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## NDU Journal

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# **NDU Journal**

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‘NDU Journal’ is an annual publication of National Defence University, the premier institution of security and strategic studies. The subject journal is a unique publication of the country which primarily deals with the national security issues of Pakistan. The journal has its own standing among the students, researchers, experts, policy makers and intelligentsia. It has been enlisted by International Political Science Abstracts, USA, Bibliography of Asian Studies USA and Ulrichs Periodicals Directory. Keeping the flag high, all the articles appearing in the journal are selected after a rigorous scrutiny and blind peer review at home and abroad. It is the testimony of quality of contents of the journal that **Higher Education Commission of Pakistan** has upgraded the subject journal into ‘Y’ category.

**NDU JOURNAL, VOLUME XXVII, 2013**

<b>Ser</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Signature</b>
1.	Dr. Tughral Yamin	
2.	Zahid Latif Mirza	
3.	Dr. Iram Khalid	
4.	Dr. Raja Muhammad Khan	
5.	Muhammad Umar Abbasi	
6.	Zia Ul Haque Shamsi	
7.	Dr. Shabana Fayyaz	
8.	Dr. Muhammad Saleem Mazhar & Dr. Naheed S. Goraya	
9.	Hassan Jalil	
10.	Muhammad Rafique	

## **EDITOR'S NOTE**

Having been up-graded to 'Y' category by Higher Education Commission (HEC) of Pakistan, this is the second issue. Endeavours have been made to ensure rich and high quality contents. All the articles in the current issue have been double reviewed by national and international referees. Institute for Strategic Studies, Research and Analysis (ISSRA) is committedly engaged in the pursuit of research and analysis on domestic, regional and global issues including security matters, with a view to creating a synergy in the efforts of renowned scholars and security analysts. The gist of all the articles is presented below for the consumption of readers.

Appeasement, apologies and reconciliation are pacific means used by nations to pursue their foreign policy objectives. Dr Tughral Yamin's article 'Apology as a Foreign Policy Tool' examines a country's propensity to express its regrets to other nations, in pursuit of its foreign policy objectives.

Since independence, Pakistan's largest province, Balochistan having geo-strategic importance and plentiful natural resources inducing a coastal line, has remained plagued with unrest and disturbance. Zahid Latif Mirza in his article, 'Balochistan – Past, Present and Future' argues that Pakistan's future is linked with prosperous Balochistan.

Dr. Iram Khalid has conducted a study of four Pak-India crises. She argues that a nuclear power should act in such a way that lacks no theoretical, rational, and favorable aspect, while making a decision.

Dr Raja Muhammad Khan in his article 'Negotiations with TTP: An Analysis of Counter Terrorism Strategy' analyzes the government's dialogue process with TTP. The author argues that the employment of unconventional methods is inevitable in order to defeat an unconventional opponent.



Hassan Jalil in his article ‘Islamic Concept of Morality as Notion of War Fighting Concept’ examines the concepts of morality in modern armies. The author presents an Islamic concept of morality which is unique in nature.

Muhammd Umar Abbasi in his article ‘The Future of Oil & Natural Gas Politics in Central Asia: A Statistical Analysis’ opines that the prospects of democratization in the region are bleak as the powerful states support autocratic regimes for their energy related interests.

Sun Tzu is regarded the beacon of knowledge in policy making, strategy, war and politics. Zia ul Haque Shamsi’s article argues that politico-military leadership of Pakistan has ignored Sun Tzu’s precepts during planning and execution of the Kargil conflict.

Dr. Shabana Fayyaz in her article ‘Women’s Role in Moderating Extremism in Pakistan’ stresses the vitality of women’s critical role as agents of peace in crafting and instituting a pro-active counter extremism policy.

Dr. Muhammad Saleem Mazhar and Dr. Naheed S. Goraya in their article ‘Challenges in Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline’ discuss that the project must be implemented in order to solve Pakistan’s energy problems.

Muhammad Rafique has conducted content analysis to gauge the US image in pre and post Abbottabad operation scenarios. The results of the study reveal that US image has been transformed from bad to worse as a result of Abbottabad operation.

As an editor, I feel confident that the publication of journal will enrich the pursuit of academic research. I hope this publication will satisfy the needs of pre-eminence in the research arena, reflecting an insight into world of excellence.

Happy Reading!

\_\_\_\_\_ **The Editor**

# **APOLOGY AS A FOREIGN POLICY TOOL**

*Dr. Tughral Yamin*

## **Abstract**

*Appeasement, apologies and reconciliation are pacific means used by nations to pursue their foreign policy objectives. It is an expedient way to mend, repair and improve relations. The manner of an apology is dependent on the nation's strategic makeup. The aggrieved party may not always be happy with what it receives as official regrets. Sometimes countries demand apologies to assuage their national pride. When 24 Pakistani troops were killed in a bombing raid at a remote border outpost on the Pak-Afghan border, Pakistan retaliated by blocking the NATO Ground Lines of Communication (GLOC), pending an apology. It took Pakistan many months to articulate the demand it considered necessary to reset relationship with Americans. The demand for an apology remained the key point in their agenda. The Americans waited patiently and rerouted their supplies through the longer and more circuitous Northern Distribution Network (NDN). After having received the Pakistani list of demands, the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said sorry on behalf of her government. The supplies were reopened without raising the transit fees. The entire episode was illustrative of an aggrieved junior partner in an asymmetric relationship trying to extract an apology from a stronger party and then settling for whatever came its way as a word of sympathy to close down an unfortunate chapter in their uneasy relationship. This paper examines a country's propensity to express its regrets to other nations, in pursuit of its foreign policy objectives.*

## **Introduction**

English poet Alexander Pope (1688-1744) said: "To err is human, to forgive divine." Mercy and forgiveness are godly attributes but ordinary mortals readily seek revenge by demanding "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth."<sup>1</sup> This

trait is reflected in international affairs as well. The tendency to seek revenge, show restraint or apologise depends on a nation's short- and long-term foreign policy objectives. In case there is a history of animosity, an apology becomes the first pre-requisite to pave the way for establishing mutually beneficial and cordial relationships. The act of contrition needs an appropriate expression of regret and it must reflect genuine remorse. Psychologists conceptualise apology "as a process that consists of one or more of three components: affect, affirmation, and action." Whether an apology is "*good enough*" is dependent "on the severity of the consequences of the wrong, the level of responsibility attributed to the wrongdoer, and the perceived wrongfulness of the behaviour."<sup>2</sup>

Apologies in most cases are symbolic but countries want these nonetheless to assuage their national pride. There is a long list of demands for official apologies. Indians want the British to apologise for the *Jillianwala Bagh* massacre of 1919. The British acknowledge the incident but are quite unwilling to offer a formal apology.<sup>3</sup> The Chinese have demanded apologies from the US over the bombing of their embassy in Belgrade,<sup>4</sup> and the aerial collision between an American surveillance plane and a Chinese fighter accosting it, off the coast of Guam.<sup>5</sup> In Bangladesh Sheikh Hasina Wajid has tried those accused of collaborating with the Pakistani forces in 1971 for war crimes and has served them harsh sentences.<sup>6</sup> She also wants an apology from Pakistan before she could consider visiting it.<sup>7</sup> Afghan President Hamid Karzai wants an apology from the US before he agrees to the terms of their pull out from his country.<sup>8</sup>

Pakistan was recently faced with need to demand an apology. On November 27, 2011, 24 of its soldiers were killed in a pre-dawn NATO air raid on the isolated border post of Salala in Mohmand Agency of the Federally Administered Area (FATA).<sup>9</sup> Pakistan, a non-NATO military ally could either ignore it as an isolated and inadvertent accident or suitably react to it. The Pakistani Government studied its options and did what they considered was the least that they could ask for.

They demanded the immediate evacuation of the US drones from Shamsi air base in Balochistan and blocked the NATO GLOC pending an apology. Then, perhaps for the first time in their short parliamentary history, the Pakistani lawmakers put their heads together to redefine their relations with the US. It took them many months to articulate what they thought was necessary to reset the terms of their affiliation with the Americans. The demand for an apology remained the key point in their agenda. The Americans waited patiently for the Pakistanis to get their act together. Meanwhile they rerouted their supplies through the longer and more circuitous Northern Distribution Network (NDN) – A decision that cost the US government, a whopping 100 million dollars a month.<sup>10</sup> After receiving the Pakistani list of demands, Secretary of State Clinton offered an anodyne sorry on the behalf of her government.<sup>11</sup> The Pakistani government emotionally and physically spent after the long drawn standoff, reopened the supply line without raising the transit fees or haggling any further.

This paper attempts to construct a relationship between a nation's tendency to apologise and its national character. The purpose is to find out if Pakistan had any chances in obtaining a meaningful apology by answering the following questions: What motivates a nation to tender an apology? Does the willingness to say sorry stem from its national ethos? And is there a place for an apology in a nation's strategic culture?

### **The Place of an Apology in International Relations**

Nations demand an apology, when they feel offended by the acts of other nations, groups and people. These infringements range from minor breaches of diplomatic protocol and airspace violations to serious human rights abuses like massacres, genocides and pogroms. A nation's umbrage is expressed in various forms. Sometimes a formal protest note or demarche is issued by summoning a country's envoy to the foreign office. At other times, the issue is raised at the ministerial or head of state level. To express national anger on a subject, public and international opinion is built

through media debates, op-ed pieces and public statements. Sometimes nations defer to the wishes of the complainant and apologise, at other times they don't. There are no internationally recognised strictures obliging countries to apologise. At times saying sorry can be easy but very often there can be severe resistance from within. An apology can be a means to healing old wounds and beginning a process of reconciliation, and in some cases, it is the only politically correct thing to do. The country making an admission of past wrong actually atones for the sins of the fathers.<sup>12</sup> It takes courage to say sorry and to admit one's mistakes and is clearly a difficult step to take. After the bold decision is taken to formally repent, it is diplomatically tendered as a well thought out plan. The manner of delivery and the timing of an apology are carefully choreographed to earn the earnest goodwill of the aggrieved party.

Official apologies have been made for historical slights. Some of these intra and interstate confessions have been recorded as case studies.<sup>13</sup> Apologies have also been made for the sake of internal harmony. The Australian government has apologised to the aborigines.<sup>14</sup> Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) have been used to remove internal misgivings in countries like South Africa,<sup>15</sup> and Sri Lanka.<sup>16</sup> A case has also been made for "creating an international process of Truth, Justice, Reparation, and Reconciliation (TJRR) for confronting human rights violations with the participation of the United States as a responsible actor."<sup>17</sup> This suggestion has not gained any traction at any international forum so far.

The nations losing wars tend to apologise to regain their place within the comity of nations. Such acts of contrition do not save the losers from facing the wrath of the victors in terms of severe fiscal penalties, territorial seizures and criminal proceedings against the wartime leadership. In modern history, the terms of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles were particularly harsh. Germany was virtually asked to renounce its existence.<sup>18</sup> It lost 13 per cent of its territory and 10 per cent of its population. It had to pay reparations, which were boosted to unnatural terms.<sup>19</sup> Germany lost again in the

Second World War. It surrendered unconditionally on May 7, 1945.<sup>20</sup> After the German capitulation the victorious powers – the USA, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France – divided Germany into four occupation zones.<sup>21</sup> Under the terms of the Potsdam conference held on August 2, 1945, the heads of states and governments of the allied nations decreed harsh measures against Germany including: “total disarmament and demilitarisation, destruction of war potential, destruction of national Socialism, decentralisation of the economy and reconstruction of the political life on a democratic basis.” There was to be no central government till further notice.<sup>22</sup> Territories to the east of the River Oder were given to Poland and all of North East Prussia was handed over to the USSR.<sup>23</sup> Leaders of Nazi Germany were tried and sentenced for war crimes at Nuremberg trials.<sup>24</sup> Rudolf Hess, Hitler’s deputy, who had tried to make private peace with Britain, early in the war, remained a prisoner in Spandau till he committed suicide in 1987 at the age of 94.<sup>25</sup> The Nazis were collectively blamed for the Jewish Holocaust,<sup>26</sup> and a huge Israeli dragnet was launched to track down Nazi fugitives from all over the world.<sup>27</sup>

To wash away this national stain the West German Government paid billions of Deutschemarks to the state of Israel and individual Jewish survivors.<sup>28</sup> Multiple official apologies were offered. A repentant Chancellor Willy Brandt literally fell on his knees in front of a Holocaust memorial in the Warsaw Ghetto in 1970 in a symbolic gesture now known as the Warschauer Kniefall.<sup>29</sup> Another person to go “down on his knees to beg forgiveness” was the Serb President Tomislav Nikolic. He, however, stopped short of admitting that the killing of 80000 Muslims in 1995 in Srebrenica was genocide.<sup>30</sup>

In Asia, the Second World War came to a cataclysmic end when the Americans dropped the nuclear bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Fighting a losing battle, the Japanese Government set aside national pride and opposition from within the military to surrender.<sup>31</sup> The widely accepted US narrative holds that the dropping of the nuclear

bombs prevented the killing of thousands of servicemen, who could have died in a physical invasion of Japan.<sup>32</sup> An alternative plot suggests the bomb that the Japanese were in any case on the verge of surrender,<sup>33</sup> and the bomb was dropped for two unrelated purposes i.e. speed up the process of Japanese defeat to keep the Russians from sharing the spoils of victory and to test the nuclear device.<sup>34</sup> After the War, the Japanese did not demand an apology. They were in no position to do so. The Americans compensated them by sponsoring their rebuilding process and provided them a nuclear umbrella against external aggression. At the people level, there was sympathy and displays of solidarity with Japan e.g. on August 6, 2012 Clifton Truman Daniel, a grandson of Harry Truman, the US president who had ordered the nuclear strike against Japan, attended the 67<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the event, in Hiroshima peace park near the epicentre of the 1945 blast. Daniel declined to comment on his grandfather's decision to drop the bomb but expressed the desire that nuclear weapons should never be used again.<sup>35</sup>

### **A Nation's Strategic Culture**

It would be instructive to find out what influences a nation's tendency to apologise. In this regard we need to understand a nation's strategic culture. This term was developed by American strategic scholars during the Cold War to describe Soviet behaviour in a nuclear environment. Later, its usage was extended to explain other nation's actions. A host of indicators were studied to construct the architecture of a nation's strategic culture. According to Colin S. Gray, the leading exponent of this theory, a nation's strategic culture flows from its geography and resources, history and experience, and society and political structure.<sup>36</sup> A nation's historical narrative in many ways defines its international behaviour. Each international actor perceives a place for itself on the world stage and tries its best to live up to its self-image. This self-importance is reinforced by a country's history and geography. A nation's geo-strategic location not only adds to its significance but also its decision making process in a number of ways i.e. territorial claims can increase the

propensity for interstate conflict and military operations in a given region.<sup>37</sup>

Gray defined strategic culture as “modes of thought and action” based on “perception of the national historical experience, from aspirations for responsible behaviour in national terms.”<sup>38</sup> Iain Johnston, another scholar defined a nation’s strategic culture as “an ideational milieu which limits behaviour choices.” These choices emerge from a set of commonly held assumptions, prejudices and preferences. These influences shape the thought process of the policymakers within their social, organisational and political environment.<sup>39</sup> The national aims and objectives, grand strategies and military doctrines are a product of a nation’s strategic culture. Strategic culture is a collection of symbols and expressions reflected in the strategic language used to enunciate a country’s military policies and foreign relation options. It explains why actions and ideas sometimes seem to be at odds with what would be considered as rational choice for a state. Iain Johnston believes that factor of rationality should not be rejected out of hand in perceiving a strategic choice because:

Strategic culture is compatible with notions of limited rationality (where strategic culture simplifies reality), with process rationality (where strategic culture defines ranked preferences or narrows options) and with adaptive rationality (where historical choices, analogies, metaphors, and precedents are invoked to guide choice).<sup>40</sup>

There is no universal model to assess the rationality or irrationality of a state. The history and experiences of each state point to political choices that they are likely to follow. Iain Johnston has dwelt at length the nexus between a state’s culture and its preferred strategy:

Different states have different predominant strategic preferences that are rooted in the early or formative experiences of the state, and are influenced to some



degree, by the philosophical, political, cultural and cognitive characteristics of the state and its elites.<sup>41</sup>

Jack Snyder was of the view that theory of Soviet behavioural forecasts based strictly on rational actor paradigm and game theoretical modelling was wrong. He argued that each country had its own way to interpret, analyse and react to international events. He defined strategic culture as 'the sum of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of a national strategic community share with regard to nuclear strategy.'<sup>42</sup> Ken Booth echoed Snyder's sentiments by using historical examples to demonstrate that culture can have certain distorting effects in the study and practise of strategy, which consequently leads to mistakes when it comes to an analysis through the international relations prism.<sup>43</sup> Snyder and Booth's basic argument was that the strategic culture of a country or nation should not be based on archetypical images or clichés rather it should be reflective of its central ethos and value system.

### **US Strategic Culture**

Like any other nation, the US strategic culture has its roots in its history, geography and its self-image. America's ascendancy in global affairs spans two centuries. It emerged as one of the two superpowers in a bipolar world at the end of the World War-II. It became the sole superpower after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The American belief in its 'manifest destiny' became an inspiration for the expansion of the US across the North American continent in the nineteenth century.<sup>44</sup> An early proponent of this concept was President John Quincy Adams.<sup>45</sup> Adams believed that his country was destined to expand from the Atlantic seaboard to the Pacific Ocean. This concept was widely interpreted to include the eventual absorption of all North America: Canada, Mexico, Cuba and Central America, and was used to validate territorial acquisitions. This expansion was considered not only good, but also obvious (manifest) and certain (destiny).<sup>46</sup> This thought was illustrated clearly in the Monroe Doctrine. On

December 2, 1823 President James Monroe declared that further efforts by European nations to colonize land or interfere with states in North or South America would be viewed as acts of aggression requiring US intervention.<sup>47</sup> On balance the US government promised not to interfere in the existing European colonies nor meddle in the internal concerns of European countries but neither would they tolerate involvement in their affairs.<sup>48</sup>

After the end of the World War-II, the US automatically stepped into the vacuum created by the erosion of European colonial powers. After half a century of intense Cold War, it emerged as the sole superpower after the Soviet Union imploded due to an imperial overstretch and poor fiscal policies.<sup>49</sup> The fall of the USSR was celebrated as the superiority of the western capitalist system. The 21<sup>st</sup> century was described as the American century during which the US was to emerge as the most powerful nation on earth.<sup>50</sup>

An aura of invincibility is reflected in American pop culture, most notably the superhuman qualities of the Hollywood good guys,<sup>51</sup> and the comic book superheroes.<sup>52</sup> The Americans as a nation are imbued with a high sense of self-righteousness and morality. Their leaders use religious overtones to justify their zeal to protect the American way of life and the western civilisation.<sup>53</sup> This sense of moral superiority has grown over the years. It is in this spirit that they have felt compelled to destroy demonic figures like Hitler, Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden. During the Cold War, the US claimed the leadership of the *Free World*,<sup>54</sup> against the Soviet *Evil Empire*.<sup>55</sup> In their campaign against the dark forces of Terror, they demanded from the world at large that “you’re either with us, or against us.” The implied consequence of not joining them was to lose favour and be deemed an enemy.<sup>56</sup> This attitude qualified as a prime example of Manichaeism struggle between good and evil, light and darkness.<sup>57</sup> The Americans as a nation can be moved to believe that they represent the forces of good and that their war against the evil forces is justified. Axiomatically they can do no wrong and therefore are not morally bound to offer any

apologies. This streak was particularly evident in the aftermath of 9/11.

This is not to say that US foreign policy makers are not open to sensible advice and that they will always exercise the military option instead of diplomacy as a tool to resolve conflicts. The realization has dawned in Washington that it cannot always have its way and that there are limits to its national power. 'It decision to conform to international norms and pressures was most evident recently in the case of Syria'. In the first week of September 2013, the US forces were all set to attack Damascus for the use of chemical weapons against its own people but then it took the Russian bait of resorting to diplomacy by going to the UN to force the Syrian government to accede to the Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC).<sup>58</sup>

### **Pakistan's Case**

The Pakistani case merits careful examination. It needs to be determined why this puny and pliant state opted, to go on a pliable collision course with mighty USA. The relations between Pakistan and the US had been deteriorating over the past decade. *Prima facie* they were frontline allies but a trust deficit had crept into their relationship. Pakistani felt aggrieved because its air and ground space was being routinely violated by the NATO and ISAF forces in Afghanistan. The unilateral incursion to kill Osama bin Laden on Pakistani territory on May 2, 2011 was considered a clear violation of national sovereignty and therefore illegal.<sup>59</sup> More painful than this one time landing of US boots on ground had been the collateral killing of innocent civilians in the CIA operated Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) attacks in FATA.<sup>60</sup> Drone strikes have become increasingly unpopular in Pakistan. These sentiments have received a fillip because the UN does not endorse the drone strikes and the Amnesty International has published a report against it.<sup>61</sup> There has been domestic condemnation of the illegality of the drone attacks within the US as well.<sup>62</sup>

Over the past years Pakistan has been regularly losing military and paramilitary personnel manning forward posts along the border in cross border air raids, artillery and mortar shelling and ground attacks. Eleven FC soldiers and ten civilians were killed in an air raid in Mohmand Agency in June 2008. An Army Major was among the dead. On September 30, 2010, NATO gunships attacked a security post in Kurram Agency, killing three soldiers and injuring three others. It was for the first time after this incident that Pakistani authorities blocked the Torkham border supply route for US and allied troops in Afghanistan.<sup>63</sup> The route was reopened after the US regretted the incident.<sup>64</sup> In February 2011, a soldier was killed and seven others sustained injuries when NATO and Afghan forces fired mortar shells at the Bangidar security check-post in North Waziristan Agency. In the last week of April 2011, three Pakistani soldiers were killed and over a dozen people, including security personnel and local tribesmen, sustained injuries in cross-border shelling between Afghan and Pakistani security forces near South Waziristan. In May 2011, two NATO helicopters entered North Waziristan Agency in hot pursuit of alleged terrorists. In the last week of August 2011, around 300 men crossed into Pakistan from Afghan territory and stormed seven security checkpoints along the Durand Line killing dozens of Pakistani security personnel.<sup>65</sup> The death of two dozen soldiers in Salala late in 2011 was the final straw that broke the back of Pak-US relationship.<sup>66</sup> Pakistan asked the Americans to close down their UAV operations and leave Shamsi airbase in Balochistan, and blocked NATO supply lines through Chaman and Torkhum, pending an apology.<sup>67</sup> The Government of Pakistan also decided to stay away from the Bonn conference on Afghanistan.<sup>68</sup>

Pakistan refused to become part of the joint inquiry and rejected the US contention that the attack was in self defence. Instead, it blamed the US/ISAF forces for not coordinating their operations with their Pakistani counterparts.<sup>69</sup> The military public relations department's press release issued with the approval of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) noted that the inquiry conducted by Brigadier General Stephen Clark did not affix specific responsibility and

highlighted the fact that a parallel inquiry conducted by Brigadier General Jorgensen considered Pakistan military in an adversarial role and not part of the friendly forces.<sup>70</sup>

The political leadership carried out an extended parliamentary debate. As a result of which the Parliamentary Committee on National Security (PCNS) came up with 14 suggestions to redefine the relationship with the US.<sup>71</sup> On April 12, 2012 the parliament approved the PCNS proposals.<sup>72</sup> It called for an immediate cessation of American drone strikes and an apology for the killing of Pakistani soldiers was central to these demands.<sup>73</sup> Pakistan also demanded an increase in the transit fees, which the Americans termed as price gouging.<sup>74</sup> Meanwhile, the movement of supplies through the much longer and more expensive NDN began to have its effects. On July 2, 2012, nearly seven months after the incident US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that the US was sorry for the losses suffered by Pakistani military in the Salala check post attack and announced that the Pakistan would henceforth be reopening the vital NATO supply routes to Afghanistan.<sup>75</sup> It is important to note that the apology was offered by the Secretary of State. In an election year it was considered unwise for the President to dole out apologies. The limited quota of apologies had been spent in saying sorry to the Afghans for the desecration the holy Quran,<sup>76</sup> and for defiling their corpses.<sup>77</sup> In case of Pakistan more ignominy was heaped upon President Zardari, when President Obama ignored him at the May 2012 NATO Chicago summit on Afghanistan.<sup>78</sup> The Americans refused to revise or indeed enhance the transit fees. The Pakistanis did not press the issue and an MOU was signed between the representatives of the two governments on July 30, 2012 to regularise the arrangements for NATO supplies, which till then had been done on a verbal understanding. The document drafted in the light of the UN charter prohibited the supply of ammunition but permitted the transit of weapons for the Afghan National Army.<sup>79</sup>

## **Conclusion**

What conclusions can be drawn from this extended storm in the diplomatic tea cup? One thing that emerges quite clearly from this episode is that no nation irrespective of its size, power potential, stated foreign policy posture or strategic culture is under any compulsion to offer another nation a word of sympathy or sorrow; unless it stands to gain something by doing so. A natural corollary of this argument is that no nation, no matter how strongly it may feel about a certain perceived injustice, should be under any illusion that it can receive a genuine apology. Another thing that becomes quite evident from this incident is that the nature of apology is dependent upon the intensity of hurt and anger displayed by the other side and its capacity to react. If the aggrieved party can be satisfied with a perfunctory word of regret, then that is exactly how far the other state party would go.

Analysed in this backdrop, let's see what were the expectations from each side. And how each party dealt its diplomatic cards to achieve its desired ends? Pakistan felt that it had been wronged by a strategic military partner. It wanted to redeem the honour of the men it had lost in an incident, which it felt was clearly the result of some heartless and apathetic behaviour. It also wanted to leverage this incident to seek better terms and conditions to reopen the NATO and better if not equal partnership with the US. The Americans were in no hurry. They gave the Pakistanis the rope. They knew that their stamina to hold their ground was limited and that they were heavily dependent on the aid that they were doling out to this weak and impoverished nation. Pakistan could go the distance by holding out for seven months was something they had not imagined. A face saving exit for both parties was a lukewarm regret followed by the reopening of the blocked roads.

It is important to understand that although USA is still the most powerful nation on earth, it can say sorry, when it feels that it serves their purpose. It has offered apologies to the Afghans a number of times i.e. in the case of the burning of

the Quran and drone strikes against civilians. These apologies have not always come directly from the White House but have been handed down by high level emissaries.<sup>80</sup> Like any other great nation there are limits to its military, diplomatic and economic power. Two long running wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have cost it dearly in terms of blood and treasure. It may have killed Osama bin Laden and weakened the forces of terrorism but Al Qaeda and its affiliates are still out there. Russia is showing significant diplomatic muscle and China is projecting military and economic power regionally and globally. Clearly, the US would like to extend its dominant position in the world and would use the full spectrum of its power potential, including its repertoire of coercive and persuasive diplomacy towards this end. On the flip side, it has enough political resilience to offer regrets if that would help achieve its limited or long term foreign policy objectives.

Pakistan is a minor player on the international chessboard. Realistically speaking, US is under no obligation to say sorry to it. Its geostrategic position does provide Pakistan a regional context. As long as the US has to move its supplies to Afghanistan through its communication network, it will deploy all its diplomatic skills to keep it under its wings. There are, however, other characteristics that can keep Pakistan relevant i.e. it is one of the most populous Islamic countries in the world and it possesses nuclear weapons. All this combined will continue to provide it space in American foreign policy. However, to assume that the US will beg forgiveness for infringements on its sovereignty is pure naivety. To be taken seriously in the international arena, Pakistan has to adopt long-term policies to improve its economy, the state of law and order and the quality of its population. As long as it remains mired in poverty, economic chaos and internal disorder external powers will play upon its weaknesses and get away with it without saying sorry.

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# **BALUCHISTAN – PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE**

*Zahid Latif Mirza*

## **Abstract**

Since independence Pakistan's largest province having geo-strategic importance and unlimited natural resources inducing a coastal line has remained plagued with unrest and disturbances. Decades of serious political and administrative neglect has aggravated the whole issue. Pakistan's future and its leap forward towards prosperity is linked with Baluchistan. For Pakistanis, Baluchistan and its current situation and how it is handled is vital to understand. A simplistic view of addressing the problem, which has too many dimensions and fault lines could be fatal. Only an indepth understanding of its past and present can give the contours of 'way forward'. A holistic approach encompassing Federal and Provincial governments can take the Baluchistan out of current imbroglio. The current well balanced political dispersion of Baluchistan has given a rare opportunity. It can be a real catalyst of change, provided the nation is serious to address this long simmering issue. This paper provides an insight into the complexities of most deprived province and will make a good reading.

## **Introduction**

Baluchistan with 44%<sup>1</sup> of the land mass and 5%<sup>2</sup> of Pakistan's population is passing through an ever growing volatile situation, where gradual degeneration is taking place in all facets of public life. Repeated policy failures since creation of Pakistan have created deep seated multi-dimensional problems having serious security implications for the country. The reasons of the present crisis are not well known to the people of Pakistan and lack of wholesome comprehension at national level, coupled with least resolve has compounded the problem. There is a dire need to tackle the present imbroglio in a synergetic manner to address the issue in totality.

## **Scope**

In this connection, this paper aims to review Balochistan issue in the context of historical perspective, nature of repeated unrests, prevailing environment, last government's policy initiatives including their outcome, present political landscape and suggests a way forward.

## **Historical Perspective**

Pre-partition, this region was governed by the British. They strengthened the institution of nawabs / sardars while keeping the masses in the state of extreme deprivation. The whole system was so articulated to facilitate their management of Balochistan by exploiting the tribal system through few individuals having their vested interest.

The issue of Balochistan, started emerging when the future of Kalat State was decided by referendum in Shahi Jirga in June 1947,<sup>3</sup> in favour of Pakistan and Shahzada Karim Khan, brother of Khan of Kalat reacted violently against the accession and rebelled to Afghanistan in March 1948.<sup>4</sup> Establishment of One Unit, inept handling of tribal leaders in post Nawab Nauroz Khan situation and political expediencies of early 70s created deep rooted issues, where people were the ultimate victims and resultantly alienated. Deep scars of the past have seriously impacted the psyche of a common Baloch and therefore the whole provincial issue has to be seen in that context.

## **Eruption of Disturbances and Unrests**

Balochistan has witnessed five successive insurgencies and unrests since 1947. Poor handling, coupled with non-institutionalized approach by successive governments is the main drivers of unrest. The current situation is far more complex, as the ongoing unrest in the province is aided and abetted by the international players, which should also be seen in the context of Afghanistan situation. For better

understanding, it is pertinent to scan the nature of successive insurgencies and unrests.

The first insurgency erupted in March 1948 by Prince Karim<sup>5</sup> (younger brother of Khan of Kalat), who defected to Afghanistan along with a *lashkar* and conducted anti state activities to address the issue of State of Kalat as an independent state. Geographically, it was confined to the Jhalawan area of Balochistan. It lasted for few months only.

Late fifties witnessed the eruption of second insurgency.<sup>6</sup> It primarily stemmed from the establishment of One Unit. Commonly known as Jhalawan disturbance, the insurgency was confined to the districts of Kalat, Khuzdar and Kohlu. It terminated temporarily in March 1960 after declaration of general amnesty and surrender of Sardar Nauroz Khan. Poor handling of Sardar Nauroz Khan<sup>7</sup> and his family by the government laid the seeds of lack of trust in Balochi people towards the Federation of Pakistan.

The uneasy peace lasted for a brief period and the decade of sixties again found Balochistan gripped into the third insurgency.<sup>8</sup> Its causes revolved around removal and arrest of tribal chieftans, Nawab Akbar Bugti, Khair Bakhsh Marri, Atta Ullah Mengal and Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo on the charges of supporting Sardar Nauroz Khan. Geographically, the area engulfed by the insurgency included Districts of Kalat, Khuzdar, Kohlu and Dera Bugti. Dissolution of One Unit and general amnesty, again gave Balochistan a brief spell of peace with the formation of Baloch Government in 1972.

The state's inability to find lasting solution to the provincial problems, took Balochistan into its fourth insurgency in 1973 which lasted for four years.<sup>9</sup> It started after the removal of National Awami Party's (NAP) Government of Atta Ullah Mengal by Mr Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in February 1973 and encompassed general areas of Kharan, Sibi, Dera Bugti, Khuzdar and Kohlu. This insurgency could have lasted longer but the declaration of general amnesty by General Zia ul Haq



normalized the situation but without addressing the root causes.

Commencing in 2005, today the unfortunate province is confronting fifth cycle of unrest which is now entering into its eighth year. The simmering issues of Balochistan got its spark from the unrest in Dera Bugti/Sui on conflict of locals with Pakistan Petroleum Limited (PPL), which created misunderstandings between Federal Government and Nawab Akbar Bugti. The situation further aggravated after the development of Gwadar Port, without addressing the concerns of locals coupled with disappearance of Nawab Akbar Bugti from the provincial landscape in 2007. The spatial dimensions of current disturbances now covers vast spaces of Baloch and Brahvi areas with distinct shade of mental subversion of masses having roots in lower and middle class with educated youth joining hands. So far a coherent policy and requisite political initiatives at different tiers to address the issue through a wholesome approach have not emerged on the national scene.

### **What Does the Successive Disturbances and Unrests Imply?**

After independence, the Government could not comprehend the complex dynamics of Balochistan and tried to resolve the issues through reactive measures which lacked a long term vision. Resultantly, the disturbances grew in quantum and space, engulfing entire Baloch/Brahvi dominated areas from its traditional base of Dera Bugti, Kohlu, Sarawan and Jhalawan. The neglect of over last sixty years is now emerging in the form of deepening fault- lines with significantly fractured society. Destroyed societal fabric will poses serious challenges for a way forward without a wholesome response.

The political leadership of the province which emerged after successive disturbances was a classical product of political expediencies and did not reflect the will of the people as well as true representation of society. Continuous policy

failures since 1950's have created state/non-state stake holders who are thriving on ever deteriorating situation in the province.

The tribal system, despite being a reality has invariably been either undermined or misused by the political elites. Short term gains through this faulty policy, has further strengthen the stranglehold of tribal leaders. Resultantly today, tribal system has become more strong than it was in 1947.

No wholesome policy was ever formulated by the successive governments at federal and provincial level to address the issue in totality with its focus on the masses in post disturbance periods. Political structure of the province is greatly influenced by groups having vested interests thus no developments have taken place in social and other sectors. Fruits of Eighteenth Amendment and National Finance Commission (NFC) Award have been lost in the black hole of corruption and other governance related issues.

### **Prevailing Environment of the Province**

Balochistan occupies a strategic location in the regional context with a long coast line having Gwadar Port and sharing of 1160 km border with Afghanistan.<sup>10</sup> It dominates the sea lines of communication which are vital for free flow of 40% of world's oil<sup>11</sup> and can also serve as a strategic corridor for Central Asian Republics. Its huge land mass gifted with a wide variety of natural resources offers opportunities and challenges. In the regional context, regional and extra regional powers have converging and diverging interests.

Its ethnic landscape is characterized by Baloch, Pashtoons and Brahvis.<sup>12</sup> Tribal system is fully intact mostly due to vested interests. The tribal leaders are aware that their survival lies in maintaining strong control over poor/deprived masses and weak writ of the government. Ignorance and intra-province conflict suits their interests. They control the destiny

of common people and hence jealously guard their traditions/culture for furthering their personal agendas.

Political dynamic of the province has remained uncertain. Politics in Balochistan generally revolve around pro and anti federation elements wherein nawabs and sardars have acted as good tools for political expediencies for short term solutions, but having long term serious consequences. Mainstream political parties have less influence in interior Balochistan and remain dependent on tribal hierarchy for their political ambitions. The present political dispersion has two distinct shades i.e in Baloch and Brahvi Areas, middle class leadership has emerged which can be an excellent catalyst for change of political dynamic in Balochistan. Similarly in Pashtun area, the representatives of the people can address most of the problems by virtue of their stance on various provincial issues including terrorism.

The tribal system thrives on poverty, illiteracy and backwardness of people and is averse to all such policy initiatives which lead to empowerment of people. The issues of Balochistan become more complex when the internal deteriorating security environment is exploited by regional and extra regional powers, state and non state actors who exploit the weak political and governance structure of the province for patronage for all facets of their anti state and anti social activities.

The complexity of Balochistan problems are also exacerbated due to the porous and harsh nature of terrain. There are numerous divided tribes and villages along the border with several frequented and unfrequented routes thus facilitating illegal movement across the border. It has a negative impact on security situation of the province. Till today, Balochistan continues to house approximately 345,100 (20.3%) of Afghan refugees.<sup>13</sup> Large refugee camps particularly close to the border are ideal hideouts and breeding grounds for terrorists and militant organizations. No elaborate mechanism exists to monitor their activities in a cohesive manner at provincial level. These refugees are not

keen to go back due to law and order situation in Afghanistan and better economic opportunities inside Pakistan. Their presence has seriously complicated the security environment in Balochistan.

### **Inferences Drawn from Prevailing Environment of Balochistan**

The socio-cultural spectrum characterized by tribal system does not let positive influences to permeate into its folds. Resultantly, main stream political parties have not been able to develop in-roads in the interior parts of province. Due to poor governance, lack of government writ; the tribal system continues to be the practicable mechanism. Political parties still rely on tribal chieftains for accomplishment of their political agenda. Since tribal system is a reality and cannot be whisked away. How it has to be exploited/utilized for empowering the masses and at the same time weakening the stranglehold of sardars is the *key question*, which needs to be strategized.

The existing administrative mechanisms of the province does not represent a common man, is inept, having rampant corruption. It is therefore part of the problem and not part of the solution.

Its strategic location,<sup>14</sup> enormous amount of natural resources and internal conflict provides an ideal opportunity for exploitation by inimical forces. Separatist tendencies in the province now have trans-frontier linkages. In the regional context, it is Pakistan's soft belly, vulnerable to exploitation by global powers.

Prevailing situation in the province provide vast spaces for terrorist organizations which keep transiting from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and cross border movement from Afghanistan. Similarly the inhospitable terrain of Pak-Afghan border has facilitated inflow of arms and ammunition and illegal immigrants thus adding new dimensions to this complex issue. Afghan refugee camps continue to contribute

negatively towards the fragile security situation of Balochistan.

Disillusionment of youth led by the middle class educated leadership of militant organizations is now injecting loss of hope in sizeable population—a serious challenge indeed. Finally the nature of present unrest has changed radically with its expansion from traditional Marri, Bugti and Mengal areas. Today the spatial dimensions of challenging the state have expanded, compounded by mental subversion which needs to be comprehended for its serious and far reaching implications.

### **Review of Government’s Policy Initiatives in the Past**

Unfortunately despite successive unrests no government has learnt from the history of Balochistan. Instead of adopting a wholesome approach, the issue was taken lightly as a law and order situation at best and hence dealt mainly with purely reactive measures. Severity of the situation has always been half heartedly appreciated in the past and some political initiatives were taken by the previous regimes with least positive results.

Government constituted two parliamentary committees in September 2004. Senator Mushahid Hussain Sayed’s Committee was mandated to assess the overall situation of Balochistan for making suitable recommendations.<sup>15</sup> Senator Wasim Sajjad led the other committee to suggest policy measures “to promote inter-provincial harmony and protect rights of provinces with a view to strengthen the Federation”.<sup>16</sup> Recommendations formulated by these committees were comprehensive and encompassed all major concerns of Balochistan. Unfortunately, these recommendations were never implemented - a classical example of policy failure. Remoteness of Balochistan and lack of ability to comprehend the erupting crises lay at the foundation of ongoing unrest in Balochistan.

**Aghaz-e-Haqooq Balochistan:** A very well thought-out initiative ever taken by the past government is Aghaz-e-

Haqooq Balochistan.<sup>17</sup> Ironically, due to lack of sincere efforts including political will, it has least impact on the people of Balochistan.

**18<sup>th</sup> Amendment and NFC Award:**<sup>18</sup> It has provided enormous capacity to Balochistan, with a net increase of Rs 83 billion.<sup>19</sup> Similarly greater provincial autonomy has not been aptly managed for addressing the grievances of the masses by the provincial leadership.

### **Failure of Past Policy Initiatives – A Re-Appraisal**

Other than Aghaz-e-Haqooq Balochistan package, no significant policy was ever devised which could claim to be in-line with the aspirations of the people. Serious governance issues, enormous corruption in Provincial machinery, lack of resolve to address the real issues confronted by the people have resulted in unsuccessful implementation of this excellent package. 18<sup>th</sup> Amendment/NFC Award, though has been widely appreciated, but the administrative structures of the province have neither the capacity, nor sincerity and resolve to capitalize on the enormous benefits. Unfortunately these weaknesses are further widening the already existing fault-lines. The disillusionment of people of Balochistan is gradually increasing with serious repercussions for the security of Pakistan.

### **Balochistan – An Overall Brief Reappraisal**

Since independence, a critical look at past and present unrests amply indicates a classical policy failure, where federation and the provincial political and administrative structures have failed to grasp the complexity of the whole issue. Finding short term solutions by all successive federal and provincial governments has alienated the masses. Resultantly unrest has grown now encompassing vast spaces of Baloch and Brahvi areas. Mental subversion of the youth and their taking up of arms in some parts of province has seriously eroded the social fabric of the Province. Deep vested interest of political elites, some tribal leaders and non state

actors have significantly eroded the resolve to stem the tide in positive direction.

As a State, if issues confronted by Balochistan are not handled appropriately with total resolve and clarity, the situation can aggravate further, with long term negative implications for Pakistan. As a whole, Balochistan has negative social and security indicator, requiring the wholesome review.

### **Way Forward**

Provincial political landscape today has all the ingredients of giving hope to the people of Balochistan. With a leadership which reflects the aspirations of a common Baloch no well seated in the corridors of power, if aptly utilize the levers of power and state and provincial institutions, with any biases, the nation can pin all their hopes. It can be a catalyst of positive change. History has once again given the opportunity to turn the tide. Some plausible thoughts are discussed as under:

- The tribal character, ethnic composition, vast natural resources, history of unrest and serious governance issues demands concerted and dedicated efforts at national and provincial level. The policy and strategy for handling Balochistan should have four thrust lines as under:
  - Political initiative focusing on broad base reconciliation bringing all stake holders on negotiation table. Selective application should be avoided. A high powered body with a balanced composition duly authorized for all encompassing negotiations by the federal and provincial governments *needs to be constituted at priority*. Historical apprehensions make proud Baloch very sensitive and thus they doubt sincerity of various political initiatives.

- Aghaz-e-Haqooq Balochistan, 18 Amendment and NFC Award have totally failed to deliver, primarily because of very serious governance issues. *A solid, fool proof mechanism needs to be developed* to address governance related issues of Balochistan.
- Balochistan issue has been aggravated due to absolute absence of good governance. Without working out a policy by federal and provincial governments for *posting of competent, efficient and honest officers de-linked from political expediencies in provincial machinery*, no initiative will ever succeed.
- Armed struggle by some Baloch elements, at its root is now characterized by loss of hope and loss of trust in federation to address their concerns as citizens of Pakistan stemming from disillusionment and also perceived sense of deprivation. Revival of this hope is the key to moving forward. Mental subversion of Baloch needs re-addressal by devising an imaginative and credible policy, which is strategized with sincerity and credibility.
- Supporting guidelines should include:
  - Tendency of labelling Baloch in general as anti state should be avoided and all separatist elements should be brought into the main stream. ‘Rhetoric only’ will never pay. Actionable measures needs to be initiated at priority.
  - Develop fool proof institutionalize mechanisms at federal and provincial levels for socio-economic developments for bridging the gap between sardars and the masses thus providing conducive environment to heal the simmering feedings of deprivation.
  - Equal and balanced representation of ethnic groups in administrative setups at national and provincial level. No ethnic group should be neglected due to its peaceful nature.



- Holding of census to crystallize the actual demographic profile of the province, which can ensure balanced policies in various spheres of governance and politics. It is a very serious issue, which at present may look ordinary but may lead to serious ethnic conflict in future.
- Repatriation of Afghan refugees needs to be tackled vigorously as it is contributing negatively toward the security canvas of the province.
- Need to develop effective mechanisms for border control, restricting free cross border movement which presently contributes to law and order situation in the Province.
- Appropriate measures need to be put in place to check the inflow of funding to non state actors and separatists elements.
- Nexus between various militant groups operating in Balochistan should be broken. Lack of national policy on terrorism is a major contributory factor towards security situation which is fully exploited by terrorist and other groups with vested interest.

### **Parting Shot**

Balochistan is passing through turmoil, due to its geo-strategic importance, tribal dynamics, successive policy failures, beneficiaries of the prevalent situation and non-state actors. Since the independence, unfortunately due to narrow vision of national security, Balochistan is gradually sinking into a quagmire with serious and long lasting implications for Pakistan. The nation should rise to the occasion. Despite all the internal and external threats, the situation can still be managed, provided the nation has competency, sincerity and honesty to address these challenges. It can be done, provided there is a will. The current political dispersion in Balochistan is well balanced and reflects the aspiration of people. An all out support can change the internal dynamics of Balochistan in the positive direction.

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# MANAGEMENT OF PAKISTAN INDIA CONFLICTS: AN APPLICATION OF CRISIS DECISION-MAKING

*Dr. Iram Khalid*

## **Abstract**

*Crisis is a volatile situation replete with multiple threats. Pakistan, like other states has faced several such crises. Interestingly, most of the said situations were with India. This research envisages a study of four crises, these include the crisis evolving out of the minority issue of 1950, the Brasstacks crisis of 1986-87, the crisis due to the nuclear tests in 1998, and the Kargil crisis of 1999. This study may also be of vital importance to help assess and analyze these crisis situations, in both general and Indian orchestrated crises. Furthermore, this takes into cognizance variables such as the role of military leadership, media, communal organizations, state policies, and foreign powers etc. The detailed study in the theoretical frame-work of 'crisis' and 'crisis decision making', has established the fact that it is essential for a nuclear power, when pitched against an opponent, to behave in such a compact way that lacks no theoretical, rational, and favorable aspect of any issue, while making a decision. It is important to avoid mixed signals and future confusion to avoid any mistake.*

## **Introduction**

Countries with history of conflict and continuing tension are susceptible to facing problems in the course of their bilateral relations. Sometimes, they try to manage a problematic bilateral situation and are successful. While occasionally, they face a predicament which is characterized by hostile posturing and end up in an uncompromising and unyielding stance leading to a deadlock. The situation prolongs, receives extensive media coverage, and consequently becomes public concern. This heralds the beginning of a crisis which has the potential to escalate. It assumes menacing proportions, especially when stakes are

pitched between two nuclear armed rivals. The term “crisis” is used so frequently and for such varied scenarios that it is fraught with a wide variety of meanings. Even in foreign policy research and diplomatic history regarding crisis, diversity is more evident than uniformity.<sup>1</sup>

Two major theories explain the meaning of crisis. First is the systematic perspective in which “crisis represents a significant change in the quality or intensity of interactions among nations.” The second is the decision-making perspective which focuses on human participation rather, than a system output. According to this perspective, a situation is a crisis when it is so defined by those who are responsible for coping with it.<sup>2</sup>

Charles Hermann explains, “A crisis is a situation characterized by surprise, a high threat to values, and short decision time”.<sup>3</sup> From the perspective of a single state, a crisis is a situation with three necessary and sufficient conditions deriving from a change in its external or internal environment: firstly, a threat to basic values; secondly, a simultaneous or subsequent high probability of engagement in military hostilities, and thirdly, an awareness of the availability of a finite time for response to the external value threat.<sup>4</sup> The crisis actors are states whose decision-makers perceive the above mentioned three conditions of a crisis. These three perceived conditions are considered to be interrelated and mutually reinforcing. According to the Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, crisis is a loose term in search of a commonly agreed scholarly meaning. Similarly, procedural definitions identify events that occur in any sort of crisis.<sup>5</sup>

Richard Lebow identifies three different types of crises based on their capacity for management. They are justification of hostility crisis, spin off crisis, and brinkmanship crisis. The justification for war is deemed necessary to secure domestic and international support. In this case, the state initiating the conflict is determined to escalate hostility; therefore, unless

the initiator is deprived of the justification, there is very little hope for the management of crisis before a war erupts.

According to this categorization, the second type is the spin off crisis, an example of which is the American attack on Grenada. This type of crisis facilitates the interests of the initiator. Lebow's third type is the brinkmanship crisis. In this situation, the initiators expect the adversary to back down instead of putting up a fight. War is not intended but the threat of force is used to achieve specific political objectives. The outcome may not be as predictable as in the cases of the other two types, which can be seen in the case of Turks in Cyprus in 1974 and the Chinese in 1996 against Taiwan. In this case, crisis management determines the resolution or otherwise. From all of the above mentioned types, the third appears likely to respond to management.<sup>6</sup>

J. Philips Rogers has identified two types of crisis.<sup>7</sup> In the first type, the policy makers believe that the adversary is almost exclusively aggressive in its objectives. His second category of crisis is based on the attitude of the policy makers, who give more importance to political content, and are classified as hawks. They believe that in a crisis situation, it is difficult to determine whether the objectives of an adversary are primarily offensive or have other dimensions. In addition, an adversary's objectives are influenced by situational context e.g. in 1964, Vietnamese Commandos attacked a US electronic intelligence destroyer. The policy makers and Congress allowed President Johnson to take any action, even to use armed forces to protect American interest in the Gulf of Tonkin.<sup>8</sup>

### **Crisis Situations and Policy Makers**

In crisis situations, policy makers develop an understanding of the nature and degree of threat to their country's interests, an estimate of the way the adversary views the situation, and a determination of the consequences of probable courses of action designed to secure their objectives.<sup>9</sup> These are images of an adversary, beliefs about the dynamics

of crisis escalation, the best ways to control it, and bargaining rules for crisis management on terms consistent with their country's interests.<sup>10</sup>

### **Elements Determining Crisis Attitudes of Decision-Makers**

Crisis situations present extraordinary conditions needing prompt decisions. Decision-makers exhibit some typical forms of attitudes under such circumstances. There are some rudiments which would determine the attitudes of decision-makers in crisis situations. These fundamental elements include the enemy strategy, the problems pertaining to information, perceptions, and intentions.

#### **Enemy Strategy**

Enemy Strategy may vary according to the nature and impact of the elements of power which are at the disposal of the enemy. In the late 60's and 70's, the US opted for a strategy to have control over the Indian Ocean, which is known not only for its natural resources but also for its importance in world trade. The former USSR anticipated this American strategy and a crisis developed between the two over the control of the Indian Ocean.<sup>11</sup>

#### **Problems of Information**

Information plays a decisive role in crisis decision-making and hence it is very important to ensure maximum possible credibility. Still, the policy makers face problems related to information that affect their attitudes. These problems consist of the following:<sup>12</sup>

- Information overloading,
- Information deficit (lack of first hand information on specific aspects of a decision),
- Contradictory information, which necessitates weighing the relative merits of contradictory reports regarding the same event.<sup>13</sup>

## **Crisis Attitudes**

Based on a review of diplomatic interactions in crisis situations the following general forms of crisis attitudes may be reflected in the behavior of the decision-makers.<sup>14</sup> One such occasion is when the British Prime Minister adopted telephonic diplomacy to solve the Falkland issue and decided to use force against Argentina after consultation with President Reagan.

- In most cases, suspicion is directed towards opponents, their intentions, and the motives underlying their actions. Intentions and actions of friendly states that are not in conflict are largely predictable. Suspicion may also generate a pessimistic speculation concerning the intentions of the other side. Peace gestures may therefore be rejected as tricks.
- Issue escalation is another attitude common to decision-makers operating in a crisis or conflict.<sup>15</sup> As an issue in a crisis becomes imbued with ideology or symbolic importance, compromise may become difficult to achieve because government officials and the public will regard any withdrawal from a symbolic stance as a sacrifice of some great principles.
- A feeling of urgency due to limited availability of time for making critical decisions and the consequent belief that unless decisions and actions are taken rapidly, disastrous consequences ensuing from the enemy's hostile actions may result.<sup>16</sup>
- Under the feeling of urgency and the uncertainties surrounding the enemy's motives and actions, policy makers perceive fewer alternative courses of action open to themselves than to the enemy.<sup>17</sup>
- Policy makers perceive crisis as a turning point in the relationship between parties. A corollary is the common opinion that a war will somehow solve the problems between the conflicting parties.<sup>18</sup>
- In a crisis, perceptions of threat are more significant than perceptions of the opponent's relative capabilities. If a government perceives great threat to fundamental



values then it will resist with armed forces, even if the enemy's military actions are perceived as slight.<sup>19</sup>

### **Structure of a crisis**

During different stages of the life-cycle of a crisis, the situation is marked by some or all of the following elements.<sup>20</sup>

- A crisis is marked by high risks. In most cases, a party might unintentionally raise the risk to crisis levels because it fails to apprehend the broader consequences of its actions
- The second element which is visible in a crisis situation is limited time for deliberations concerning a decision. As the crisis intensifies, each of the constituent elements also experiences increased intensity. Risks increase, resulting in enhanced uncertainty. Options become increasingly polarized creating a feeling that there is insufficient time for effective deliberations. All this contributes to an ever growing hostility. Limited time, uncertainties, difficult value trade-offs, and a sense of constricting possibilities exacerbate the hostility felt and expected. This also shows that the crisis has either been ignored or proper planning for crisis management has not been done.<sup>21</sup>

### **Possible Outcomes of International Crises**

Here, it is pertinent to identify and explain different outcomes of crises. It is also important to note that these outcomes are self explanatory in the sense that they show how they were achieved.<sup>22</sup> K. J. Holsti, in his work on international politics, has identified the following possible outcomes of international crises, avoidance, Submission or Deterrence, Compromise, Award.

### **Decision-making**

In the context of crisis, decision-making is simply the act of making a choice from amongst the available alternatives in

order to cope with an uncertain situation. The decision-making approach towards the understanding of international politics is not new. Centuries ago, the Greek historian Thucydides, in his book “The Peloponnesian War,” indicated the factors that helped leaders in the Greek City-States to make decisions about the issues of war and peace. He was, thus, an early student of decision-making.

This is the process in which problems are identified, alternative policy options are worked out, suitable policy options are selected, and the same are then pursued.<sup>23</sup> Decision-making focuses on the individuals engaged in the foreign policy making process and specifically on the part which deals with choosing from amongst the various modes of action. It also explains the nature of the process of decision-making, the factors which influence this process, and the different decisions that are taken.

It also tells us that the best decisions are the rational decisions. In simple terms, rational behavior is a purposive behavior that focuses on actions and their outcomes. Rationality helps develop a sense of relating means to ends. It works on the assumption that an individual is capable of determining a relationship among possible alternatives. Another view of rationality is that it is doing what one believes is one's best interest. This means that rationality is a matter of an individual's personal perception.<sup>24</sup>

### **Crisis Decision-Making**

Crises are perilous because they have the potential to transform into all out wars. Hazards are exceptionally high, especially when a crisis precipitates between nuclear armed rivals. The main focus of this research is to examine the circumstantial effects of crises on decision-making. This can facilitate swift and critical thinking and decisive action, which in turn can help to gain a competitive edge in managing a crisis.<sup>25</sup>

In a crisis situation, decision-makers need to comprehend the nature and degree of threat to national interests. They should also have an appraisal of how the adversary views the situation and an assessment of the possible consequences of various policy options designed to secure national objectives. Such complex situations require difficult judgments to be made with less than perfect information and severe time constraints. Commenting on crisis decision-making, Henry Kissinger once said, “..... only rarely does a coherent picture emerge; in a sense, coherence must be imposed in the events by the decision-makers.”<sup>26</sup>

A crisis threatens the high priority goals of a decision-making unit, marked by a limited response time, has an element of surprise for the members of a decision-making unit, and carries a risk of war.<sup>27</sup> From above, it is clear that in crisis situations, decision-makers are operating under conditions of intense pressure. The pressure, generating features of a crisis situation, have been observed in most crises, like the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Berlin blockade, the Sino-Soviet border clash, the Formosa Straits Crisis in the 1950's, and the Taiwan Straits Crisis in 1997 and 1999.<sup>28</sup> These crisis situations are also important because none of these transformed into large scale open military hostilities and all were successfully managed. In comparison, many crises in the global south have escalated into an all out war.

Crisis characteristics like misperception, insufficient information, or a simple error of judgment can lead to decisions which can diminish, rather than enhance the chances of management of conflict. It is very difficult to study and analyze the whole range of problems associated with crisis decision-making in different political systems due to a lack of reliable information. However, it is possible to analyze the commonly associated problems which hamper effective decision-making.<sup>29</sup> The areas of analysis consist of description, perception, and derivation of results, which still remains a matter of perspective. Therefore crisis decision-making carries with it positive as well as negative impacts.

Stress, domestic pressures, and group thinking renders the job of decision-makers difficult. In the United States, possible alternatives are assessed to determine the costs and benefits of decisions. The allies can help them by extending reliable information because successful management of a crisis also depends on effective communication and understanding of signals between the adversaries.<sup>30</sup>

Crisis decision-making has been described in terms of four theories. These theories include:<sup>31</sup>

- Organizational Response Model,
- Hostile Interaction Model,
- Cost Calculation Model, and
- Individual Stress Model.

### **Pakistan-India Relations and Crisis Decision-Making**

During the last 65 years of their existence, Pakistan and India, the two South Asian nuclear powers, which are also neighbors, have passed through a bitter experience of four wars and a host of protracted conflicts and intense crises. Even during peacetime, foreign policy decision-making has been a difficult proposition for the system of each of the two countries. In this regard, stress arising from prevailing perceptions and the limited availability of time, have also played their role. As far as Pakistan is concerned, the tradition of a lack of political consolidation leading to an unstable democratic system creates room for individuals rather than representative institutions to take decisions in crisis situations. The Pakistani decision-making process tends to be highly centralized and personalized in the office of chief executive.<sup>32</sup> In Pakistan, military supremacy has also remained a critical factor. “Although its influence has oscillated from 1947 to 1958, it exercised indirect political influence and from 1958 to 1971 direct political control, in the post 1971 period the military reverted to indirect influence until July 1977 when it, once again, took over control of the government through popular public consent.”<sup>33</sup> After independence, the military leadership became dominant in all

decision-making processes especially regarding national security.<sup>34</sup> Defense decision-making and foreign policy security matters pertaining to Indo-Pak relations, nuclear issue and Kashmir have been a prerogative of the military.<sup>35</sup> An overview of some crisis between Pakistan and India can contribute towards the better understanding of the present study. The table given below shows the conflictual history between Pakistan and India. The present study focuses on an analysis of different crises between Pakistan and India.

**Table: Conflicts in South Asia**

<b>Date and Name of Crisis</b>	<b>Proximate Origin</b>	<b>Resolution</b>	<b>Consequences</b>
1947-48 First Kashmir war	Pakistan-supported raiders enter Jammu and Kashmir	None; semi-permanent division of the state; international mediation efforts ineffective	Still in dispute
1948 Indian incorporation of Hyderabad	Hyderabad state appeared to be seeking independent status	Indian army invasion of Hyderabad	Absorption into Indian Union (now in Andhra Pradesh)
1960 Indian military occupation of Goa	Alleged Goa pro-Indian revolt, but use of force instigated by domestic elements, political pressures on Nehru	Incorporation of Goa	Goa first a Union territory, now a separate state within Indian Union
1962 India-China war	Massive Chinese response to Indian probing along disputed borders	Major Indian military defeat in east, standstill in west, Chinese withdrawal from some, but not all claimed territory	Led to unsuccessful US-UK effort to resolve Kashmir; India-China border and territory disputes remain, but

			several agreements reached recently
April 1965	Dispute over Rann of Kutch reaches a crisis	Resolved several years later by International Court of Justice	Led to subsequent India-Pakistan war
September 1965 India-Pakistan war	Initiated by Pakistan in an attempt to contain growing Indian power, internationalize Kashmir dispute	Military standstill, US-British pressure to stop fighting, followed by failed Soviet mediation effort	Independent state of Bangladesh has normal relations with India, and now with Pakistan
1984-present Siachen Glacier dispute	Probably Indian belief that Pakistan was attempting to control the glacier, reminiscent of 1959-61 conflict with China	Unresolved, but escalation limited by human and material cost and secondary strategic importance of territory	Symbolic importance of not yielding for both sides prevents a settlement, technical means of verifying pullback becoming available
1984, 1985 Suspicion of Indian attack on Kahuta	Threat raised with Americans by Pakistanis	Indian denial, no strong evidence of preparation for an attack	Led to some CBM agreements
1986 Suspicion of Soviet attack on Kahuta	Threat raised with Americans by Pakistanis	Denied by Soviet Union	Resolved at pre-crisis stage
1987 Brasstacks	Massive Indian military maneuver escalated into full-fledged crisis; no military action	India reoriented provocative military exercise; United States reassured both sides there was nothing to be alarmed about	Nuclear program accelerated in India and Pakistan; no resolution of India-Pakistan tensions, but some minor CBMs agreed to.
1990 Multifaceted	Combination of domestic	Mutual realization that	Led to establishment of

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Kashmir Conflict	political weakness in both India and Pakistan; Kashmir uprising, support by Pakistan for Kashmir separatists; compound crisis complicated by nuclear alarm.	no significant military activity likely; U.S. intervention and reassurance to both sides.	important military CBMs regarding pre-notification of military exercise and preventing airspace violations.
1993 Mounting Tension	Multiple blasts in Bombay; accusations of Pakistani culpability; subsequent atrocities in Kashmir	Pakistan denied role in Bombay and Kashmir episodes.	None; repeated terrorist attacks in India in subsequent years, but cross-border movement apparently tapered off after 2002 crisis.
1998 Nuclear Tests	Major diplomatic crisis after India Pakistan tested nuclear devices and set themselves forth to be nuclear weapons states; no evidence of any threat of attack.	Both countries sanctioned and begin extended series of negotiations with the United States about their adherence to precepts of global nonproliferation regime.	Sanctions relaxed by Clinton; most of them lifted by Bush.
1999 Kargil Mini-War	Pakistan-sponsored jihadis and regular units occupy territory on the Indian side of the LOC; border crisis, with strategic	War fought from May to July but limited to Kargil sector; American pressure on Pakistan to withdraw back to own territory behind LOC.	LOC begins to assume permanent status.

	undertones; gross Pakistan miscalculation of India response.		
2001-02 Border confrontation	Indian buildup armed forces after terrorist attacks; direct pressure on Pakistan, indirect pressure on United States to force Pakistan to stop/reduce support for jihadis and terrorists.	Lasted ten months; resolved by American pressure on Pakistan to reduce cross- border terrorist attacks and Pakistani assurances.	Major effort to start a new peace process initiated by Prime Minister Vajpayee in April 2003; continued by Congress-led coalition since 2004-05.

### **Nature of Decisions**

### **External/Internal Constrains**

The decision-makers work under certain limitations following the routine pattern of decision-making as they weigh and choose from amongst various foreign policy alternatives. Their choices are further curtailed because of a fragmented assessment of the consequences of each option. This happens even in a political system where, owing to constitutionalism, standard procedures of foreign policy decision-making are followed. Another plausible reason is the change of preferences due to the eruption of a crisis. Reduction of stress and emerging safe become top priority concerns. This induces changes in the process of decision-making which becomes increasingly complex especially when states have to deal with divergent and mixed leadership—political and military, as in the case of Pakistan—in order to cope with a situation. South Asia, with its strategic worth, is considered different due to the presence of one major country, India, having problems with all its neighbors. The other country, Pakistan in spite of a weak political system, refuses to yield to Indian efforts for



regional hegemony. Its crisis decision-making process thus remains crucial, but it hardly ever works under the recognized national leadership. Even though on many occasions, crisis response options were finalized in consultation with the United States.

### **Indian Factor**

Since independence, India remains the primary source of concern for the Pakistani decision-making elite. Finding suitable alternatives to deal with a situation involving India has thus been their major worry. This attitude had its roots in the bitter historical experience of the sub-continent partition. Pakistan has been a major hurdle in the fulfillment of India's regional ambitions. The defense policy of Pakistan is closely tied to that of India striving to maintain conventional military balance. While the decision to follow India and become a declared nuclear power not only represents a sense of insecurity vis-à-vis India, but also an effort to check Indian ambitions of gaining a position of influence in the hierarchy of nations.

### **Security Issues**

In the case of Pakistan, the international strategic environment and security threats assigned the military an important role and with it the instable political system also facilitated the military to become an important factor in decision-making.<sup>36</sup> Pakistan had seven Prime Ministers and eight cabinets during 1947-58. However, there was one Pakistani C-in-C of the Army, Muhammad Ayub Khan, who was appointed for a four year term on 17 January, 1959. In June 1958, his tenure was extended for two more years, up to January, 1961.<sup>37</sup> Procedural anomalies like these further strengthened the role of military in the power structure of Pakistan. Even the foreign office functioning was permeated by military influence. In many of the vital decisions affecting Pakistan's foreign policy, the involvement of its foreign Ministers and Foreign Office was minimal.<sup>38</sup> During Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's regime, General Zia-ul-Haq, General Nasir Ullah

Babar and General Tikka Khan were the main actors of Pakistan's Afghan policy. Then, under General Zia, the Afghan policy was run by General Fazl-e-Haq and General Akhtar Abdur Rehman, while General Arif and General Ayub were running the issues related to India and United States.

The present defense decision-making process dates back to 1947 and has its roots in pre-independence colonial India. This system was brought about when Lord Kitchener was made Commander-in-Chief and the sole military adviser in 1902.<sup>39</sup> This arrangement, with a powerful commander-in-chief of three services, continued after independence. In theory, the control of policy planning and execution lay with the then newly formed Cabinet Committee for Defense (DCC). The extended membership remained ineffective because of the lack of knowledge of military affairs on the part of civilian decision-makers. A new system was introduced through a policy paper in 1973. Provisions were made to make this structure the part of the constitution. Article 243 (1) of the 1973 constitution entrusted the responsibility for national defense to the head of the government and the chairperson of the cabinet committee for defense, who also holds the office of Prime Minister.

### **Efforts toward the Constitutional Mechanism**

As a matter of fact, in 1973, the government of Pakistan finalized a policy paper. Under the provisions of this policy paper, a proper process of defense related decision-making was introduced. This process was later institutionalized with the establishment of the Defense Coordination Committee (DCC) of the Cabinet. This committee was empowered to discuss all defense and security related matters with the Chief Executive. Thereafter, many constitutional structures and processes were modified in 1985, owing mainly to the incorporation of the 8<sup>th</sup> Amendment to the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan.

## **Analysis of decision making during crisis**

A study of bilateral relations shows that tensions between Pakistan and India started to surface right from independence. They developed tensions initially on the issue of Kashmir, in 1948, and later on the refugees' issue.

### **Minority Issue**

The Indian leadership was facing difficulties on the Kashmir issue and under the prevailing circumstances, and they were looking for some way out. The initial stages of the 1950 minority crisis deliberately created a wrong impression of Pakistan's policy on minority settlements. According to Indian media reports and leadership statements, Pakistan would not accept minorities as citizens. This raised tensions between the two countries to a point that a crisis precipitated and Pakistan was blamed. The situation escalated due to a large number of killings, looting, and threatening statements of the Indian leadership. At one stage during the course of this crisis, the Indian Prime Minister was under such intense pressure that he offered to resign from his office to appease the hardliners. The Indian Government was trying its best to convince the world of its innocence and portraying Pakistan as a religious and communal state responsible for the crisis. In fact, the Indian Prime Minister Mr. Nehru had handled the situation in a successful manner, giving an impression to the international community that India was interested in the final settlement of the communal minority's issue, for which he purposely allowed international pressure to build. The intention behind his efforts was to make the international community see Kashmir from the same perspective. A settlement of this issue would permanently deny Pakistan all international support and concomitantly defuse all its efforts to insist on a settlement of the Kashmir dispute in accordance with UN resolutions. Mr. Nehru wanted to use Bengal to achieve an agreement on the minorities issue and later use that agreement as a solution to the Kashmir issue, thereby robbing Pakistan of all international support. Suspicion of each other was an obvious and crucial factor throughout the

crisis. Through the 1950 crisis, non-filtered media information had created a sense of insecurity in the minorities of both states, highlighting the critical role of information during the course of a crisis. Indirect international involvement was also evident from the initial stages of the crisis till eventual de-escalation, having both positive and negative impacts. In the negative sense, the British economic initiative of September 1949 served as an incentive. This can also be interpreted as a British connivance to help promote Nehru's objectives, whereas the American and Western involvement to help de-escalation was certainly a positive step. De-escalation was the goal of both parties however, it could not have defused without international involvement. Although this crisis was diffused successfully, the relations between the two states continued to experience increasing tensions, culminating into the war of 1965. This shows that both the states failed to relinquish their neurotic hostilities for each other. The events of 1971 were the worst experiences endured by Pakistan, during which the decision-makers of Pakistan had failed miserably to manage the situation and save the day for their country. Similarly, the decision of the Indian government to conduct nuclear explosions in 1974 disturbed the delicate balance of power within the region. In spite of all these apparently compulsive developments, some internal and external factors appear to have played an effective role in salvaging the relationship between the two states. The role of the intelligence agencies appears to have gained an increased relevance during the 1980's. Similarly, the presence of Soviet forces in a neighboring state with hostile intensions, the Sikh insurgency in India, and Sindh factor in Pakistan had evoked doubts about each other intensions.

### **Brasstacks Crisis**

Another crisis situation brewed between Pakistan and India during 1986-87, with the information of Indian military build-up in close proximity to the Pakistani border. The emerging volatile situation had all the potential for escalation, especially due to the use of live ammunition in close proximity to the Pakistani border. India had also failed to share

information with Pakistan concerning the nature and scope of its large scale military maneuvers. Pakistani leadership eventually took the step to activate diplomatic channels by involving the American and the British governments with the hope of de-escalating tensions. After intense diplomatic efforts, a deal was negotiated between the leaders of the two countries, achieving the desired objective. Yet again the crisis highlighted the endemic nature of suspicion and hostility in the relationship between the two countries. During the course of the crisis, elements of stress, threat, and misperception were quite visible. Although India had absolutely denied the role and efforts of external forces in de-escalation, the external forces had definitely played a vital role.

In this case, the individual stress model technique was adopted in managing the crisis. At the initial stages of this crisis, Pakistan was at the receiving end. Perception of threat increased in the minds of decision-makers on both states due to a lack of communication between the two DGMO's. Indian Army Chief General Sunderji's role as the key factor behind the plan, during the planning and implementation phases, was surely a contributing factor towards the crisis. However, the entire situation headed towards unintended results, which confirmed that the element of uncertainty plays a decisive role in the escalation of a crisis. In formulating its response, Pakistan was entirely dependent on information that was collected and provided by the intelligence agencies. The situation became more tangible when the troops on both sides mobilized during 22<sup>nd</sup> and 24<sup>th</sup> of January, 1987. Some analysts had the view that, at this stage nuclear ambiguity played an active role in managing this crisis. Although some political groups were not prepared to accept the adoption of an analytical approach, the fact remains that frequent meetings were conducted to discuss the situation during the entire crisis. Exchange of threatening statements from both sides had built up stress on the decision-makers of both sides. Many factors like element of surprise, short time period, threat perception, information, and lack of communication, made the task of decision-makers much more difficult for both sides.

## **Nuclear Issue**

The year 1998 was destined to witness another major multi-dimensional crisis between Pakistan and India. Again, the main area of concern was the security threat faced by Pakistan due to the Indian nuclear tests in May of 1998. A high level meeting of Pakistani officials belonging to the DCC (the Cabinet members, scientists, Foreign Office, and the three services chiefs) reached a consensus to level the Indian score. The most remarkable factor behind this decision was the operationalization of the theory of balancing terror. During the course of the crisis, diplomatic assistance had been offered by the American government, but the Pakistani officials ignored the American offer. India was mainly responsible for the Pakistani response because it initiated this action based on the Hostile Interaction Model and the Pakistani decision-makers reacted on basis of the same model after consulting all the related organizations. This crisis confirmed that the two states have usually held certain doubts and misperceptions about each other capabilities and intentions, and these factors have very often influenced perceptions concerning security related threats.

## **The Kargil Crisis**

The Kargil crisis of 1999 is another crisis situation that has been studied for this research. The crisis precipitated when a group of Kashmiri freedom fighters took control of strategic heights in the Kargil-Drass sector on the Line of Control (LoC) on its Indian side. This move was embarrassing for the Indian Army in the sense that it had failed to detect the movement of freedom fighters and Pakistan Army early enough to preventive measures. Moreover, it created serious security problems for the Indian Army by threatening the supply route of their forces deployed beyond Kargil in Indian occupied Kashmir. Initially, the Indian Army failed to dislodge these forces from their positions but finally the international community, led by the Americans, came to their rescue with threats of dire consequences for Pakistan. In terms of crisis decision-making in Pakistan, for this particular case, it is

worth mentioning that the Pakistani decision-making was shrouded in secrecy, and there is concrete evidence to prove that the security related decision-making process was completely inaccessible, while Indian leadership appeared more than willing to share all information with media, world leaders, and other friendly countries. In Pakistan, even today, no one is prepared to take any responsibility for the Kargil episode. This probably is due to the fact that the campaign was a disaster and that it severely damaged Pakistan's national cause on Kashmir, as well as the cause of Kashmiri freedom fighters. On the other hand, in India, a Kargil commission was to determine responsibility for the lapses in Kargil, and hand out punishments for those responsible. Another very important feature of this crisis was the media campaign in favor of India. In this regard, Indian media was amply supported by news channels like the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), and American channels like the Cable News Network (CNN) and Fox News. In the face of this favorable projection of the Indian case, Pakistan felt a dire need for more channels. In fact, this propaganda campaign by the media helped India to gather vital support essential for securing the withdrawal of forces. To some extent, it is due to this reason that in Pakistan, one can notice a mushroom growth of cable news and talk show channels in the aftermath of the Kargil crisis.

Transformation of the issues in 1950, 1986, 1987, 1998, and 1999 into crises are important aspects of this research. The division of the sub-continent was an effort to solve the identity issue. Further this issue has historical, political, cultural, religious, and international reasons, all of which are well proven. Both governments tried to resolve the issue but widespread killing of minorities in 1950 made the situation even worse. At the same time, threatening statements of Indian leaders and the preparation for intervention in Pakistan by the Indian Army further increased the intensity of the crisis. The crisis of 1986-87 (emanating from Indian border exercises) had a different nature on the basis of two aspects. First, as already mentioned, live ammunition was to be used in these exercises, and secondly, Pakistan was not

taken into confidence about the details of these exercises by the Indian government. These exercises were held in close proximity to the border of Pakistan's Sindh province, which was a matter of deep concern for Pakistan in view of the restive internal conditions of that province. The Indian point of view was that these exercises were just a routine matter, but when Pakistan, in response, ordered its army to be deployed near the Indian border, the matter rapidly escalated into a crisis. In addition, the ambitious plan of the Indian Army Chief General Sunderji had provoked a tense situation within the region. The lack of communication between the political leadership and military officials of the two countries had also substantially contributed in augmenting the tension.

Likewise, in May 1998, India took a political decision to conduct nuclear tests. The situation became tense for Pakistan, owing to the threatening statements by the Indian leadership coupled with the bitter memories of past Indian hostility. It had also disturbed the delicate balance of power in the region, further complicating the security problems of Pakistan.

Pakistan faced a crucial situation during the Kargil crisis of 1999 due to a lack of communication between the top leadership of the two countries. Inconsistencies in the attitude of Pakistani decision-makers remained obvious throughout the course of the crisis. The long conflicting and conventional legacy played a vital role in the socialization process of the leadership of both countries. The longstanding unresolved conflicts further hardened the emotions of leaders and the general public. Leaders of both countries have knowledge about each others' capabilities, the facts and figures regarding national power, role of the leadership, military balance, and the emotions of the masses. The root cause of the whole situation lies in the confusion about the intentions of each other. On the basis of the perception, intentions were misperceived during Brasstacks and Kargil crises.

Information related to problems plays a vital and critical role in crisis escalation. In the discussed crises, the major



sources of information were the intelligence agencies, which were considered reliable sources. In this context, a lack of information and the excess of information were both problematic. The two main factors: absence of mechanism and lack of filtered reliable information; became the chief causes of complication in the process of decision-making.

### **An assessment**

A minute and keen study of all crises produces the following rational findings regarding the emergence, escalation, resolution or non-resolution of a crisis in a due time period.

- The 1950 crisis was triggered off by the British initiative. The 1986-87 crisis was the outcome of Indian initiatives. Similarly, India was responsible for the nuclear crisis of 1998, although it offered a golden opportunity to Pakistan to become a declared nuclear power. The 1999 Kargil crisis was a consequence of tactical action by Pakistan, capturing strategic heights around Kargil. However, it is worth mentioning that India had breached the LoC more than 20 times after 1971, in comparison to Pakistan's 5 violations. The international community remained silent when Indian forces captured Siachen in 1984 and India was allowed to retain its presence there only because it had breached the LoC at a place which remained unmarked after 1971.
- The 1950 minority crisis had all the potential to transform into an all out war. However, both Pakistan and India lacked a willingness to go to war and they exhibited a keenness to resolve the crisis peacefully. The 1986-87 Brasstacks crisis again, had the potential to develop into a war. In this case, General Sunderji's defective planning and General Zia's deft handling of the resources at his disposal averted a war. The 1998 issue also possessed the potential for war, as revealed by the rhetorical statements by the Indian leadership. However, after the nuclear explosions, India was

already under immense international pressure and any military adventure against Pakistan would have labeled India as an aggressor, which would have further complicated the situation for India. After a discouraging response Pakistan took full advantage of Indian limitations and gave time to the international community to take meaningful and punitive actions against India. Pakistan finally decided to go ahead with its nuclear tests. It is worth mentioning here that Indian belligerence after the nuclear tests of May 1998 came to a rather abrupt end after the Pakistani response. In fact, the tone and content of all leadership statements became rather conciliatory. Similarly, the Kargil crisis also had every potential for transforming into a conflict between the two countries. In this case, war was averted due to Pakistan's potential for a nuclear retaliation.

- In all the above mentioned four cases, it is very important to note that each had the potential for transforming into a war but on all the four occasions, the two countries exhibited a keen inclination for peace.
- 1950 created a greater threat for Pakistan than for India. Same was the case in 1986-87, and again in 1998, while the Kargil crisis was presumably less threatening for Pakistan, due to its nuclear retaliation capabilities.
- The 1950 crisis was rather complex, as far as the Indian objectives were concerned. Minority's crisis was brewed to finalize an agreement with Pakistan which was intended to convey a message to the world that India had resolved the minorities issue with Pakistan and with it, the Kashmir dispute. In this connection, the initial British role appears to be of crucial importance for India. During the 1986-87 Brasstacks crisis, India's moves were initially meant to divide Pakistan. They were also intended to teach Pakistan a lesson, after its alleged involvement in the Sikh insurgency in East Punjab. The 1998 nuclear crisis was intended to ensure Indian supremacy in the region. Another Indian objective may also have been to check whether Pakistan

had nuclear capability. Pakistan's objectives in the Kargil crisis of 1999 are a matter of speculation. One motivation may have been to avenge the Indian occupation of Siachen as well as to check any further Indian advances in the area.

### **Crisis Decision-Making**

Here are some concrete factors which cause a crisis situation and influence the process of decision-making.

- Throughout the four crises that have been discussed here, there appeared to be air or suspicion between the two countries.
- Decision-makers were mostly dependent on information which was made available to them by the agencies.
- Lack of concrete and credible information made the element of misperception a key factor during the crises mentioned.
- The elements of stress, threat, and limited time were also present there during the four crises. Yet, Pakistani leadership was able to take appropriate decisions during the crisis of 1950 as well as in 1986-87. In 1998, the decision to carry out nuclear tests was taken without stress, but during the same crisis, the decision to freeze all foreign exchange accounts held by Pakistani banks reflects stress on the decision-makers.
- Indirect international involvement and mediation is very clear during all the case studies. In 1950, British involvement was helping the Indian cause. In 1998, the international community's response to Indian tests was perhaps strong enough to deter Pakistan from carrying out its own nuclear tests. Yet, the response was weak, coupled with a lack of concrete security guarantees for Pakistan against India, ignoring of the Indian initiatives, and scaring Pakistan into submission. Again, during the Kargil crisis of 1999, United States, Britain, and the West came to the rescue of India. Their

threats actually caused the withdrawal of the forces from strategic heights in and around Kargil.

### **Suggestions**

In the light of the above mentioned findings of this research, the following suggestions can prove to be useful (in the case of any) to effectively deal with the eruption of any future crisis:

- There is a critical need to constantly monitor Indian moves, whether important or apparently unimportant. The revival of the in house think tank in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, receiving due consideration for its suggestions, would be extremely useful.
- A proper policy paper should be adopted, such as the one in 1973 which clearly defines the process of decision-making, especially in matters pertaining to security. This can help in determining the responsibility of actors in any future security related decision-making.
- In all dealings, Pakistan should strictly follow the national interest criteria during the decision-making process. This is also significant because, on more than one occasion, during a crisis, the international community has come to the rescue of India, at the cost of Pakistan's national interest.
- Under prevailing circumstances in the International arena, Pakistan should avoid ending up on the wrong side of international law.

### **Conclusion**

The facts and figures presented establish that not only at the time of crisis, but also in routine matters, both states have always nurtured doubts, misperceptions, and reservations about each other intentions. During crises, the role of personalities in both states has shown a tendency towards increased centralization in the decision-making process. Moreover, these personalities have never been willing to

reconsider their decisions. Still, the fact remains that the efforts made by the decision-makers achieved some degree of success in managing the crises. Hostile situations, accompanied by an uncompromising and unyielding stance, may create a crisis between states at different levels. This can assume serious proportions if such situations arise between nuclear armed rivals. In the future, to avoid such situations decision-makers in Pakistan must depend on related institutions in order to enhance coordination and harmony in the system.

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### **Notes**

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<sup>19</sup> Dina Zinnes, A.C. North, Howard E. Kock Jr, 'Capability, Threat and the outbreak of War', 201. See also Steven Fink, 'Crisis Management Planning for the Inevitable', 15-19. See also Bertgen Verbeek, *Decision-Making in Great Britain During The Suez Crisis*, 17-42, see also Imtiaz H. Bokhari, *Management of Third World Crisis in Adverse Partnership Theory and Practice*, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1997, 4-10.

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