callous than to get to a place and protect yourself! You wear big helmets, white vehicles, go around well-equipped, and you protect yourself! That is not what the country or the trouble-spot is expecting from you, and therefore it is essential for the mandate to factor this in. This should be one of the primary factors. Although I do agree, as was said in the morning, that it is not possible to protect the complete nation, no matter how small it is, there are ways and means of doing things…”

The paper will conclude with a discussion on the issue of protection of civilians, which is a specific aspect of an assignment under external integration. The resolutions on ‘Women, Peace and Security’ are quite specific in stating that protection from violence need to include protection from systematic sexual violence. The importance to halt this violence lies in the destructive effects it has on the ability to re-establish a stable society. Therefore, the Security Council:

[d]emands that all parties to armed conflict immediately take appropriate measures to protect civilians, including women and girls, from all forms of sexual violence, which could include, inter alia, enforcing appropriate military disciplinary measures and upholding the principle of command responsibility, training troops on the categorical prohibition of all forms of sexual violence against civilians, debunking myths that fuel sexual violence, vetting armed and security forces to take into account past actions of rape and other forms of sexual violence, and evacuation of women and children under imminent threat of sexual violence to safety [UNSCR 1820];

Practically, this places emphasis on strengthened leadership and accountability, clear and enforceable codes of conduct, as well as actively addressing attitudes and the work environment within the military forces. Moreover, the Security Council:
Stresses that sexual violence, when used or commissioned as a tactic of war in order to deliberately target civilians or as a part of a widespread or systematic attack against civilian populations, can significantly exacerbate situations of armed conflict and may impede the restoration of international peace and security, affirms in this regard that effective steps to prevent and respond to such acts of sexual violence can significantly contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, and expresses its readiness, when considering situations on the agenda of the Council, to, where necessary, adopt appropriate steps to address widespread or systematic sexual violence [UNSCR 1820];

By now, several peace operations, such as MONUSCO, have a mandate to address systematic sexual violence. Women and women’s organizations are considered central to succeed in increasing protection:

[the Security Council] requests the Secretary-General and relevant United Nations agencies, inter alia, through consultation with women and women-led organizations as appropriate, to develop effective mechanisms for providing protection from violence, including in particular sexual violence, to women and girls in and around UN managed refugee and internally displaced persons camps, as well as in all disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration processes, and in justice and security sector reform efforts assisted by the United Nations (UNSCR 1820);

Including women’s agencies and competences to effectively address sexual violence is thus central to reach the objectives of peace and security. By now, there have been several concrete steps taken. As formulated by Rachel Mayanja, the UN Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women: “Through the appointment of his Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict, [the Secretary General] has demonstrated his determination to address the persistent scourge of violence against women, including sexual violence, to lead by example and to strive to empower women and girls to play a meaningful role in peace and security, including in situations or armed conflict.”

Conclusions

This paper offered some reflections on the relevance of UNSCR 1325 for the Challenges Forum by addressing the themes of troop and police contributions, mandate implementation and protection of civilians. As the framework on UNSCR
132.5 showed, these themes relate directly to both representation and integration, or mainstreaming, of gender throughout peace operations. Both representation and integration are closely interlinked with the objective of creating peace and security through a peace operation. Moreover, better integration of gender assists in avoiding negative unintended consequences from operations. Therefore, an increased emphasis on the resolutions on ‘Women, Peace and Security’ in the Challenges Forum would be a central entry point in discussing how to strengthen peace operations. As stated by the Security Council:

Recognizing that an understanding of the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, effective institutional arrangements to guarantee their protection and full participation in the peace process can significantly contribute to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security [UNSCR 1325].
## ANNEX 2

### List of Acronyms

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNDP</td>
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List of Partner Organizations

(in alphabetical order)

• Argentina: Argentine Armed Forces Joint Staff and CAECOPAC in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• Australia: Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence
• Canada: Pearson Peacekeeping Centre
• China: China Institute for International Strategic Studies in cooperation with the Ministry of National Defence
• Egypt: Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• France: Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs (United Nations and International Organizations Department) and Ministry of Defence (Policy and Strategic Affairs Department)
• India: United Services Institution of India
• Japan: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• Jordan: Institute of Diplomacy
• Nigeria: National Defence College in cooperation with the Nigerian Army, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• Pakistan: National Defence University in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence
• Russian Federation: Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• South Africa: Institute for Security Studies
• Sweden: Folke Bernadotte Academy (Coordinators) in cooperation with the Armed Forces, National Police Board, Swedish Prison and Probation Service and National Defence College
• Turkey: Center for Strategic Research of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in cooperation with the National Police Force, Armed Forces and the University of Bilkent
• United Kingdom: Foreign and Commonwealth Office in cooperation with the Ministry of Defence and the Department for International Development
• United States: United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute in cooperation with the United States Institute of Peace
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<td>Gen.</td>
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